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Abstract
Films such as Natural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994) and Crash (David 
Cronenberg, 1996) have become famous for their alleged associations with real 
violence. Politicians, the media and campaign groups apparently believe that these 
movies are a drug which produces serious side effects. Look at any discussion of these 
movies in the press and you will find a raging debate on violence in the mass media and 
violence in our society. There is a basis to this dominant discourse that can be 
understood by reference to social theories o f risk. It is my diesis that risk theories can 
help us to understand the dynamic o f the current debate on media violence.
Risk analysis is concerned with invisible risks that are harmful to individual and 
global environments. The companies who manufacture products that are perceived to 
have risks refuse to claim responsibility for their actions and, instead, talk o f ‘acceptable 
risk levels’. Campaign groups, such as Greenpeace, argue that anecdotal evidence 
suggests there are no acceptable levels: they reveal the full extent of the real and 
potential side effects produced by these large industries. Pro-censorship groups and 
self-appointed moral watchdogs have utilized this dominant discourse to engineer a 
political debate that they hope will lead to the regulation o f media violence. The 
entertainment industry is presented as a manufacturer o f risks. They produce products, 
for example violent movies, which are perceived to contain side effects that are harmful 
to individuals and to social environments. The industry may talk o f ‘acceptable levels’, 
but anecdotal evidence, such as the James Bulger case, suggests that media violence can 
lead to real violence in our society. Anti-violence campaign groups undertake their own 
research which claims to measure the side effects o f television violence. The 
entertainment industry is asked to self-regulate, and legislation is called for.
My argument is that the debate on media violence has become polarized. 
Independent researchers need to change tlie terms of reference in order to alter the 
dominant discourse surrounding risk theories and die mass media. What is more, 
researchers must recognize that the effects o f watching films or television cannot be 
measured in the same way die effects o f car pollution are measured. Watching films or 
television programmes is a complex and dynamic process that does not lend itself to 
scientific measurements. Thus, new mediods o f research must be utilized in order to 
break the circularity o f die debate on violence and the mass media.
One such method is to understand viewer response to risk, and perceptions of 
die dangers and rewards associated with risk-taking behaviour. John Adams’ (1995), 
‘risk thermostat hypothesis’ indicates that people have a propensity to take risks which 
varies from one individual to another. Recent qualitative research in audience response 
to media violence also suggests that diis is the case. New research mediods can seek to 
understand individual perceptions of risk-taking, and the cultural construction o f risk, in 
relation to die mass media.
C opyright: A nnette Hill
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1Introduction: Risky Business
Oliver Stone and John Grisham don’t get along. The controversy surrounding 
the release o f the film Natural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994) is such that a leading 
crime novelist and a leading Hollywood director have taken to throwing mud, close 
range, at each other. And why? Natural Born Killers is a fiilm about two mass 
murderers who go on a killing spree and become media stars. Oliver Stone made the 
movie because, in his words, it is a film about ‘die media’s obsession with.. .senseless 
sensations’ (1996, p.238). John Grisham would disagree, hi his opinion, Natural Born 
Killers is a movie that inspires young people to commit murder. And Grisham is 
prepared to go to court to prove this. Variety (1996a, p. 11) reports:
Hollywood author and lawyer John Grisham wants films to be legislated as 
products. Just as manufacturers can be held liable for breast implants that leak 
or poorly placed gas tanks in vehicles that contribute to a death or serious 
illness, the scribe behind the bestseller ‘The Firm’ wants studios or directors to 
be held liable for a film that inspires violence.
Grisham claims that the film Natural Born Killers is partly responsible for the death of 
his friend William Savage. Despite the fact that Sarah Edmondson and Ben Darras 
stand accused of murdering Savage, Grisham intends to bring a lawsuit against Oliver 
Stone and Warner Brothers (the distribution company) because he believes: ‘A case 
can be made that there exists a direct causal link between Natural Born Killers and the 
death of Bill Savage’ (Grisham, 1996, p.235).
Grisham uses die rhetoric of risk in order to draw attention to the hazards of 
screen violence, a medium which he compares to any otiier product on the market 
Altiiough die two murderers claim to have watched Natural Born Killers more than 
twenty times before diey went on a killing spree, diey also claim to have taken LSD, 
and it is significant that Grisham has chosen to concentrate on a movie, rather than 
dings, as the direct cause o f die murder of his friend, Savage. If screen violence was 
not such a high profile concern of the public and not so popular* with the media, would 
Grisham have made the same choice?
It is this very question fiiat lies at the heart of this study. John Grisham is able 
to situate a film such as Natural Born Killers within a judicial debate about industrial 
risks and hazards. Grisham is able to do this because he assumes that the alleged 
negative effects of screen violence can be measured in die same way that the negative 
effects of breast implants, or gas tanks can be measured. In odier words, Natural Born 
Killers is an industrial product, not a work of art. This is important because for 
Grisham to make a case for films to be legislated as products, he is assuming tiiat films 
contain risks, and any director, producer or writer can be held responsible for these 
risks.
U iis tells us a great deal about die construction of die media violence debate. 
Politicians, the media, and public opinion have ensured that such movies as Natural 
Born Killers, Reservoir Dogs (Quentin Tarantino, 1992) and Crash (David 
Cronenberg, 1996) are perceived to be environmental hazards; just like carbon 
monoxide, violent movies pose a ‘risk’ to innocent civilians, especially children. It is 
my argument that the debate about screen violence can be linked to social theories of 
risk, dieories commonly associated widi industrial products. This thesis wid be the
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first to use risk theories as a means o f understanding the current discourse o f screen 
violence.
Social theories of risk will be presented and critiqued in relation to the mass 
media, and die objective o f this thesis is to show that watching television is a complex 
and dynamic process that does not lend itself to scientific measurements. Recent 
qualitative research in audience response to media violence validates this claim. This 
diesis will discuss such research, and introduce new research by the author in order to 
demonstrate that individuals are willing to take ‘risks’, and this is part of the reason 
why violent movies are so popular. The aim of this thesis is to argue that new research 
methods can seek to understand individual perceptions of risk-taking behaviour and 
the cultural construction of risk, in relation to the mass media. Before I present an 
oveiview of the chapters in this study, I would like to consider the way in which risk 
and the cinema have come to be associated with one another.
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R i s k  a n d  t h e  M a s s  M e d i a
Going to the cinema has always been a risky business. Back in the pre- 
Hollywood era of die American film industry, audiences eager to see the latest 
cinematic release had to contend with physical and moral hazards to their health. Early 
cinemas such as nickelodeons were considered to be poorly lit, unhealthy, amoral fire 
haps.1 Annette Kuhn (1988, p .l) writes that in between 1909 and 1925, diis early 
period of cinema ‘may be regarded as an extended moment of risk’. It may also be 
regarded as the period in which cinema established itself as a powerful social,
economic and political force. It is no accident, then, that the risks and hazards of 
cinema somehow became intertwined with the growth of the cinema as an 
entertainment industry. Indeed, the more popular that cinema became, the more it was 
perceived as dangerous and amoral.
Despite many myths regarding the hazards of early cinema, the general public 
still displayed an appetite for this type of entertainment, and it is this connection 
between perceptions o f cinema as a risky activity and the viewing practices of 
audiences that is the focus of this thesis. As we have seen from tire example of 
nickelodeons and anxiety about early cinema, die construction of the audience was in 
many ways shaped by risk regulators. For example, fire insurance underwriters had a 
direct impact on the cinema going experience because nickelodeon proprietors and the 
film industry were forced to take into account regulatory guidelines which minimized 
physical risks to die audience.2 However, from the veiy beginning debates about die 
risks of cinema were not confined to physical risks, but also incorporated perceived 
moral risks to the individual and to the social environment. As the history of cinema 
censorship indicates, it is this second type of risk which has come to dominate viewing 
practices, and with the advent of television, censorship and regulation of perceived 
social and moral risks has become an industry in its own right.3
It is with this in mind diat an examination of the perceived ‘risks’ of media 
violence and audience response to this type of entertainment will prove to be useful to 
our understanding of the role of mass communications in contemporary society. Now 
that cinemas themselves are relatively safe buildings, die direat o f fir e or disease is no 
longer such an issue;4 however, the threat of moral risks appears to have become a 
global ‘problem’, and, as we approach die end of the millennium, commercial cinema 
and television are perceived to be even more violent than ever. You only have to look
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at Hie amount of news articles that regularly denounce media violence, and to see 
how many film stars believe screen violence to have ‘gone too far’, to realize that 
media violence is a popular cause for concern.5 And yet, what are the ‘risks’ of media 
violence?
There are three common ‘risks’ associated widi media violence: diese are 
copycat violence, desensitization to real violence, and an increased fear of real 
violence in our society (for further details, see Cumberbatch and Howitt, 1989; 
Gauntlett, 1995; Buckingham and Allerton, 1996). High profile cases such as the 
Suzanne Capper case, die James Bulger case, and the Dunblane massacre spark 
‘anodier panic attack’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.31) about the alleged effects of media 
violence on innocent children.6 There may be unproven connections between tiiese 
cases and screen violence, but in the case of public opinion diese children signify the 
visible side to die risks of television violence. Rather than considering the mass media 
as a positive force, there are ‘invisible threats’ (Beck, 1992, p.73) to watching 
television, or playing computer games: die mass media is seen to be destructive and 
out of control.
This is how the ‘risks’ o f media violence come to be linked widi risk and 
environmentalism, and it is important for us to consider how risk consciousness and 
conflict has had a significant impact on our understanding of popular culture, and in 
particular media violence. Hie growdi of environmentalism and eco-politics has 
created a society that is far less trusting o f die government and large multi-national 
corporations. These aspects of a traditional, industrial society are no longer seen as 
positive forces, but rather somedring that must be watched and regulated. The public 
distrust government politicians and industry spokesmen because events such as 
Vietnam, or Chernobyl, or environmental hazards such as acid rain, or the destruction
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of rain forests, are examples of unethical and amoral practices. Risk is not confined to 
one town, or country, it is a global phenomenon.7 We now live in a ‘risk society’ 
where the side effects of poorly made products are visible in the ‘voices, faces, eyes, 
and tears’ o f our children around the world (Beck, 1992, p.61).
This is how risk consciousness and conflict evolves. Individual citizens come 
together and produce causal proof that these hazards of modernization are affecting the 
health o f their children, not just now but in the future. This causal proof is based on 
anecdotal evidence, public opinion, and scientific research. Citizens change the terms 
of reference so that what ‘scientists’ call ‘acceptable levels’ are no longer acceptable, 
and indeed are hazardous to die healdi of our future society. This type of risk 
consciousness and conflict is important in ensuring that multi-national industries and 
politicians are held responsible for unediical and amoral management. The Gulf war' 
syndrome, and the consequent campaign to force the British government to accept 
responsibility for the negative effects of organo-phosphate pesticides, is a good
* Rexample of this.
However, this does not mean that all aspects of our society should be treated in 
the same way. The issue of media violence is a good case in point. Media violence is 
concerned widi fictional and mediated representations o f violence. The ‘risks’ of 
media violence are not real, but rather are ‘virtual risks’ diat are to do with our 
imagination and not part of our experience of everyday life. It is very difficult to 
measure the effects of watching television. This is a complex and involved process, 
and it is precisely because media violence is not real, that the process of watching 
media violence does not lend itself to scientific measurement. Odier, more subtle 
methods of qualitative and quantitative research need to be used in order for die 
complex and dynamic nature of watching film and television to be explored. Research
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by Ann Gray (1992), Marie Gillespie (1995), David Buckingham (1996), Martin 
Barker (1997b) and David Gauntlett (1997) are recent examples of this, and such 
research shows that children and adults are sophisticated and active viewers.
It is a testimony to the strength of the concept of risk and environmentalism in 
our society, that such new types of audience research are routinely misinterpreted and 
ignored. The media, politicians, and campaign groups are not interested in alternative 
ways of understanding the media violence debate. Instead, political and social 
commentators, such as Lord Alton, or the Daily M ail, are only interested in one way of 
interpreting media violence, and this is from the point of view of risk. The debate has 
been set so that media violence is constructed as an industrial risk, one drat must be 
controlled and regulated, just like any odrer product on the market. Once this debate 
has been constructed, citizens' campaign groups apply pressure on the entertainment 
industry to self-regulate, and pressure on the government to produce new legislation.
N a t u r a l  B o r n  K i l l e r s :  R i s k  i n  A c t i o n
Ihe case of Natural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994) is a good example of 
this type of moral campaign in action. At first glance this media violence controversy 
could be seen to be air example of a ‘moral panic’.9 The usual rhetoric associated with 
‘dangerous’ popular texts was employed by the press to demonize this movie. 
Christopher Tookey (1995, p.9) wrote an article in the Daily M ail widr the sensational 
headline ‘Wiry This Film is a Work of Pure Evil’; and dre film was linked with several 
murders in America and Europe.10 Charles Laurence (1994, p.27) in dre Daily 
Telegraph called dre film ‘our worst nightmare’ and went on to write:
7
The blood from Hollywood's jackpot of violence seeps into soil already thick 
with the roots of dangerous social ills. At the veiy least, it must enrich that soil. 
And in that lies the argument for refusing a certificate to Natural Born Killers, 
a film which is pail o f the media culture it itself portrays as accelerating die 
cycle o f real-life violence.
Using die kind of words one would associate widi biblical sermons, and harking back 
to W B Yeats' poem ‘The Second Coming’ where the ‘blood dimmed tide’ signifies 
die end of the world, Laurence successfully taps into this source of social fear: 
violence is everywhere and films are to blame.11 In another article in the Daily 
Telegraph, William Cash (1997, p.27) similarly wains that ‘there's worse to come’ and 
says ‘Natural Born Killers heralds a new era in Hollywood depravity’.
This media campaign was veiy effective. Although the film was given an ‘ 18’ 
certificate in 1995 and released at the cinema, die British Board of Film Classification 
(BBFC) took three months to come to this decision.12 When the film was due for its 
video certificate, the BBFC similarly withheld the release o f Natural Born Killers. At 
the start of 1996 die BBFC passed this film for its video certificate but the Dunblane 
massacre in March 1996, where Thomas Hamilton shot 16 school children dead, 
prompted Warner Brothers, the producers of this film, to withdraw its release date, 
claiming it would not be appropriate to release the film in the light o f the Dunblane 
massacre (see Wintour and Bunting, 1996). This far, the moral campaign to ban 
Natural Born Killers can be traced to consistent media coverage of increasing levels of 
crime and alleged links with real-life violence, and with the help of its over anxious 
distribution company, Natural Born Killers appeal's to have become a successftil target 
of ‘moral panic’.
However, one key factor has been left out. On the day of the Dunblane 
Massacre, Warner Brothers actually telephoned David Alton, the then Liberal 
Democrat MP who actively campaigned to ban this film, and told him of their decision 
to withdraw its video release date. Quite why Michael Heap, the managing director of 
Warner Brothers, felt it necessary to telephone David Alton from California is a 
mystery until it is made clear that David Alton is not only a member of parliament, but 
also a key member of the Movement for Christian Democracy (MCD), a campaign 
group that has been instrumental in highlighting the perceived ‘risks’ of such films as 
Natural Born Killers. David Alton and the MCD had managed to mobilize over 80 
MPs to table an Early Day Motion condemning the video release of this film, which 
was due only one week after the Dunblane Massacre, on March 22, 1996. David 
Alton's response to this decision by Warner Brothers is indicative of how 
‘uncompromising’ and how powerful he, and his campaign group, have become. The 
Guardian reports his reply next to an article about Dunblane as a ‘"Safe" haven for 
city parents’ (Wintour and Bunting, 1995, p.5): ‘A furious Mr. Alton said: “if this film 
is not appropriate to be released as a video because of this horrific incident, it is not 
appropriate to be shown at any time. All the evidence shows that these videos lead to a 
culture of violence and we need to stop it”.’ Thus Alton, via the Guardian, links 
Natural Born Killers with Dunblane and the causal effect of screen violence. Note 
how ‘furious’ he is; a response that is appropriate to his role as a tough moral 
guardian, and suggests a vindication of his campaign to ban this film.
Despite the fact that there is no evidence linking die Dunblane Massacre with 
any film at all, Natural Born Killers has now become synonymous with real-life mass 
murder, and thanks to politicians like David Alton and his campaign group (MCD) 
will probably not be released on video in this country in the foreseeable future.
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Although the press have been instrumental in voicing this moral campaign, it is the 
pressure group behind it that has orchestrated this effective piece of censorship. And 
this pressure group have utilized the ‘social drama’ of risk (Pamlund, 1996); they have 
successfully campaigned against media violence as if  it is a product, produced by the 
entertainment industry in order to pollute our environment and damage the moral 
health of our children, now and in the future.
The role of anti-violence campaign groups and media violence controversies 
will prove to be significant to an understanding of the construction of media violence 
as an environmental hazard because it is through an examination of these social groups 
that we shall see how the debate about media violence is less concerned with 
representations o f violence per se, and more concerned with what media violence 
symbolizes in a technologically advanced society. Fighting against the release of 
Natural Born Killers gives anti-violence campaign groups die social resources they 
need to fight then* ‘real’ battle (Renn, 1992, p. 191), which is concerned with the 
protection of family values, and a desired lifestyle which is based on the teachings of 
the Bible (see Barratt, 1997; Thompson, 1992). Consequently, what I want to do in 
this study is re-examine die media violence debate in order to understand the origins of 
this discourse and in order to situate it in relation to the ‘masterframe of environmental 
discourse’ (Eder, 1996) and the symbolization of risk (Renn, 1996).
Despite this overwhelmingly negative approach to the issue of media violence, 
people still choose to watch films and television programmes which contain violence. 
Indeed, films such as Natural Born Killers, or Reservoir Dogs are advertised as ‘risky’ 
films, daring the audience to see if  they can watch. It is this phenomenon and tiie way 
in which people choose to engage in risk-taking behaviour that will become the subject 
of the second half o f tiiis diesis. The construction of media violence as dangerous and
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hazardous ensures that those people who choose to watch films such as Natural 
Born Killers are demonized and perceived to be evil and depraved, just like the movie. 
However, not all ‘risky’ activities are heated in the same way. The question that I want 
to ask is why? Why must this type of risk-taking behaviour' be any different to other 
types o f risks that people choose as a fonn of entertainment?
Some risk-taking activities are perceived as acceptable by the media, 
politicians and social commentators. For example, skydiving, or bungee jumping, are 
constructed as exciting but dangerous sports; not everyone wants to fall from a plane 
or bridge, but those people that choose to take part in this sport ensure that it is as safe 
as possible so that they can enjoy this activity time and again. Hiey do not choose to 
sky dive or bungee jump because they are social misfits, or because they have a 
deathwish, but rather because they find such activities exciting and exhilarating. 
Indeed, many people jump from airplanes and bridges to raise money for a charitable 
cause. They do this, in part, in an attempt to show that people who like dangerous 
sports can be morally and socially responsible members o f the community. However, 
watching media violence is not perceived as an acceptable form of risk-taking 
behaviour'. People who watch media violence are considered to be socially inadequate, 
immature, unstable people. They are perceived as people who must like violence, who 
must naturally be aggressive in the first place in order for them to like such films and 
television programmes. You would never find a horror fan taking part in a sponsored 
film event, daring themselves to watch ‘risky’ films in order to raise money for a 
charitable cause. This would not happen because watching media violence is a socially 
unacceptable form of behaviour'.
What I want to examine hi this thesis is both the construction of media 
violence as an environmental hazard and the reality of media violence as an
11
entertainment activity. Audience research suggests that people who choose to watch 
media violence are neither evil, or depraved, but rather are ordinary men and women 
who like to watch films and television programmes that are both shocking and 
entertaining.13 Some people may perceive Natural Born Killers as a shocking movie, 
but it does not mean that it cannot be perceived as entertaining by other members of 
our society. Similarly, some people may transgress social rules and threaten die safety 
of the community, and diey may do so after watching a film or television programme. 
However, this does not mean that such a ‘problem person’ is made this way by 
watching media violence, but rather this means that such a person brings with them a 
history of aggression and mental illness that makes diem unable to balance their 
behaviour in relation to others. This is an important point to bear in mind when 
considering ‘effects’ research, or anti-violence campaign groups such as CARE, or the 
MCD, and what we shall find in later chapters is that people who choose to watch 
media violence have little connection widi the type of ‘problem’ person these groups 
are concerned with. It is time to open up die issue of media violence and promote a 
dialogue between researchers, policy makers and people who actually choose to watch 
films and television programmes which contain violence.
A n  O v e r v i e w  o f  t h e  T h e s i s
This study will begin with an overview of media violence controversies and 
the type o f academic research which has come to dominate our understanding of this 
issue. Chapter three will re-examine the social drama of media violence in relation to
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social theories of risk, in order that we can attempt to understand the social, cultural 
and political significance of the construction of media violence as an environmental 
hazard. In Chapters four and five, we can see how the ‘masterfiame of environmental 
discourse’ (Eder, 1996) has come to shape, not only our perception of environmental 
risks, but also the way in which we perceive the role of popular culture in our 
everyday lives. Debates about the conservation of nature, or a safe, idealized 
community are about social relationships with nature, society and technology. Tliese 
debates are less about reality but more about ‘discursive realities’ (Hajer, 1996, p.257) 
in which cultural politics ar e shaped and made. The cultural construction of risk and 
media violence is one such ‘discursive reality’ and these chapters will explore this 
fiom an anthropological and sociological perspective.
Chapter six will consider John Adams’ theory of tire risk thermostat (1995). 
Adams believes everyone has a propensity to take risks, everyone has a ‘risk 
thermostat’; some people like to have their thermostat set higher than others, but no 
one wants a zero-risk lifestyle. Individual risk-taking behaviour' is based on a delicate 
balancing act between perceptions of risk and personal experience of risk. This theory 
will prove to be useful in our' understanding of how and why people like to watch 
films and television programmes which contain violence, hr the final section of this 
study, I want to find out what consumers o f media violence have to say about their 
experience of watching media violence. Chapter seven considers recent quantitative 
and qualitative audience research which goes some way to explaining why people like 
to watch media violence, and how people manage risk fiom an individual and social 
perspective. Chapters eight to eleven introduce new audience research conducted by 
the author on active consumers of violent movies, such as Natural Born Killers, or 
Reservoir D ogs. This research has been previously published in a more detailed form
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(see Hill, 1997), but here, key results of this qualitative research have been theorized 
in relation to social theories of risk, particularly Adams’ risk thermostat hypothesis. 
The final chapter shall attempt to situate new audience research and risk in relation to a 
more general understanding of environmentalism and die mass media. Here, I wish to 
show diat social theories of risk present a new perspective on the media violence 
debate, one that calls for an integrative approach to an understanding of this 
controversial issue.
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N o t e s
1 Between 1908 and 1913, New York and London passed a series of regulations that set out to reduce 
the risk of fire, altering the layout of cinemas and in turn the viewing experience, in order to make the 
cinema a safe leisure activity. Many New York clerics campaigned for greater control of films and 
audiences in order to reduce the ‘risk of damnation’. See Uricchio and Pearson (1994, p.45) for more 
information about nickelodeons and New York regulations of the cinema, and see Kuhn (1988, p. 16) 
for information about the Cinematographic Bill (1909) and British regulation of early cinema.
2 The mayor of New York City received letters and complaints about the connections between the rise 
in immigrants, urbanisation, and Ihe conniption of the young, and the rise of nickelodeons between 1908 
and 1909. The film industry sought to counter such accusations, but the die was cast, and even though 
such accusations were founded upon impressionistic and anecdotal evidence, they remained a significant 
factor in the growth of cinema, leading to various different censorship laws (see Kuhn, 1988).For 
example, the Cinematographic Bill (1909) was intended to ‘safeguard the public from the danger which 
arises from fires at cinematographic entertainments’ and yet, according to Kuhn (1988, p. 16) there was 
no evidence to suggest that any such fires had taken place.
3 See Kuhn (1988) and Mathews (1993) for more information about the history of censorship, and 
see Barker and Petley (1997) for more details about perceived moral and social risks of popular 
culture, in particular media violence.
4 I am referring to cinemas in the ‘first world’; cinema disasters do occur in developing countries, 
for example India.
5 There are a number of studies which have detailed the press coverage of media violence 
controversies. See, amongst others, Barker and Petley (1997), Cumberbatch and Howitt (1989),
Petley, 1997, Barker, 1984a, 1984b. As to movie stars denouncing levels of violence, Dustin 
Hoffman, Gregory Peck are two examples, see Hoffman, 1996.
6 For detailed discussion of the Suzanne Capper case and the James Bulger case see Buckingham (1996, 
pp. 19-55) and the Home Affairs Committee, 1994. Video Violence and Young Offenders. London: HMSO. 
For discussion of the Dunblane massacre, where Thomas Hamilton gunned down 16 infants, see newspaper 
coverage from Thursday March 14, 1996 onwards. In particular see, the Guardian, Thursday March 14
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1996, pp. 1-5, 16, 17, broadsheet section, and the Guardian, Friday March 15th, 1996, pp. 1-5, 18 in 
broadsheet, and pp. 1-3 in Friday review.
7 For more details about environmental risks and globalization, see Beck, 1992, and Risk Society for 
a useful overview of this issue. See also, Krimsky and Golding, 1992, Social Theories o f Risk for a 
detailed discussion of different perspectives of risk and society, and Lash, Szersyniski and Wynne,
1996 for different discussions of the environment, the self, and the politics of knowledge.
8 See the Guardian, December 11,1996, p.l and May 12, 1997, p.6, and the Daily Telegraph, June 
25,1997 for media discussion of this.
9 ‘Moral panic5 is a term applied to the way in which the mass media manufacture news items in 
order to amplify negative and anxiety ridden perceptions of ‘risky5 activities, such as taking drugs, or 
watching violent movies. The theory of ‘moral panics5 was invented by Cohen (1972) and Cohen 
and Young (1973), although see Pearson (1983) and Kasperson (1992) for more examples of this 
type of research.
10 See Variety, 17-23/6/96, p.l 1 and 70, and also French (1996, pp.227-239).
11 See W. B. Yeats (1992, p .l84).
12 The film, produced by Warner Bros., was scheduled for release on 18 November in the UK, but was 
withheld by the BBFC until 24 February 1995.
13 For examples of such research see Gunter and Wober (1988), Hill (1997), Barker and Brooks 
(1997), and for similar research in children's responses to violence see Buckingham (1996) and 
Hargrave (1996) amongst others.
Dangerous Movies
2
Media violence is an emotive topic. There has been a great deal of writing in 
the area o f media violence, but there is very little o f this that truly aims to treat this 
subject in a rational and non-judgemental manner. The aim of this thesis is to redress 
the balance. It is high time that researchers should deal with both die negative and 
positive  aspects of media violence and attempt to consider why, despite the vast 
amount of negative literature on this subject, many people still choose to watch films 
and programmes that are shocking and entertaining. Therefore, this thesis will 
examine the social construction of media violence, and attempt to understand 
individual responses to films and television programmes which contain violence; it is 
my intention to show that everyone has a propensity to take risks, and that active 
consumers of media violence are engaged in a risk-taking activity that is concerned 
widi virtual risks that are part o f our imagination, not part of our experience of real 
violence in everyday life.
Consequently, what I want to outline in this chapter are various different 
approaches to understanding the subject o f media violence in order to argue that 
there has been very little theoretical and empirical research that really engages with 
the perceived ‘risks’ and benefits o f watching media violence. Most research focuses 
on anxieties about the negative effects o f media violence, specifically behavioural 
effects, such as ‘copycat’ violence. This ‘research’ presupposes media violence is 
both harmful and hazardous to individuals and to the environment; it assumes that
the effects of watching television can be measured just like any other product on the 
market, in order to prove a causal link between watching violence and negative 
attitudes or behaviour. Detailed suiveys show that this type o f ‘research’ has 
preconceived ends and fixed assumptions; its research methods are neither reliable or 
valid (Cumberbatch and Howitt, 1989; Gauntlett, 1995; Buckingham and Allerton,
1996). And yet this type o f ‘research’ is the most dominant in this area. The reason 
why this is the case can be linked to the emotive nature o f this subject. Media 
violence is a common concern o f the public, the media, and the government, and 
because anxiety about media violence focuses on the protection o f children, it is a 
‘problem’ that people would like to see resolved as soon as possible.
The construction o f media violence as an environmental risk, a risk that must 
be contained and regulated in order to protect the safety o f our future environment, is 
the starting point for this thesis. It is because media violence is perceived to be an 
environmental threat that risk analysis proves to be so useful in understanding the 
link between environmentalism and the mass media. My own approach to media 
violence is one that utilizes a number of different methodologies from several 
different disciplines. It is my contention that a combination of macro and micro 
levels o f analysis, and ‘critical ethnographic research’ (Moores, 1993) is the best 
approach to understanding the ‘risks’ and rewards of media violence. By using 
theoretical and empirical developments in Media Studies, Cultural Studies and Risk 
Analysis, it is possible to examine the social and political construction of media 
violence, and individual practices to viewing violence. It is this new approach which 
brings together media studies and social theories o f risk that will help to situate the 
subject of media violence in a social, political and environmental arena.
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D o m i n a n t  R e a d i n g s
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The most dominant readings o f media violence and its related issues are 
readings which rely on experimental psychology and the ‘effects’ paradigm (see for 
example, Bandura et al., 1963, Tannenbaum and Zillman, 1975). Other research into 
media violence includes feminist and psychoanalytic readings o f pornogr aphy, horror 
and the news (see, for example, Kappeller, 1995; Creed, 1993; Clover, 1992; Soothill 
and Walby, 1991), cultural studies approaches to the structure and reception of texts 
which contain violence (see, Barker, 1984a, 1989; Sconce, 1996), and media studies 
approaches to the production and consumption of violence and its relationship with 
other areas of mass communication (Cohen and Young, 1973; Barker and Petley,
1997).
In this section, I want to consider the theoretical and methodological 
problems in using the cause-effect paradigm, and feminist and psychoanalytic 
approaches to media violence. Such approaches begin with the assumption that 
watching violence is a negative act that is potentially dangerous to other, weaker and 
more vulnerable members o f the community, i.e. women and children. Psychology, 
feminism and film theory pathologises die film viewer. Buckingham and Allerton 
(1996, p.7) comment: ‘viewers are... “other” people, who are presumed to be less 
intelligent, healthy, or well adjusted than ourselves.. .viewers are typically 
categorised as “sensation seekers”, or “addicts”... die pleasures that viewers derive 
from watching television come to be seen as somehow suspect or invalid.’ 
Consequently, this approach to media violence is overwhelmingly negative, and
suspicious of media violence as an entertainment activity: it is something to be 
monitored and controlled.
Thus, fiom this perspective, active consumers of media violence are seen to 
be immature, irrational and somehow defective, whereas other, more vulnerable 
viewers o f television, such as women and children, are perceived to be 
impressionable and at risk to the negative ‘effects’ of viewing violence (see Barlow 
and Hill, 1985). We can already see that this methodology poses some problems 
when attempting to understand viewing processes. Before such research has even 
begun, viewers are treated as passive and unable to differentiate between fact and 
fiction; and media violence texts are perceived to be negative and hazardous to the 
environment. This is not an open and objective method of research.
Effects Research
There are three common ‘effects’ associated with viewing violence. The first, 
‘behavioural effects’ is concerned with ‘copycat’ violence, and an example of this is the 
James Bulger case, where two young boys were alleged to have seen a horror film 
C hild ’s  Play 3 , and then murdered a young child (Buckingham, 1996).1 The second 
‘effect’ o f media violence is concerned with attitudes or beliefs, for example towards 
gender or ethnicity, and an example o f this would be the influence of negative, 
stereotypical portr ayals o f women in the media on male attitudes to women (Gerbner et 
al., 1980, 1986), The third ‘effect’, and the one that is most related to the research in 
this thesis, is concerned with emotional responses to television, and commonly refers to 
the desensitization hypothesis and cultivation effects (Gerbner, 1988, 1994). Here,
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television is seen to either increase fears o f crime in real life, or to desensitize ‘heavy’ 
viewers of media violence to real violence.2
Effects research set out to ‘prove’ these alleged negative effects o f watching 
media violence, and they did so with alarming regularity. Laboratory experiments (see 
Bandura, Ross and Ross, 1963, Donnerstein and Berkowitz, 1981), field experiments 
(see Feshbach and Singer, 1971, Parke, Berkowitz, Leyens, West and Sebastian, 1977), 
correlation studies (see Belson, 1978, Van Evra, 1990), and longitudinal panel studies 
(see Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder and Huesmann, 1972, 1977) all claim to have found 
‘proof of the negative effects of television. Over time, this ‘evidence’ has accumulated 
into what is commonly referred to by political and social commentators as ‘a vast world 
literature’ (Barker, 1997a, p. 16) and anti-violence campaigners such as David Alton, the 
Liberal Democrat peer, can claim that this vast body of evidence demonstrates links 
between screen violence and negative effects which cannot be ignored.
However, this ‘evidence’ has been widely criticized. Detailed studies by 
Cumberbatch and Howitt (1989) and Gauntlett (1995), for example, have successfully 
argued that these studies are seriously flawed. Cumberbatch and Howitt (1989, p.9) 
note that effects research is based on an extremely crude theory that viewers are 
passive and experience identical responses to watching television. There are now many 
studies by Buckingham (1993b, 1996), Gray (1992), Schlesinger et al. (1992), and Hill 
(1997), to name but a few, that reveal viewers are active and experience a wide variety 
of responses to viewing television. Gauntlett (1995, p. 10,12) points out:
‘Effects’ researchers all too often fail to define, examine and reflect upon 
precisely what it is they are concerned about. The question ‘what is the effect on 
viewers of all the violence on television?’, for example, is asked as if  it were 
just as clear cut as any other scientific problem about the response of a liquid to 
heat...(this is an) inappropriate ‘scientific’ view of what is basically art and/or
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entertainment material, intended for consumption by conscious audiences rather 
than content-counting analysts.
Criticism of effects research has therefore been widespread in the academic discipline, 
and yet such comments are rarely abed in the media. Murdock (1997, p.69) succinctly 
explains why this is die case:
The attraction of these ‘many studies’ is not simply that tiiey offer the illusion of 
strength in numbers, but diat they fit perfectly widi the common-sense 
assumption that, since ‘it stands to reason’ that there must be a link, responsible 
research is simply confirming what reasonable people already know, and diat 
refusing to accept this is patently unreasonable.
Thus, once popular and political opinion has constructed media violence texts as 
dangerous and hazardous to the environment, it does not take long for ‘science’ to be 
called upon to verify die claims of public opinion. Murdock (1997, p.69) writes: ‘this 
circular* relationship between empiricist science and common-sense thinking was built 
into academic work on media “effects” from the outset’.
Buckingham and Allerton (1996) point out other medrodological problems to 
die cause-effect paradigm which echo criticisms by other researchers who have 
reviewed tiiis type of effects research in detail (Cumberbatch and Howitt, 1989; 
Buckingham, 1987; Gauntlett, 1995). One problem concerns the ‘nature o f die 
“stimulus’”; films and programmes which are used in this type of research are classified 
as ‘violent’ by the researcher, rather than by the subject of study: ‘this term is applied to 
a wide range of material, from Nightmare on Elm Street, to Hopalong Cassidy to 
anthropological documentaries about circumcision rites’ (Buckingham and Allerton, 
1996, p.9). Clearly, who determines what is ‘violent’ is veiy significant to the outcome
of a scientific study, and if the researcher fails to differentiate between different types of 
media violence, then they have failed to take into account the diversity of material 
available and the diversity o f responses to this material.
Another problem, related to this, is the fact that researchers all too often assume 
that watching film or television programmes is a solitary activity, decontextualised 
fiom eveiyday life (see Feshback and Singer, 1971, Donnerstein and Berkowitz, 1981). 
This is clearly not the case. There is now a growing body of literature which 
demonstrates that watching film and television is a social activity and is veiy much part 
of our eveiyday experience. Work by Ann Gray (1992) and Marie Gillespie (1995), for 
example, reveals that viewers watch and discuss what they see at the cinema and at 
home, and part of the pleasur es of watching film and television is to engage in social 
processes, before, during and after the viewing event. Thus, key researchers in 
television audience studies, such as Morley (1992) and Ang (1991, 1996) argue for the 
social contexts o f television viewing to be taken into account.4 This is of particular 
significance to the social processes of viewing violence, because, as we shall see in later 
chapters in this study, one of the reasons people choose to watch media violence is 
because it is a social activity.
Perhaps one of the most central problems with ‘effects’ research is that it 
assumes that viewers have difficulty differentiating between real violence and fictional 
violence. Buckingham and Allerton (1996, p.9) sum up the significance of this as 
follows:
Seeing a gory murder in a television programme is clearly very different to 
seeing a gory mur der in real life, in all sorts of fair ly obvious ways, although the 
two are often regar ded as parallel. The simple equation of television with direct 
experience enables the importation of ready-made psychological theories, and 
thus sustains the hegemony of the discipline. Above all, what is neglected here
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is the mediated, textual nature of the experience of television -  precisely the 
dimension that has been so comprehensively ignored by research to date on the 
effects o f television violence.
This is an important point and one that will be taken up in later chapters in relation to 
risk and media violence. What we shall see is that viewers of media violence choose to 
see this type of entertainment precisely because it is fictional, and far removed fiom real 
experience of violence.
What we can see fiom this brief oveiview of some of the theoretical and 
methodological problems of ‘effects’ research is that it systematically fails to address 
the complex and dynamic nature of viewing violence. Researchers cannot measure the 
effects of television in the same way that scientists can measure the effects o f car 
pollution. As Gauntlett (1995, p. 12) points out:
Any effect which may occur' could only do so veiy indirectly, as television 
merely sends out information which is perceived and interpreted by individuals 
who are responsible for their actions; television can suggest meanings and 
values, but the influence of these has to be far removed fiom the usual 
definitions of ‘cause and effect’.
This fundamental problem with research into viewing violence should indicate that any 
researcher who wishes to understand the social processes and individual experiences 
associated with media violence will have to begin fiom a more open and objective 
standpoint. Before I examine research in cultural studies and media studies which 
attempts to do this, I would like to briefly turn to feminist and psychological approaches 
to media violence in order to point out that such theoretical methods o f analysis also fail 
to consider the complex nature of viewing media violence.
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There are a number of key studies in the area of media violence that utilize 
feminist and psychoanalytic methodologies. These studies are primarily located within 
the discipline o f Film Studies. Here media violence is treated as a theoretical subject, 
and viewers of media violence are perceived to be ‘spectators’, passive to the dominant 
readings o f film narrative and film apparatus.5 When using this type of research 
methodology, a writer will have a clear* set o f political and ideological assumptions 
about spectatorship and media violence, which, as is the case with ‘effects’ research, is 
already present before the research has even begun. Thus, such readings o f media 
violence, whilst interesting and stimulating, have little to offer in the way of objective 
and reliable resear ch data.
For example, Barbara Creed (1993), in her book The M onstrous Feminine, 
utilizes Freudian and Lacanian theories of sexual difference in order to challenge 
patriarchal assumptions about women as victims in honor movies. Creed argues that 
men, rather than fearing the monster in a honor film, fear the ‘monstrous feminine’; it is 
a fear* of the female as castrator, not the castrated which tenifies male spectators in the 
cinematic environment. For Creed, this is an indication of how powerful women really 
are; the female spectator can feel empowered by identifying herself as a female 
castrator, she can adopt sadistic and masochistic pleasure from the ‘monstrous 
feminine’ (1996, p. 155). The problem with this theory of cinematic spectatorship is that 
it is restricted by feminist and psychoanalytic discourses. There is no sense that 
‘spectators’ are engaged in an active and dynamic process, but rather that they are 
tr apped by patriar chal institutions and the labyr inth of the unconscious mind. The only 
‘pleasure’ to be gained from the cinematic experience is one of masochism or sadism,
Feminism and Psychoanalysis
the only reason for watching these films in the first place is to satisfy voyeuristic and 
fetishistic desires.6
This method of examining horror films is dominated by gender politics. There 
does not seem to be any attempt to acknowledge that aspects of viewing violence, for 
example feeling your heart beat faster, have little to do with gender, and more to do 
with heightened anticipation and increased adrenalin levels. Carol Clover’s Men, 
Women and Chainsaws is another analysis o f horror films that is determined by 
feminism and psychoanalysis. Once again, Clover presents an interesting reading of the 
pleasures o f honor films but these are centered around theories of identification and 
psychoanalysis. Male and female spectators ‘identify’ with female victims; indeed they 
cross gender lines, emphasising a ‘feminine masochism’ which cuts across familial' film 
theories of a ‘one way eye/camera’ that foregrounds ‘aggressive voyeurism’ (Clover, 
1992, p.230) to open up a two way eye/camera in relation to horror. This reading of 
honor is based upon a binary opposition; even when Clover opens up the traditional 
feminist and film theory approach to spectatorship, she can still only introduce two 
ways of reading film. This does not leave much room for multiple readings, or dynamic 
and contradictory responses to media violence. Nor does it allow for the fact that the 
issue of identification is one that is open to interpretation. Martin Barker has critiqued 
die model o f identification as used in media studies. He writes: ‘the concept of 
identification has no scientific validity as one for understanding the relationship 
between media studies and audiences’ (Barker, 1989, p.109). Neither Clover or Creed 
acknowledge the weaknesses in using the concept of identification, and yet such a 
concept underpins all o f then* theories about spectatorship and horror.
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The very term ‘spectator’ implies a passive response to media violence, when it 
is clear fiom empirical studies in audience research that the viewer is active and very 
much engaged in physical and emotional responses to media violence on many different 
levels. The fact that Clover and Creed do not acknowledge empirical studies in 
audience research, nor attempt such research themselves, makes their theories regarding 
honor inappropriate to any real understanding of audience practices. Such writers make 
gr and claims that are not backed up by any grounded research. Even when film theorists 
argue for different types o f interpretations o f a text, they still assume what audiences 
think, rather than asking audiences what they themselves have to say about certain 
films. For example, Cynthia A. Freeland (1995, p. 140), writing about ‘realist horror’, 
the type of films that are discussed in this study, makes this comment:
My own strategy of reading this genre involves me, admittedly, in a sort of 
tension: ideological critique focuses on problematic ways in which realist 
horror films create discourses of knowledge and power, serving conservative 
and patriarchal interests, and it is likely to produce a critical view of realist 
honor. But I have also tried to foreground the honor and mass media audience’s 
ability to produce subversive interpretations, acknowledging that viewers do 
indeed have a significant power and interpretive role in reading, and resisting, 
realist horror films.
Freeland acknowledges a tension between ideological practices and an understanding of 
audience reactions to honor, but she is still unable to refer to studies in what horror 
audiences actually have to say about this subject.7 This lack of any evidence or 
reference to empirical research makes such theoretical approaches weak and far 
removed fiom die real issues o f audience interpretation of media violence.
Nevertheless, Freeland’s acknowledgement of the significance of audience 
resistance is certainly more in line with audience research in this study. Freeland is right 
to suggest that audiences have ‘a significant power’, and her research is more in
26
keeping with philosophical and cognitive readings of horror than die feminist 
psychoanalytic approaches we looked at earlier. Freeland shares an interest in honor 
that is similar* to that o f Noel Carroll and his more common sense dieory of the 
cognitive and evaluative processes of watching horror. In The Philosophy o f  Horror 
CaiToll argues that when we watch horror movies we are engaged in the ‘thought dieory 
of emotional responses to fictions’ (1990, p.79). Thus, we are not afraid of the monster 
in C hild ’s  Play 3, but rather we are afraid of the thought that this monster might be real. 
Carroll also argues that we do not identify with the monster or victim by simply feeling 
what diey feel, but, rather, audiences have a more comprehensive view of events taking 
place, and assimilate different points o f view.
This is a much more dynamic approach to understanding audience reactions and 
Carroll has some interesting points to make about an audience’s conscious desire to 
respond to their own fear and revulsion. This ties in with the findings o f the focus group 
interviews in this diesis which suggests that viewers like to test boundaries in relation to 
media violence. In the next section I want to consider a more macro-sociological 
approach to viewing violence, and it is in the fields of cultural and media studies that 
we shall find research which is more in line with my own theoretical and 
methodological practices in this study.
C u l t u r a l  a n d  M e d i a  S t u d i e s
There are a number of significant studies in the history and reception of media 
violence texts. In The M anufacture o f  News, Cohen and Young (1973) demonstrated
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that the media do not reflect, but rather construct reality and create ‘moral panics’ about 
a range of issues, for example, youth subcultures such as mods and rockers. This shows 
that the way in which the media select and generate information about ‘social problems’ 
indicates that a sociological understanding of the mass media is significant to analysis 
of media violence. This theory is discussed in more detail in the next chapter, but what I 
want to point out here is that the problem with such a theory of ‘moral panics’ is that it 
places too much emphasis on die power of the media. As we shall see in an analysis of 
anti-violence campaign groups and their adoption of the discourse o f environmentalism, 
there are other factors which help to shape the political and cultural construction of 
‘social problems’. Indeed, these factors are in many ways as, if  not more important than 
the ‘manufacture of news’: the function of the media is to communicate, whereas the 
function of non-governmental organizations is to bring about social change.
Geoffrey Pearson in Hooligan: A  History o f  Respectable Fears (1983) also 
charts the cyclical nature of public anxiety regarding certain ‘risky’ enterprises, fiom 
riding a bicycle to reading ‘penny dreadfids’. This history of ‘respectable fears’ is 
extremely useful in situating contemporary concerns about media violence within an 
historical and cultural context. It offers a macro-sociological approach to the issue of 
media violence. Pearson’s argument that people have always feared the loss of family 
values and respect for par ents, and have always predicted a future of violence and social 
unrest, is particular ly appropriate to our understanding of environmentalism and media 
violence in future chapters in this study. Environmentalism is a contemporary concern, 
but it has its origins in previous fears for the conservation of an idealised and ‘natural’ 
society. Thus, die historical context of environmentalism and media violence will be 
significant to any sustained analysis o f this subject.
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Pearson (1984), Murdock (1997) and Petley (1997, p.87) have shown that 
behind public anxiety of media violence there remains a ‘potent strain of class dislike 
and fear’. We shall see the significance of this in relation to the way in which dominant 
social institutions wish to control and regulate die risks of media violence. Similarly, 
Martin Barker’s research into horror comics in A Haunt o f  Fears: the Strange History o f  
the British Horror Comics Campaign (1984b) and Comics: Ideology, Power and the 
Critics (1989) situates current media violence controversies in a wider political and 
social context. Here, Barker examines die production and dissemination of knowledge 
about violence and children’s comics and finds that such controversies are less about 
the comics diemselves and more about political concerns, in diis instance the threat of 
war and social unrest. Talking about censorship and the comic Action , Barker makes 
this point: ‘In each case, what has been removed is not the “excessive violence”. .. It is 
a veiy cynical reference to audiority, Audiority is just not allowed to be shown in 
compromised positions... Yet all this has happened under the guise o f removing 
excessive violence’ (1989, p.35). We can see here that a close analysis of the structure 
of the comic Action and an understanding about the political and social issues of the 
time (the Vietnam war and social unrest) have proved fruitful in suggesting reasons for 
censorship of this comic. Barker presents a convincing case for the political and cultural 
construction of media violence controversies, and he does so by researching the 
production and consumption of such texts.8
Within cultural studies, there has been a rise in research into fans of honor films 
which places particular emphasis on what viewers have to say about their reasons for 
watching certain types of entertainment, entertainment which is considered ‘risky’ and 
separate fiom more mainstream leisure activities. Jeffrey Sconce (1996), Mark 
Kermode (1997) and David Sanjek (1990) have all examined media violence fiom the
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point o f view o f the fan’s perspective, and this resear ch has much in common with my 
own interest in active consumers o f films such as Natural Born Killers, or Reservoir 
D ogs, consumers who come to the viewing experience with a certain set o f assumptions 
and expectations, what Barker calls ‘investment’ in a film.9 We shall see from the next 
section how new television audience research has begun to concentrate on the 
ethnography of media consumption, and how this awareness o f the social and cultural 
contexts for film and television viewing has direct implications on the way in which we 
can understand why people like to watch shocking entertainment.
N e w  A u d i e n c e  R e s e a r c h
A number of recent studies in audience research attempt to understand the 
different types o f physical and emotional responses to television by talking to viewers 
themselves. These studies take into account the social context of television viewing and 
place an emphasis on the ‘social construction of emotions’, making reference to 
research in social psychology about the way in which people can construct different 
versions of events, none of which may be ‘true’ but which nevertheless demonstrates 
the types of discourses available at the time, and the choices people make about 
language and different forms of communication (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Edwar ds 
and Potter, 1992).
Some recent examples of this approach to audience research can be seen in 
David Morley’s Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies (1992), David 
Buckingham’s M oving Images: Understanding Children’s Emotional Responses to
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Television (1996), and David Gauntlett’s Video Critical: Children, the Environment and  
M edia Power (1997). All o f these studies begin with die assumption that listening to 
audiences will tell us more about their viewing practices than any theoretical paradigms. 
Consequently, viewers are given primary importance. The results of these research 
studies show that the viewing experience is an active and dynamic process, and we 
should not underestimate the ‘media literacy’ of television audiences who are capable 
of understanding and interpreting texts in a wide variety o f ways. This does not mean to 
say that the significance of the text is ignored, but rather to highlight that ‘textual 
analysis can be a useful source of hypotheses for audience research’ (Buckingham, 
1996, p.311).
For example, in Video Critical, Gauntlett finds that when children were asked to 
make a video which dealt with environmental issues, they showed a great deal of 
awareness and anxiety about the environment both on a local and global scale. 
However, despite this concern, many children felt a sense of par alysis in relation to how 
to combat environmental problems (Gauntlett, 1997, p. 145). Gauntlett links this finding 
to a tendency in media coverage of environmental issues to dr aw attention away fiom 
sociological explanations about environmental degradation towards a more 
individualistic explanation of such issues. Thus, the children may be aware of 
environmentalism, but their* awareness is influenced by the way in which the media 
report such issues. For Gauntlett, tiiis is an example o f ‘hegemonic bending’, a theory 
about the way in which structural, social and political accounts in the news are shaped 
into more individualistic, psychological stories. Gauntlett (1997, p. 151) himself notes 
the similarity between this treatment o f an environmental problem and die tr eatment of 
media violence. The James Bulger case is a good example of how the tragic death of
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one child came to dominate the way in which the news media dealt with the wider 
sociological issue of violence in our society.
David Buckingham’s study, M oving Images (1996) is similarly appropriate to 
the subject o f this research, and Buckingham’s findings about the way in which children 
understand and engage with honor, melodrama and the news can be seen to validate my 
own data analysis. Buckingham finds evidence to suggest that ‘in die case of fiction, 
“negative” responses are often inextricably connected with “positive” ones, such as 
excitement and enjoyment’ (1996, p.306). This links with the dieory put forward in this 
study that there are ‘risks’ and rewards to viewing violence. Buckingham also found 
that ‘children develop a variety of “coping strategies” diat enable them to avoid or deal 
with these responses’ (1996, p.307). This means of ‘coping’ with positive and negative 
responses can be directly related to the reactive mechanisms of self-censorship and 
boundary testing which participants discuss in my own research findings, detailed in 
Chapters ten and eleven.
Out of the three research studies discussed so far, only Buckingham actuaUy 
considers the issue of media violence and the way in which viewers respond to fictional 
and mediated images of violence. And yet, despite the similarities with Buckingham’s 
research and my own, his viewers are children, not adults. When it comes to critical 
ethnographic research into adult consumers of media violence there are veiy few 
examples to refer to, despite the fact that most media violence controversies are sparked 
off by a movie which is intended for adults, and which will have been given an ‘18’ 
certificate by the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC).10 The reason why this is 
the case is to do with the nature of the media violence debate which is framed around 
anxiety and concern about the protection of children (see for example, Newson, 1994; 
PAPFCPG, 1997). However, as researchers such as Buckingham (1996) have shown,
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children are less concerned about ‘video nasties’ and more concerned about violence on 
the news. Indeed, most of the children in Buckingham’s study are better able to ‘cope’ 
widi horror films than then* parents (1996, pp.254-299).
It is time that more researchers begin to consider the way in which adult viewers 
respond to media violence. Recent examples of this type of research are few and far 
between. Research by Gunter and Wober (1988), Docheity (1990), and Morrison, 
MacGregor and Thorpe, (1993) examines responses to violence in television fiction and 
factual television. Gunter and Wober (1988) in Violence on Television: What the 
Viewers Think have some interesting points to make about how viewers perceive the 
issue of media violence. Whilst viewers claim that they are worried about the amount of 
violence on television, their own viewing practices indicate that they themselves watch 
crime drama and other programmes which contain violence (Gunter and Wober, p.67). 
Viewers are worried about the negative ‘effects’ of media violence on other people, not 
themselves. This finding is similar to other research projects, for example, Buckingham 
(1996) and Hargrave (1996), and is of particular interest in relation to perceptions of 
risk and media violence, and individual risk-taking behaviour, issues which are 
discussed in Chapter seven.
Women Viewing Violence (Schlesinger et al., 1992) and Regulating fo r  
Changing Values (Kieran et al., 1997) are two studies which attempt to examine the 
way in which adults engage with the controversy of media violence, but both studies are 
problematic and fail to provide an objective and comprehensive account of viewing 
practices. Both of these studies are critiqued in detail in Chapter seven, but what is 
important to point out here is that Schlesinger et al., fail to consider the potential 
pleasures to be gained fiom watching media violence, and instead confine themselves to 
an examination of portrayals o f women as victims of violent crime; it is not surprising
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to learn that women who have had experience of violence perceived such portrayals of 
women on television as negative and in no way entertaining. Women Viewing Violence 
therefore is a study of a particular type of violence, and a particular type of viewer, one 
that could not be classified as an active consumer of media violence. In the case of 
Kieran et al., and then study of television viewers and moral and ethical values, this 
study only touches the surface o f viewing violence, and indeed is more concerned with 
how audiences perceive a wide range of issues, rather than how audiences engage with 
media violence texts.
Thus, it can be seen that my own research in active consumers of media 
violence marks a significant contribution to our understanding of how and why people 
like to watch films and television programmes which contain violence. The qualitative 
research in this study uses discourse analysis and critical ethnographic practice as a 
means to understand the way in which people discuss and respond to media violence. 
This research was first presented in Shocking Entertainment: Viewer Response to 
Violent M ovies (Hill, 1997) as untheorised, raw data. However, in this study the data 
has been interpreted in relation to social theories of risk and individual risk-taking 
behaviour. This is because risk presents a useful means of hypothesizing about the 
perceived ‘risks’ and rewards of watching media violence. Why social theories of risk 
are significant to an understanding of individual viewing practices will be explained in 
the next section, where the relationship between environmentalism, risk and the mass 
media will reveal a new approach to the topic o f media violence.
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S o c i a l  T h e o r i e s  o f  R i s k
Risk analysis is fast becoming a popular subject in the social sciences. There are 
two parallel approaches to the study of risk, one which involves scientific studies, case 
analyses and empirical findings, die other which involves social theories of risk, 
focusing on human response to risks and hazards, and the role o f social and cultural 
factors in the experience of risk. Krimsky and Golding (1992, p.xiii) explain the growth 
of risk analysis as follows:
Hie field of risk studies grew out of the practical needs of industrialized 
societies to regulate technology and to protect tiieir citizenry from natural and 
technological hazards. From its inception the study of risk was positioned at the 
intersection of academic, governmental, and industrial interests. Rising public 
concern about environmental hazards, in conjunction with glowing corporate 
fears about liability, brought risk assessment and risk management to the 
foreground in the public and private sectors.
The way in which risk analysis has divided into two fields, the one concerned with 
measuring the effects of natural and industrial hazards, the other more interested in 
examining perceptions of risk, and social and cultural roles in risk management, can be 
seen to mirror the way in which audience research and media violence has separated 
into the study of ‘effects’ and the study of individual and social responses to media 
violence.
Consequently, how social theories of risk attempt to bridge this gap and utilise 
conceptual frameworks and empirical evidence is one that is of particular interest to this 
study of the ‘risks’ o f media violence. Social theories of risk have focused on cognitive 
and cultur al approaches to an understanding of risk. Ortwin Renn (1992) presents a 
clear and helpful overview of the major sociological perspectives of risk and how these
have grown fiom technical, economic and psychological approaches to risk.11 Out of 
these three areas, it is the psychometric paradigm and its interest in subjective 
judgement about the nature and magnitude of risks that relates to perceptions of risk and 
media violence. The psychometric paradigm explores the qualitative characteristics of 
risk and examines the contextual variables which shape an individual’s perception and 
management of risk (see for example, Slovic, 1987; Slovic, Fischoff and Lichtenstein, 
1981; Marris et al., 1997). The qualitative characteristics of risk and media violence will 
also be examined because perceptions o f risk shape the way in which people choose to 
engage in risk-taking behaviour.
Cultural Theories
The psychometric paradigm has influenced the way in which sociological and 
cultural perspectives of risk have developed. The stalling point for sociological and 
anthropological approaches to risk is that perceptions o f risk are filtered through social 
and cultural fiameworks. Such cultural theories o f risk are influenced by 
anthropological studies in social organization. The cultural perspective of risk focuses 
on proposed prototypes of cultural belief patterns which help to shape perceptions of 
reality. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Schwartz and Thompson (1990), Douglas 
(1992) and Wildavsky and Dake (1990) all identify a number of cultural patterns. There 
are four commonly proposed patterns, the fatalist, the hierarchist, the individualist and 
the egalitarian.
Renn points out that the cultural theory of risk helps us to understand that ‘what 
people and organizations perceive as undesirable events reflects their perception and 
evaluation of the cultural definition of the social context and its relevance for then
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worldviews’ (1992, p.76). However, despite its usefulness, die cultural theory of risk 
can be restrictive, and offer a type of ‘cultural imperialism’ (Kasperson, 1992, p. 164) 
which is too deterministic. As shall be argued in Chapters six and seven, a typology of 
cultural bias does not help to explain the various and often contradictory responses to 
risk-taking behaviour*. What is more, it fails to take into account the fact that people 
construct versions of events which aren’t necessarily true, but reflect types of discourses 
and language choices. Thus, elements of the cultural theory of risk are useful in 
understanding social contexts, but these are hypotheses, not exclusive explanations.
Social Theories
There are a number of different sociological studies of risk which have been 
well documented by other researchers (see for* example, Renn, 1985,1992; Krimsky and 
Golding, 1992), and there is not room to undertake an extensive overview here. 
However, it is worth outlining some of these studies in order to highlight the relevance 
of risk analysis to studies in mass communication. There have been studies on the 
organizational aspects o f risk (Perrow, 1984; Clarke, 1989); investigations into risk 
conflicts and then* causes (O’Riordan, 1983; Wynne, 1996), and analyses of media 
coverage and communication of risks (Peters, 1990; Hansen, 1993; Anderson, 1997). It 
is in the analyses of media coverage that the relationship between media studies and 
risk analysis becomes most apparent. There have been some interesting studies in how 
the media construct and disseminate information about risk events, and environmental 
issues, such as the Chernobyl accident, or the seal plague that affected a large number* 
of seals along the Norfolk coast in Britain.12 However, the way in which risk analysts 
have examined environmental and industrial hazards has usually been defined by the
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way in which the media communicate risk events. Whilst this is significant to an 
analysis of risk, it does not open up die arena of risk analysis to other areas of 
investigation. Such studies have been confined to analyzing discourses and media texts 
and examining the impact of such communication on the general public (Peters, 1990; 
Hansen, 1993). There has been little endeavor on the part of risk analysts to see the 
mass media from a more macro-sociological perspective.
There are two recent studies in risk which attempt to broaden die debate and 
cross fertilize with other disciplines, such as cultural and media studies. Alison 
Anderson (1997, p .l), in M edia, Culture and  the Environment, makes an important 
point when she claims that the ‘study of risk and environment deserves to play a crucial 
role in framing diis contested terrain’. Anderson’s book promises to examine the role of 
the media in constructing ‘social problems’, but her area of investigation is restricted to 
environmental issues; she fails to see that the ‘masterframe of environmental discourse5 
(Eder, 1996) ensures that other issues within mass communications, such as popular 
culture, or globalization and transnationalism are also related to risk and 
environmentalism. Anderson considers key approaches in cultural studies (Morley, 
1992) about ‘active’ audiences and tiieir critical interpretation of news events, but once 
again, tire promise of interesting parallels between media studies and risk analysis are 
not fulfilled. Instead, Anderson is content to frame television audiences in relation to 
‘circuits of communication’ and collective identities (Anderson, 1997, p.201).13 She 
offers nothing new in the way of understanding viewing practices, or examining risk- 
taking behaviour in relation to popular culture. Indeed, she merely adds traditional 
theories in mass communication to social theories of risk: there is no real sense of cross- 
fertilization here.
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A more promising study by Simon Cottle (1997) begins with an examination of 
local TV news programmes about environmental issues, but expands the findings of this 
content analysis to incorporate a more influential approach to the study of risk and the 
media, where the media is seen to be a mediating force, rather than a relayer of 
messages. Cottle (1997, p .l) summarises the potential for cross-fertilization between 
media studies and risk analysis as follows:
Mass Communications researchers...have attended to the environment as a 
mediated ‘social problem’ and pursued processes of source interventions, 
claims-making and discursive contestation waged via the media public stage. 
They have yet to specifically pursue, however, the complex ways in which the 
mass media articulates with and mediates both expert systems and lay 
knowledge.
Cottle is right to point out that mass communication researchers have failed to take on 
board the theoretical and social implications o f risk and environmentalism. For Cottle, 
this means that an interpretation of local news programmes fiom the point of view of 
risk analysis can reveal that there is an expert and lay knowledge of risk at work in the 
mass media.14 We can understand this division between expert and lay perspectives of 
risk by exploring wider theoretical issues relating to social dominance and social 
processes o f contestation. For Cottle, macro-sociological theories of a ‘risk society’ and 
‘reflexive modernization’ can provide a useful source of enquiry. Macro-theories of 
risk, as outlined by Ulrich Beck (1992) in Risk Society, and Beck, Giddens and Lash
(1995) in Reflexive M odernization, will be considered at length in the next chapter. 
Briefly, a risk society is one in which the risks and hazards of industrialization are 
visible, and pose a threat to the health and welfare of oiu* local and global environment. 
These risks and hazards are the site of risk consciousness and conflict, and mobilize a 
reflexivity which challenges the structures of traditional modem society. What I would
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like to point out here is that macro and micro levels of sociological analysis can and will 
be useful to an understanding of risk, environmentalism and the mass media. Such an 
analysis need not restrict itself to one line of enquiry: the environment is not the only 
cause for social concern. It is my argument that by using a cross disciplinary approach 
we can situate the issue of media violence, in a wider, political, social and 
environmental context.
Perhaps the most influential theory of risk in relation to my own line of enquiry 
about die social construction of media violence as an environmental hazard is the theory 
of die social amplification of risk (Kasperson and Renn et al., 1988). This theory 
attempts to present a holistic approach to die study of risk communication. The dieory 
of the social amplification of risk is analyzed in relation to media violence in the next 
chapter, but a brief synopsis is appropriate here. Kasperson and Renn et al. (1988) claim 
that when a risk event occurs, such as a nuclear accident, there are a number of primary 
and secondary processes that we must take into consideration. Risk is not just about 
assessing the dangers of this risk event to the environment, but it is also about the social 
process of risk communication. Thus, formal organizations, social institutions, cultural 
and social groups, and individuals are all part o f the social processes o f risk. Kasperson 
(1992, p. 162) explains: ‘die sociological and individual interactions (are) inherently 
inseparable, with the particular social mechanisms that shape particular societal 
responses functioning in a kaleidoscopic manner’. It is this wide ranging approach to an 
understanding of risk communication that has been of particular help in relating 
seemingly disparate areas, such as media violence and liability insurance, to theories of 
mass communication and environmentalism.
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It is this type o f integrative framework for understanding and managing 
environmental and industrial risks that is of interest here. Ortwin Renn (1992, p.79 
explains this as follows:
It has become evident that a novel and integrative framework is necessary to 
capture the full extent o f the social experience of risk and to study the dynamic 
processing of risks by the various participants in a pluralistic society. Such a 
novel approach cannot and should not replace existing perspectives, but should 
instead offer a meta-perspective that assigns each perspective an appropriate 
place and function. The major objective of such a meta-perspective is to make 
the various perspectives compatible with each other and to provide a semantic 
framework that allows comparative analysis across the various perspectives.
In the final section of this chapter I want to show that a compar ative analysis across 
various different perspectives, including media studies, cultural studies, and risk 
analysis can provide a ‘meta-perspective’ which will help us to understand mass 
communications and the social experience of risk.
T o w a r d s  a  N e w  A p p r o a c h
Martin Barker (1997b, p.70) believes that in relation to the media violence 
debate ‘What is happening around the media today bears not one mark of a rational 
debate in which people weigh evidence, assess arguments, and debate knowledge’. So, 
what are academic researchers in this field to do? Barker and Petley (1997, p. 10) 
present this challenge to other colleagues in audience research:
There is an unexamined model in ‘effects’ research about how we might be 
influenced by the media: what is it, and what are the problems with it? And
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what interests - political, financial, bureaucratic - lie behind the seventy-year 
tradition of such research? And, finally, what is it about this body of ideas about 
‘effects’ that it so strongly resists challenges to its validity?
There are many questions posed in this challenge. Barker and Petley know that ‘effects’ 
research has been examined and critiqued in considerable detail (see amongst others, 
Cumberbatch and Howitt, 1989, Gauntlett, 1995), and yet this type of research still 
remains unchallenged by politicians, the media and public opinion. This type of 
examination, then, is not enough. Researchers need to re-examine the ‘effects’ model; 
they must discover why it is so successful, and they must present new approaches 
which challenge conventional assumptions about media violence.
I want to suggest that a re-examination of the ‘effects’ debate will reveal a new 
method of approach that can help us to understand the full extent of the social 
experience of media violence and the dynamic processes at work. It is my thesis that the 
nature o f the screen violence debate can be related to a specific sociological 
phenomenon, that o f risk. Social theories of risk reveal a new way of understanding the 
current discourse on media violence, and it is my contention that once we have 
understood the origins of this discourse, we can begin to change the pattern of the 
debate.
In the next chapter I want to outline Ulrich Beck's theory of a risk society 
(1992) in order to reveal that there is a strong correlation between the effects paradigm 
and the risk paradigm, as outlined by Beck. The risk paradigm draws on the political 
and social significance of modernization hazards, such as carbon monoxide, or acid 
rain. With the mobilization of citizens' campaign groups, such as Greenpeace, multi­
national corporations are challenged to regulate then products, to make the environment 
‘safe’. It is due to the success of these campaign groups to publicize and fight for the
right to live in a ‘safe’ environment that politicians and the judiciary are forced to take 
such issues seriously and implement new legislation.
In the same way that campaign groups such as Greenpeace highlight the hazards 
associated with certain modernization products, organizations such as Christian Action 
Research and Education (CARE), or the Movement for Christian Democracy (MCD) 
present media violence as a health hazard that can affect, not just individuals, but 
society as a whole. The next chapter will outline how and why anti-violence 
campaigners have utilized the risk paradigm. I will then critique this paradigm in 
relation to media violence, and go on to assert that, as critics of ‘effects’ research have 
been saying for some time (Gauntlett, 1995, p. 10), audience response to viewing 
violence cannot be measured in the same way car* pollution can be measured. We are 
dealing with entertainment, not carbon monoxide. The challenge comes with presenting 
media violence as a form of entertainment many people choose to engage with. 
Research in perceptions o f risk, conducted by John Adams (1995) in Risk, show that it 
is possible to see that individuals form then* own ‘risk thermostats’, and choose to take 
risks because they are aware that there is always a balance between the rewards to be 
gained fiom taking risks and the drawbacks to such activities. Adams and Mary 
Douglas (1995), in Risk and Blame, see this propensity to take risks as a common 
reaction by individuals to the cultural construction of risk in modem society.
Thus, my thesis that the ‘effects’ debate has utilized the risk paradigm in order 
to control a product such as media violence can be broadened to include a new way of 
understanding media violence in all its various forms. If in-depth qualitative research 
can understand how and why people choose to watch texts which contain violence, and 
if  social and cultural theories of risk can help us to understand die wider implications of 
these viewing processes, then it is possible to build a new theory with regard to media
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violence. The qualitative research used at the close of this study is presented as an 
indication that this new theory regarding violence and the mass media is founded on 
hard evidence. Presenting this new theory is a challenge, but one that is not without 
reward.
N o t e s
1 This case has been well documented by other researchers in the field, and as Buckingham (1996), 
and Barker and Petley (1997) have shown, there is no evidence that either John Venables or Bobby 
Thompson, the two murderers of James Bulger, had indeed seen this film at all.
2 For a detailed survey of these three types of effects, see Cumberbatch and Howitt (1989), Gauntlett 
(1995) and Buckingham and Allerton (1996) amongst others.
3 In the laboratory setting, often films designed specifically for the research project will be shown. 
For example during a laboratory experiment by Bandura, Ross and Ross, 1963, children were shown a 
film in which a man hit a bobo doll, and then shown into a room with a bobo doll. If the children were 
seen to hit the doll, this was taken as an example of the effects of watching the programme. Clearly, 
experimenter demand and unreal examples of media violence have influenced the outcome of this 
study (see Gauntlett, 1995, p. 17).
4 It is important to point out that whilst Morley (1992) and Ang (1991, 1996) point out the 
significance of empirical research in the social contexts of television viewing, they themselves have 
little new research to offer. There is clearly room for a great deal more research in this area.
5 Judith Mayne’s overview of this aspect of film theoiy, Cinema and Spectatorship (1993), is a good 
introduction to this area, and includes chapters on the subject of spectatorship, and spectatorship as an 
institution. This form of film theoiy relies heavily on Freudian and Lacanian theories of voyeurism 
and film as signifier and signified.
6 In this sense, Creed is building on a history of feminist film criticism that begins with Laura 
Mulvey and her essay ‘Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema’ in Visual and Other Pleasures, 1989, 
London: Macmillan.
7 As Buckingham and Allerton (1996, p.20) point out in their overview of children’s negative 
responses to television, there has been some research into horror audiences, notably Sparks (1986, 
1989,1991) and Zillman et al. (1986) who attempts to consider the social context of fright responses.
8 Annette Kuhn (1988) and Tom Dewe Mathews (1994) have also examined the social and political 
reasons for censorship in the history of cinema.
9 See an unpublished paper by Barker and Brooks (1997) about action movie fans and their responses 
to die film Judge Dredd.
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10 See for example N atural Born Killers (Oliver Stone, 1994) or Crash (David Cronenberg, 1996) which 
were both given an 18 certificate by die British Board of Film Classification.
11 Technical analysis of risk involves collecting statistical data and probabilistic risk assessments, and 
examples of this can seen in the work of Morgan, 1990, and Renn, 1985. Economic analysis of risk 
involves the calculation of risks and benefits as utilities; risk analysis ‘is part of a larger cost-benefit 
consideration in which risks are the expected utility losses resulting from an event or an activity. The 
ultimate goal is to allocate resources so as to maximize their utility for society’ (Renn, 1992, p.62), 
see Smith (1986) for an overview of this area.
12 For accounts of the Chernobyl accident see Dunwoody and Peters (1992, pp. 199-230) and also 
Anderson, 1997. For a good chapter on the seals plague of Britain see Anderson (1997, pp.137-168).
13 Anderson takes the theoiy of ‘circuits of communication5 from R. Johnson in Introduction to 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, 1986, ed. D Punter, London: Longman, pp.277-313.
14 Expert and lay knowledge of risk has been written about in some detail by risk analysts and 
theorists. Expert knowledge is a scientific perspective and understanding of industrial and 
environmental hazards, lay knowledge is a public perspective of risk. See Wynne (1996), Marris et al. 
(1997), Krimsky and Golding (1992) for more information.
The Risk Paradigm
3
Ulrich Beck's Risk Society is a study of postindustrial society. Beck (1992) 
argues that multinational corporations make products which contain invisible risks that 
are harmful to individual and global environments. The companies who manufacture 
risks refuse to claim responsibility for then actions and, instead, talk of ‘acceptable risk 
levels’. Sub-political groups, such as Greenpeace, argue that anecdotal evidence 
suggests there are no acceptable levels: they seek to reveal the full extent of the real and 
potential side effects produced by these large industries.
It is my thesis that the issues Ulrich Beck associates with a risk society are the 
same issues utilized in the debate about violence and the mass media. Pro-censorship 
groups and self-appointed moral watchdogs have drawn upon environmental discourses 
in order to engineer a political debate that will lead to legislation and regulation. The 
entertainment industry is presented as a manufacturer of risks. They make a product, for 
example violent movies, which contain side effects that are harmful to individual and 
social environments. The industry may talk of ‘acceptable levels’, but anecdotal 
evidence, such as the James Bulger case, suggests that media violence can lead to real 
violence in our society. Those researchers who claim there is little or no evidence of 
these risks are perceived as part o f the industry. Sub-political gr oups undertake their 
own research which claims to measure the side effects o f television violence. The 
entertainment industry is asked to self-regulate, and legislation is called for.
This chapter will examine this thesis in detail and outline the parallels with 
Beck's theory of risk and the media violence debate. What we shall see is that the
construction of media violence as a type of entertainment that is dangerous and 
hazardous to the environment serves to highlight the origins of this dominant discourse. 
By using Beck’s theoiy o f a risk society, and other social theories of risk, such as 
Kasperson, Renn et al. (1988) and the social amplification of risk, we can re-visit the 
media violence debate in order to understand the social and political implications o f risk 
and the mass media, hi the next section I want to consider the way in which media 
violence is reported in the press in order to highlight how environmental discourses 
frame discussion of this issue.
S i c k  C r a s h  S e x  F i l m  B a n
Two days before Christmas 1996, the Daily M ail ran this sensational headline:
‘Crash Film Go-Ahead May Sink Censors.’1 The Daily M ail chose to highlight this 
news stoiy about the potential cinema release of David Cronenberg's new film Crash
(1996). The film, dubbed a ‘sex and wrecks’ film by the D aily M ail, caused a 
commotion when it was shown first at Cannes, and then the London Film Festival.2 
After seeing the film at Cannes, the Evening Standard, called it ‘beyond the bounds of 
depravity’.3 It took three months before the British Board of Fihn Classification 
(BBFC) chose to grant the film an 18 certificate, uncut, and another three months 
before the film went on general release in Britain in the summer of 1997.4
The short history o f this particular attack on screen violence can, as is so often 
the case, be traced to political and social pressure. One press article after another led to 
the inevitable call for censorship. When the film was due to be screened at the London
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Film Festival the Daily M ail ran a front page headline that said: ‘Ban This Car Crash 
Sex Film’ and began a campaign to stop the film being shown in Britain.5 Following on 
fiom this, the ITV programme The B ig  Story posed the question: ‘Does this film wreck 
lives?’ and then went on to consider children’s interest in toy cars, and computer games 
such as ‘Destruction Derby’ and adult fascination with car- crashes.6 At the same time 
Virginia Bottomley, the then Heritage Secretary for the Conservative Government, 
called for the film to be banned by local authorities because, she claimed, ‘all o f us must 
be worried about material which, if  seen repeatedly, can influence lives’.7 Her 
comments co-incided with national newspaper reportage that politicians had called for 
significant cuts in the levels of screen violence8; this, in turn, came in the wake of the 
morality campaign by Frances Lawrence, the widow of Phillip Lawrence, a headmaster 
who was stabbed to death by schoolboys.9 So significant had the TV violence debate 
become at this time that the Daily Telegraph reported that Virginia Bottomley and 
Michael Howard (the then Home Secretary) had placed ‘pressure on programme 
makers, distributors and censors to consider afiesh the impact of screen violence on 
childr en’ on the fiont page next to a large photograph of Bill Clinton celebrating his re- 
election as President o f the United States.10 The political agenda about the debate on 
screen violence could not be made more obvious.
It is significant that Crash was given its cinematic release one month after the 
British general election.11 Conservative politicians seized the opportunity to use this 
film as a scapegoat for many social fears and concerns about violence in om- society, 
and the BBFC chose to wait until the general election date was fixed before deciding 
when to grant the film a certificate. It is clear' fiom subsequent press coverage of this 
film that a call for increased censorship and regulation of media violence is not confined
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to one political party. According to Rachel Sylvester (1997, p .l) of the Daily 
Telegraph.
Tough proposals to tighten the regulation of sex and violence in films are to be 
put before parliament.. .the move follows reports that James Ferman, the chief 
film censor, is to stand down as head of the BBFC. He has come under pressure 
to resign after he cleared the release of Crash, the film about car crash fetishists, 
earlier this year. Jack Straw, the Home Secretary, is examining proposals to 
overhaul the board...
Thus, Jack Straw, Home Secretary for the Labour Government, is considering the same 
proposals that Virginia Bottomley sanctioned in her press report six months earlier. It 
appears that the Daily M ail’s warning that ‘Crash is the point at which even a liberal 
society should draw the line’ has been heard by New Labour.
Indeed, MPs across all parties are now considering proposals which aim to 
amend the Crime and Disorder Bill; two of the proposals ar gue for radical changes in 
the organization of the BBFC and a separate system of classification for films shown on 
television. Julian Brazier, Tory MP for Canterbury, says: ‘We have got to find ways of 
curbing the way in which videos and films are encour aging the culture of violence by 
glamorising it’ (Sylvester, 1997, p.2). The catalyst for this political re-organization of 
Britain’s censorship and classification laws is the film Crash. In the next section I want 
to consider how the debate about Crash reveals a dominant discourse associated with 
screen violence, a type of discourse which can be found to appear regularly in 
newspapers such as the Daily Mail.
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T h e  D o m i n a n t  D i s c o u r s e
The way in which politicians, social commentators, and journalists discuss the 
perceived threat o f Crash as an unmoral and depraved film which glamorises violence 
can be seen to be part of a dominant discourse that shapes the way in which we consider 
media violence and social communication. Comments such as this one by Bel Mooney 
(1996, p.5) wilting about the danger of films like Crash in the Daily M ail will serve to 
illustrate this:
I am proud to call myself a liberal, but I cannot see why freedom of expression 
must mean the freedom to peddle violence and pomography...Over many a 
dinner table I have argued that unless people like myself take a stand against the 
seemingly endless downward spiral o f sex and violence in books, film and on 
television, the world that I was bom into will disappear forever, and we shall 
allow our children to inherit a moral vacuum, not a civilised community.
This type of discourse focuses on the social and moral implications o f the negative 
effects of screen violence. There is a particular type of rhetoric which is common to this 
way of discussing media violence. The repetition of key words such as ‘evil’, 
‘depraved’, ‘saturated’ and ‘risk’ used in press coverage of notorious violent movies 
such as Crash, or Child's Play 3 are common. For example, Christopher Tookey (1996, 
p.6) o f the Daily M ail claims that Crash ‘promulgates a twisted morality o f its 
own...and clearly runs counter to any moral consensus’, while Nigel Reynolds writes in 
the Daily Telegraph. ‘The film is morally vacuous, nasty, violent and little more than an 
excuse to string together one scene after another of sexual intercourse,’13 David 
Buckingham (1996, p.25) notes the same type of discourse in his analysis of the Child's 
Play 3 furore. He writes:
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Looking across the press coverage o f the (James Bulger) case, a very familiar 
rhetoric emerges. Violence is being ‘pumped into our living rooms’. Young 
people are ‘saturated’, ‘hooked’ and ‘corrupted’: then ‘impressionable minds’ 
are ‘bombarded’ and ‘warped’. The videos themselves are described as ‘an 
addictive pollutant’: they are ‘evil’, ‘sick’, ‘brutalising’, ‘poisonous’...The scale 
of the problem is enormous - and it must be contained by firm and decisive 
action. This ‘stuff must be stopped.
What this rhetoric indicates is that screen violence is presented as a product that can 
poison impressionable minds. This product is addictive; it is evil; it is everywhere. 
What is more, it can influence future generations, and thus, Bel Mooney’s impassioned 
plea for a moral society where children can grow up safe and secure from the evils of 
the world is one that is echoed time and again in the argument against media violence.
The dominant discourse associated with media violence is not new and, indeed, 
researchers have shown it is cyclical in nature (see Pearson, 1983, Barker, 1984, 1997a, 
Kidd-Hewitt and Osborne, 1996). Graham Murdock (1997, p.67)) charts ‘an 
archaeology of popular* anxieties’ which are related, not just to violent movies, but to 
popular* culture in general. Murdock (1997, p.67) writes: ‘The... image of direct effects 
draws its power from a deep reservoir o f social fear* and dogma which first formed in 
the mid-nineteenth century.’ Popular* entertainments such as ‘penny dreadfuls’ and 
coverage o f crime in popular* newspapers became the subject of moral campaigns. 
Murdock (1997, p.68) writes: ‘Commentators were quick to see them as both a potent 
symptom of moral decline and a powerful new incitement to anti-social behaviour*.’ 
Thus, concerts and theatr es were seen to corrupt the young and new popular* media were 
described by one professor in 1904 as having the same kind of ‘evil effects as syphilis 
or leprosy’ (Murdock, 1997, p.77).
As Murdock shows, it did not take long for popular culture to become the 
subject of moral campaigns, and for popular texts to be demonized by the press. Crime 
movies in the 1930s were die subject o f sustained media campaigns, and in the 1950s, 
children's comics were also targeted as a ‘powerful new incitement to anti-social 
behaviour’ (Murdoch, 1997, p.68). As Martin Barker (1984b) revealed in A Haunt o f  
Fears: the Strange History o f  the British Horror Comics Campaign, such media 
campaigns led to acts of censorship which had very little to do with the actual content 
of the texts themselves, and more to do with the political and social climate at the time.
Thus, the dominant discourse surrounding screen violence is not new, and we 
can see that fear s concerning media violence regularly become the news topic of the 
day. The question we must ask is: how can we understand this phenomenon in relation 
to wider social issues and concerns? One common response is to refer to the work of 
Cohen and Young (1973) and the role of the media in the construction of ‘moral 
panics’. Cohen and Young (1973) demonstrated in The M anufacture o f  News: 
Deviance, Social Problems and the M ass M edia  that ‘moral panics’ are engendered by 
media fantasies and can be based on a wide variety of topics, ranging fiom bicycles to 
drug-taking hippies.14 Stanley Cohen (1972, p. 172), in Folk Devils and  M oral Panics, 
examines the media's tendency to ‘over-report’ the confrontations between mods and 
rockers in the 1960s, and subsequently create a moral panic. What Cohen calls an 
‘amplification spiral’ can be seen in the way the press campaigned to ban penny 
dreadfuls, or films like Crash. When Christopher Tookey (a film critic for the Daily 
M ail), speaking on BBC's Heart o f  the M atter, says: ‘I don't consider myself 
particularly at risk fiom sado masochistic eroticizing films; I've no doubt that others 
would be more at risk’15 he is referring to a common fear* that weaker members of 
society are more vulnerable to the negative effects of media violence. However, as
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Julian Petley (1997, p.87) points out, ‘lurking behind these fears about the "corruption 
of innocent minds" one finds, time and again, a potent strain of class dislike and fear.’16 
It is this ‘potent strain of class dislike and fear*’ that is one aspect which can fuel the 
‘deviancy amplification spiral’ and lead to a moral panic.
Thus, it can be seen that concerns about media violence are in fact concerns 
about class, youth, ethnicity and gender and are manufactured by the media in order to 
mobilise support for the control o f these socially constructed ‘problems’ (see Cohen and 
Young, 1973; Kidd-Hewitt and Osbome, 1995). Whilst this way of thinking about the 
more macro-sociological issues associated with the media violence debate is both useful 
and significant to our understanding of this phenomenon, it still does not help to explain 
why the dominant discourse associated with media violence has been and continues to 
be so successful. Moral panics and the amplification spiral focus on how the media 
manufactures social ‘problems’; it does not tell us how other factors, such as anti­
violence campaign groups, or multinational screen entertainment industries fit into the 
socially constructed ‘problem’ of media violence. Therefore, in the next section I want 
to consider the significance of ‘risk’, not just as a term of reference, but as a social and 
political movement in its own right that has far* reaching consequences for our 
understanding of the role the mass media has to play in our society. The first place to 
begin is with an overview of the work of Ulrich Beck, as it is his theoretical paradigm 
of ‘the risk society’ that helps to situate risk analysis away fiom the field o f science, and 
into the arena o f politics and social change.
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U l r i c h  B e c k :  R i s k  S o c i e t y
The publicity blurb for Ulrich Beck's Risk Society: Towards a New M odernity 
calls it a ‘panoramic analysis o f the condition of Western societies (which) has already 
been hailed as a classic.’17 Risk Society was first published in Beck's native Germany in 
1986, and it was only translated and published in this country in 1992. Between 1986 
and 1992 the book has become a ‘classic’ sociological text, and is widely seen as one of 
tlie first books to popularize the notion of ‘risk analysis', something that has now 
become an international industry, with books, conferences and courses addressing the 
concept o f ‘risk’.
Risk Society has two central premises. The first concerns ‘reflexive 
modernization’. Beck (1992, p. 10) describes this as follows: ‘Just as modernization 
dissolved the structure of feudal society in the nineteenth century and produced the 
industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society and another 
modernity is coming into being.’ For Beck, all societies must evolve; they must become 
‘reflexive’ if  the relationships between social structures and social agents are to change. 
Reflexive modernization requires that social agents, such as husbands and wives, 
recognise the choices they make in the workplace and at home are culturally imposed, 
not chosen freely. Individuals must break loose from these structures, and ‘reflect upon 
and flexibly restructure the rules and resources of the workplace and then leisure time’ 
(Beck, 1992, p.3).
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Beck's second theory is o f the most significance to the dominant discourse of 
media violence. In an industrial society, science and technology are seen as positive, 
guiding forces in social change, hi a risk society, science and technology represent risks 
and hazards which have a global impact and can affect generations of lives. Beck (1992, 
p.20,21) writes:
In the modernization process, more and more destructive forces are also being 
unleashed, forces before which the human imagination stands in awe... The 
concept o f risk is directly bound to the concept of reflexive modernization. Risk 
may be defined as a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities 
induced and introduced by modernization itself.
Thus, Beck (1992, p.58) believes that a ‘narrow-minded belief in progress’ has led to a 
‘techno-scientific rationality’ where science is allowed to overshadow natural resources. 
It is only recently, in the face o f denial fiom multi-national corporations, that the risks 
and hazards associated with ‘techno-science’ have become part of public debate.
Beck argues that as science has become de-mystified, the social recognition of 
risks has become more commonplace. As illustration, Beck (1992, p.60) compares a 
pre-sixties instruction sheet on what to do in the event o f a nuclear war, with 
contemporary understanding of the hazards associated with nuclear* power, hr 1959, 
West Germany informed its public to ‘immediately jump into a hole, a pit or ditch’ to 
protect themselves fiom the ‘thermal effects’ o f an atomic bomb. Such instructions 
appear* ludicrous in the light of current public knowledge on the effects o f nuclear* 
radiation.
Modernization Risks
It is the need for economic productivity that has led to a repression of the risks 
and hazards associated with certain products. Now, Beck (1992, p.61) argues, the side 
effects have developed voices o f their own. They have revealed themselves to the 
public eye. Beck writes:
People themselves have become small, private alternative experts in risks of 
modernization...They no longer need to ponder the problems of then* situation. 
What scientists call ‘latent side effects’ and ‘unproven connections’ are for them 
their* ‘coughing children’ who turn blue in foggy weather and gasp for air* with a 
rattle in then* throat. On then* side o f the fence, ‘side effects’ have voices, faces, 
eyes and tears...For* them risks are not risks, but pitifully suffering, screaming 
children turning blue. It is die children diey fight for.
Thus, in Germany, the side effects o f sulphur* dioxide develop human voices, and 
parents whose children suffer fiom pseudo-croup begin to question the established 
acceptable values for pollutants: they join citizens' gr oups and demand for reductions in 
national levels o f pollutants.
A similar example can be drawn fiom the British government denial of Gulf 
war* syndrome. Only recently, after six years of denial, has the government admitted 
that organo-phosphate pesticides were extensively used throughout the Gulf war*. 
Evidence fiom citizens' groups has already established that organo-phosphate pesticides 
can be extremely harmful, not just to the person exposed, but to future generations. This 
government about-turn on Gulf war syndr ome comes as a victory for the National Gulf 
Veterans and Families Associations (NGVFA), which repeatedly emphasised the side- 
effects soldiers were experiencing after the war. With the help of the Guardian in 1993, 
it was revealed that Gulf veterans' fertility had been adversely affected and then* 
children showed abnormal incidence of birth defects. Three years later, the then 
Conservative government finally admitted to the source of such illness, and a new
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Labour government has ordered n e w  research into ‘Gulf W a r  S y n d r o m e ’.18 If it were 
not for the strength of anecdotal evidence, press pictures of babies fighting for survival 
and the pressure applied b y the N G V F A ,  no  response would have been forthcoming at 
all.19
A c c e p ta b le  L e v e ls
B e c k  (1992, p.63) writes in s o m e  detail about the denial of risk. H e  believes that 
scientists block citizens' accounts of side-effects b y  demanding that strict causality must 
be proven. A s  the account regarding Gulf war* syndr o m e  indicates, proving causality 
can take a long time, and can endanger lives. Victims of side effects experience a loss of 
reality as their* illnesses and injuries are denied in the face of scientific measurements 
and statistics. Acceptable levels, or, as B e c k  (1992, p.64, 65) calls it, ‘the acid rain 
dance’, can be the main barrier to official acceptance of risk:
Acceptable levels...are the retreat of a civilization supplying itself in surplus 
with pollutants and toxic substances. T h e  really rather obvious d e m a n d  for non­
poisoning is rejected as utopian. A t  the same time, the bit of poisoning being set 
d o w n  becomes normality. It disappears behind the acceptable levels. Acceptable 
levels m a k e  possible a permanent ration of collective standar dized poisoning.
Thus, acceptable levels permit toxicity and cancel out the real side-effects that are being 
produced: they m a k e  t h e m  ‘h a r m / e ^ ’ (Beck, 1992, p.65). W h a t  is more, acceptable 
levels of toxicity contain u n k n o w n  elements, poisons and toxins which have not yet 
been identified, and are therefore freely introduced into our* environment
O f  course, as the Gulf war* syndrome case points out, real people are affected by 
‘acceptable levels’. A n d  it is only once a substantial n u m b e r  of real ‘victims’ have
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stepped forward and claimed a causal connection between organo-phosphate pesticides 
and birth defects that what is ‘acceptable’ can be questioned at all. A s  B e c k  (1992, p.69) 
says: ‘W e  are concerned...with a permanent large-scale experiment, requiring the 
involuntary h u m a n  subjects to report o n  the accumulating s y m p t o m s  of toxicity 
amongst themselves.’ A n d  even then, the burden of proof is still placed with the 
‘victim’, not those responsible for ‘acceptable level toxicity’.
T h e  P o litic iza tio n  o f  R is k
B e c k  (1992, p.73) believes there has been an about-turn, a ‘cultural risk 
consciousness’ which has led to the social recognition and politicization of risk. W h e r e  
as thirty years ago people were helpless against the invisible threat of air pollutants and 
fertiliser toxins, n o w  people have begun to speculate on invisible threats to their health 
and to then future (Beck, 1992, p.73). Speculation leads to social and political action. 
B e c k  (1992, p.77) writes:
Suddenly the problems are simply there, without justification, as pure, explosive 
challenges to action. People emerge fiom behind the conditions and objective 
constraints. Causes turn into causators and issue statements. ‘Side effects’ speak 
up, organize, go to court, assert themselves, refuse to be diverted any longer. 
These are the dynamics of reflexive politicization, producing risk consciousness 
and conflict.
These examples of ‘reflexive politicization’ lead to what B e c k  (1992, p. 195) terms ‘a 
de-centralization of politics’. A  large n u m b e r  of citizen's initiative groups and political 
m o v e m e n t s  resist state audiority and b e c o m e  sub-political groups which utilize the 
judiciary and media publicity to effectively campaign for environmental protection, or
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organic foodstuffs. These sub-political groups d e m a n d  personal responsibility, they 
d e m a n d  n e w  legislation to reduce levels of risk. W h a t  w a s  once non-political, and the 
subject of m a n a g e m e n t  meetings o n production processes and the disposal of waste, has 
n o w  b e c o m e  political, a ‘hot potato for governmental policy-making’, which, as B e c k  
(1992, p.78) points out, can compete with problems of unemployment, 01* law and 
order, w h e n  it com es  to opinion polls.
There are t w o  types of pressure that c o m e  with public criticism of ‘acceptable 
levels’, and the development of sub-political groups which politicize risk. Th e  first type 
of pressure concerns multinational corporations w h o  have unleashed such harmful 
products on  the environment. These corporations are asked to self-regulate. This can 
lead to t w o  options: eliminate the product, or cause of risk, at a primary stage; or, 
produce a n e w  product which will eliminate the cause of risk at a secondary stage. B e c k  
(1992, p. 160) believes that the second option is most c o m m o n l y  taken because this 
transforms risks into developmental opportunities.
T h e  second type of pressure concerns the government, w h o  are asked to 
intervene and control and/or eliminate levels of environmental hazards. B e c k  (1992, 
p.80) calls this a ‘legitimate totalitarianism of hazard prevention’. H e  explains:
T h e  political ‘side effects’ of civilization's ‘side effects’ threaten the continued 
existence of the democratic political system. That system is caught in the 
unpleasant dilemma of either failing in the face of the systematically produced 
hazards, or suspending fundamental democratic principles through the addition 
of authoritarian, repressive ‘buttresses’.
Thus, the right to intervene, and prevent individual and global hazards, creates a 
politicization of risk that is highly undemocratic. It is Beck's assertion that one of the 
essential tasks of a future risk society is to create an alternative me t ho d  of dealing with
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risk (Beck, 1992, pp.231-234). O n e  such m ethod is ‘differential politics’ where with the 
aid of flexibility and reflexivity sub-political groups can legitimate ‘the moralization of 
industrial production’ (Beck, 1992, p.222).
Risk Society presents a global theory of understanding contemporary society. 
Beck's theories regarding environmental pollution and social conflict have been m u c h  
discussed and widely praised. T h e  British sociologist Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991) 
agrees with Beck's theory regarding reflexive modernization. H o w e v e r  such writing has 
remained clearly within the discipline of sociology. It is m y  theory that Beck's concept 
of risk, and other ar eas of risk analysis, can be applied to the mass media, hi the next 
section I w o u l d like to outline the relationship between risk theories and media 
violence, a relationship which will prove central to understanding the dominant 
discourse associated with this emotive topic.
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R i s k  a n d  M e d i a  v io l e n c e
O n e  of the key changes that B e c k  notes in his analysis of risk awareness is the 
point where risks that were once invisible b e c o m e  visible. T h e  visibility of risk is 
significant to the w a y  in which the perceived negative effects of media violence are 
discussed and scientifically examined. T h e  visibility of risk and media violence takes on 
m a n y  forms. These ‘risks’ can be to the individual and to society as a whole. There are 
three c o m m o n  negative ‘effects’ associated with media violence. T h e  National 
Television Violence Survey ( N T V S )  is a large research p r o g r a m m e  (based at the 
Universities of California, North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin) which attempts to
measure the effects of television violence. In a recent report it identified: ‘three primary 
types of harmful effects associated with viewing violence: learning aggressive attitudes 
and behaviours, becoming desensitized to real-world violence, and developing a fear of 
being victimized b y  crime’ ( N T V S ,  1996, p.viii). These three types of harmful effects 
have all been the subject of a great deal of scientific research. Belson (1978) found that 
high exposure to television violence increases the degree to which serious acts of real- 
life aggression will be committed b y adolescent boys; V a n  Evra (1990, pp.96-97) 
reports o n a substantial b od y  of evidence that suggests violence on  television 
desensitizes viewers: those w h o  are used to watching violence are less shocked b y the 
violence watched than other types of viewers; and Gerbner, Gross, M o r g a n  and 
Signorelli (1980, 1986) argue that heavy viewers of television violence develop a 
distorted view of society and b e c o m e  mo r e  fearful of crime.
It is possible to see that the perceived risks of media violence affect individuals 
and the social environment. T h e  ‘copycat’ effect is believed to be a result of the 
glamorization of violence on television and film: impressionable and vulnerable 
television viewers m a y  be exposed to this type of media violence and attempt to imitate 
this behaviour in real life: such a risk affects individual behaviour, particularly the 
behaviour of young children w h o  m a y  not be able to differentiate between real violence 
and fictional violence. T h e  desensitization effect is believed to be a result of an 
individual’s propensity to watch too m u c h  violence; such viewing patterns can distort 
perceptions of real violence and the risk of watching increased amounts of violence is 
that viewers will cease to be sensitive to real violence and the suffering of others. The 
effect of developing a fear of real-life crime is believed to be the result of watching 
increased amounts of violence o n  television which only distort the risks of real 
violence; thus, a viewer of media violence perceives greater risks of real violence than
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there actually are in the community. All of these risks affect the individual and the 
social c o mm unity and are believed to be visible risks that can be measured and 
scientifically proven as hazardous and unsafe.
There is certainly a case to be m a d e  for the negative effects of media violence, 
and researchers such as George Gerbner (1988,1994), or E d  Domierstein (1981, N T V S ,  
1996), and writers such as Michael M e d v e d  (1992) have argued vociferously for a 
reduction in the risks and hazards of media violence. Th e y  base then* argument o n  the 
high visibility of such ‘risks’, and their ai m  is to increase risk awareness in relation to 
media violence. However, the visibility of risk is as m u c h  to do with media publicity as 
to do with the actual side effects of economic products. In the case of media violence, 
once the link has been made, media publicity can in fact generate perceptions of risk, 
and label films such as Natural Born K illers a health hazard, w h e n  in fact n o causal 
comiections have been m a d e  at all b y any injured parties. In this way, a film like 
Natural Born K illers is perceived to be part of the entertainment industry and therefore 
capable of producing risks to the environment; once perceived to be capable of such 
acts, Natural Born K illers is allegedly linked with copycat murders, and desensitization, 
the two most c o m m o n  side effects of screen violence. These allegations in the press 
lead to further allegations by  social and political commentators, and the government is 
called upon to produce n e w  legislation to deal with this risk.
Therefore, although a case can be m a d e  for the negative effects of media 
violence and the risks this poses to vulnerable viewers, such as children, a case can also 
be m a d e  that researchers and social and political commentators construct such risks, and 
manufacture a campaign against media violence in order to achieve political and social 
change. This is an example of what Ingmar Palmlund (1996, p. 199) calls ‘the social 
d r a m a’ of risk evaluation. Palmlund (1996, pp.209-210) writes:
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T h e  plot in social dramas over technological risk reflects t w o  opposing impulses 
in m o d e m ,  industrialised society: the celebration of technological progress as 
against the protection of the health, safety, and property rights of individuals. 
T h e  conflicts from these opposing impulses are m a d e  visible b y  a precipitating 
event -  real or socially constructed -  that fuels the underlying dissatisfaction 
and frames it as anxiety over certain technological risk.
Thus, it can be seen the media violence controversy is a conflict of t wo opposing 
impulses, and that w h e n  a precipitating event occurs it is an event which is socially 
constructed in order to fuel underlying dissatisfaction and anxiety about the perceived 
risks of media violence. W e  can see this most clearly in ‘moral panics’ such as the 
James Bulger case, the Dunblane massacre, or the controversy over Crash.
Palmlund (1996, p.210) lists five criteria which must be me t  if a specific 
technological risk will b e c o m e  a social controversy:
1. T h e  risk should be tied to effects that appear* familiar and close to people.
2. T h e  effects should stir u p  emotions of flight and fear*.
3. T h e  risk should concern a large or important enough group of people for 
politicians and senior administrators to worry about their support.
4. Raising the issue of risk in national politics should not obviously threaten 
fundamental national interests of major importance.
5. Tire issue should ideally be such that the mass media can grasp it and assist 
politicians in placing it and keeping it on the agenda in national politics so 
as to satisfy the public’s need of spectacular dr ama.
All of these criteria fit the social controversy of media violence. T h e  ‘risks’ of media 
violence ar e familiar* and close to m e m b e r s  of the public because film and television is a 
popular* form of entertainment. T h e  perceived negative effects of media violence ‘stir up 
emotions of flight and fear*’ because of the shocking nature of certain types of media 
violence and because the ‘risks’ concern children and vulnerable m e m b e r s  of the 
community. Those people w h o  fear* the ‘risks’ of media violence represent a large
proportion of the voting public, and therefore politicians and senior administrators are 
concerned enough to address such issues in order to w in votes and retain support. W e  
can see this most clearly w h e n  President Clinton called for a ‘violence s u mmit5 in the 
run up to the recent presidential election (see Time, 1996, and Variety, 1996). Raising 
die issue of the ‘risks’ of media violence does not threaten ‘fundamental national 
issues’, such as health or unemployment, and the issue is emotive and dramatic enough 
for the mass media to assist politicians and anti-violence campaign groups in keeping it 
o n the agenda in national politics.
I want to examine this theory of die social drama of risk in m o r e  detail in the 
following sections. Fust, I wou ld  like to consider die role of citizens' activation groups 
and pro-censorship campaigns, as these are the next stages in the formation of Beck's 
risk society. W h a t  w e  shall see fiom an examination of diese sub-political groups is diat 
non-governmental organizations can choose to b e c o m e  caught u p  in the ‘social dram a ’ 
of risk (Palmlund, 1996, p. 199) and, as social actors, adopt a criteria for campaigning 
against media violence that aims to create social controversy and change.
C h ris tia n  C a m p a ig n  G ro u p s
It is not difficult to relate the entertainment industry to other multi-national 
corporations like ICI, or C o c a  Cola. Multinational screen entertainment industries are 
concerned with economic development and produce consumable goods to achieve that 
end result. Large companies such as Ti m e- W a m e r ,  or die Disney Company, and 
entrepreneurs such as Rupert M u r d o c h  control m u c h  of our cinema, television, 
advertising and electronic communication (see Giddens, 1997, pp.382-388; Lull, 1995; 
Waters, 1995). T h e  globalizing of die media ensures that ‘a world information order -
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an international system of production, distribution and consumption of informational 
goods -  has c o m e  into being’ (Giddens, 1997, pp.396-397). O n c e  this connection has 
been made, anyone interested in campaigning for reduced levels of media violence has 
only to turn to the dominant discourse o n  the risks and hazards associated with 
multinational industries and chemical products to see the w a y  forward for the success of 
then* o w n  campaign.
O n  an international level, there are m a n y  citizens groups which support 
censorship, and are anti media violence. In the U S A ,  there are large organizations such 
as the National Coalition on Television Violence ( NC T V) ,  the National Council for 
Families and Television (NCFT), Americans for Responsible Television (ART), to 
n a m e  but a few. T h e  significance of these campaign groups in relation to risk awar eness 
and the politicization of media violence (for example the V-chip, a micro-chip which 
can regulate television viewing) will be discussed later in this chapter.
In Britain, the largest and most active organizations which campaign against 
media violence are Christian Action Research and Education (CAR E ),  the M o v e m e n t  
for Christian D e m o c r a c y  ( M C D ) ,  the National Viewers and Listeners Association 
( N V A L A )  and a m o r e  recent, as yet unofficial, body, the Parliamentary All Party 
Family and Child Protection G r o u p ( P A P F C P G ) . 20 William T h o m p s o n  (1992) and 
A.J.B. Barratt (1995, 1997) have researched these campaign groups in s o m e  detail. 
Banatt (1997, pp.1-2) writes:
These groups are engaged in a political struggle over lifestyle choices of 
society: attacks o n television, cinema and video form only one fiont in the battle 
against the ‘permissive society’ which stands opposed to the fundamentalist 
Christian ideal. Both C A R E  and M C D  actively campaign against 
homosexuality, abortion, euthanasia, genetic engineering, and single-parenthood 
in their support of ‘traditional’ family life underpinned b y  Christian morality. 
However, headline grabbing stories are mo r e often associated with their* actions
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in support of ever stricter regulation of the media. Audio-visual media 
(television, cinema, video) c o m e  under fire because they are seen b y  these 
groups to actively promote humanistic and amoral lifestyle choices... the 
ultimate a im of these groups, to found and maintain a society built upon the 
basis of Biblical standards, will not be realised if the media are allowed to 
support values which run counter to this ideal.
Barratt’s point about religious fundamentalism and non-govemmental organizations is a 
significant one in relation to risk and environmentalism. Just as Christian campaign 
groups argue for ‘a society built u p o n  the basis of biblical standards’ (Barratt, 1997, 
p.2) so too do environmental groups argue for a society built u p o n  the basis of 
nature as the collective good. Klaus Eder (1996, p.213) writes: ‘Life histories of 
environmental m o v e m e n t  activists clearly s h o w  that religious motivations have in 
fact played a major role in the engagement of “caring” for nature. M e m b e r s  of 
traditional Christian churches have played a major role in the environmentalist 
m o v e m e n t . ’ C A R E  and M C D  believe that the mass media promotes amoral lifestyles, 
and in the words of D r  Clifford Hill, a key figure in the P G V E ’s report on ‘video 
nasties’ in 1983, and the P A P F C P G ’s recent report Violence, Pornography and the 
M edia: ‘in order to effect basic changes to the structures of society w e  have to change 
tire values of society’ (cited in Barratt, 1997, p.2). T h e  environmentalist m o v e m e n t  also 
challenges the w a y  in which industrial products promote environmentally unfriendly 
lifestyles, and they defend the value of natur e, arguing for an environmental ethics that 
will change the values of society (Eder, 1996, p.211).
W e  can see evidence of this link between religious fundamentalism and 
environmentalism in the w a y  that campaign groups like C A R E  or the N V A L A  
carefully outline then central aims with regard to violence and the mass media. For 
example, the N V A L A  (1997) states:
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T h e  Association campaigns for: higher standards in the media; the eradication 
of pornography and violence; bad language and blasphemy to be cleaned 
up;...wholesome family viewing helping to strengthen marriage and family 
life;...the portrayal of good moral behaviour and standards.
T h e  mass media is something that must be controlled. Without this control a ‘permanent 
ration of collective standardized poisoning'’(Beck, 1992, p.65) w o ul d  take place. Note 
the w a y  the N V A L A  talk of ‘w ho lesome family viewing’ and ‘good moral behaviour’ 
as if these factors are under threat, are being ‘poisoned’ b y  the entertainment industry
Similarly, C A R E  is a Christian charity that specializes in issues affecting family 
life, in particular* children. It began as the Nationwide Festival of Light ( N F O L )  in 
1971, but quickly re-organized itself to b e c o m e  a m o r e  effective lobbying organisation. 
It n o w  has a membership of 80,000, and a head office only five minutes a w a y  fiom die 
Houses of Parliament (see Barratt, 1995, p.22, and Thompson, 1992). C A R E  (1994, 
pp.27,28, 33) states:
It has been involved in assessing the impact of the media on  society for over 
twenty years. Through its separate non-charitable lobbying arm, C A R E  
Campaigns, C A R E  has sought changes to legislation affecting broadcasting and 
other media. In particular*, w e  have been involved with the Protection of 
Children Act 1978, the Indecent Displays (Control) Act 1981, the Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982, the Video Recordings Act 
1984, the Broadcasting Act 1990 and several Parliamentary attempts to reform 
the 1959 Obscene Publications Act...CARE believes that violent and sexually 
explicit videos, television and other media can have a very damaging effect on 
children, especially if they have repeated exposure to such media...We 
r e c o m m e n d  a review of the law to assess the differences in arrangements for- 
controlling the content of different media.
A s  can be seen fiom this extract taken fiom the H o m e  Affairs Committee o n Video 
Violence and Young Offenders (1994), C A R E  is a campaign group of s o m e  power. It 
has set up a non-charitable lobby group, C A R E  Campaigns, in order to successfully
campaign against, a m o n g  other things, media violence. C A R E  uses the rhetoric of risk, 
identifying children as the focus of then concern, identifying the ‘repeated exposure’ of 
media violence as a dangerous threat to children, and calling for control and censorship 
of such modernization products before it is too late. This m ethod of focusing o n  the 
protection of children is a c o m m o n  campaign issue used b y C A R E ,  the M C D  and the 
N V A L A .  A s  T h o m p s o n  (1992, p.86) notes: ‘the protection of children, rather than the 
threat of moral decline, (becomes) the major public justification for further controls 
(and) alternative legislation’ of media violence.
A n d  C A R E  has not been slow to campaign against all aspects of media 
violence, including radio, television, computer games and the internet. A s  C A R E  states, 
it has been involved in numerous acts of government legislation with regal’d  to media 
violence, and has been successful in achieving results. In 1984, following the ‘video 
nasties’ scare the Video Recordings A ct ( V R A )  1984 w a s  introduced which required 
that all videos must be classified b y the British Board of Film Classification (BBFC). 
F r o m  1982 to 1984 the B B F C  and the video industry operated a voluntary code which 
regulated types of videos, however, following a successful campaign by  C A R E ,  with 
the help of the Parliamentary Group Video Enquiry ( P G V E )  and a report on ‘video 
nasties’ in 1983, the V R A  1984 w a s  pushed through parliament to co-incide with the 
Conservative general election (see Barker, 1984).
Th e  H o m e  Affairs Committee’s report on Video Violence and Young Offenders 
in 1994 also led to significant amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill. In this instance 
C A R E ,  and another Christian campaign group, the M o v e m e n t  for Christian Demo c ra c y 
( M C D )  conducted a moral campaign which once again utilized the media and social 
and political commentators to achieve results (Barratt, 1995, p.22, 23). In the w a k e  of 
the James Bulger case in 1993, David Alton, the then Liberal Democrat M P  w h o  is also
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a leading figure in the M C D ,  tabled for amendments to the Criminal Justice Bill; ‘the 
a m e n d m e n t  proposed that any video recording should be banned for private use "either 
because it presents an inappropriate role model for children, or because it is likely to 
cause psychological h a r m  to a child"’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.27). Alton's a m e n d m e n t  
had been devised at a meeting b y  the M C D  in March, 1994. Although Alton's 
a m e n d m e n t  w a s  withdrawn, Michael Howard, the then H o m e  Secretary, introduced an 
a m e n d m e n t  that placed tighter restrictions on  regulation of the entertainment industry 
which shared m a n y  similarities with Alton's original proposal.
Here, t w o  sub-political groups, C A R E  and M C D ,  engineered media publicity 
and public opinion to place pressure on  the government, and what is n o w  called the 
Criminal Justice Act 1994 is proof of then success. H o w  they achieved this is 
significant and selves as an illustration of the ‘social dra m a’ of risk (Palmlund, 1996). 
hi April 1994, just t wo weeks before David Alton's proposed a m e n d m e n t  to the 
Criminal Justice Bill w a s  due to reach the floor of the House of C o m m o n s ,  a report w as 
published by  Elizabeth N e w s o n  (1994), a child psychologist. Christopher Graffius, then 
Secretary-General of the M C D  and personal assistant to David Alton commissioned this 
report, titled Video Violence and the Protection o f Children, which claimed to present 
overwhelming evidence that media violence causes h a r m  to children. Martin Barker 
(1997a, p. 12) comments:
( M C D )  had spoken of gratuitously violent films and videos, and h o w  bad they 
ar e for the young. A n d  they had played on the memories of recent cases where 
young people, even children, had so obviously gone to the bad. A n d  they had 
got their argument into every newspaper in the land, and onto m a n y  radio and 
television programmes. T h e  effect, as then Parliamentary sponsor David Alton 
himself put it, w a s  that they had ‘changed the terms of reference’ in which 
‘films of this kind’ wou ld  henceforth be discussed.
69
70
It is possible to see fiom the evidence so far h o w  campaign groups such as C A R E  or the 
M C D  have m a n a g e d  to ‘change the terms of reference’ in relation to media violence. It 
is then* utilization of the rhetoric of risk that has enabled such a change to take place and 
it is their adherence to the five criteria Palmlund outlines as necessary to create social 
controversy that has m a d e  the visibility of the ‘risks’ of media violence so successful. 
H i e  N e w s o n  Report m a d e  the effects of media violence familiar and close to people in 
the w a y  in which it concentrated o n  the c o m m o n  sense assumption that if ‘children had 
gone to the bad’ it must be because of ‘video nasties’. The report stirred up feelings of 
fiight and fear, and because it focused o n the protection of children, the report w as 
taken seriously b y  concerned parents, politicians and the media, w h o  grasped the ‘social 
d r am a ’ of the situation and m a n a g e d  to assist M C D  in ‘keeping it o n  die agenda in 
national politics so as to satisfy the public’s need of spectacular d r am a ’ (Palmlund, 
1996, p.210).
T h e  fact that there is little research into the role of Christian campaign groups 
and the media violence debate also minors the w a y  in which the role of N G O s  and 
technoscience has been neglected b y  risk researchers.22 Eder and Jamison m a k e  it quite 
clear that environmental groups are powerful and effective political m o v e me n ts  and 
have helped shape risk consciousness and conflict. According to Jamison (1996, p.242):
N G O s  are becoming significant in the social shaping of science and technology, 
particularly in the environmental field. Organisations like the W o r l d  Resources 
Institute and Worldwatch Institute have be c o m e  highly effective in their 
production and dissemination of environmental information, and their various 
publications are widely read b y  other actors, as well as b y  the general public. 
T h e y  have become, in m y  terms, crucial ‘translators’ of academic research 
findings into the discourse of science and technology policy. N o r  should this 
surprise us; this is the veiy task for which they were established. W h a t  should 
surprise us, however, is that then* role in the contemporary world of 
technoscience is so unexamined.
Similarly, T h o m p s o n  (1992) and Barratt (1997) have both argued that the role of 
Christian campaign groups in the media violence debate is significant. W e  have 
examined h o w  groups such as C A R E  and M C D  have b e c o m e  ‘effective in their 
production and dissemination of.. .information’ and what I want to consider in the next 
section is h o w  anti-violence campaign groups have also b e c o m e  ‘translators’ of 
academic research findings. T h e N e w s o n  Report is one example of this, and a m o r e  
recent report o n  Violence, Pornography and the Media b y the campaign group 
P A P F C P G  will n o w  be examined in detail in order to reveal that the role of ‘science’ 
and ‘research’ is not objective, but is instead another component in the ‘social drama’ of 
risk.
‘V io len ce , P o rn o g ra p h y  a n d  th e  M e d ia 9
A  recent report, Violence Pornography and the Media, w a s  submitted by the 
Parliamentary All Party Family and Child Protection Group ( P A P F C P G )  to both 
Houses of Parliament in June 1996. T h e  report w a s  distributed by, amongst others, 
David Alton of the M C D ,  and Charlie Colchester and Claire Wilson-Thomas of C A R E .  
Through analyzing this report, it is possible to see Beck's theory of ‘reflexive 
politicization’ (1992, p.77) and Palmlund’s theory of the ‘social d r a m a ’ of risk (1996, 
p.210) in action. T h e  report collects together anecdotal evidence from teachers, social 
workers, paediatricians and the police about the causal link between media violence and 
aggressive acts. It also includes an opinion poll which suggests that 6 5 %  of the British 
public are concerned about sex and violence used for entertainment in the media 
( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p.4). H i e report says that there has been a shift in public opinion;
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n o w  that m o r e  people o w n  videos and computers, children have greater access to the 
media and are therefore m o r e  at ‘risk’. Children are seen as ‘vulnerable viewers’ w h o  
m a y  ‘blur the distinction between fact and fantasy’ if they have experienced ‘repeated 
exposure to violent.. .material on  the screen’ ( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p. 12,14).
In a key passage, the report links researchers w h o  refute claims of causal-effects 
as mouthpieces for the entertainment industry. It says ( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p. 13):
There has always been a powerful lobby for m a n y  years claiming that there is 
n o causal connection between violence portrayed on  die screen and that taking 
place in society. These claims have always been promoted and publicised by 
parts of the television and video industry...Some have considered that an 
unrealistic requirement for m o r e  definitive research m a y  be used as a 
m e c h a n i s m  for delaying policy change...
T h e  report m a k e s the entertainment industry appear as a powerful c o m p a n y  w h o  lines 
researchers to talk about ‘acceptable levels’ and lack of ‘causal proof in order to delay 
policy change. Just as B e c k  (1992, p.65) talked about ‘the acid rain dance’, so too is this 
d e m a n d  for ‘definitive proof seen as a delay tactic which only allows a surplus of 
pollutants and toxic substances (screen violence) to threaten our* civilization.
T h e  report calls for anecdotal evidence to be taken into consideration. It says: 
‘There is n o w  vast anecdotal evidence associating the portrayal of violence with violent 
behaviour’ ( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p. 13). Like drugs, screen violence is ‘administered to a 
person fiom outside the b o dy  with the intention of altering s o m e  local or general 
function’ and ‘once a drug has b e c o m e  established...evidence for deciding that it has 
harmful side effects..,is entirely anecdotal’ ( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p.13). T h e  report goes on 
to recommend: ‘There is a need to collect all the available evidence, both anecdotal 
accounts and experimental studies, into a consolidated b o d y  of information’
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( P A P F C P G ,  1996, p. 15). This ‘b o d y  of information’ can be presented to parliament (as 
the P A P F C P G  have done) in order that citizens m a y  place pressure o n  the government 
to provide n e w  legislation. A s  the P A P F C P G  (1992, p,5) says:
W it h  a large proportion of the population saying that freedom of expression has 
gone too far and blaming the rising tide of crime u po n  media displays of sex and 
violence there is a clear case for government action to respond to public 
disquiet.
W h a t  is important about the rhetoric of this report is the w a y  it draws up o n past 
research, anecdotal evidence and public opinion as if it is a received truth. In actual fact 
the report has n o n e w  evidence to suggest causal proof, nor is it compiled by one k n o w n  
researcher in this field, and yet it is confident that the government will respond to its 
dem a nd s  for industry accountability and political legislation.
T h e  confidence of the P A P F C P G  is not unfounded. Th e  N e w s o n  Report also 
claimed it had found causal proof, and yet its principal source of evidence w as  a 
populist tract b y  Michael M e d v e d  (1992). This did not stop the national newspapers 
fiom hailing it as ‘definitive proof that ‘video nasties’ could pose serious risks to 
children. A s  w a s  noted earlier, the N e w s o n  Report w a s instrumental in paving the w a y  
for die Criminal Justice Act in 1994 (see Buckingham, 1996, Barker, 1997a). Such 
reports, therefore, are not without considerable social and political p o w er  and w e  can 
see fiom the w a y  in which they are written and the w a y  in which diey are reported by 
the media diat the campaign groups w h o  are behind these reports have b e c o m e  ‘crucial 
“translators” of academic research findings’ (Jamison, 1996, p.242).
T h e  P A P F C P G ' s  report on  Violence Pornography and the Media has already 
attracted media publicity. T h e  D aily Telegraph chose to mention it twice on  one page,
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as proof that ‘experts’ and public opinion were in agreement that ‘there w a s  a link 
between violence on the screen and violent crime’. A  commentary o n this report b y 
Martin Barker (1996, p.5), a well k n o w n  researcher in the field of violence and the mass 
media, called it: ‘a devious piece of moral campaigning, with an agenda not based on 
significant evidence at all but on the ideological ambitions of its adherents’. This 
commentary has so far not been mentioned in association with the P A P F C P G ' s  report. 
This silence suggests that, as with the N e w s o n  Report in 1994, criticisms of the 
P A P F C P G ’s report m a y  well go unnoticed, such is the strength of anti-violence 
campaign groups and then effective production and dissemination of information on 
media violence.
E ffe c ts  R e se a rc h : *A c c e p ta b le  L e v e ls 9
T h e  N e w s o n  Report and the P A P F C P G  report reveal h o w  significant the need 
to provide definitive proof of the effects of watching violence o n television is to the 
success of sub-political groups w h o  advocate anti-violence. Without doubt the most 
powerful methods of proving causal connection are anecdotal evidence and public 
opinion. However, the role of ‘experts’ like Elizabeth N e w s o n  are significant to media 
publicity. Without ‘experts and ‘scientific proof the authenticity of citizen's claims 
w o u l d  be based solely o n  anecdotal evidence. Whilst this is enough to convict ‘video 
nasties’ in the press, government ministers d e m a n d  m o r e  ‘objective’ evidence. 
Scientific research and hard statistics provide tire necessary ‘expert’ opinion needed to 
bring about n e w  legislation (Barker and Petley, 1997).
T h e  combination of evidence used b y  sub-political gr oups campaigning against 
violence is similar' to evidence used b y  sub-political groups campaigning against toxic
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waste, or environmental d a m a g e  to rain forests. B e c k  (1992, p.71) writes in Risk 
Society:
...so long as risks are not recognised scientifically, they do not exist - at least not 
legally, medically, technologically, or socially, and they are thus not prevented, 
treated, or compensated for. N o  amount of collective moaning can change this, 
only science. Scientific judgement’s monop ol y  on truth therefore forces the 
victims themselves to m a k e  use of all the methods and m e an s  of scientific 
analysis in order to succeed with their claims.
In the case of media violence pro-censorship groups present themselves as if they are 
victims of risk w h o  are forced to counteract a wealth of scientific data, which argues for 
‘acceptable levels’ of media violence ‘in order to succeed with then claims’. Th e  risks 
associated with watching violence on television do not exist, according to certain 
experts. These experts, as the P A P F C P G  report indicates, are implicitly identified as 
part of the entertainment industry, despite the fact that they are independent researchers 
in then o w n  right. O n c e  a researcher refutes the causation hypothesis they are 
automatically seen to deny the strength of anecdotal evidence and public opinion which 
suggests a causal link between media violence and aggressive acts. T o  deny the 
‘obvious’ strength of evidence like the James Bulger case is to deny any h u m a n  feelings 
at all. Thus, independent academic researchers like David Gauntlett (1995, 1997), 
Martin Barker (1984a, 1997a), G u y  Cumberbatch (1989) and David B u c k in g ha m 
(1993, 1996) w h o  publish evidence to suggest that there are n o  ‘risks’ associated with 
watching television, are seen to be unfeeling, objective and either ‘a fool or villain’ 
(Barker, 1997a, p. 16).
T h e  paradox is that evidence which supports the cause-effect debate has always 
been the m o r e  dominant, both in volume and media publicity. A s  N e w s o n  (1994, p.6)
points out: ‘a vast world literature, m o r e  than 1,000 papers, linking heavy exposure to 
media violence with subsequent aggressive behaviour’ has accumulated over the past 
seventy years.24 W h a t  is more, such research concentrates o n  laboratory tests and 
quantitative analysis (see Gerbner, 1988, Donnerstein and Berkowitz, 1981, V a n  Evra, 
1990), whereas research which counteracts the cause-effect mode l  tends involve in- 
depth qualitative analysis (see Buckingham, 1996, Gauntlett, 1997, Gray, 1992). This is 
exactly the opposite to the w a y  ‘effects’ research is portrayed in the press.
However, bearing in m i n d  the pattern established b y  sub-political groups 
campaigning against ‘modernization risks’, if the structure of the dominant discourse is 
to pitch science against citizen, then, in relation to media violence, the evidence which 
supports ‘acceptable levels’ of violence on  television must be seen to be blind to the 
‘real’ hazards affecting citizens on  a global level. O n c e  this structure has been put into 
place, N G O s  can utilize the rhetoric of risk and present their o w n  campaign as the only 
moral and ethical course to take. If the entertainment industry will hide behind its talk 
of ‘acceptable levels’ then the anti-violence campaigners must prove that these levels 
ar e n o longer acceptable in today's society.
N a tio n a l T e le v is io n  V io le n c e  S u rv e y
S o m e  examples of research which supports the cause-effect model will illustrate 
this point. T h e  National Television Violence Study ( N T V S )  is a recent American study 
that w a s  commissioned b y  the National Cable and Television Association to provide the 
lar gest content analysis of media violence ever undertaken.25 A n  executive s u m m a r y  of 
the N T V S  for 1994-95 claims the following key finding: ‘T h e  context in which most
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violence is presented o n  television poses risks for viewers’( N T V S ,  1995, p.ix). This is 
the first claim. T h e  N T V S  (1995, p.ix) explains this finding in m o r e  detail:
T h e  risks of viewing the most c o m m o n  depictions of televised violence include 
learning to behave violently, becoming m o r e  desensitised to the harmful 
consequences of violence, and becoming m o re  fearful of being attacked. T he 
contextual patterns noted below are found consistently across most channels, 
program types, and times of day. Thus, there are substantial risks of harmful 
effects from viewing violence throughout the television environment.
T h e  clear* link between the rhetoric used here, and the rhetoric used b y  Ulrich B e c k  in 
Risk Society should be noted: television viewing involves ‘substantial risks’; the 
‘harmful effects’ of viewing can be found ‘throughout the television environment’.
T o  substantiate then* claim, the N T V S  (1995, p.3) has attempted to measure the 
effects of viewing violence o n television, examining 2,693 programmes o n  23 different 
channels and analyzing over 18,000 violent interactions o n television in order to prove 
the causal link between watching violence and aggressive acts. T h e  m ethod of content 
analysis which the N T V S  use to validate their claim of causal proof is a research 
m ethod which focuses on  quantitative data. This mean s  that the N T V S  can quote 
statistics every time they wish to prove a causal link. Thus, for example, the statement: 
‘Violence predominates on television, often including large numbers of violent 
interactions per program’ is followed b y  this statistic: ‘T h e  majority of programs on 
television contain violence (57%), and roughly one third of violent programs contain 
nine or m o r e  violent interactions’ ( N T V S ,  1996, p.25). This example of precise 
information, and hard statistics, reveals h o w  the N T V S  attempts to measure the effects 
associated with watching television violence. These statistics are presented as proof that 
violence o n  television is not within ‘acceptable levels’ of exposure: if 5 7 %  of television
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programmes contain violent content then this is over half of all U S  television viewing. 
A i m e d  with these types of statistics, it is possible for the N T V S  (1996, p.viii,ix) to 
m a k e  statements like: ‘T h e  context in which most violence is presented on television 
poses risks for viewers’ because in then* opinion the ‘precise quantitative content 
analysis techniques’ which have been employed prove that this is true: ‘Perpetrators go 
unpunished in 7 3 %  of all violent scenes’; ‘4 7 %  of all violent interactions s h o w  no h a r m  
to victims’; ‘Only 4 %  of violent programs emphasize an anti-violence theme’; 
‘Children's programs...ffequently portray violence in a humorous context (67 % )’ 
( N T V S ,  1992, p.x). T h e  statistics speak for themselves.
T h e  fact that this type of research has been seriously criticized b y  m a n y  
researchers in this area (see Gauntlett, 1995, Cumberbatch, 1989) and s h o w n  to be 
lacking in reliability or validity has veiy little impact on the impression formed by the 
general public that there are harmful side effects to watching television. This type of 
study quantifies the volume of television violence, and then uses such statistics to 
suggest that viewers are at ‘risk’ to high levels of violence. For example, the N T V S  
(1992, p.x) claim that ‘Perpetrators go unpunished in 7 3 %  of all violent scenes.’ This is 
exactly the kind of alarming statistic the media, and anti-violence campaign groups 
utilize in then ‘translation’ of academic research (Jamison, 1996 p.242). A n d  yet, if one 
examines the factors behind this analysis, it is possible to see that the N T V S  is referring 
to perpetrators w h o  go unpunished in the s a m e  scene. It is n o w o nder such a high figure 
has been found. A s  one American journalist commented, to punish perpetrators in the 
sa me  scene one would have to ‘create a scene in which, lets say, a m a n  is shot, a cop 
sees it happen, and the criminal is arrested o n the spot. U S  television chooses to do 
things the old fashioned way. There's something called plot’ (cited in Barker, 1997a, 
p.27). Unfortunately, such criticism and examples of research which counteracts these
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claims are rarely given public hearing. For example, Barrie Gunter (1996, p.2), in his 
report Violence on Television in the United Kingdom - a Content Analysis makes no 
such claims as the N T V S ,  and indeed finds that ‘the amount of violence has declined 
since 1986’, and ‘n o w  accounts for 0. 61 %  of p r og r am m e oulput time compared with 
1.1% in 1986’. It is true that these studies involve different countries, and that Gunter’s 
report suggests that ‘the most c o m m o n  setting for violence is the U S A ’ (Gunter, 1996, 
p.3), but despite this, the difference between these t wo reports is extensive.
W h a t  is significant about research which attempts to measure the effects of 
television, and what marks it out as so successful to anti-violence campaigns, is the w a y  
that it verifies anecdotal evidence and public opinion polls that dominate press coverage 
of this area. O n c e  these three aspects of ‘reflexive modernization’ c o m e  together it 
becomes difficult to deny this accumulation of evidence because each verifies the other 
and becomes caught u p in the ‘social d r a m a ’ of risk. W h a t  is more, once the media, the 
judiciary and the government express concern and fear for the safety of society, sub 
political groups w h o  advocate anti-violence have only to present reports such as 
Violence, Pornography and the Media (discussed earlier), for the whole issue of risk 
and the mass media to b e c o m e  a politically sensitive issue.
T h e  P o l i t i c i z a t i o n  o f  M e d i a  V io le n c e
For risk to b e c o m e  a political and social issue, it must have the n e w s  media, the 
public and the judiciary on  its side. T h e  recognition of modernization risks involves 
‘collective knowledge...and the political illumination of the associated chains of cause
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and effect’ (Beck, 1992, p.77). It must also involve ‘a n e w  ecological morality’: 
campaign groups w h o  are on ‘a crusade against pollutants must scrutinize the industrial 
operations from the eco-moral point of view’ (Beck, 1992, p.77). This n e w  point of 
view produces a specific type of risk awareness and conflict: if ecological hazards are to 
be reduced or eliminated, the veiy process of elimination must b e c o m e  political in 
nature.
T h e  issue of media violence has b e c o m e  a political hot potato. Collective 
knowledge of the risks associated with watching media violence has led to political 
intervention. A s  the P A P F C P G  report indicated, anecdotal evidence, public opinion 
polls, and ‘expert’ opinion lead to the politicization of media violence. Th e  Video 
Recordings Act (1984) and the Criminal Justice Act (1994) were implemented because 
of the recognition of television violence as a modernization risk. W h a t  is more, it is the 
moral component of the campaign against television violence that has been the most 
successful in winning public and political support.
In an essay titled ‘T i m e  to Face Responsibility’, M a i y  Whitehouse, the founder 
of the National Viewers and Listeners Association ( N V A L A ) ,  m a k es  absolutely clear 
the eco-moral point of view B e c k  speaks of in relation to the recognition of 
modernization risks. She highlights the links between children, the environment, and 
responsibility w h e n  she asks this question: ‘h o w  do w e  fill the film-makers with a sense 
of their o w n  responsibility for the health and welfare not only of the whole of our 
society, but especially, for pity's sake, the welfare of the children w h o  are the future?’ 
(Whitehouse, 1996, p.61). T h e answer to her question, of course, is for citizens' groups 
such as the N V A L A  to m a k e  sure that the entertainment industry takes full 
responsibility for ‘the moralization of (their) industrial production’ (Beck, 1992, p.222).
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A b o v e  all else, anti-violence campaigners d e m a n d  for ‘ethical practice’, and ethical 
practice, in the case of media violence, m e an s  increased control and censorship.
T h e  V -C h ip
A  good example of the politicization of media violence is the proposed 
introduction of the V-chip in America and Canada. T h e  V-chip, invented b y  Professor 
T i m  Collings in Canada, sends an electronic signal to T V  sets w h e n  programmes which 
contain material considered to be unsuitable for children are broadcast. A  ratings system 
is applied to violence, language and sexuality. It enables parents to choose from a 
viewing level of 0-5 the amount and type of violence, language and sexuality they wish 
to see on then* h o m e  television screens. Unsuitable material wou l d be scrambled b y  the 
V-chip, unless it were switched off b y  an adult using a secure code. T h e  ratings system 
which parents will use to control the risk of television violence can be operated b y  an 
independent organization 01* b y  the entertainment industry themselves.
T h e  V-chip w a s  designed b y  Professor Collings in response to effects research 
which determines to find evidence of causal proof that television violence can cause 
risk to society - the ‘V ’ stands for violence. Collings first approached the regulatory 
body, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission ( C R T C ,  
1996), about the V-chip in 1991. After trials in Canada, the C R T C  has decided to 
introduce widespread use of the V-chip in n e w  T V  sets, as of September 1996. America 
has also decided to introduce the V-chip, and its target date for all n e w  television sets 
over 13 inches to be equipped with a V-chip is July 1st 1999.26 Britain is still 
considering the possibility of whether to intr oduce the V-chip.27
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A  recent report titled ‘Respecting the Children: a Canadian Approach to 
Helping Families Deal with Television Violence’ ( C R T C ,  1996) reveals h o w  sub­
political groups campaigning against violence succeeded in producing this legislation. 
A  section at the end of the report lists ten anti-violence advocacy groups to contact. 
These anti-violence advocacy groups took part in public discussions o n screen violence 
and were instrumental in voicing the opinion of parents w h o  ‘want further action to 
protect then* children against gratuitous and glamorized T V  violence’.28 Nearly two 
million Canadians signed a petition calling for greater protection for their children. T h e  
results of this public meeting were to launch a V-chip rating system to help parents 
protect then children from television violence.
T h e  C R T C ' s  report reveals that campaign groups can and do effect change on a 
global scale. Indeed, so successful has been the case for causal proof of the side effects 
associated with media violence in Canada that die case against such evidence is not 
even presented in the C R T C ' s  1996 report. A t  the back of die report is a list of the 
‘selected readings related to die issue of television violence’ which includes 28 
references to research which claims that aggressive tendencies and desensitization 
effects are a m o n g  the risk factors associated widi watching television violence.29 There 
is not one mention of any research which refutes such claims, even though there is a 
substantial amount of well respected research in this area (see Barker and Petley, 1997; 
B u c k i n g h a m  and Allerton, 1996; Cumberbatch, 1989; Gauntlett, 1995, 1997). T h e  case 
for causal proof is presented as conclusive. A n d  with ‘conclusive proof and nearly two 
million parents' signatures advocating reduced levels of television violence, the 
entertainment industry has little choice but to self-regulate.
T h e  introduction of the V-chip provides a useful w a y  for anti-violence 
campaign groups to gain increased responsibility fiom the entertainment industry, and
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government legislation at the s a me  time. T h e  Canadian government must provide n e w  
legislation to implement this television classification system, and, most importantly, this 
places accountability with Canadian programmers w h o  ‘will be responsible for 
encoding the programs they broadcast in order to activate a V-chip pre-set at whatever 
level of televised violence each family considers acceptable for its children’.30 This also 
m e an s  that the entertainment industry can transform its ‘mistakes’, i.e. gratuitous sex 
and violence, into ‘development opportunities’, i.e. n e w  television sets fitted with the 
V-chip (Beck, 1992, p. 160).
This highly successful example of reflexive politicization also leads to what 
B e c k  (1992, p.80) calls a ‘legitimate totalitarianism of hazard prevention’. Like the 
introduction of the Criminal Justice Act (1994) in Britain, legislation regarding the V -  
chip in Canada involved an accumulation of causal proof through anecdotal evidence, 
public opinion, and scientific research. Indeed, B e c k  (1992, p.222) m a y  argue that this 
is not an example of ‘hazard prevention’ but instead a step forward in ‘the moralization 
of industrial production’, something he advocates as a form of social development in 
the coming years. However, in the case of the mass media both concepts induce the 
s ame results: the censorship of creative freedom.
W ith the U S A  about to follow in the footsteps of Canada and introduce the V -  
chip as a television classification system, ‘hazard prevention’ and ‘the moralization of 
industrial production’ will no doubt b e c o m e  widespread, at least w h e n  it comes to the 
c om modity of television. Criticism of the V-chip as back door censorship has had little 
effect o n  Bill Clinton's decision to advocate its uses (see Variety, 1996, Time, 1996). 
N o r  have very real concerns as to the logistical problems of operating a centralized 
ratings system for television been properly addressed. Rating crime programmes like 
Law and Order, or sitcoms like Seinfeld, could prove extremely problematic because
/
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sex, violence and language occur at different levels and in different contexts every 
week: h o w  can one rating do justice to the complexity of these programmes?
T h e  lack of concern b y  the Canadian and American governments as to whether 
the V-chip will actually prove effective only serves to reveal that the risk of screen 
violence has be c o m e  a political issue that can wi n  votes. It is n o coincidence that the 
findings of the National Television Violence Suivey ( N T V S ,  1996), discussed in the 
previous section, were publicised at the s am e  time as President Clinton's advocacy of 
the V-chip and call for a ‘violence s um m it ’. In the n m  up to the presidential election, 
magazines like Time (1996) and Variety (1996) were quick to highlight the significance 
of President Clinton's decision to introduce the V-chip just as the N T V S  revealed that 
T V  violence is widespread and poses risks to young viewers. T h e  picture of a young 
b o y  with a smashed television on his head m a k e s  the message loud and clear: television 
is to blame (Time, 1996, p.45).
T h e  S o c ia l A m p lific a tio n  o f  R is k
W e  began this chapter b y  considering the dominant discourse of media 
violence. Controversies over films such as Child’s Play 3, Natural Born K illers, or 
Crash can be seen to be constructed around a familiar rhetoric: these films are morally 
depraved and they can corrupt innocent children and vulnerable m e m b e r s  of our* 
society. Researchers have s h o w n  that this dominant discourse taps into ‘an archaeology 
of popular* anxieties’ (Murdock, 1997, p.67) and reveals class conflict and public 
anxiety of new, u n k n o w n  technologies (Pearson, 1983; Petley, 1997b). This spiral of 
anxiety and fear* is c o m m o n l y  referred to as a ‘moral panic’ (Cohen, 1972; C o h e n  and 
Young, 1973).
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David Gauntlett in Moving Experiences (1995, p. 107) outlines the spiral of 
panic about television violence. This has been modified by Barratt (1997), w h o  argues 
that the media violence debate is not only an example of a ‘moral panic’ but rather can 
be also be understood as a carefully constructed moral crusade b y  Christian campaign 
groups such as C A R E  and the M C D .  W e  can see fiom the organization and 
commi tm e nt  of such campaign groups as C A R E  and the M C D ,  that die role of n on­
governmental organizations are significant to our understanding of the media violence 
debate. It is not the case that die media manufacture ‘moral panics’ but rather diat the 
media, politicians and non-governmental organizations campaign together to regulate 
and control the mass media. F r o m  the evidence presented so far, it is possible to see tiiat 
Christian campaign groups are often a catalyst for ‘moral panics’ This theory of moral 
crusades and moral panics is a significant one, and has implications for the w a y  in 
which the media violence debate and anti-violence campaign groups can be linked to 
risk and environmentalism.
Moral crusades and moral panics are an example of risk consciousness and 
conflict. Thus, it is significant to bear in m i n d  that moral crusades and moral panics are 
intricately caught up in risk evaluation and management. W e  cannot discuss the 
‘effects’ of media violence without considering the effects of risk and environmentalism 
if w e  wish to understand the construction of this debate. O n e  w a y  to open up the 
discussion of media violence is to consider the theory of the social amplification of risk 
(Kasperson, Renn, et al., 1988).
Kasperson (1996, p.161) states: ‘T h e  social amplification of risk refers to the 
cultural, social and individual structures and processes that shape the societal 
experience with risk’. This societal experience is a dynamic process, taking into account 
‘the continuing learning and social interactions resulting fiom social experience with
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risk’ (Kasperson, 1996, p.161). According to Kasperson (1996, p.159):
T h e  concept of the social amplification of risk is based on the thesis that events 
pertaining to hazards interact with psychological, social, institutional and 
cultural processes in w a y s  that can heighten or attenuate perceptions of risk and 
shape behaviour. Behavioural responses, in turn, generate secondary social or 
economic consequences. These consequences extend far beyond direct effects to 
h u m a n  health or the environment to include significant indirect impacts such as 
liability, insurance costs, loss of confidence in institutions, stigmatisation, or 
alienation from community affairs...
Thus, the social amplification of risk is concerned with the dynamic processes which 
shape oui' understanding of a risk event. T h e  risk event is not confined to one primary 
source, but, rather involves m a n y  different factors and processes, and the consequences 
of the risk event have direct and indirect impacts on social and cultural practices.
A s  with Beck, in Risk Society, the social amplification of risk is about real risks 
and the cultural and social construction of risk. Kasperson writes (1996, p. 159):
T h e  experience of risk is therefore both an experience of physical h a r m  and the 
result of culture and social processes b y  which individuals or groups acquire or 
create interpretations of hazards. These interpretations provide rules of h o w  to 
select, order and explain signals from the physical world. Additionally, each 
cultural or social group selects certain risks and adds t h e m  to its strand of worry 
beads to m b  and burnish even as it selects out other risks as not meriting 
immediate concern.
hi the case of media violence, the ‘creative interpretations’ of the ‘risks’ of media 
violence are defined b y  anti-violence campaign groups, the media and politicians. 
Kasperson, R e n n  et al. consider the individuals or groups w h o  are involved with the 
production and dissemination of knowledge as ‘amplification stations’. Kasperson 
(1996, pp.159-160) explains this as follows:
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Amplification stations can be individuals, groups or institutions. It is obvious 
that social groups or institutions can amplify or attenuate signals only by 
working in social aggregates and participating in social processes. But 
individuals in gr oups and institutions do not act or react merely in their roles as 
private persons, but rather according to the role specification associated with 
their positions. Amplification m a y  therefore differ a m o n g  individuals in their 
roles as private citizens and in then roles as employees or m e m b e r s  of social 
groups and organisations...We term these larger social units social stations of 
am plification. Individuals in their' roles as m e m b e r s  of employees of social 
gr oups or institutions do not only follow their1 personal values and interpretative 
patterns; they also perceive risk information and construct the risk ‘problem’ 
according to cultural biases and the rules of their1 organisation or group.
Social stations of amplification resemble the w a y  in which campaign groups, politicians 
and the media w o r k  together to intensify the perceived negative effects of media 
violence. Cultural biases, religious beliefs, personal values, and political persuasions all 
influence the w a y  in which the ‘risks’ of media violence are constructed as an 
environmental ‘problem’ which must be solved.
A  primary risk event can set in motion a roll call of secondary effects. These 
effects include:
• Enduring mental perceptions, images and attitudes towar ds risk;
• Political and social pressure;
• Changes in risk monitoring and regulation;
• Repercussions o n  other technologies and social institutions.
These secondary effects (adapted fiom Kasperson, 1992, p. 160) can be directly related 
to the moral crusade and moral panic concerning media violence. T h e y  can also be 
related to the risk paradigm, as outlined b y  B e c k  in Risk Society. Ca m pa i g n  groups and 
the mass media encourage perceptions of media violence as risky and hazardous; this 
creates political and social pressure, which leads to changes in the monitoring and 
regulation of media violence; this also has repercussions on other technologies, such as 
computer games and the internet, and other institutions, such as the B B F C .  Figure 1
will illustrate the relationship between the social amplification of risk and the media 
violence debate.
Figure 1 reveals that there is a ripple effect to the social amplification of risk 
and media violence. T h e  primary effects of media violence are alleged to be harmful. 
Despite the fact that there is n o  convincing evidence to support this, a tragic event 
such as the murder of James Bulger is used as a catalyst to set in motion a roll call of 
secondary effects, such as political and social pressure, changes in risk monitoring 
and regulation and repercussions o n  other technologies. W e  can see fiom Figure 1 
that social amplification stations, such as C A R E ,  or M C D ,  are directly linked to risk 
consciousness and conflict. W h a t  I w o u l d  like to add to the theory of the social 
amplification of risk is the fact that sub-political groups can choose to set the ripple 
effect hi motion, actually using a tragic event to create links between real violence 
and media violence in order to achieve their o w n  political and social agenda. Thus, 
campaign organizers b e c o m e  social actors in the d r a m a of risk controversy and 
create an emotional and intellectual experience that taps into the roots of existing 
public anxiety about the need to ‘exert control over the u n k n o w n  and uncontrolled’ 
(Palmlund, 1996,p.l99).
Consequently, rather than attempting to understand media violence 
controversies fiom the point of view of ‘moral panics’ and the manufacture of news, 
w hich in m a n y  w a y s  only offers a limited interpretation of the significance of such 
controversies, it is better to take into account the wide ranging and dynamic processes at 
w o r k  in the ‘social d r a m a ’ of risk consciousness and conflict. Moral crusades and moral 
panics are significant to the construction of media violence controversies, but these two 
factors alone do not explain either the strength or the range of effects on  social and 
political institutions that these contr oversies set in motion.
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Figure 1: the social amplification of the risks of media violence
Repercussions for other media
Political/sociall pressure
Construction of 
risk and media
B y  using an adapted form of the theory of die social amplification of risk, w e  can see 
the primary and secondary processes at work, and w e  can understand the implications 
of the construction of media violence as an environmental risk. It is possible to see that 
media violence has veiy little to do with the risk controversy; it is the production and 
dissemination of knowledge that is at stake. A s  Ortwin R e n n  (1992, p.191) points out, 
in the social arena of risk, risk has b e c o m e  a symbol for odier issues: ‘T h e  risk as such 
m a y  not be the trigger for entering the stage but rather as its symbolic meaning for 
decision-making processes in society and for existing p o we r  structures’. This is w h y  
social actors, such as anti-violence campaign groups, social commentators and 
politicians b e c o m e  involved in the social amplification of risk. W h a t  is at stake is die 
control of economic and social values.
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C o n c l u s io n
This chapter has illustrated the paradigm of risk in relation to violence and the 
mass media. Anti-violence activists have formed sub-political groups which use the risk 
paradigm to successftdly argue the case for causal links between media violence and 
real-life violence. A s  has been shown, sub-political groups such as the Parliamentary 
All Party Family and Child Protection Group ( P A P F C P G )  utilize die rhetoric of risk in 
order to d ra w  parallels with other industrial products, such as leaded petrol, or organo- 
phosphate pesticides, which are k n o w n  to cause a serious threat to die health of the 
environment and the general public. O n c e  the risk paradigm has been put into place, it 
is veiy difficult to counteract any arguments that media violence presents a risk to
viewers, and, in particular, to children, w h o  are perceived as most vulnerable to the 
side-effects of watching television violence. T h e  risks are visible in the faces of the 
dead children w h o  ar e the victims of media violence.
T h e  risk argument has a n u m b e r  of factors which m a k e  it successful: anecdotal 
evidence, public opinion, and scientific research m e a n  that there are three forms of 
evidence that can be used to provide causal proof, the most important stage in 
illuminating risk. W h a t  is more, the influence of media publicity, and the judiciary 
ensure that the government will not be hesitant in taking steps to legitimate hazard 
prevention. It is far* m o r e  difficult and costly to reduce levels of real crime b y  tackling 
social problems such as poverty, than to blame the entertainment industry for harmful 
side-effects which can lead to real crime. Politicians can take steps to reduce levels of 
media violence without actually dealing with the real causes of crime. And, the risk 
argument ensures that anti-violence campaigners and politicians appear as moral 
crusaders: if media violence is presented as an international health hazard, then whoever 
successfully campaigns for its elimination is presented as no  less than heroic. It is no 
wonder, then, that the risk paradigm is utilized in order to achieve changes in legislation 
with regard to the mass media: it has a proven tr ack record for success.
W ith the risk paradigm so firmly in place with regard to violence and the mass 
media, it is m y  suggestion that w e  need to change the terms of reference if w e  ar e to 
counteract the growing support for the ‘legitimization of hazard prevention’: the 
Criminal Justice Act (1994) and the V-chip are only t wo recent examples of this. In the 
next chapter I want to argue that watching television is not comparable to injecting 
drugs: the effects of television cannot be measured in the same w a y  that the effects of 
organo-phosphates can be measured. Television viewing is a complex and sophisticated 
process that does not lend itself to scientific measur ement.
91
92
N o t e s
1 Poulter, S. and Burt, J., D aily  M ail, Monday, December 23 1996, p.l and 7.
2 Crash won the Special Jury Prize at Cannes 1996 for 'audacity, courage and daring'. See Screen 
International, Friday, August 16 1996, p.22. It was also screened at the London Film Festival, 9th November 
1996.
3 Evening Standard, 3/6/96, p. 16.
4 Crash was released on 6th June 1997. It was given an 18 certificate and passed uncut by the BBFC 
on 18th March 1997. The City of Westminster chose to ban the film from all cinemas in its catchment 
area. This meant that most West End cinemas in London could not show the film. See press release for 
Crash, BBFC, 1997, and the Guardian, June 6th 1997, pp.2 and 3, the Independent, June 5th 1997, 
pp.4 and 5 for reviews and discussion of this film.
5 Busfield, S., D aily  M ail, Saturday November 9,1996, p.l and 6.
6 The B ig  Stoiy: Crash, first screened on ITV 14/11/96, 7.30pm. The B ig Stoty made a direct link between 
fantasy car crashes and real car crashes. A clinical psychologist talks about the causal link between watching 
screen violence and real violence; Sony, the makers of 'Destruction Derby' are blamed for inciting 17-25 year 
old males to kill and injure innocent people. Here is the presenter Dermot Mumagham on the subject: 'Nearly 
4000 people a year are killed on our roads, hundreds of thousands are injured, and as Christmas approaches 
die toll rises. But, far from being horrified by car crashes, we seem to love them. We even bring up our 
children to enjoy crashes, giving them toys and computer games...And people say it's all just entertainment, 
but there are serious consequences.'
7 D aily  Telegraph, Saturday 9 November, 1996, p.l. It is worth pointing out that as the Heritage Secretary 
Virginia Bottomley had no reason to call for local councils to ban Crash', the Heritage Secretary controls 
broadcasting, not film, which is the responsibility of the Home Office. Thus, it can be seen that Bottomley 
was speaking for herself, not in her official capacity as an MP, when she denounced David Cronenberg’s 
new film.
8 In November 1996 Michael Howard, the Home Office Minister, asked the British Board of Film 
Classification to report on then* policy to reduce levels of screen violence. The BBFC's reply asked for 
a ‘cool headed look at current facts' and claimed that whilst ‘censorship can cut gratuitous acts of 
violence...(the BBFC) cannot change the culture of violence which permeates much mainstream film 
making’ (BBFC, 1996, p.l-2).The D a ily  M a il, always quick to respond to such matters, interpreted the 
BBFC's ‘cool headed' reply as an act of cowardice. The BBFC is ‘powerless to stop the rising tide of 
sickening screen violence' it said, and, on a more ominous note, suggested: ‘The Home Office is 
understood to be examining ways of scrapping the BBFC - a private company funded by the film 
industry - and establishing a new watchdog’, Poulter, S. and Burt, J., D aily  Mail, Monday, December 23 
1996, p.l and 7.
9 See the D aily  Telegraph, Wednesday November 6,1996, p.l.
10 See the Daily Telegraph, Wednesday November 6,1996, p.l.
11 The General Election was on the 1st May 1997.
12 Tookey, C., D aily  M ail, Saturday November 9,1996, p.6.
93
13 D a ily  Telegraph, Saturday, November 9,1996, p.3.
14 For examples of research into moral panics, see Cohen (1972), Cohen and Young (1973), Pearson (1983), 
Barker (1984), and Martin (1993).
15 Panorama: the K illin g  Screens, 1994, screened on BBC1,27 February 1994,21.30-22.10.
16 Visions o f  Ecstasy, directed by Nigel Wingrove, lost its battle to obtain a certificate, when the European 
court upheld the BBFC's decision to ban this film which they believe to contain blasphemous images. See the 
Guardian Tuesday November 26, 1996, p.5 and the Evening Standard, Monday 25 November, 1996, pp.l 
and 2.
17 See back cover of Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, Published by Sage, 1992.
18 See the Guardian, Monday, May 12th 1997, p.6.
19 See the Guardian, Wednesday December 11, 1996, p.l, for news coverage of Government acceptance of 
the condition Gulf war syndrome.
20 Christian Action Research and Education (CARE) has been involved in assessing the impact of the mass 
media on society for over 20 years. The Movement for Christian Democracy (MCD) grew out of the 
Epiphany group, and has only been in existence since 1990. The National Viewers and Listeners Association 
(NVALA) was set up by Maiy Whitehouse in 1950 and is a voluntary organization which aims to campaign 
against pornography, violence and bad language and promotes the portrayal of moral behaviour. For an 
interesting article on Mary Whitehouse's views see French (1996, pp. 52-61) and for more information about 
these campaign groups see Barratt (1995, pp.22.23) and Thompson, 1992. Other citizens groups include the 
Voice of die Listener and Viewer (VLV), and the Consumers Association but the VLV is less concerned with 
campaigning against anti-violence and more interested in educating the public. The VLV is an independent 
non-profit making association which aims to educate the public about all broadcasting issues.
21 Thompson discusses the campaign tactic of ‘the protection of children’ in relation to CARE and 
NVALA by tracing this tactic to the ABUSE campaign in 1978, and the NVALA’s decision to link the 
existence of the Paedophile Information Exchange to pornography, see Thompson, 1992, p. 86 for 
more details.
22 Thompson (1992, p.64) and Barratt (1997, p.8) both argue that moral crusades and the moral 
majority have been neglected by academics. Their research shows that more work is needed in this 
area.
23 See the D aily  Telegraph, November 6, 1996, p.4 and for earlier citation of this report see die Daily  
Telegraph, June 26,1996.
24 Newson cites Professors Sims and Gray in a document presented to the Broadcasting Group for the House 
of Lords in September 1993.
25 The NTVS uses four research sites: the University of California; the University of North Carolina; the 
University of Texas; the University of Wisconsin. It involves a three part assessment of television violence, 
involving content analysis, a study of the effectiveness of the current US ratings system, and a review of anti­
violence educational initiatives for television.
26 America plans to introduce the V-chip to 50% of all new TV sets larger than 13 inches by July 1st 1998. 
Television sets under 13 inches will not be equipped with a V-chip, see Reuters Limited, Friday 26th 
September 1997. For discussion about the V-chip in Canada and the USA see Variety, February 19-25,1996, 
pp.l, 61, 62; Time, February 19, 1996, pp.44-45; Klive, A, 1996, 'Chips with Everything', in Broadcast, 3 
May 1996, pp. 18-19, and also several other reports on the V-chip in the same issue of Broadcast. There were 
many reports of this in the press during March 1996, as Virginia Bottomley, the National Heritage Secretary, 
ordered an Enquirer into the introduction of the V-chip in Britain. For discussion see Prober, A, 1996. 'When
94
the chips are down' in the Guardian, April 6, 1996, p.15; and MacDonald, M, 1996. 'Support Grows for 
Fitting New TV Sets With "V-chip"' in die Independent, 19th March 1996, p.2 amongst others.
27 For discussion of this see Broadcast, 3 May 1996, pp. 17-19; Screen International, 22 March 1996; Prober 
(1996); Ohs Independent, 19 March 1996, amongst others.
28 See press release attached to the CRTC (1996) report on helping families deal with screen violence (no 
page references given).
29 Amongst the many names cited are, Belson, W, 1978. Television and the Adolescent Boy; Gerbner, G, 
1988, Violence and Terror in the Mass Media; Martinez, A, 1992. Scientific Knowledge and Television 
Violence. Ottawa: Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission; The NTVS (1996), and 
Spears, G, and Seydegait, K, 1993. Gender and Violence in the Mass Media. Ottawa: Health Canada.
30 CRTC(1996) press release March 14 1996, published with the 1996 CRTC report Respecting Children (no 
page numbers given).
Cultural Insecurities
4
In the previous chapter I outlined the relationship between social theories of risk 
and die debate concerning the alleged harmful effects of media violence. I 
demonstrated diat anti-violence campaign groups, social commentators and politicians 
utilize a risk approach in order to achieve success in regulating and controlling levels of 
media violence, hi diis chapter I w o u l d like to analyze diis risk approach in m o r e  detail 
in order to reveal its strengths and weaknesses. O n  the one hand a risk approach can, 
for example, highlight unacceptable levels of toxic waste, and this is a w e l c o m e  and 
necessary critique in relation to die p o w er  and impact multinational corporations might 
have on oui* global envhonment. However, w h e n  the risk argument is used in relation 
to the mass media, it can distort and filter evidence so that the mass media, a complex 
and diverse area, is m a d e  to appeal* threatening and ultimately harmful. Whilst this is 
not to say that aspects of the mass media shouldn't be open to criticism, this does point 
out a failure to differentiate between acid rain and the mass media. Clearly, the effects 
of watching television cannot be measured in die sa m e w a y  the effects of acid rain can 
be measured. In fact, w h e n  scientists do attempt to measure the effects of 
environmental hazards, such as acid rain, then* research shows that it is remarkably 
difficult to measure effects at all. A d a m s  (1995, p. 167) argues: ‘the greenhouse 
debate...(is) yet another case of people arguing furiously hi the dark’. A n d  yet 
organisations, such as C A R E ,  or M C D ,  w h o  use the risk argument, fail to m a k e  this
distinction, and fail to recognise the difficulty of finding scientific proof of negative 
effects, whether these be the effects of global w arming or the effects of media violence.
Therefore it is necessary to critique h o w  the risk argument is used in relation to 
media violence, and this will be done in t wo stages. First, the introduction of seat belt 
laws will be analyzed in order to reveal that even w h e n  w e  are dealing with a case that 
appeals conclusive and favourable to scientific measurement, the facts are not what 
they seem. O n c e  individuals and organisations apply die risk argument to the mass 
media, it is even m o r e  apparent h o w  evidence can be selectively filtered and 
manipulated. Secondly, although social theories of risk take into account the political 
and cultural construction of risk, such theories often fail to acknowledge that all 
societies have a propensity to take risks and that individuals engage in risk-taking 
behaviour.
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T h e  R i s k  A r g u m e n t  R e v e a l e d
T h e  risk argument has m a n y  strengths. Sub-political groups w h o  use the risk 
argument can campaign against the hazardous effects of a variety of modernization 
products, ranging from nuclear waste to breast implants. Such organisations argue that 
industrial modernization is always concerned with m o n e y  not morality, and sub­
political groups, such as Greenpeace claim that morality is not only important, but 
essential to our individual and global well being. Thus, risk awareness, a significant 
factor in the risk argument, signifies a heightened concern for moral, social and
ecological issues. For example, buying a particular brand of coffee m a y  not only affect 
your personal health and well being, but have repercussions o n  a global scale. If die 
coffee is mass produced it can contain dangerous chemicals that can h a r m  the 
consumer's health, the health of the workers w h o  farm the coffee beans, and the 
stability of the land on  which it is produced. Growing coffee can be a national and 
international environmental hazard, and eveiy time you buy a par ticular brand of coffee 
y ou contribute to this destruction. Thus, citizen’s campaign groups w h o  use the risk 
argument can highlight potential dangers and serve to alert the implications of 
unrestrained growth; they can strive to regulate and control industrial modernization, 
which, if left unchecked, will ultimately destroy m o r e  than it promises to produce.
There are clearly s o m e  cases where citizen’s campaign groups w h o  use the risk 
argument can serve as a champion of h u m a n  rights. For example, the case highlighted in 
die previous chapter, where the National Gulf Veterans and Families Associations 
( N G V F A )  finally forced the British government into admitting that organo-phosphate 
pesticides were extensively used throughout the Gulf war*, w ou l d not have reached its 
successful conclusion without the benefit of the risk argument as used by  the N G V F A .  
Emotive pictures of babies affected b y  then fathers' exposure to organo-phosphate 
pesticides helped highlight the unethical treatment of British soldiers by the British 
government. Clearly die government should take responsibility for these tragic events, and 
if it is only through a utilization of the risk argument that this can be achieved, then the 
risk argument has served a usefid purpose.1 A  similar case can be m a d e  in relation to 
intensive farming and the B S E  scare, where official scientific reassurance that there is no 
h a r m  in eating British beef has been flatly contradicted by cases of death due to eating 
contaminated beef (Grove-White, 1997, pp.20-21). B y  using the risk argument, campaign
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groups can highlight the dangers of intensive fanning and further encourage industry
2
accountability in the face of public mistrust of industrially generated risk.
Yet, w h e n  the risk argument is applied to other modernization products such as 
cars, computers, or violent movies the same logic is used, a logic which cannot allow 
for the actual complexity of these products in the market place. W h a t  campaign groups 
w h o  use the risk argument do not take into account is the fact that s o m e  modernization 
products have positive and negative attributes. In the case of organo-phosphate 
pesticides this product encourages healthier crops and yet is it also capable of harming 
the health of h u m a n  beings, n o w  and in the future. A s  the N G V F A  have pointed out, in 
this instance, the negative attributes far outweigh the positive attributes of this 
modernization product. However, in the case of products such as the automobile, or 
popular entertainment, the positive rewards to be gained fiom using these products are 
as strong, if not m o r e  so, than the negative attributes. Driving a car*, or watching 
television, are popular1 activities that are used for w o r k  and for pleasure. Driving a car1 
also provides the consumer with a certain status that is socially recognized b y  his, or 
her peers. Similarly, watching television enables the consumer to take part in a social 
activity that ensures communication and status amongst his or her peers, hi the light of 
the risk argument, which has been used in relation to both of these pr oducts, the car 
industry and the entertainment industry are perceived to be only interested in m o n e y  not 
morality. A s  B e c k  (1992, p.21) states: ‘Risk m a y  be defined as a systematic w a y  of 
dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced by  modernization itself. 
Thus, according to Beck, and campaign groups such as C A R E ,  the very concept of risk 
is b o u n d u p  with the concept of hazar ds and dangers associated with modernization.
B e c k  himself perceives television to be symptomatic of the modernization
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process. Like Theodor A d o r n o  (1991), and the Frankfurt School of critical theory, B e c k  
considers the mass media to be part of the workings of capitalist domination. T he 
‘culture industry’ (Adorno, 1991) lures people into believing that they are making 
individual choices w h e n  it com es  to entertainment, but this is an illusion: the culture 
industry reinforces its capitalist ideology and discourages free and critical thinking. 
Thus, B e c k  writes: ‘Television isolates and standardizes...Everyone sits isolated even in 
the family and gapes at the set. Thus arises the social image of an isolated mass 
audience’ (1992, p. 132). It is quite clear that, like A d o m o ,  B e c k  does not see television 
as capable of positive attributes; it reinforces social structures and erodes independent 
thinking: it creates zombies of us all. A n d  yet, of course, television can be both 
entertaining and stimulating and individual and social. It can be any n u m b e r  of things to 
different types of viewers. There is a great deal of complexity of response to television 
programmes which is also reflected in the sheer variety of programmes o n  offer to the 
normal household. And, as David Gauntlett has pointed out (1997, p.31), Beck, like 
A d o m o ,  fails to recognize that there are different pleasures to be gained from popular’ 
culture, pleasures that appeal to a wide audience.
I want to consider this concept of the ‘culture industry’ in m o r e  detail in a 
moment. W h a t  I want to point out here is that if groups such as C A R E  or M C D  
perceive television to be part of the entertainment industry, which is in turn part of the 
modernization process, then they assume that television can be subjected to the same 
type of scientific analysis. Indeed, as soon as the risk argument is in operation, the 
‘hazards and insecurities induced and introduced b y  modernization itself (Beck, 1992, 
p.21) ensure that television will be perceived as negative. It follows that research which 
attempts to investigate this product will focus on h o w  to minimize hazards and reduce
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insecurities c o m m o n l y  perceived to be associated with this product. A s  the previous 
chapter indicated, this is exactly what the American effects tradition aims to achieve in 
its systematic research into the risks of media violence (Gauntlett, 1995; Murdock, 
1997; Rowland, 1997).
Before I examine the mistaken presumption that the effects of television can be 
measured like any other modernization product, let m e  provide an instance of the risk 
argument in action in order to reveal that even w h e n  w e  are dealing with a product 
which, in theory, has a greater propensity to be measured for side effects than the mass 
media, there ar e still considerable problems with this approach.
R o a d  S a fe ty :  th e  R is k  A r g u m e n t in  A c tio n
T h e  car industry is a prune example of industrial modernization in action. Large 
growth, economic progress, heavy advertising; die automobile industry is one of the 
success stories of twentieth century capitalism. Henry Ford is not just the n a m e  of a car 
manufacturer; he is a metaphor for economic success. A n d  the automobile has c o m e  to 
represent social status and mobility. It is no accident that Elvis possessed a compulsive 
urge to bu y  Cadillacs; a Cadillac signified the success and style of Elvis Presley's music 
career.
In the late twentieth century, the automobile also represents die risks and 
hazards associated widi industrial modernization. Cars kill, both o n  the road, and 
dirough the emission of pollutants which affect the environment. In 1991 over 4000 
people in Britain died due to road deadi, and in America the figure w a s  over 40,000 
(Adams, 1995, p. 13 6). T h e  car industry has responded to this concern b y  developing a
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large bureaucracy to deal with safety management. T h e  U S A ,  the world's leading car 
manufacturer, n o w  has a National H i g h w a y  and Traffic Administration which is 
capable of enforcing vehicle safety regulations. Since the m i d  1960s it has ensured that 
cars must have tougher windscreens and energy-absorbing steering columns to help 
protect drivers in road accidents. In effect, the car industry has turned the risks and 
hazards associated with the modernization process into what B e c k  (1992, p. 176) terms 
‘developmental opportunities’. T h e  original cause for concern, i.e. that cars can kill, is 
subsumed in this n e w  development of the consideration and treatment of the risks 
associated with driving a car: thus, rather than suggesting that the n um b e r  of cars 
should be reduced, safety regulation becomes the solution.
It is this emphasis o n safety that led to the introduction of the seat belt which 
has b e c o m e  a significant symbol of risk reduction around the world. A s  John A d a m s  
(1995, p.l 14) states in Risk:
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A r o u n d  the world hundreds of millions of motorists are n o w  obliged b y law to 
belt up. T h e  seat belt law, with minor national variations, probably affects m o r e  
people than any other single piece of safety legislation. T h e  first seat belt law 
c a m e  into effect in the state of Victoria in Australia in 1970, and b y  1991 over 
80 jurisdictions worldwide had laws compelling drivers and s o m e  passengers to 
wear seat belts. It is n o w  a ‘truth’, almost universally acknowledged, that these 
laws have saved thousands of lives. It is a ‘fact’ endlessly repeated, not only on 
television in the popular press, but in scientific literature. Seat belts feature 
routinely in discussions of safety as an example of a measure that yields 
enormous benefits for minimal cost. T h e  ‘success’ of seat belt legislation in 
saving m a n y  lives is frequently cited by advocates of other public health 
measures as an example of the w a y  legislation and regulation can reduce risk.
A n d  yet despite the wealth of information in the press and b y other researchers about 
the success of this safety regulation, A d a m s  (1992, p. 116) maintains that ‘the strength 
of convictions about what this legislation has achieved is remarkably independent of
objective evidence’. H o w  can this be so? It seems to be ‘c o m m o n  sense’ that wearing a 
seat belt can help save lives. Only a fool or villain wo ul d  suggest otherwise (Barker, 
1997a, p.16).
A dams' argument about seat belt legislation is worth considering in s o m e  detail 
because of the parallels between this debate about road safety and the debate about 
media violence. First, it is important to examine the basic assumption that seat belts 
save lives. A d a m s  does not deny that a seat belt could prove to be life-saving if a driver 
or passenger were involved in a car* crash. A d a m s  (1995, p.l 19) cites Evans (1991) w h o  
has calculated that wear ing a seat belt can reduce the chances of death from a car- crash 
b y  41 per cent. Obviously, if tr avelling at high speed, a seat belt w o u l d  help prevent a 
driver or front passenger from crashing through the windscreen. W e  all reme mb e r those 
adverts admonishing us to wear seat belts that showed d u m m i e s  flying through the 
windscreen at high speed: this is what happens w h e n  cars collide. This knowledge of 
what happens w h e n  cars collide is called the ‘lay perspective’ (see Slovic, 1987, 1992, 
1995; Durant, 1997): it is public awareness of risk assessment.
After the seat belt legislation c a m e  into effect in Australia in 1970, seat belt 
campaign groups used an integration of expert and ‘lay perspectives’ to present claims 
for the life saving benefits of wearing a seat belt, hr a congressional inquiry b y  the 
Department of Transport in 1978, British campaign gr oups claimed that wear ing a seat 
belt could save up to a potential of 89,000 lives over the next ten years; it also referred 
to other studies in France and Sweden, as well as Australia, where seat belts have 
reduced fatalities b y  u p  to 60-70 per cent (cited in A d am s , 1995, p. 115). In 1981 
campaign groups and the car industry itself were united in advocating seat belt usage, 
and that same year1, die British seat belt law w a s  passed b y Parliament, adding Britain to
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However, despite this Targe b o dy  of evidence’, fiom expert and lay 
perspectives that seat belt usage can reduce road fatality, there w a s  in actual fact veiy 
little real evidence that wearing a seat belt could encourage people to be safer on the 
roads. All the scientific evidence that the seat belt campaign groups referred to wa s  
based o n  original research conducted in Australia in 1970 which monitored the effects 
of seat belt legislation on road accident deaths. This research found that the n u m b e r  of 
road accident deaths w a s  significantly reduced after the seat belt legislation w as  
introduced. However, what this original research failed to do w a s  s h o w  an awareness of 
risk compensation. Risk compensation is a p h e n o m e n o n  whereby ‘people modify their 
behaviour in response to perceived changes in risk to then* personal safety’ (Adams, 
1995, p. 114). According to A d a m s ,  this m ea n s that people drive m o r e  dangerously 
w h e n  they are wearing a seat belt. Thus, if people are forced to wear seat belts, m o r e  
rather than less accidents will occur, particularly towards those w h o  are m o re  
vulnerable, such as cyclists and pedestrians.
Thus, A d a m s  found that the original evidence conducted in Australia would 
have to be discounted because of its failure to incorporate risk compensation. A s  early 
as 1981 A d a m s  found that: ‘Available data for eight western European countries which 
introduced a seat belt law between 1973 and 1976 suggests that it has not led to a 
detectable change in road deaths’ (1992, p.120). In fact minor accidents, and the death 
of pedestrians and cyclists had increased in all eight countries in this s ame period. This 
research, and countless others inspired b y  the original ‘success’ of Australia's road 
safety record after seat belt legislation, failed to incorporate the h u m a n  element into 
then statistics regarding road safety. These researchers had used test dummies; they had
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a long list of countries that had already passed similar laws.
measured the effects of wearing a seatbelt, and yet they had failed to take into account 
that h u m a n  beings act differently under different circumstances: most importantly, they 
had failed to take into account that h u m a n  beings have a propensity to take risk.
Adams' research c a m e  at a time w h e n  the risk argument w a s  in full operation. 
T h e  car industry had been found responsible for selling dangerous products. Seat belt 
campaign groups had lobbied in the press and in parliament for the introduction of seat 
belt laws; they had produced ‘overwhelming evidence’ that appealed irrefutable; they 
had gained prominent support from the Department of Transport, the British Medical 
Association, and the Automobile Association. W h a t  is more, they had ‘c o m m o n  sense’ 
o n their side; driving a car can be dangerous, and wealing a seat belt can reduce this 
danger: this is the ‘lay perspective’ of risk assessment in relation to driving. It did not 
take long for the government to agree and pass legislation enforcing seat belt usage. 
Adams' report o n  risk compensation and the misinterpretation of European statistics 
regarding seat belt law and numbers of road death (Adams, 1981) w a s  suppressed b y 
the government and seat belt campaign groups because it did not fit with the dominant 
discourse o n road safety.
A d a m s  refers to his o w n  experience of this selective filtering of the evidence in 
Risk, and, in keeping with Barker and Petley's comme n ts  on the s a m e  type of selective 
reportage of evidence in relation to the ‘effects’ of media violence (1997), A d a m s  
refers to the ‘v e he m e n c e ’ (1995, p. 126) with which the press argued then case for the 
efficacy of seat belt legislation, and the almost ‘evangelical’ (1995, p. 131) attitude of 
road safety researchers towards the efficacy of seat belt usage. A d a m s  (1995, p. 126-7) 
writes: ‘This belief is n o w  so widespread, profoundly held, and insistently repeated that 
it is difficult to imagine any w a y  in which it might be altered. T h e  contrary view is
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Thus, the most successful piece of legislation regarding the prevention of the 
risks and hazards associated with modernization products is successful because of the 
w a y  in which campaign groups utilised the risk argument, not because of the 
‘overwhelming evidence’ about seatbelt usage and road safety. Whilst there is evidence 
to suggest that wearing a seat belt can reduce the risk of death b y  car crash, there is also 
evidence that wearing a seat belt actually increases the chances of minor accidents, and 
accidents which involve pedestrians and cyclists. Such evidence should have received 
proper hearing w h e n  the introduction of the seat belt w a s  debated in parliament in 1981 
but, because seat belt campaign groups utilized the risk argument, any evidence 
refuting the need to wear seat belts w a s  routinely suppressed and/or ignored. A s  A d a m s  
points out, cars can kill, and the causal link between the automobile and death o n the 
road is something w e  w o u ld  all accept as part of the hazards associated with this type of 
risk-taking behaviour. However, h o w  this behaviour should be regulated should be the 
subject of open debate; other safety regulations should be offered as alternatives; and 
the very question of h o w  m u c h  h u m a n  behaviour can be regulated at all should be one 
that is routinely explored.
W h a t  I want to point out here is that the social and cultural construction of the 
automobile as a symbol of economic and social success ensured that the car, and those 
people w h o  drive a car, could not be perceived as a hazar d in itself. It w a s  the w a y  it 
w a s  designed that w a s  the problem. Thus, steps to ensure that cars were designed to be 
safer, and roads designed to prevent accidents circumnavigated the fact that people 
drive cars, and people like to take risks. These two very important factors - one, that 
cars can kill, and two, that people like to take risks - rarely c o m e  together. Joyriders
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routinely filtered out.’
symbolize risk-taking behaviour and the car's potential to kill, but here, the joyriders ar e 
perceived to be criminals fiom troubled, often single parent, backgrounds; other 
reasons are found for their behaviour*. M o r e  often than not, w h e n  a traffic accident hits 
the headlines, as in N o v e m b e r  1993 w h e n  ten people were killed in a coach crash on 
the M 2  m o to r w a y  in Kent (Adams, 1995, p. 126), it is the call for* safety measures, for 
seat belts to be m a d e  compulsory for* coaches, that hits the headlines, rather than the 
thought that this might be a result of risk-taking behaviour*.
I will return to an individual's propensity to take risks in the following chapters. 
However, the theoretical position outlined above in relation to road traffic accidents 
highlights the link between safety and regulation and industrial and political 
m a n a g e m e n t  of risk. O n c e  the causal link had been m a d e  between the car* industry and 
road accidents and death, the industry had to take responsibility. T h e  easiest and most 
cost effective w a y  for it to do this w a s  to add safety measures to its existing product, 
effectively creating another potential for economic growth but, this time, in the interests 
of safety. T h e  introduction of the seat belt, an extremely inexpensive safety measure, 
w a s  a viable symbol of the car industry's n e w  risk awareness policy. T h e  government 
also w e l c o m e d  tire introduction of the seat belt as a road safety measur e. Th e  seat belt 
legislation w o ul d  ensure that the government w a s  seen to care for citizens' lives, whilst 
at the sa m e  time it meant that road extensions and improvements could still take place. 
N o  one wanted to rid society of the automobile: it is popular* with the industry and with 
the general public. However, n o  one wanted to appear* to advocate risk-taking 
behaviour* which could lead to accidents and death. Thus, the seat belt c a m e  into being.
This effective and extremely clever m an a ge m en t  of risk obfuscates the real 
issues of concern in relation to road traffic accident and death. T h e  safety belt is a
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product of effects research; it does not address the role of the automobile industry, or 
the role of the driver in any way. A  comparison with similar practices in relation to 
environmentalism will substantiate this point. Hajer (1997, p.248) notes that 
environmental debates highlight the role between nature, technology and society. H e  
writes:
T h e  popular- m o v e m e n t  wanted to save nature from the effects of 
industrialization but did not address the practices of industrial society head on, 
focusing instead o n  the effects of nature. In the end it thus paved the w a y  for a 
p r o g r a m m e  that focused on  the application of n e w  technologies and scientific 
m a n a g e m e n t  techniques to ‘conserve nature’. Here the concern about the 
immorality of society w a s  matched by  a renewed appeal to forms of techno- 
scientific m a n a g e m e n t  that were very similar to those industrial practices that 
h ad motivated the moral outcry in the first place.
Thus, whether it be car’s, television, or ecology, the risk argument ensures that causes of 
concern and anxiety about a product b e c o m e  a concern about the ‘effects’ of this 
product, and thus are inextricably linked with ‘the industrial practices that motivated 
the moral outcry in the first place’.
In the next section I want to s h o w  h o w  the risk argument is inappropriate for 
research into the effects of television. If it is difficult to measure the effects of seat belt 
regulation in an accurate and reliable manner, then it is even m o r e  difficult to measure 
the effects of watching film and television. People watch film and television in a 
variety of complex and contr adictory ways. This means that any attempt to measure the 
effects of television (Donnerstein and Berkowitz, 1981; Lefkowitz et al, 1972, 1977) 
automatically fails to take into consideration the fact that people rarely view 
p rogrammes in a systematic manner, and that people alter their viewing habits 
according to socio/cultural and individual factors. Effects research is a form of techno- 
scientific m a n a g e m e n t  and fails to consider the significance of social practice and
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social structure. It m a y  purport to be concerned with ‘the immorality of society’ but is 
instead an example of ‘scientific m an a g e m e n t  techniques’ (Hajer, 1997, p.248).
T h e  S e a r c h  f o r  ‘U n d e n ia b le  P r o o f
W e  have already looked at die cause-effect paradigm in Chapter two, and the 
w a y  that it is constr ucted o n  die belief that television has negative effects which can be 
objectively measured and calculated in relation to the impact of television on 
contemporary society. T h e  cause-effect paradigm in media research has t w o  significant 
flaws. Fust, it is based o n  early research into the effects of television that has been 
found to be unreliable and invalid. This early research methodology relied on 
laboratory experiments which failed to take into account die difference between 
surrogate actions and real actions, and that experimenter expectations and d e m a n d  
inevitably colour results (see, for example, Gauntlett, 1995, p. 18, and his criticism of 
studies b y  Bandura, 1963).
Secondly, the cause-effect paradigm assumes diat all viewers are the same, i.e. that 
their behaviour can be standardized and measured. O n c e  again, despite the fact that 
there has been a wealdi of research to suggest that viewers have complex and 
contradictory responses to film and television programmes (see for example, Gauntlett, 
1997; Buckingham, 1993b, 1996) research studies searching for a causal link between 
watching violence and aggressive acts continue to see the television viewer as passive 
and standardized (see for example, Barlow and Hill, 1985; V a n  Evra, 1990).
These t w o  flaws indicate that, as with the study of seat belt usage in Australia 
and Europe discussed earlier, the effects of using a product, whether it be car's or
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television, cannot be objectively measured so that the results can be used as ‘undeniable 
proof. T i m e  and again studies have s h o w n  that the social and cultural contextualisation 
of viewing is significant to our understanding of viewing practices, and viewers 
respond to the mass media in a variety of different ways. Studies b y  A n n  Gray (1992) 
Schlesinger et al. (1992), David B u c k i n g h a m  (1993b, 1996) and David Gauntlett 
(1997) indicate that children and adults possess an amazingly complex and 
contradictory response to the mass media. There m a y  be patterns and themes which 
emerge in these studies, for example that children and adults k n o w  the difference 
between fiction and reality and this affects the w a y  they respond to representations of 
violence (Buckingham, 1996, pp.213-251), but these patterns and similarities have not 
been objectively measured: h u m a n  behaviour, especially something as complex and 
subjective as watching television, does not lend itself to scientific measurement, and 
this is what m a k e s  audience research especially challenging.
T o  refer to B e c k  once more, under the risk paradigm, all modernization 
products must be m a d e  accountable for the risks and hazards they produce. This means  
that scientific measur ement must be used if causality is to be proven. Thus, quantitative 
research methods, ‘the effects tradition’, dominates the media violence debate, despite 
the fact that m o r e  sophisticated qualitative and quantitative research studies are far* 
m o r e  likely to help us understand w h y  and h o w  viewers choose to watch media 
violence. It is assumed that modernization products are part of an industry that is 
unethical and amoral. This also m e a n s  that those research studies which attempt to 
prove causality m a y  already have an outcome hi mind. Tire risk argument and 
experimenter expectations and d e m a n d  can be seen to be of direct relevance here. E v e n  
though the effects of watching film and television cannot be measured, anti-violence
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campaign groups d e m a n d  that research prove there are negative effects to this 
modernization product. W h e n  viewed from this perspective, most research in the 
effects tradition can be seen to be caught in a paradox of its o w n  making, where the 
reason for conducting scientific research o n media violence is not to learn m o r e  about 
viewer response, but to vindicate anti-violence campaign groups in then fight against 
ethical malpractice, and to reinforce the practices of techno-scientific management.4
P o p u l a r  C u l t u r e :  t h e  R i s k s  a n d  H a z a r d s
T h e  most c o m m o n  research methodology used in relation to media violence 
focuses on  proving causality, and in this respect, can be seen to locate popular* culture 
with the modernization process. This m e a n s  that popular' culture has b e c o m e  defined as 
a ‘social risk position’ (Beck, p.23) where the distribution and growth of risks is 
channelled through capitalist development. There are ‘definitional struggles over the 
scale, degree and urgency of risks’ (Beck, 1992, p.46) in relation to popular culture, but 
there is n o doubt that, according to campaign groups such as C A R E ,  and politicians 
such as David Alton, entertainment is perceived to be a comm o di t y that must be 
controlled and regulated.
Theodor Adorno's concept of the ‘culture industry’ is of direct relevance here. 
Like the Frankfurt School, B e c k  critiques the concept of the enlightenment; writing 
about science, B e c k  says: ‘its claims to truth and its claims to enlightenment are 
demystified’ (1992, p. 155); part of the function of a risk society is to demystify a belief 
in science and progress. A d o m o  (1991, p.92), in The Culture Industry, writes:
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the total effect of the culture industry is one of anti-enlightenment, in 
which...enlightenment, that is the progressive technical domination, becomes 
mass deception and is turned into a mea n s of fettering consciousness. It 
impedes die development of autonomous, independent individuals w h o  judge 
and decide consciously for themselves...
This concept of the ‘culture industry’ is veiy close to Beck's understanding of popular 
culture as a ‘social risk position’, where a product such as television ‘isolates and 
standardizes’ (Beck, 1992, p. 132). W h a t  is more, the concept of the ‘culture industry’ 
m a k e s  an important link between industry as the primary force of capitalism, and 
culture ‘as a basic causal factor in its o w n  right’ (Strinati, 1995, p.55). Thus, the term 
the ‘culture industry’ already signifies the fundamental concerns and anxieties of a risk 
society: these are industrial modernization and ‘a permanent ration of collective 
standardized poisoning’ (Beck, 1992, p.65).
However, where A d o r n o  s a w  the culture industry as the location of power, 
encouraging conformity and consensus, and perpetuating a passive, dependent 
consumer, B e c k  sees the consumer as a subject of resistance. T h e  consumer becomes a 
site of ‘cultural risk consciousness’ and conflict (Beck, 1992, p.73) and this leads to a 
formation of a risk society. Thus, rather than an individual being lulled into a false 
sense of resistance whilst, for example, listening to popular music, an individual is 
forced into a veiy real position of resistance as the perceived risks and hazards of 
popular music c o m e  to light. Witness the public reaction to rock and roll in the U S A  in 
the 1950s; this w a s  a direct response to the perceived risks of this type of popular music 
on youth and the com mu n it y  (Guralnick, 1994). Therefore, o n  the one hand B e c k  
perceives popular culture as a product that isolates and standardizes, it is something
negative and ultimately harmful to society, and yet on the other hand he sees this h a r m  
as the actual catalyst for resistance.
This is not to say that fears about media violence are based only o n this 
breakdown between high/popular culture, nor is this to suggest that such fears about 
n e w  and popular* forms of entertainment can only be located in the twentieth century. 
Pearson (1983) in Hooligan, a History o f Respectable Fears has certainly s h o w n  that 
there is a long and complicated history to fears and anxieties about a variety of 
entertainment activities. T h e  point I wish to m a k e  is that the risk argument situates 
media violence as part of popular culture which is produced and distributed by the 
entertainment industry. M e d i a  violence, therefore, is a product which is perceived as 
having negative effects. Whether* one uses Adorno's critique of popular culture as 
infantalizing and standardizing the consumer, or Beck's concept of popular* cultur e as 
symptomatic of a risk society that wishes to be spar ed fiom poisoning, media violence 
is perceived to be hazardous and dangerous. It is therefore treated in such a way.
C la ss  S o c ie ty  vs. R is k  S o c ie ty
It is in the identification of risk that B e c k  re-assesses the significance of a class 
society, as first outlined b y  Marx, and, in relation to popular* culture, further examined 
b y  A d o r n o  and the Frankfurt School. For Adorno, popular culture only serves to 
highlight class barriers: ‘T h e  select and enlightened few, b y  undertaking their 
intellectual and cultural practices, can cut themselves off fiom m u n d a n e  activities of 
the masses and thereby resist the p o w er  of the culture industry’ (Strinati, 1995, p.76). 
For Beck, risk breaks d o w n  barriers. B e c k  (1992, p.49) writes about a transition fiom a
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class to risk society in s o m e  detail:
Class societies remain related to the ideal of equality in then developmental 
dynamics...Not so the risk society. Its normative counterproject, which is its 
basis and motive force, is safety. Th e  place of the value system of the ‘unequal’ 
society is taken b y the value system of the ‘unsafe’ society. Whereas utopia of 
equality contains a wealth of substantial and positive goals of social change, the 
utopia of the risk society remains peculiarly negative and defensive. Basically, 
one is no  longer concerned with attaining something ‘g o o d ’, but rather with 
preventing the worst; self-limitation is the goal which emerges. T h e  dream of 
the class society is diat eveiyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. T h e 
utopia of the risk society is that eveiyone should be spared from poisoning.
Beck's concept of the transition from a class society to a risk society is worth dwelling 
o n here. G o n e  are the traditional class barriers; society unites in ridding its community 
of ‘poisons’ (of whatever type): it wants to create a safe world. For Beck, a class 
society and a risk society cannot exist side b y  side: one cannot dream of having a ‘share 
of the pie’ and wish to be ‘spared from poisoning’. However, as the food metaphors 
suggest, it is possible to wish to share die pie, and be spared from poisoning.
In relation to anti-violence campaign groups, w e  can see that although such 
groups suggest that they wish to spare everyone from poisoning, what w e  actually find 
is diat then perception of ‘eveiyone’ is based distinctly along economic factors. For 
example, w h e n  B e c k  argues that traditional class barriers break d o w n  w h e n  a 
com mu n it y  resists the hazardous effects of industrial modernization, this can at first 
appeal' true in relation to media violence. M e d i a  violence affects eveiyone; children and 
adults are perceived to be at risk, and the individual and the c o m mu n it y  are adversely 
affected. This perceived threat of media violence mea ns  diat people from all types of 
economic backgrounds form an opinion that the negative effects of media violence can 
h a r m  our society. T h e y  unite to create a safer environment. T h e  example of die
introduction of the V-chip in Canada, cited in the previous chapter, is a good case in 
point; over 1.5 million Canadians signed a petition to help parents protect their children 
fiom excessive television violence ( C R T C ,  1996). This social and cultural construction 
of media violence m e a ns  that anti-violence campaign groups, utilizing the risk 
argument, can appeal to all citizens in then campaign to prevent a dystopian society. 
For example, the National Viewers' and Listeners' Association ( N V A L A ) ,  one of the 
largest British anti-violence campaign groups says in a recent advertisement that: 
‘Violence on  television contributes significantly to the increase in violence in society 
and should be curtailed in the public interest’. Having m a d e  the point about cause and 
effect the N V A L A  goes o n  to say: ‘Improving pr o gr a m m e  standards wou l d benefit 
eveiyone and h a r m  no one’.5 T h e  veiy clear reference to a class-less society is m a d e  
obvious in the pronoun ‘eveiyone’.
However, critics of the argument against media violence have s h o w n  that tire 
discourse used in the debate is highly class conscious. Julian Petley (1997, p.87) 
argues: ‘lurking behind these fears about the "corruption of innocent minds" (in relation 
to media violence) one finds time and again, implicit or explicit, a potent strain of class 
dislike and fear.’ A s  Petley notes, Geoffrey Pearson (1983, p.208) has examined middle 
class dislike of working class culture, fiom eighteenth century b a w d y  houses, to the 
M usi c  Halls of the 1890s, to television now, and found that ‘popular- entertainments of 
all kinds have been blamed for dragging d o w n  public morals in a gathering pattern of 
accusation which remains essentially the s a m e ’ (cited in Petley, 1997, p.87). Petley 
finds similar- kinds of class-based rhetoric in association with ‘video nasties’, which 
since the 1980s have been used as an example of the alleged risks and hazards of 
television viewing. Petley writes:
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...the connection between the ‘underclass’ and ‘video nasties’ c a m e  very m u c h  
to the fore at the time of the Alton a m e n d m e n t  to the Criminal Justice Bill, 
aimed at tightening video censorship still further. Thus in the Sunday Times of 
3 April 1994 w e  find one Margaret Driscoll arguing that ‘the children most 
likely to be d a m a g e d  are those being brought up in sink estates where family 
values no  longer hold s w a y  - the products of an "anything goes" society’, whilst 
a Times editorial of 11 April 1994 held forth that ‘horror-video addiction is part 
of socially-disadvantaged sink culture in which lack of parental supervision is 
endemic’.
W h a t  these press co m m e n t s  indicate is that whilst anti-violence campaign groups such 
as the N V A L A  assert that public response to modernization products is about the safety 
of the community, not about capitalist values, social commentators in the national press 
reveal the exact opposite. This concept of safety is concerned with controlling those 
people w h o  con s um e  media violence, and the perception of these consumers is 
distinctly class based.
T h e  M y th o lo g ic a l V iew er
T h e  paradox of the product and the consumer as the cause of h a r m  is reflected 
in the risk argument itself. C a m p a i g n  groups w h o  use the risk argument are concerned 
with controlling and regulating a product. A s  with the introduction of seat belt 
legislation, methods of regulation, such as film certification, government sanctioned 
censorship and the introduction of the V-chip, all focus o n w a ys  of controlling and 
regulating the product. N o  one wants to ban entertainment altogether; neither the 
entertainment industry, nor the government, nor the general public wants to get rid of 
television. Thus, the introduction of the V-chip in Canada and the United States is a
simple, cost effective w a y  for the industry and die government to be seen to be reducing 
the risks of violence on television. It is a seatbelt for the mind. A n d  yet, it is people w h o  
c o nsume media violence. A n d  it is a notion of a dangerous underclass addicted to 
watching sex and violence that filters through the media as an expression of die fears 
and insecurities this product evokes.6 Despite this connection between media violence 
and its viewers, the risk argument paradoxically remains fixed on proving causal 
connection and regulating the product.
T h e  reason this is die case is that real viewers of media violence are m a d e  up of 
a wide cross section of the public. T h e  C i n e m a  Advertising Association undertakes 
film profiles which are representative samples of the British population and serve to 
highlight such demographic patterns as age, gender and the social background of 
moviegoers. Tables la, lb, and lc reveal that consumers of media violence, in this 
instance films such as Reservoir Dogs and Natural Born K illers, are representative of 
the public. Table la shows that although m o r e  m e n  (62%) than w o m e n  (38%) chose to 
see a movie such as Reservoir Dogs, there w a s  still a substantial proportion of w o m e n  
w h o  chose to see this movie, something that is rarely, if ever mentioned in the press, or 
b y  anti-violence campaign groups. Similarly, Table lb reveals that consumers of the 
A B C 1  bracket (upper and middle class) outnumbered diose of die C 2 D E  bracket 
(skilled and unskilled working class) sometimes by 4 0 % ,  as in the case of True 
Romance. 7  In Table lc, although the 20-35 age bracket appears the most popular in 
relation to viewing violent movies, there are still substantial numbers of movie goers 
w h o  are aged from 18 to over 45. Thus, with a movie like Pulp Fiction, 1 2 %  of movie 
goers were aged 18-19, 1 0 %  were over 45, and the remaining 7 8 %  were aged between 
20-35.
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Table la: CAA Film Profiles -  Gender
Total British cinema goers 51.76million: male (25.25m), female (26.50m), Caviar 14/BMRB 
Intemational/CAA 1996
Film Ma le Female Total
Reservoir D o g s 6 2 % 3 8 % 1344000
Pulp Fiction 6 5 % 3 5 % 4330000
True R o m a n c e 7 2 % 2 8 % 343000
Natural B o m  Killers 7 1 % 2 9 % 1846000
M a n  Bites D o g 4 6 % 5 4 % 286000
Killing Z o e 6 6 % 3 4 % 250000
Figures supplied by Cinema Advertising Association, August, 1996.
Figure lb: CAA Film Profile -  Class
Total British cinema goers 51.76million: ABC1 (25.42m) C2DE (26.33m), Caviar 14/BMRB 
Intemational/CAA 1996
Film A B C 1 C 2 D E Total
Reservoir D o g s 5 6 % 4 4 % 1344000
Pulp Fiction 6 0 % 4 0 % 4330000
True R o m a n c e 7 1 % 2 9 % 343000
Natural B o m  Killers 5 7 % 4 3 % 1846000
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M a n  Bites D o g 5 6 % 4 4 % 286000
Killing Zo e 7 5 % 2 6 % 250000
Figures supplied by Cinema Advertising Association, August, 1996.
Table lc: CAA Film Profiles -  Age
Total British cinema goers 51.76million: 15-24 (7.19m), 25-34 (9.16m), 35+ (29.63m), Caviar 
14/BMRB International/CAA 1996
Film 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 4 5 + Total
R D 1 4 % 5 3 % 1 8 % 6 % 1 0 % 1344000
P F 1 2 % 3 1 % 3 4 % 1 3 % 1 0 % 4330000
T R 3 5 % 1 9 % 3 2 % 6 % 7 % 343000
N B K 1 5 % 4 0 % 2 6 % 1 2 % 7 % 1846000
M B D 6 % 5 8 % 2 9 % 0 % 8 % 286000
K Z 2 0 % 4 0 % 4 1 % 0 % 0 % 250000
Figures supplied by Cinema Advertising Association, August, 1996.
T h e  C A A  film profiles reveal a quite different image of consumers of violent movies 
than the press and anti-violence campaign groups wou l d have us believe. These figures 
compare with similar studies in television audience figures for films such as Reservoir 
Dogs, and television series such as Cracker or Millennium. A n  audience breakdown for 
Reservoir Dogs, transmitted on  Channel Four, Saturday 31st of M a y  1997 shows that 
out of a total of 2.68 million viewers, 6 1 %  of m e n  and 3 9 %  of w o m e n  chose to watch
th is  film , the m a jo rity  o f w h ich  were aged 25-44 (47.1% ), and in  the C l social group 
(32.3% ).8
T h is d ispa rity  between the popu la r im age o f  a consum er o f m edia v io lence, and 
the actual re a lity  should g ive us cause to  question the social and cu ltu ra l construction o f 
m edia vio lence. A  m yth  o f w o rk in g  class, teenage boys fio m  single parent fam ilies  as 
the dom inant consumers o f  m edia vio lence  has been perpetuated in  the press. A n d  a 
focus on the regu la tion  and con tro l o f m edia vio lence as a product o f  industria l 
m odern ization has dom inated the cam paign to  reduce levels o f m edia v io lence. B o th  o f 
these factors have ensur ed tha t how  people actua lly  respond to  m edia vio lence is o f  no 
consequence to  the ris k  argum ent. H a je r (1996, p.257) com m ents in  h is  exam ination o f 
eco log ica l m odern ization tha t ‘eco log ica l m odern ization "freezes" o r excludes some 
aspects o f re a lity  w h ile  m anipu la ting  others...and tha t the creation o f  discursive rea lities 
are in  fact m om ents at w h ich  cu ltu ra l p o litic s  is being m ade’ . A s H a je r po in ts out:
W hether o r no t the actors them selves are aware o f  th is  is no t the po in t. 
Im p lic itly , m etaphors, categorizations, o r d e fin itio n  o f solutions always 
structur e re a lity , m aking certa in  fram ings o f  re a lity  seem p lausib le  and closing 
o f f  certa in possible fu tu re  scenarios w h ile  m aking other scenarios ‘th inkab le ’ .
W hat th is  reveals is tha t cam paign groups w ho use the ris k  argum ent are p rim a rily  
concerned w ith  channe lling society's anxieties and insecurities in to  cam paign causes. 
T h is is because environm entalism , o r as H a je r (1997, p.256) ca lls it, ‘ ecologica l 
m odern iza tion ’ is part o f cu ltu ra l p o litic s , and any debate about conserving nature and 
regu la ting  industries is re a lly  a debate about ‘the social re la tionships between nature, 
society and techno logy’ (H a jer, 1992, p.257). In  such a debate, there is  o n ly  room  fo r 
dom inant discourses and ‘d iscursive re a litie s ’ (H ajer, 1997, p.257). M ethods fo r
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s tru c tu iin g  re a lity , i.e . effects research, make the fu tu re  scenario o f a ‘ safe’ 
environm ent ‘ th inkab le ’ by  exclud ing aspects o f  rea lity .
In  the next chapter I  w ant to  consider fu rthe r explanations as to  w hy society 
w ishes to  con tro l m edia v io lence. I f  an ti-v io lence  cam paign groups are no t concerned 
w ith  real view ers o r rea l socia l practices, then th is  suggests tha t the socia l re lationships 
between the m edia, technology and society are open to  in terpre ta tion . The cu ltu ra l 
construction  o f ris k  and the taboo practice o f  w atch ing m edia vio lence is  one such 
in te rp re ta tion  tha t should be explored fro m  an anthropo log ica l and socio log ica l 
perspective.
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N o te s
1 The New Labour government has also promised to investigate G ulf war syndrome and has ordered a 
review into this area. See, the Guardian, Monday 12 May, 1997, p.6.
2 In a pamphlet advertising the ‘key green issues’ for the 1997 British General Election, the Green Party 
highlighted the need to keep the food industry in check. They write: ‘intensive fanning is bad for food and 
animals, and has led to tragedies like BSE. But, the industry has not learned, and we are now being forced to 
eat genetically modified foods with unknown consequences.’ This election pamphlet was sent to my door two 
days before the general election, on May 1st 1997. It was part o f election communication for Hackney North 
and Stoke Newington. The candidate, a fitting one in relation to risk and the environment, was Yen Chit 
Chong, an engineer who works in the industry, reducing pollution. For an opposing view see Derek Burke, 
‘Immoral Maize?’ in  The Times Higher Educational Supplement, March M th 1997, p.20.
3 Adams' experience o f what happens when you do challenge a wealth o f statistical ‘proof is bom out in the 
suppression o f this evidence in relation to seat belt legislation in Britain in 1981 Adams, 1995, pp.113-133). 
See Barker and Petley (1997) for a discussion o f this in relation to media violence.
4 Two good examples o f this type o f ‘effects research’ is the Newson Report (Newson, 1994), and the 
PAPFCPG (1997) report on ‘Violence, Pornography and die Media’ . See Barker and Petley (1997) 
for a critical examination o f the Newson Report, and Barker (1997b) and Barratt (1997) for discussion 
o f die PAPFCPG.
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5 Advertisement for die NVALA, p.3, which encourages citizens to jo in  its organization and donate money.
6 Indeed, it is ironic that the introduction o f the V-chip into new television sets over 13 inches w ill 
effectively exclude this ‘dangerous underclass’ from benefiting from risk reduction, as it is only people 
who can afford a large new TV that w ill actually be able to use the V-chip, see Reuters Limited, Friday 
September 26th 1997.
7 The Cinema Advertising Association uses the following codes to represent class structures: A  = Upper 
Middle Class; B = Middle Class; C l = Lower Middle Class; C2 = Skilled Working Class; D = Working 
Class; E = Lowest Level o f Subsistence. The CAA Film Profile provides figures for ABC1 and C2DE.
8 The audience breakdown for Reservoii' Dogs also shows that 18.4% o f the AB categoiy and 24.1% 
and 25.2% o f the C2, DE categories watched this film  on Channel 4 on Saturday 31st May 1997. 19% 
o f 16-21 year olds, and 13% o f 45-54 year olds also watched this film . Figures supplied by BARB 
(British Audience Research Board) June, 1997.
5T h e  P r o d u c t i o n  o f  R i s k
In  the previous chapter I  suggested tha t w hen anti-v io lence  cam paign groups 
u tiliz e  the ris k  argum ent, they obfuscate the rea l issues associated w ith  m edia vio lence, 
and they do so through focusing on the negative, cap ita lis tic  tendencies o f 
m odern ization products. N o w  I  w ant to  consider the soc io /p o litica l and cu ltu ra l 
construction o f ris k  in  order to  attem pt to  understand w hy certa in  activ ities are 
perceived to  be positive  risk -ta k in g  activ ities , and w hy others are perceived to  be 
negative.
The soc io /po litica l and cu ltu ra l construction o f  ris k  ensures tha t some risk- 
ta k in g  activ itie s  are perceived to  be m ore acceptable than others. F o r exam ple, provided 
one is a responsible person, buying  and se lling  stocks and shares on the exchange 
m arket is considered to  be pos itive  and rew arding risk -tak ing  behaviour. H ow ever, 
w hether one is responsible o r not, consensual sado m asochistic sex is  considered to  be 
negative and hazardous risk -ta k in g  behaviour (Adam s, 1995). W hy th is  is the case is o f 
d irec t relevance to  the issue o f m edia v io lence: an active consum er o f film s  such as 
Reservoir Dogs (Q uentin  Tarantino, 1992) o r Crash (D av id  Cronenberg, 1996) is 
com m only considered to  be invo lved  in  anti-socia l and hazardous risk -ta k in g  behaviour 
and th is  has a d irect im pact on the w ay v io le n t m ovies are considered to  he harm fu l to  
the environm ent.
A n ti-v io le n ce  cam paign groups lik e  C hristian  A c tio n  Research and Education 
(C A R E ) and the M ovem ent fo r C hris tian  D em ocracy (M C D ) consider m edia vio lence
to  be hazardous to  the m ora l and socia l fa b ric  o f our society. Because these cam paign 
groups advocate a society based on the law s o f the B ib le , there is a lin k  to  be made 
between the no tion  o f ris k  and the no tion  o f  sin  in  contem porary socia l structures. M ary 
D ouglas' w o rk  on the anthropo logy o f  risk -tak ing  and ris k  averse cultures and sub­
cultures is o f  d irect relevance here. D ouglas, along w ith  other researchers in  th is  fie ld  
(Adam s, 1995; Robbins, Bales, and D 'A ndrea, 1996), believes tha t a ll cultures have a 
propensity to  take risks; how ever, soc io /po litica l and cu ltu ra l constructions o f ris k  
ensure tha t some ac tiv ities  are perceived to  be m ore ‘s in fu l’ and ‘dangerous’ than 
others, and tha t those ac tiv ities  tha t are labeled as ‘dangerous’ are ac tiv ities  w h ich  the 
dom inant cu ltu re  w ishes to  con tro l and regulate.
Thus, d iis  chapter w ill show tha t d ie  ris k  argum ent ensures that certain 
entertainm ent products w ill be associated w ith  risk-tak ing  behaviour. H ow ever, certain 
risk -ta k in g  activ ities  are perceived to  contain rewards; appearing on a ta lk  show such as 
Oprah Winfrey invo lves a certa in am ount o f risk , i.e. confessing to  an adulterous a ffa ir 
on prim e tim e  te lev is ion , but th is  is o ffse t w ith  the perceived rewards to  be gained fio m  
con fron ting  such issues. A nd  certa in risk-tak ing  activ ities are perceived to  be hazardous 
and dangerous; film s  and program m es w h ich  conta in sex and vio lence, especially o f  a 
graphic and rea lis tic  nature, fa ll in to  the second categoiy. I t  is m y contention tha t d ie  
program m es them selves have v e iy  little  to  do w ith  the dom inant discourse on m edia 
vio lence (see also M a rtin  Barker, 1984a, 1989; Julian Petley, 1997). In  th is  chapter I  
w ant to  separate the product o f v io le n t m ovies fio m  th is  negative perception o f  risk - 
tak ing  behaviour in  order to  focus on the soc io /po litica l construction o f ris k  and how  
th is  relates to  d ie  causes o f insecurities in  contem porary society.
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B eck acknow ledged in  Risk Society tha t risks are open to  socia l d e fin itio n  and 
construction; there are ‘d e fin itio n a l struggles over the scale, degree and urgency o f 
risks ’ (1992, p.46) and these d e fin itio n a l struggles can be seen in  the w ay certa in risks 
can be changed, m agn ified  and altered by, w hat B eck calls, ‘ris k  producers’ (1992, 
p .45). H ow ever, B eck fa ils  to  consider tha t the social d e fin itio n  and construction o f ris k  
is a consolida tion o f h ierarch ica l pow er, and tha t when we see ris k  awareness in  action, 
w e see h ierarch ica l pow er in  action (Adam s, 1995, p .182).1 W hat is  m ore, Beck does 
no t acknow ledge tha t some social ris k  positions are defined as e ither positive  o r 
negative, and tha t the construction o f  these socia l ris k  positions emphasizes the benefits 
and drawbacks o f risk -ta k in g  activ ities.
For exam ple, the nuclear industry  is perceived by the B ritis h  p u b lic  to  be a 
negative social ris k  position , and research has shown tha t d ie  p u b lic  are extrem ely 
d is tru s tfu l o f the nuclear* industry as an ‘ im posed’ and s c ie n tific a lly  am biguous ris k  
(O 'R iordan, 1997, p.21). H ie  nuclear* industry  has taken th is  d istrust o f the risk-taker* 
in to  account. I t  has taken great tr ouble to  counteract th is  negative perception o f nuclear* 
pow er b y  focusing on the rewards to  be gained from  th is  ris k  position . Recent 
advertis ing focuses on products w h ich  help enrich our lives and our* natural 
environm ent; one advert in  particular* showed a farm er round ing up h is sheep, 
suggesting tha t nuclear pow er is another w ay o f  w o rk in g  the land, and is as trad itiona l 
as fann ing .2 Whether* o r no t th is  advertis ing is e ffective , it  shows tha t the p o ss ib ility  o f 
a lternative ris k  positions is  an op tion  tha t even the nuclear industry  is prepared to  
explore. A no ther com pany, S hell U K , has run  discussion gr oups w ith  the B ritis h  pub lic
in  order to  assess w hat the p u b lic  th in k  o f  then  proposal to  dum p the B rent Spar o il 
storage p la tfo rm  in to  the sea.3 A ccord ing  to  S hell U K 's  ‘corporate issues and reputation 
m anager’ : ‘ S hell U K  is develop ing strategies to  try  to  avo id  generating unnecessary 
p u b lic  outrage’ . Shell U K  w ant to  demonstrate how  ‘corporate ethics and w ide r societal 
values are incorporated in to  our’ decision-m aking ’ (W ilk inson , 1997, p.21). Thus, the 
negative perception o f  Shell U K  as a risk-take r and/or risk-m aker is o ffse t by 
h ig h ligh ting  pos itive  social and e th ica l values. The ve ry  fact th a t Shell U K  have a 
‘corporate issues and reputation m anager’ is  a sure sign th is  m u ltina tiona l corporation is 
awar e o f the pos itive  and negative perceptions o f risk-tak ing  behaviour'.
Adam s (1995, p. 183) po ints out tha t Beck's theory o f  ris k  is constructed upon 
dark, fo reboding perceptions o f  nature in  danger. Beck warns about apocalyptic danger, 
o f  a ‘catastrophic socie ty’ where the ‘ state o f emergency threatens to  become the 
norm al state’ (1992, p.79). A s  Adam s (1995, p.181) points out, th is  perception o f 
techno log ica l ris k  is as m uch to  do w ith  Beck's ow n ‘personal m yth  o f  nature ’ , and is in  
actual fa c t an exam ple o f  d ie  d e fin itio n  and construction o f risk .
A aron  W ildavsky (1988) is  also a ris k  tiie o ris t w ho believes tha t perceptions o f 
ris k  are bound up w ith  socia l and cu ltu ra l de fin itions o f risk , and yet W ildavsky 
believes tiia t techno log ica l im provem ent has been o f benefit to  nature. He says:
O verw helm ing evidence shows tha t the econom ic g row th  and technolog ica l 
advance a ris ing  fio m  m arket com petition  have in  the past tw o  centuries been 
accom panied by dram atic im provem ents in  health - large increases in  longevity  
and decreases in  sickness, (c ited  in  Adam s, 1992, p. 183)
T h is is d ie  exact opposite to  Beck's perception o f industria l m odernization. W ildavsky 
(1991) believes d ia t environm ental risks have become the causes celebres o f the past
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tw o  decades. These dangers to  the environm ent have been constructed, and as such 
have been exaggerated and dem onized in  the press. There is a general propensity fo r 
‘ governm ent regulators, p o litic ia n s , the m edia and d ie  general p u b lic  to  construe 
evidence o f environm ental harm  in  an a larm ist w ay’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 183). Thus, both 
B eck and W ildavsky believe in  the social d e fin itio n  and construction o f  risk , and yet 
they have v e iy  d iffe re n t view s on w h ich  risks are dangerous to  our environm ent W hat 
th is  means is tha t ris k  positions are produced b y  social and cu ltu ra l de fin ition s, and that 
some ris k  positions are m ore p o litic a lly  e ffective  than others. E nvironm enta l risks have 
become the causes celebres because over the last tw o  decades they have become a 
usefu l sym bol o f h ierarch ica l pow er, and the d e fin itio n  o f such risks is in  the hands o f 
the dom inant hierarchies. B y  dom inant hierarchies, I  am re fe rring  in  pa rticu la r to  
governm ent com m ittees, cam paign groups, and m u lti-na tiona l corporations. These 
groups represent sym bolic and econom ic capita l in  our society and, in  re la tion  to  
environm entalism , they are the largest sponsors o f  sc ien tific  research in to  th is  area (see 
Adam s, 1995, D ouglas, 1992, p.107).
Beck and W ildavsky  agree tha t science should be released fio m  the constraints 
o f h ierarch ica l pow er; tim e  and again, B eck and W ildavsky c ite  examples o f p o litic a l 
and industria l bodies using sc ie n tific  evidence fo r then  ow n ends. Science, w hether it  is 
perceived as pos itive  o r negative, should be a place o f independent thought; it  should be 
‘ liberated fio m  the g rip  o f  dom inant h ierarchies’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 185). H ow ever, th is  
is an idea lis tic  and utop ian v ie w  o f sc ie n tific  progress. Science, as B eck and W ildavsky 
are w e ll aware, is  part o f industria liza tion , and even i f  certa in sc ie n tific  resear ch were to  
be w h o lly  independent the results o f th is  research w ou ld  s till be filte re d  and 
m anipulated fo r p o litic a l, socia l and cu ltu ra l ends. A s Adam s (1995, p .194) po in ts out, 
there is  no w ay o f  d iscovering ‘ob jective  p ro o f: “ ‘P ro o f’ is no to rious ly  e lusive, and the
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w ord  is usua lly used, w rong ly , to  mean “ unanim ous agreement” . B u t as we have 
seen...long-running disagreements about ris k  are long-runn ing precise ly because they 
are unresolved, and p robab ly unresolvable, b y  science.’ T h is means tha t ‘risks are 
cu ltu ra lly  constructed no t because people pre fer m ake-believe to  facts, bu t because, at 
the p o in t o f decision, su ffic ie n t "facts" are unavailable ’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 194). ‘P ro o f is 
the m anagement o f available data. M y  p o in t is tha t th is  management o f available data 
is orchestrated b y  dom inant hierarchies. In  re la tion  to  m edia v io lence, i t  is dom inant 
hierarchies such as anti-v io lence cam paign groups, po litic ians , d ie  ju d ic ia ry , and 
regu la to ry bodies such as the B B FC  w h ich  attem pt to  manage availab le  data. Such 
organisations/institu tions can be re ferred to  as dom inant hierarchies because they 
s ig n ify  sym bolic and/or econom ic cap ita l in  our society. I t  is these 
organisations/institu tions w h ich  attem pt to  con tro l and dissem inate in fo rm a tion  about 
m edia v io lence. Late r in  th is  chapter I  shall re fe r to  M a ry  D ouglas’ th e o iy  about the 
‘centre com m un ity ’ and the ‘status o f know ledge’ and aud io rity  th is  centre com m unity 
is  g iven b y  society as a w ho le  (D ouglas, 1992, p. 107). In  th is  sense, ‘dom inant 
h ierarch ies’ can be understood in  re la tion  to  D ouglas’ concept o f the centre com m unity, 
a com m unity tha t has ‘ways o f  co n tro llin g  access to  w ealth  and in fluence ’ . Thus, w hat 
is perceived to  be ‘undeniable p ro o f o f the negative ‘e ffects ’ o f w atch ing m edia 
vio lence is no t ‘p ro o f in  any sc ie n tific  sense, bu t rather evidence o f the w ay in  w h ich  
p o litic a l and social institu tions/o rgan iza tions w ish  to  con tro l consum er tastes.
Controlling Risk Effectively
In  the last tw en ty  years safety lite ra tu re  and cost-benefit analysis have come to  
govern our understanding o f risk . A  ris k  society is a society concerned w ith  preventing
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the w orst (Beck, 1992, p .49), and in  such a w ay tha t is  cost e ffective . F or exam ple, the 
Intergovernm ental Panel on C lim ate Change are em ploying econom ists to  attem pt a 
cost-benefit analysis o f g loba l w arm ing; even such a massive and in d e fin ite  ris k  as th is 
is being managed so tha t ‘a ll costs and benefits o f g lobal w arm ing  and the con tro l o f 
g loba l w arm ing  be expressed in  m onetary term s’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 170). A ll risks are 
soc ia lly  defined and constructed, and as ris k  producers are pa rt o f  the dom inant 
h ierarchy, i t  is  no t surpris ing  tha t contem porary risks, such as m edia v io lence, tra ffic  
p o llu tio n , o r nuclear- reactors are managed b y  industria l, o r state corporations. These 
corporations are in  tu rn  part o f industria liza tion , and are interested w ith  the m ost cost 
e ffective  w ay o f reducing ris k  in  the environm ent. They ar e also concerned that they do 
no t damage then- ow n professional status. Then jo b  is to  damage another organization, 
and re-define i t  as a social ris k  position . I t  does no t m atter i f  they are rig h t o r w rong, 
o n ly  tha t they do no t damage then  ow n professional reputation. Henderson (1977) has 
w ritte n  about ‘the unim portance o f be ing rig h t’ (c ited  in  Adam s, 1995, pp. 190-92), and 
h is  study o f B ritis h  G overnm ent decisions reveals tha t little  im portance is attached to  
being rig h t; w hat is im portan t is  the w ay risks are successfully managed to  re-enforce 
dom inant hierarchies.4
Scott Lash (1992, p .4 ) sums up th is  concept o f ris k  at a societal leve l w hen he 
discusses Beck's w o rk  in  h is in troduction  to  Risk Society:
A  sm all group o f socio logists and anthropologists... have made three 
observations...F irst, such physica l risks are always created and effected in  social 
systems, fo r exam ple by organizations and institu tions w h ich  are supposed to  
manage and con tro l ris k y  a c tiv ity . Second, the m agnitude o f physica l risks is 
therefore a d irect func tion  o f  the q u a lity  o f social re la tions and processes. T h ird , 
the p rim a ry  risk , even fo r the m ost techn ica lly  intense ac tiv ities ...is  therefore 
tha t o f social dependency upon institu tions and actors w ho m ay w e ll be - and 
arguably are increasing ly - a lien, obscure and inaccessible to  m ost people 
affected b y  the risks in  question.
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To relate th is  to  m edia v io lence, i t  can be seen tha t dom inant hierarchies, in  th is  
instance, an ti-v io lence cam paign groups, po litic ians , the ju d ic ia ry  and the media, have 
defined m edia vio lence as an exam ple o f industria l risk . I t  doesn't m atter w hether they 
are rig h t, w hat is im portan t is  tha t they present the available data as evidence o f ‘p ro o f 
tha t they have id e n tifie d  a new  risk . Once the risks o f w atch ing m edia vio lence have 
been defined and constructed, i t  is  up to  regu la tory bodies, governm ent com m ittees, 
cam paign groups and the ju d ic ia ry  to  successfully manage to  contain and reduce the 
p robab ilitie s  o f these risks occurring in  the m ost cost e ffective  w ay possible. I f  these 
dom inant hierarchies can be seen to  be active ly  engaged in  safety precautions, then they 
are re in fo rc in g  the dom inant social structure, and in  tu rn , the dom inant discourse on 
m edia vio lence. M ed ia  vio lence  its e lf, and those people w ho consume m edia vio lence, 
ar e o f litt le  o r no consequence to  these types o f dom inant hierarchies.
Perceptions o f Risk
D om inant hierarchies anticipate risks. Governm ent com m ittees, o r institu tions, 
lik e  the R oyal S ociety (B rita in ’s leading sc ie n tific  in s titu tio n ), anticipate the anxieties 
and insecurities o f  citizens, and they define, construct and manage risks, u tiliz in g  the 
ris k  argum ent as a w ay o f successfully achieving th is . W ildavsky (1991) believes that 
over the last tw en ty  years environm ental risks have come to  dom inate p o litic a l, social 
and cu ltu ra l debate. There are tw o  reasons w h y  th is  has taken place. The fu s t is  tha t 
post-war* environm entalism  has undergone a num ber o f  d iffe re n t phases (Jam ison,
1996). The second is because the perception o f ris k  has d ram atica lly  changed since the 
1960s. A s B eck (1994, p. 183) has po in ted out, risks such as personal loss o r illness,
w h ich  can be insured against, have now  been jo in e d  by nninsurable risks such as g lobal 
w arm ing, o r the im pact o f fa c to iy  fa rm ing . A nd  these new  risks are concerned w ith  the 
fu tu re . A n thony G iddens (1994, p .59) w rites tha t threats lik e  g loba l w ann ing  ‘w ill no t 
y ie ld  a precise ca lcu la tion  o f risks bu t ra ther an anay o f "scenarios" whose p la u s ib ility  
w ill be influenced, among other th ings, by  how  m any people become convinced o f the 
thesis o f g loba l w arm ing  and take action on tha t basis.’ Thus, the in tens ity  o f the current 
discourse on m edia v io lence can be understood in  re la tion  to  sh iftin g  perceptions o f 
environm entalism  and ris k  and security. A s long  as enough people are convinced o f the 
thesis o f m edia vio lence as an environm ental hazard, action w ill be taken. The 
in troduction  o f  the V -ch ip , and the p o litic iz a tio n  o f  m edia vio lence (see Chapter three) 
is an ind ica tion  tha t th is  has already taken place.
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M e d ia  V io le n c e :  a  C o n te m p o r a r y  C o n c e r n
M edia  vio lence has long  been defined as a hazard o f industria liza tion  (see 
discussion o f  B eck and A dorno  in  previous chapter), and i t  has been subject to  sustained 
attacks by  anti-v io lence  cam paign groups, the m edia and p o litic ia n s  since the beginning 
o f the m oving  image. H ow ever, the 1990s has shown its e lf to  be a decade where m edia 
vio lence has been o f specific  in terest as a m odernization risk . E a rlie r chapters have 
discussed the in tens ity  w ith  w h ich  m edia vio lence has been constructed as a 
m odern ization risk , and I  w ant to  show tha t th is  in tens ity  is specific  to  contem porary 
concerns about environm entalism  and ris k  and security.
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A ndrew  Jam ison (1996, pp.224-245) has charted the d iffe re n t phases in  post­
w ar environm entalism , and found tha t these phases can be considered in  tw o  ways. 
F irs t, they s ig n ify  ‘ changes in  strategic orien ta tion  and "co llective  id e n tity " on the part 
o f already established organisations’ ; and second, they s ig n ify  ‘the emergence o f  new  
groups, campaigns o r organisations w h ich  id e n tify  new  issues and new  form s o f 
activ ism ’ (Jam ison, 1996, p.227).5 Table 2 illustra tes these various phases (Jam ison,
Post-war Environmentalism
1996, p.227).
T a b le  2 : Phases in  P o s t-w a r e n v iro n m e n ta lism 6
PER IO D EM PH AS IS
Pre-1968: aw akening P ub lic  education
1969-74: organisation In s titu tio n  b u ild in g
1975-80: socia l m ovem ent P o litica l controversy
1981-86: pro fessiona lisa tion E nvironm enta l assessment
1987-: in te rna tiona lisa tion Incorpora tion /in teg ra tion
Jam ison (1996, p.228) describes the period  fio m  the late 1940s to  the late 1960s 
as ‘a period  o f aw akening’ . Th is transform ation incorporates the changes fio m  
conservation to  environm entalism , where a loca lized protest against the destruction o f 
nature became m ore in te rnationa l and organisational in  fram ew ork.7 N ew  
environm ental risks, such as industria l p o llu tio n , o r atom ic rad ia tion , meant that
environm ental protest became d is tin c tly  p o litic a l. F rom  the 1970s onwards, 
environm entalism  has become both a c ritic ism  o f industria lisa tion  and an exam ple o f 
in s titu tiona lisa tion . Jam ison sees a fundam ental change between environm ental 
know ledge interests in  the 1970s and those exh ib ited  in  the 1990s. F or exam ple, the 
organisational dim ension o f  environm ental m ovem ents has altered fio m  a partic ipa to ry 
and a n ti-e litis t standpoint, to  a professional, and expert-dom inated standpoint (Jam ison, 
1996, p.240). S im ila rly , w hat in  the 1970s w ou ld  have been h o lis tic  ecology, is  now  
‘ sustainable developm ent’ , where environm entalism  seeks to  d iscover w hat levels o f 
econom ic developm ent the w o rld  can sustain now  and in  the foreseeable future.
T h is transform ation in  environm entalism  is  o f sign ificance to  our understanding 
o f contem porary anxieties about the effects o f m edia vio lence. E nvironm enta lism  is no t 
confined to  organisations such as Greenpeace, bu t is  now  an in s titu tio n  in  its  ow n rig h t 
w h ich  has been integrated and incorporated in to  other in s titu tio n a l fram ew orks. This 
means tha t as environm entalism  transform ed fio m  a pa rtic ipa to ry  to  professional 
organisation, eco log ica l discourse became a source o f pow er. A n ti-v io le n ce  cam paign 
groups have capita lized on th is  grow th  in  environm entalism . They have done th is  by 
adopting a num ber o f strategies w h ich  can be seen to  be associated w ith  environm ental 
cam paign groups. F o r exam ple, they have transform ed sm all scale c itize n ’ s groups in to  
professional organizations (see fo r exam ple the grow th  in  the N V A L A , o r C AR E and 
its  p o litic a l lobby group C A R E  Cam paigns, discussed in  Chapter three). A n ti-v io lence  
cam paign groups have focused on the p o litic iza tio n  o f the ‘ socia l p rob lem ’ o f m edia 
v io lence, o ften  using p o litic a l com m entators, such as D avid  A lto n , fo rm er L ibe ra l 
D em ocrat M P , to  com m unicate then  message about the hazards o f m edia vio lence to  
the general p ub lic . B y  using the ris k  argum ent, an ti-vio lence cam paign groups have 
successfully managed to  integrate a ll the phases o f  post-w ar environm entalism  - pub lic
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education, in s titu tio n  b u ild in g , p o litic a l controversy, environm ental assessment, 
incorpora tion  - in to  a sustained attack on m edia violence. O ver the last tw en ty  years, we 
have seen m edia vio lence become a p o litic a l issue w hereby the question is no t whether 
it  is  appropriate o r no t to  show representations o f vio lence, bu t w hether society can 
sustain th is  rap id  grow th  in  vio lence, both on screen and on the street. In  the same w ay 
tha t environm entalism  has become in  the 1990s a g lobal, and m u ltina tiona l issue, so too 
has m edia vio lence become a concern fo r everyone, everywhere.
Public Perception o f Risk and Security
Th is transform ation o f environm entalism  in to  a m u ltina tiona l concern is 
re flected in  sh iftin g  perceptions o f ris k  and security over the last tw en ty  years. 
R obbins, Bales and D 'A ndrea (1996), in  then  artic le  ‘ Illu m in a tin g  the M odern ization  
Process: S hifts in  In te rna tiona l Perceptions o f R isk  and S ecurity ’ , exam ine pu b lic  
op in ion  po lls  in  order to  m on ito r ris k  perception. Through analyzing the G allup  P olls, 
the B ritis h  S ocial A ttitudes Survey, and the B ritis h  C rim e Survey, R obbins et a l., found 
s ig n ifica n t fiends in  ris k  perception. F o r exam ple, concern about the C o ld  W ar and the 
threat o f nuclear w ar reduced s ig n ifica n tly  in  the 1990s, co inc id ing  w ith  the Post-C old 
W ar era. T h is m eant tha t ‘as populations m ove away fro m  the perceived risks o f the 
C o ld  W ar, the key concerns fe lt sh ifts fro m  risks generated by nation-states to  those 
occurring  at e ither the personal o r the g loba l personal le ve l’ (R obbins et a l., 1996, p.7). 
Thus, in  the 1990s, rather than nuclear w ar being a s ign ifican t cause fo r concern w ith  
the B ritis h  popu la tion , ‘ the m ore personal threat o f crim e had become a predom ate 
concern, w ith  tw o  th irds  o f  the popu la tion  being concerned "a great deal" about crim e 
levels in  1995’ (Robbins et a l., 1996, p.8).
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T h is  s h ift fio m  na tiona l con flic ts  to  personal o r g loba l personal concerns means 
tha t anxieties about in terna tiona l and nationa l ris k  and security have focused on social 
and econom ic threats, such as drugs, A ID S , g loba l w arm ing, unem ploym ent, o r la w  and 
order. The emphasis is  on ‘personal threats’ (R obbins et a l., 1996, p .9 ), w hether th is  be 
on a nationa l o r in te rna tiona l leve l. D iffe re n t cultures m ay p rio ritiz e  certa in security 
issues m ore than others, fo r exam ple nationa lism  is seen as a key prob lem  by the 
Japanese, whereas the U S A  consider drugs as a cause fo r concern, bu t the focus is s till 
on personal issues o f security and how  th is  relates to  social and econom ic factors.
R obbins et a l., have ind icated tha t p u b lic  op in ion  has d ram atica lly  sh ifted  fio m  
concern regar d ing  nuclear w ar, to  concern o f  a m ore personalized nature. W hat is m ore, 
the perception o f ris k  has sh ifted  fro m  som ething tha t is v is ib le  and therefore insurable, 
to  include som ething tha t is  in v is ib le , and therefore uninsurable. B o th  o f these factors 
mean tha t the d e fin itio n  and construction o f m edia vio lence in  the 1990s has drawn 
upon these sh iftin g  perceptions o f risk . A s G iddens (1994, p .59) ou tlined  earlier, i t  is 
the am ount o f  people w ho can be convinced that m edia vio lence is  ha rm fu l to  th e ir 
personal and social environm ent tha t is m ore im portant than w hether m edia vio lence is 
a m odern ization ris k  in  itse lf.
R obbins et al. (1996) reveal tha t the pub lic  are concerned about social and 
econom ic issues lik e  drugs, A ID S , unem ploym ent, environm entalism  and law  and order 
in  the 1990s. They chart a sh ift fio m  concerns about nationa l security, such as nuclear- 
war- to  concerns o f  a spec ifica lly  personal nature. This also re flects a sh ift in  
environm entalism , w h ich  Jam ison (1996, p.227) illus tra ted  as a change fio m  localised 
awareness (conservation) to  in te rna tiona l and ins titu tio n a l environm entalism  that 
ensured everyone, everywhere cou ld  p o te n tia lly  become invo lved  in  eco-po litics.
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M edia  v io lence has been defined as a ris k  that is d ire c tly  lin ke d  to  issues o f 
environm entalism , personal security and la w  and order. For exam ple, i t  is a ris k  tha t is 
uninsurable; i t  is  a ris k  tha t crosses nationa l and in ternationa l boundaries; it  is  a ris k  that 
m ust be contained. M ed ia  vio lence threatens our environm ent; i t  threatens social 
s ta b ility  and fa m ily  values; i t  appeals to  ‘d roo ling , horm one-addled, vio lence prone sub­
lite ra te  adolescent m ales’ ;8 it  is  ha rm fu l to  ch ildren.
A n ti-v io le n ce  cam paign groups, the m edia and po litic ia n s  can id e n tify  those 
negative effects o f the m odern ization process tha t spec ifica lly  tie  in  w ith  issues o f 
environm entalism , personal security and law  and order w h ich  are o f m ost concern to  the 
general p ub lic . C erta in ly, in  B rita in  and A m erica  the perceived risks o f m edia vio lence 
are ‘ filte re d  through the lens o f  (these) in d iv id u a l cu ltures’ (R obbins et al., p . l 1). 
Therefore issues o f  environm entalism , personal security, econom ic s ta b ility , disease, 
drugs, fa m ily  values, m o ra lity  have come to  dom inate the discourse on m edia vio lence 
precise ly because such issues are close ly lin ke d  w ith  perceptions o f  ris k  and danger in  
B rita in  and the U S A . In  a G allup  P o ll conducted in  1993, 51%  o f the B ritis h  general 
p u b lic , and 47%  o f the A m erican p u b lic  were concerned about diseases lik e  A ID S , and 
30%  o f the B ritis h  p u b lic  and 27%  o f the A m erican pub lic  were concerned about dings 
(c ited  in  R obbins et a l., 1996, p. 12). M ed ia  vio lence is  com m only discussed as a 
disease, and as a drug. C h ild ren  are ‘exposed’ to  m ovie vio lence; it  is  T ike eating salt, 
the m ore you  eat, the m ore you  w ill need to  eat to  taste i t  at a ll’ (M edved, 1993, p.23).
The concerns regarding m edia vio lence are o ften phrased in  re la tion  to  
add iction , and exposure, as i f  m edia vio lence is  both a k ille r  v irus  and a w id e ly  
accessible drug. These m etaphors m ay be usefu l phrases fo r describ ing the perceived 
effects o f m edia vio lence, but they are also m etaphors w h ich  re fle c t current pub lic  
op in ion  and in ternationa l perceptions o f ris k  and security. B y  focusing on m edia
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vio lence, po litic ia n s  and other dom inant hierarchies, such as regu la to ry bodies, can 
im p lic itly  re fe r to  such socia l and personal issues as environm entalism , la w  and order, 
disease, o r drugs. W hen they regulate and con tro l m edia v io lence, the dom inant 
hierarchies can appear to  be dealing w ith  p u b lic  concern about these issues. P rovid ing  a 
V -ch ip  in  every new  te lev is ion  set is  fa r m ore cost e ffective  and easier to  enforce than 
reducing the production  and consum ption o f  dm gs: it  is a safety measure tha t is sim ple 
to  in s ta ll and can c la im  to  reduce ris k  im m ediate ly. I t  is a vaccination  fo r the te lev is ion  
against the v irus  o f vio lence.
Structuring principles
Thus, the p o litic iz a tio n  o f  ris k  (Beck, 1992, pp.76-80) is  close ly lin ke d  w ith  
p u b lic  perception o f  risk , w h ich  is  in  tu rn  lin ke d  w ith  the construction and management 
o f ris k  in  re la tion  to  environm entalism : each is inseparable fio m  the other and is part o f 
a d ia lectica l process. This process can be understood in  re la tion  to  agency-stracture 
in tegra tion . The agency-stracture issue suggests a lin k  between the m icro  leve l o f the 
hum an agent, and the m acro leve l o f large-scale social structures. A n thony G iddens' 
structura tion  theo iy , as developed in  the Constitution of Society (1984), h igh ligh ts a 
d ia lectica l process between agency and structure, w hereby ne ither can exist w ith o u t the 
other. S tructure exists in  and through the ac tiv ities  o f hum an agents.9 Here we can see 
that the structuring  p rin c ip le  o f environm entalism  exists in  and though pub lic  
perceptions o f ris k  and security: w ith o u t the available discourse o f  environm entalism , 
and the d e fin itio n  o f the ris k  argum ent, ind iv idua ls  w ou ld  be unable to  express concern 
fo r the hazards o f m edia v io lence; how ever, w ith o u t an awareness o f  sh iftin g  pub lic  
perceptions o f ris k  and security over the past tw en ty  years, in s titu tions  such as C AR E,
136
or po litic ia n s  such as D a v id  A lto n  w ou ld  be unable to  m ob ilize  th is  p u b lic  concern in to  
a structu ring  p rin c ip le  fo r co n tro llin g  levels o f m edia vio lence. A s G iddens' theory o f 
structura tion helps to  critique  m odern ity, and introduce the concept o f re flex ive  
m odernization (Beck, 1992; G iddens, 1990,1991; Beck et a l., 1995), i t  can be seen that 
th is  d ia lectica l process between m icro  and m acro perceptions o f ris k  is indeed part o f a 
p o litic a l and in s titu tio n a l process tha t is  re fle x ive  in  nature.
F or exam ple, i t  is no accident tha t ju s t as pub lic  perception o f ris k  has sh ifted  
fio m  external to  in te rna l dangers, p o litic ia n s  are h ig h lig h tin g  m edia vio lence, and, I  
w o u ld  argue, im p lic itly  h ig h lig h tin g  environm entalism , as part o f then* cam paign on 
la w  and order. A s was discussed in  Chapter three, in  the U S A , President C lin ton  called 
a ‘v io lence sum m it’ (Time, 1996, p.45) in  the run  up to  the 1996 presidentia l e lection 
cam paign. O n a sm aller scale, in  B rita in , the then Hom e Secretary, M ichae l H ow ard, 
and the H eritage Secretary, V irg in ia  B o ttom ley, consistently managed to  appear* to  be 
‘ta ck lin g ’ the prob lem  o f the perceived effects o f m edia vio lence by  asking regulators 
and program m e makers to  report on th e ir po lic ies tow ards reducing levels o f screen 
v io lence (B B FC , 1996) in  the run  up to  the general e lection in  1997. Jack Straw , the 
H om e Secretary fo r the new  Labour* governm ent is also p lacing  pressure upon the 
B B FC  to  become m ore accountable, and is said to  be tak ing  a ‘hands on approach to  
censorship’ (H e llen  and R u ffo rd , p . l) .  The re flex ive  nature o f th is  p o litic iza tio n  o f 
m edia vio lence w ou ld  no t be possible w ith o u t a d ia lectica l re la tionsh ip  between 
structure and agency. P o litic ians cou ld  no t know  whether to  include such an issue as 
m edia vio lence in  th e ir e lection  cam paigns w ith o u t reference to  op in ion  po lls , such as 
G allup, o r the B ritis h  C rim e Survey, and then  find ings on perceptions o f ris k  and 
security.
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T his awareness o f sh iftin g  perceptions o f in ternationa l ris k  and security ensures 
tha t m edia vio lence is constructed and managed as a m odernization ris k  w h ich  can be 
u tiliz e d  b y  p o litic ia n s  as an exam ple o f social and econom ic concerns, shared by 
ins titu tions and citizens a like . M a ry  D ouglas (1992), in  Risk and Blame, considers how  
p o litic a l and cu ltu ra l bias can be contained w ith in  the p roduction  o f ris k  and in  the 
p o litic a l rhe to ric  o f responsib ility  in  p u b lic  p o licy . In  the next section I  w ant to  consider 
th is  concept o f  p o litic a l and cu ltu ra l bias in  some de ta il in  order to  understand w hy 
m edia vio lence is perceived to  be a risk-tak ing  a c tiv ity  w h ich  is hazardous and 
dangerous.
R i s k  a n d  B la m e
M a ry  D ouglas considers theories o f  organization in  re la tion  to  perceptions o f 
ris k  and blam e. L ik e  B eck (1992), W ildavsky (1988) and Adam s (1995), D ouglas 
believes d ia t ris k  perception studies w o u ld  do w e ll to  exam ine how  institu tions 
re in fo rce  dom inant hierarchies b y  de fin ing  and constructing risks and apportion ing 
blam e. She believes tha t ‘ ind iv idua ls  always transfer the re levant pa rt o f th e ir decision­
m aking to  d ie  ins titu tions in  w h ich  they liv e ’ , and tha t ‘ in s titu tions m ob ilize  m oral 
concern to  engage then* m em bers' sustained support’ (Douglas, 1992, p.55, 56). 
D ouglas (1992, p.63, 60) w rites:
Physical disasters are keen ly studied in  every com m unity deserving the name 
and occasion is taken to  score d ie  perform ance o f com m unity institu tions: 
blam e fa lls  in  such a w ay as to  re in fo rce  the loca l com m unity ideal. Far from  
being steadily analysed, fro m  the start danger is roped in to  the w o rk  o f show ing
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up v illa in s  o r m ain ta in ing  m orale... Processes o f b lam e-p inn ing o r exonerating 
fio m  blam e strengthen the pattern o f the organization and are actua lly an 
in teg ra l part o f it.
Thus, natu ra l and man-m ade disasters trig g e r enquiries w h ich  ‘trace the real d is tribu tion  
o f pow er’ (D ouglas, 1992, p.77). For exam ple, a ra in  cerem ony is about changing 
m eteoro log ica l conditions, bu t i t  is  also about re in fo rc ing  group id e n tity  and the 
dom inant h ierarchy. I f  there is a dram atic change in  the weather, a drought, fo r 
exam ple, then the dom inant organization m ust apportion blam e. One such w ay is to  
accuse another o f w itch cra ft, an ‘other’ tha t is part o f the p o litic a l process and a v is ib le  
target o f  abuse. D ouglas ca lls th is  a ‘ cosm ic p lo t’ (1992, p .76) w h ich  provides an 
opportun ity  to  ah  hidden hos tilitie s , and con tro l factiona l d iscord. She argues: 
‘organizations w h ich  are m ost keen ly a le rt to  lo w  p robab ility , h ig h  consequence danger 
are re lig ious  sects...new p o litic a l m ovem ents and pub lic  interest groups (1992, p.77). 
She compares environm ental m ovem ents w ith  ris k  perce iving organizations w ho w ish  
to  secure au tho rity  and survive  as a group; the methods w ith  w h ich  they achieve th is  are 
c lose ly lin ke d  w ith  the in terp re ta tion  o f  disaster and ris k  apportion and blam e: a 
‘cosm ic p lo t’ is a Tow  cost so lu tion  to  th e ir organizational problem s’ (D ouglas, 1992, 
p.77).
Sin, Danger and Media Violence
Douglas' theory o f ris k  perception and the m ic ro -p o litics  o f a com m unity are 
persuasive. I t  is ce rta in ly  the case tha t re lig ious sects, new  p o litic a l movem ents and 
p u b lic  interest groups are the m ost active campaigners against m edia vio lence. Indeed, 
organizations such as C hristian  A c tio n  Research and E ducation (C A R E ) and the
M ovem ent fo r C hristian  D em ocracy (M C D ) are a com bination o f a ll o f tire  above; 
C A R E  and M C D  are evangelical C hristian  organizations, they both  have p o litic a l sub­
sections, and both c la im  to  be p u b lic  in terest groups (see Chapter three). I t  is also the 
case tha t C A R E  and M C D , lik e  environm ental groups, have u tilize d  the ris k  argum ent 
and accused m edia vio lence o f  presenting a ris k  to  the s ta b ility  o f the fa m ily  and society 
in  the late Tw entie th  Century. They blam e m edia vio lence fo r the break up o f  the 
fa m ily , co rrup tion  o f  the young, and an increase in  rea l life  vio lence. Th is blam e can be 
lin ke d  to  other types o f blam e, lik e  ‘the cosm ic p lo t’ , where a person close ly lin ke d  to  
d ie  p o litic a l process and o f h ig h  v is ib ility  as a v ic tim  is accused o f  w itchcra ft.
Here, M a rtin  B arker’s w o rk  on m edia vio lence is o f  d irec t relevance. Barker 
(1997a, p. 12) traces the hysteria over the James B u lge r m urder and the accusations o f 
the N ew son R eport (see Chapters 2 and 4) to  m edieval w itch c ra ft accusations:
W hen a ‘w itc h ’ was denounced a w hole array o f evidences and proofs could be 
adduced; bu t these could o n ly  ever convince because tiiose  hearing them  were 
already com ple te ly persuaded tha t these were the lik e ly  explanations. Y ou  can 
o n ly  believe someone to  be a w itc h  i f  you  believe there are ‘w itch  events’ .
T h is echoes A n thony G iddens (1994, p .59) w hen he suggests tha t i t  is  the num ber o f 
people convinced o f the thesis o f g loba l w ann ing  tha t is m ore im portan t than whether 
g loba l w ann ing  actua lly  exists. A c tio n  is based on w hat people be lieve to  be the case, 
rather than w hat is  actua lly  the case.
B arker compares the rhe to ric  o f  the m edia vio lence debate w ith  accusations o f 
w itch c ra ft because both invo lve  the concept o f sin. ‘Taboos and sins belong to  the 
discourse o f re lig ious fa ith ’ (D ouglas, 1992, p.26) and both w itch c ra ft and m edia 
v io lence are perceived to  be taboo subjects w h ich  have been successfully targeted by 
re lig ious organizations. H ow ever, the d ifference between w itch c ra ft and m edia vio lence
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comes in  d ie  w ay they are referred to . W itch cra ft is  a taboo subject, and a person being 
‘ in  s in ’ means tha t they are a danger to  the com m unity. In  contrast, anti-vio lence 
cam paign groups use d ie  rhe to ric  o f  ris k  because ‘p la in  danger does no t have d ie  aura o f 
science o r a ffo rd  the pretension o f  possible precise ca lcu la tion ’ (D ouglas, 1992, p.25).
In  B rita in , in  a society w h ich  is predom inate ly secular, the tenn  ris k  is  fa r m ore 
persuasive than tha t o f  sin, o r danger.
W hat is m ore, the rhe to ric  o f  ris k  reveals a fundam ental sh ift in  perspective. 
D ouglas (1992, p.28) explains tiiis  as fo llo w s :
B e ing  ‘ at r is k ’ in  m odem  parlance is  no t the equivalent bu t the reciprocal o f 
being ‘ in  s in ’ o r ‘under taboo’ . To be ‘at ris k ’ is equivalent to  being sinned 
against, being vu lnerable to  the events caused b y  others, whereas being ‘ in  s in ’ 
means being d ie  cause o f  harm . The sin/taboo rhe to ric  is m ore o ften used to  
upho ld  the com m unity, vu lnerable to  the m isbehaviour o f  the in d iv id u a l, w h ile  
the ris k  rhe to ric  upholds the in d iv id u a l, vu lnerable to  the m isbehaviour* o f the 
com m unity.
T h is is  d ire c tly  applicab le to  the m edia vio lence debate and the ris k  argum ent. A n ti­
vio lence cam paign groups such as C A R E  and M C D  believe tha t to  w atch m edia 
v io lence is to  be ‘ in  s in ’ . H ow ever, under the ris k  argum ent, the construction o f m edia 
vio lence as a m odernization ris k  means tha t anti-vio lence cam paign groups can present 
m edia vio lence as d ie  cause o f harm , and the in d iv id u a l as the person at risk . They 
never need use the sin/taboo rhe to ric  because it  is  im p lic it in  the rhe to ric  o f risk . In  th is  
case, no in d iv id u a l is accused o f being ‘ in  s in ’ ; i t  is the entertainm ent industry w ho are 
tar geted instead. In  a recent survey about perceptions o f risk , the p u b lic  were shown to  
trus t scientists fro m  environm ental organizations precise ly because such scientists are 
concerned w id i p ro tecting  the in d iv id u a l: ‘d ie  science o f p rotest...is believed to  be 
conducted in  d ie  p u b lic  interest and targeted against ins titu tions tha t cannot be re lied
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upon’ (O 'R iordan, 1997, p .21). A n ti-v io le n ce  cam paign groups use the ‘ science o f 
pro test’ in  order to  gain pub lic  support fo r the pro tection o f the in d iv id u a l and the 
com m unity against the perceived negative effects o f the entertainm ent industry.
A s M a ry  D ouglas (1992, pp.24-5) says, ‘The charge o f  causing ris k  is a s tick  to  
beat au thority... to  exact res titu tion  fo r v ic tim s ’ and it  is also an opportun ity  to  re in force 
com m unity ideals, to  pro tect the com m unity fio m  harm . This is w h y  there exists tw o  
dom inant m ytholog ies concerning view ers o f m edia vio lence: the ‘d ro o lin g ’ adolescent 
m ale (M edved, 1992), and passive, vulnerable v ic tim s  o f m edia vio lence. These 
m ytho log ica l view ers have been created b y  anti-vio lence cam paign groups in  order to  
accuse m edia vio lence o f  ha rm fu l effects to  the in d iv id u a l and the com m unity. T h is 
rhe to ric  o f ris k  and danger m ust be m ainta ined in  order to  dem onize view ers and chaw 
attention away fio m  actual consumers o f  m edia violence. A s la te r chapters w ill reveal, 
real consumers o f  m edia vio lence are ne ither e v il and depraved, no r passive and 
vu lnerable ; such view ers are no t made aggressive by w atch ing m edia vio lence and do 
no t need pro tecting  fio m  a le isure a c tiv ity  they a c tive ly  choose to  experience.
A s Douglas po in ts out in  Risk and Blame, d ie  production  o f  ris k  is to  do w ith  
the re in forcem ent o f dom inant hierarchies, and an analysis o f ris k  and blam e in  any 
g iven com m unity w ill reveal p o litic a l and social insecurities. The v e iy  fact d ia t an ti­
vio lence cam paign groups do no t accuse consumers o f m edia vio lence, but blam e the 
entertainm ent industry its e lf, should a lert us to  the fact d ia t there is som ediing about the 
w ay consumers o f m edia vio lence engage w ith  these texts tha t is  o f specific concern to  
d ie  dom inant h ierarchy and its  m anagement o f  pow er. In  the fin a l section o f d iis  chapter 
I  w an t to  focus on the concept o f the risk-take r and the ris k  averse, because i t  is  in  these 
tw o  cu ltu ra l positions tha t we w ill fin d  w h y  the dom inant h ierarchy is  concerned about 
m edia vio lence and its  threat to  society.
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R is k - T a k e r /R is k  A v e r s e
U lric h  B eck (1992, p.49) argues tha t a ris k  society is one tha t m ust protect itse lf; 
i t  is concerned w ith  lim itin g  the risks and hazards o f the m odernization process. In  a 
s im ila r m ove, M a ry  D ouglas cla im s tha t the centra l com m unity is ris k  aversive: T t is a 
sym bolic system, a ttracting so lida rity , capable o f being m ob ilized  in  its  ow n defence, 
h o ld ing  strong view s on correct norm s o f behaviour’ (D ouglas, 1992, p. 104). This 
means that, according to  D ouglas (1992, p. 102), 'th e  s e lf is risk -ta k in g  o r risk-averse 
according to  a predictable pattern o f dealings between person and others in  the 
com m unity '. T h is pattern o f dealings invo lves an awareness o f w hat are acceptable risk - 
tak ing  ac tiv ities , and w hat are not. A s the central com m unity is ris k  averse, there w ill 
no t be m any risk -ta k in g  ac tiv itie s  tha t are com m only considered to  be acceptable.
One such a c tiv ity  w ou ld  be the setting up o f personal businesses. T h is is 
perceived to  be a ris k y  enterprise, bu t one tha t is  no t w ith o u t rew ard. M rs . Thatcher, in  
the 1980s, understood tha t ind iv idua ls  needed encouragement to  take th is  risk , and th is  
is  w hy personal businesses received fin a n c ia l incentives: at the same tim e  as d ie  ‘ro llin g  
back o f d ie  nanny state’ , the central com m unity encouraged personal responsib ility , and 
the rewards to  be gained fio m  th is  type o f  risk-tak ing  a c tiv ity , a lthough under M rs. 
Thatcher the risks fa r outw eighed the rewards, and sm all businesses fa ile d  at record 
leve ls.10 S im ila rly , d ie  N a tiona l L o tte ry  is  another exam ple o f a risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity  that 
o ffe rs d ie  chance o f great rew ard. The chances o f w inn ing  the N a tiona l Lo tte ry  are ve ry 
s lim , and the ris k  o f los ing  m oney is h igh , how ever, the rewards to  be gained fio m  
p lay ing  the L o tte ry  are also extrem ely h igh. B o th  these ac tiv ities  are related to
econom ic gain, and are n o t perceived as hazardous - setting up a business, o r p lay ing  
d ie  lo tte ry  is about opportun ity, and the chance o f  econom ic reward. O ther activ ities 
such as skyd iv ing  o r bungee ju m p in g  are less concerned w ith  econom ic reward, and 
m ore about the excitem ent and exh ila ra tion  o f tak ing  pa rt in  a dangerous sport. Such 
activ itie s  are no t enjoyed b y  everyone, bu t are generally looked upon as acceptable risk - 
tak ing  behaviour*, as long  as safety precautions are taken.
H ow ever, there are m any examples o f risk -tak ing  activ itie s  d ia t are no t accepted 
by the central com m unity. D riv in g  too  fast, tak ing  drugs, having m ore than one sexual 
partner, liv in g  alone, ta lk in g  to  strangers - these are ju s t some o f the risk-tak ing  
activ itie s  tha t the central com m unity does no t perceive to  be acceptable. A nd, one can 
add to  th is  lis t the a c tiv ity  o f  consum ing m edia vio lence. W atch ing a v io le n t m ovie, lik e  
Reservoir Dogs, fo r exam ple, is perceived to  be a risk -tak ing  a c tiv ity  tha t has little  
rew ard. Indeed, it  is  a threat to  d ie  com m unity, because to  en joy w atch ing a v io le n t 
m ovie  im p lies d ia t one m ust en joy real vio lence, and th is  w ill have consequences on d ie  
safety o f the fa m ily  and com m unity as a w hole. This is w h y  the hazardous effects o f 
w atch ing a v io le n t film  o r te lev is ion  program m e are emphasized by d ie  central 
com m unity; and th is  is w h y  those people w ho persist in  w atch ing ‘v ideo  nasties’ are 
labeled as abnorm al.
D ouglas believes d ia t once the centra l com m unity has labeled certa in activ ities 
as dangerous, it  ensures tha t those people w ho ins is t on acting dangerously w ill become 
m arginalized. Indeed, in  m ost cases, risk-aversion is part o f the com m unity's m ethod fo r 
p ro tecting  its  ow n m argins, the areas where i t  is  m ost vu lnerable (D ouglas, 1992, 
p . l 17). T h is is w h y  certa in types o f  people, fo r example hom osexuals, o r im m igrants, 
are associated w ith  risk -ta k in g  activ itie s  tha t are a tiire a t to  d ie  com m unity. In  d ie  same 
w ay, the m y tii o f  w o rk in g  class, sub-literate, adolescent m ales, especia lly tiiose  from
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single parent fam ilies , as the m ost com m on consumers o f m edia vio lence ensur es that 
such members o f the com m unity are m arg ina lized and con tro lled  by the central 
com m unity. D ouglas (1992, p. 117) also contends that ‘groups at r is k 5, fo r exam ple 
hom osexuals, o r consumers o f  m edia vio lence, ‘develop so lid a rity  in  shared adversity5. 
Such sub-cultures m ay develop ‘an ethos tha t g lo rifie s  ris k 5 (1992, p . 118), de fin ing  
then  ow n difference by  em bracing the ve ry  risk -ta k in g  activ itie s  they have been 
shunned fo r b y  the centra l com m unity. C erta in ly  skydivers, m o to rcyclis ts  o r bungee 
jum pers can be seen to  develop ‘ an ethos tha t g lo rifie s  ris k 5, and the practice o f ju m p in g  
fio m  an airplane o r over double decker buses fo r charity  is  an exam ple o f the w ay in  
w h ich  such risk-takers embrace d ie  ‘ethos o f  r is k ’ w h ils t at dre same tim e  attem pting to  
show  tha t they are m o ra lly  responsible members o f  the com m unity.
There are s im ila ritie s  between th is  d ieo ry  and P ierre Bourdieu 's theory o f taste 
in  re la tion  to  fie ld  and habitus. ‘Taste’ is  an acquired d isposition  w h ich  d ifferentia tes 
various cu ltu ra l practices and our* enjoym ent o f  them . The re la tionsh ip  between habitus 
and fie ld  form s cu ltu r al practices, and taste gives an in d iv id u a l a sense o f  place in  dre 
socia l order: ‘Taste is  a m atchm aker...through w h ich  a habitus con firm s its  a ffin ity  w ith  
other hab itus’ (B ourd ieu, 1984, p.243). Thus, an app lica tion  o f  taste ensures the 
categorization o f  cu ltu ra l objects, o r practices, and a categorization o f people by the 
tastes they m anifest. Taste un ifie s  those w ho share s im ila r habitus and d ifferentiates 
those w ho do not. W hen D ouglas ta lks about sub-cultu ies sharing an ‘ethos o f r is k ’ and 
develop ing solidar ity  th rough the categorization o f then  cu ltu ra l practices as risk-tak ing  
ac tiv itie s  tha t are undesirable by  the centr a l com m unity, in  m any ways th is  is sim ilar* to  
d ie  categorization o f  taste and form s o f habitus w h ich  are in  c o n flic t w ith  the social 
order. A s class is defined by habitus as w e ll, the fact tiia t risk -ta k in g  sub-cultures are
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com m only in  c o n flic t w ith  the m idd le  class sensib ilities o f the centra l com m unity is a 
p o in t tha t fu rthe r illustra tes the sign ificance o f  agency and structure in  re la tion  to  risk .
H ow ever, there are tw o  problem s w ith  th is  theory. Fust, the central contention 
tha t there are risk-takers and ris k  averse people sets up a b ina ry  opposition. The ris k  
society, o r the centra l com m unity m ay be ris k  averse, i t  m ay w ish  to  prevent the w orst, 
bu t people them selves lik e  to  take risks. Ind iv idua ls  can operate qu ite  d iffe re n tly  to  the 
ideo logy o f the dom inant hierarchy. They m ay support th is  h ierarchy in  p rinc ipa l, bu t in  
th e ir day to  day activ ities , a ll people are risk-takers. For exam ple, d riv in g  a fast car is a 
risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity  tha t is  w ith o u t rew ard, according to  the dom inant h ierarchy; there 
are speed lim its , fines, cat* insurance penalties tha t h ig h lig h t the negative aspects o f th is 
type o f behaviour. A n d  ye t cars have the capab ility  to  drive  at speeds w e ll above the 
lim its  set b y  the law . T h is is  because people lik e  to  drive  fast; they lik e  to  engage in  
ris k y  behaviour. The central com m unity have responded to  th is  b y  de fin ing  and 
m arg ina liz ing  specific sub-cultures w ho are perceived to  undertake th is  type o f risk - 
tak ing  a c tiv ity . T h is sub-culture, young, w o rk in g  class, adolescent m ales, especially 
fio m  single par ent fam ilies , m ay indeed have a propensity to  d rive  fast, bu t th is  does not 
mean tha t other members o f the com m unity are exem pt fio m  th is  type o f a c tiv ity . In  
fact, m any people lik e  to  d rive  fast, and no t so le ly because they w ish  to  fla u n t au thority  
and break the law , although th is  is part o f it, bu t because they lik e  to  a rrive  at w o rk  on 
tim e , o r get hom e early, o r im press their* friends. A  sim ilar* argum ent can be applied to  
consumers o f m edia v io lence. A lthough  the dom inant h ierarchy has id e n tifie d  and 
m arg ina lized a sub cu ltu re  w ho lik e  to  consume m edia vio lence, in  actual fact, m any 
people lik e  to  w atch film s  and te lev is ion  program m es w h ich  contain vio lence, and they 
do so fo r a num ber o f d iffe re n t reasons.
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The second facto r w h ich  makes Douglas' th e o iy  o f risk -ta k in g  and ris k  averse 
sub cultures w eak is tha t a lthough some groups o f people m ay develop a fee ling  o f 
so lid a rity  in  the face o f  adversity, th is  does no t mean that they w ill necessarily develop 
‘an ethos tha t g lo rifie s  ris k ’ (1992, p . l 18). Some groups m ay do th is  under specific 
circum stances, bu t i t  is also the case tha t m any people w ill g lo rify  r is k  under d iffe ren t 
circum stances and w ith  d iffe re n t types o f people tha t m ay o r m ay no t be part o f th e ir 
im m ediate socia l environm ent. Th is means tha t people do n o t belong w ith in  
categorizations, o r habitus in  a m anner tha t can be easily recorded and measured. One 
o f the problem s w ith  Bourdieu 's theory o f  habitus and fie ld  in  Distinction (1984) is tha t 
he w ishes to  prove tha t cu ltu re  can be a leg itim ate  object o f  sc ie n tific  study. O n the one 
hand, th is  is usefu l to  research in  popu la r cu lture, but, on the other hand, as w e have 
seen in  previous chapters, sc ie n tific  study can be a stra ightjacket in  w h ich  responses to  
m edia vio lence are locked in  the language o f  statistics and denied an opportun ity fo r 
free expression. B arker and B rooks (1997) have com m ented on Bourdieu's 
‘epistem olog ical p o la rity ’ ; they contend tha t th is  theory o f habitus ‘ is  a th e o iy  o f 
overw helm ing determ inants w h ich  masquerade as agency’ .11 S im ila rly , D ouglas' th e o iy  
o f risk -ta k in g  and risk-averse cultures fa ils  to  take in to  account tha t people are not 
necessarily determ ined by  then  ac tiv ities , and tha t there are poss ib ilitie s  o f  action w h ich  
are outside the rem it o f  cu ltu ra l theories concerned w ith  agency-stracture integration. 
For exam ple, w hat someone hopes to  achieve through engaging in  a risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity , 
w hether they undertake i t  o r not, is  as im portan t as id e n tify in g  and categorizing the 
a c tiv ity  its e lf.12 E m p irica l research is a means o f  h ig h lig h tin g  such poss ib ilities  o f 
action (Buckingham , 1996a; G auntlett, 1997) and la ter chapters w ill illus tra te  th is  in  
some deta il.
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The fact tha t popular cu ltu re  is perceived to  be negative and part o f the risks 
associated w ith  the m odernization process (see previous chapter) poses a problem  fo r 
the centra l com m unity. M o s t people en joy aspects o f popula r cu lture. Therefore the 
suggestion that a ll popula r cu ltu re  poses a threat to  the safety o f  the com m unity w ou ld  
mean los ing  a s ign ifican t num ber o f supporters o f  those organizations tha t make up the 
dom inant hierarchy. Th is is w h y  i t  is  o n ly  certa in aspects o f popular- cu lture that are 
defined and constructed as m odern ization risks.
The debate about m edia vio lence has focused on fic tio n a l representations o f 
vio lence tha t are perceived to  be rea lis tic  and, therefore, d isturb ing. I t  is  also the case 
tha t those texts w h ich  have been id e n tifie d  as o f pa rticu la r ris k  to  the in d iv id u a l and the 
com m unity are texts w h ich  could be in terpreted as concerning them selves w ith  social 
and econom ic unrest. Thus, film s  such as A Clockwork Orange (S tanley K ub rick , 
1971), Child's Play 3 (Jack Bender, 1992), Natural Born Killers (O liv e r Stone, 1994), 
o r Crash (D av id  Cronenberg, 1996) cou ld  be seen to  be concerned w ith  social unrest. 
There is no t space in  th is  chapter to  undertake a close analysis o f  any o f  these film s , but 
I  w ou ld  lik e  suggest one w ay o f reading these film s  in  order to  h ig h lig h t a pattern o f 
socia l c ritic ism  and unrest w h ich  the dom inant h ierarchy finds pa rticu la rly  
threatening.13
One w ay o f  reading A Clockwork Orange is  to  see it  as a dystopian v ie w  o f a 
fu tu re  society w h ich  is obsessed w ith  vio lence, and has no con tro l over its  aggressive 
youth . S im ila rly  Child's Play 3 cou ld  be interpreted as a film  about a young, w o rk ing  
class boy’s fig h t fo r su rv iva l in  a w o rld  w here the in d iv id u a l is threatened b y  corporate 
greed.14 Natural Born Killers cou ld  also be understood as a satire on the m edia's
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obsession w itb  mass m urderers, and the condem nation and g lo rific a tio n  o f vio lence, 
and Crash cou ld  be seen as another dystopian v ie w  o f a fu tu re  socie ty tha t g lo rifie s  and 
fetishizes technology. W hat can be seen in  each exam ple is a pattern o f socia l c ritic ism , 
and a reference to  real socia l and econom ic concerns tha t are no t concluded in  any w ay; 
the boundary between w hat is good and e v il has become b lurred, and view ers ar e asked 
to  exam ine c ritic a l perspectives o f  society, perspectives tha t are no t pa rt o f  om* norm al 
experience o f life .
M a rtin  B arker (1989) id e n tifie d  ju s t such a pattern o f social c ritic ism  and social 
rea lism  in  the com ic Action, w h ich  was banned in  B rita in  in  the m id  1970s. Barker 
found tha t a fter c lose ly analyzing an exam ple o f  a com ic s trip  w h ich  had been censored, 
i t  was no t exam ples o f  ‘ excessive v io lence ’ tha t editors had taken out, bu t references to  
au thority : ‘A u d io rity  was no t a llow ed to  be shown in  com prom ised positions, or 
behaving un justly , o r do ing w rong as a m atter o f  p o lic y ’ (B arker, 1989, p.35). Barker 
also found tha t i t  was because Action challenged its  readers to  be part o f som ething 
d iffe ren t, to  kn o w in g ly  take pa rt in  w hat is  considered to  be a ris k y  a c tiv ity , tha t it  was 
also subject to  c ritic ism  and censorship. I t  d id  no t f i t  in  w ith  w hat society considered to  
be acceptable as a children 's com ic. Action had fro n t covers w ith  w arnings such as 
‘B o ld lB a d !’ , ‘N o t fo r the nervous!’ and ‘Y o u  don 't know  the m eaning o f fear u n til you 
read ...A C T IO N ’ (B arker, 1989, p.46).
T h is self-conscious awareness o f  testing the boundaries o f acceptable 
entertainm ent can also be seen in  the advertisem ent o f m ovies such as Reservoir Dogs, 
or Natural Born Killers. A dverts fo r Reservoir Dogs called i t  ‘A n  am azing, awesome, 
pum ping powerhouse o f a m ov ie ’ , w h ils t review ers ran headlines lik e  ‘Drenched in  
L iv id  Shades o f V io lence ’ and spoke o f film  vio lence having gone too far*.15 D erek 
M a lco lm  (1993b, p .6) com m ented:
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There is a p o in t in  Reservoir Dogs w hen i t  is d iffic u lt no t to  take the u ltim ate  
sanction against vio lence and w a lk  o u t...I m ention th is  because reviewers, 
perhaps anaesthetised b y  current honors, sometimes fa il to  w arn po ten tia l 
customers o f w hat they are about to  face in  the cinem a.
S im ila rly , w hen Natural Born Killers was released16 a fly e r fo r the m ovie  called i t  a 
‘ro llercoaster ride  o f awesome e v il’ , w h ils t one c ritic 's  comm ents on another advert, 
cla im ed: ‘N B K  succeeds in  being the k in d  o f  risk -tak ing  a ll-o u t v isua l experience that 
comes along a ll too  ra re ly ’ .17 The ‘tid a l w ave o f hype’ (M a lco lm , 1995, p .10) 
suiTounding these film s  means that they are se lf-consciously re fe rring  to  then  ow n 
no to rie ty ; the advertis ing fo r these film s  de libera te ly asks consumers to  take a chance, 
to  become risk-takers. D erek M a lco lm 's w arn ing  to  view ers about the excessive 
v io lence o f Reservoir Dogs h igh ligh ts  the film ’s d ifference; i t  is  a film  that asks the 
consum er to  jo in  i t  in  an ‘awesome, pum ping, powerhouse’ o f  an experience, one tha t is 
u n like  anyth ing they have encountered before.
A s B arker (1989, p .45) po ints out in  h is exam ination o f Action, the objections to  
th is  com ic were spe c ifica lly  p o litic a l in  nature. B arker (1984a, 1984b) also found the 
same case to  be hue o f objections to  ho rro r com ics o f the 1950s, and objections to  
‘v ideo  nasties’ in  1984: these texts are accused o f being ‘excessively v io le n t’ , bu t the 
objections, and subsequent censorship o f  these texts p o in t to  a p o litic a l bias. These 
texts de libera te ly in v ite  the consum er to  take part in  risk -tak ing  activ itie s  w h ich  the 
dom inant h ierarchy does no t w ish  to  support. The shocking realism , the c ritic ism  o f 
au thority, the unique and dangerous experience these texts o ffe r to  the consumer on ly  
serve to  threaten the safe, ris k  aversive society tha t the dom inant h ierarchy does w ish  to  
support. To a llo w  such texts to  become popular* w ith  the general p u b lic  w ou ld  be to
a llo w  c ritic ism  and c o n flic t o f the centra l com m unity. Indeed, these texts, and others 
lik e  them  (fo r exam ple Crash, o r Brass Eye18) represent everyth ing tha t the central 
com m unity fears: they encourage v io lence; co n flic t; c ritic ism  o f the fa m ily  and 
au tho rity ; an ti-re lig ious sentim ents. These texts push the boundaries o f w hat is 
acceptable, w hen it  is  the ro le  o f  the centra l com m unity to  define and m ainta in  
acceptable behaviour.
The po p u la rity  o f these texts is  another good reason fo r d ie  dom inant h ierarchy 
to  con tro l and regulate m edia v io lence. Reservoir Dogs, Natural Born Killers, and Pulp 
Fiction d id  extrem ely w e ll at the box o ffice  w ith  Pulp Fiction grossing over 
£10,000,000 at the box o ffice  in  199619 (see Table 5, Chapter e ight), and te lev is ion  
program m es such as The X-Files, and Cracker regu la rly  a ttracting  audience figures o f 
10 to  15 m illio n  view ers. The p o p u la rity  o f these film  and te lev is ion  programm es 
means drat the p u b lic  are interested in  risk -tak ing  behaviour w h ich  has no t been 
sanctioned by the dom inant hierarchy. T h is is no t w elcom e news fo r the central 
com m unity, and one response has been to  censor popular- program m es such as The X- 
Files, cu rren tly  shown on B B C 1, so tha t they are cen tra lly  sanctioned and approved by
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‘o ffic ia l’ outlets such as B B C 1, a fa m ily  channel.
Popularity and Trust
Recent research in  p u b lic  perception o f ris k  and dom inant hierarchies shows 
tha t p u b lic  trus t o f  in s titu tions in  au tho rity  is  extrem ely lo w  (G a llup , 1993; S lovic, 
1992; M arris , Langfo rd  and O 'R iordan, 1997). T im  O 'R iordan (1997, p .21) w rites:
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O n ly  12 per cent (o f the p u b lic ) trusted the governm ent, 20 per cent trusted 
businesses, 25 per cent trusted the m edia, and less than a th ird  trusted re lig ious 
organizations and trade un ions...B ut the tw o  m ost trusted sources were their* 
M ends (80 per cent) and th e ir fa m ily  (90 per cent) as w e ll as scientists fio m  
environm ental organizations, w ho had an 80 per cent ‘trus t ra tin g ’ .
The s ta rtling  d ifference between these figures is revealing. Those organizations w ho 
represent the dom inant h ierarchy, the governm ent, businesses, the m edia, and pub lic  
organizations are tire  least trusted by the B ritis h  p u b lic  w ith  regard to  ris k  and the 
environm ent. H ow ever, fiiends, fa m ily  and environm ental organizations get a ‘trust 
ra tin g ’ o f over 80 per cent. T h is c lea rly  shows tha t the pub lic  trus t their* ow n responses, 
and the responses o f then* peers in  re la tion  to  ris k  and safety, m ore than they w ou ld  trust 
dom inant organizations lik e  the governm ent. M arris , Langfo rd  and O 'R iordan's research 
suggests tha t ind iv idua ls  no longer tru s t ins titu tions to  m ake m ora l and eth ical 
decisions. Th is is because, as D ouglas (1992, p .28) points out, ‘the ris k  rhe to ric upholds 
the in d iv id u a l, vu lnerable to  the m isbehaviour o f  d ie  com m unity.’ E nvironm enta lism  is 
therefore perceived to  be trus tw orthy  because it  is  pr otective o f  the in d iv id u a l.
R ob in  G rove-W hite  (1996, p .279) po ints out: ‘ fragm entation o f p u b lic  loya lties 
tow ards m any m ainstream  "tra d itio n a l" institu tions in  socie ty’ has s ign ifican t 
im p lica tions for* the achievem ent o f  objectives o f ris k  reduction  w ith in  these 
institu tions. The fact d ia t m edia vio lence texts lik e  Cracker, o r Pulp Fiction are popular 
w ith  the B ritis h  p u b lic  suggests d ia t d ie  p u b lic  perceive w atch ing m edia vio lence as an 
acceptable risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity  and tha t d iey  tru s t d ie ir ow n responses to  m edia vio lence, 
m ore than m ainstream , tra d itio n a l ins titu tions, such as the m edia, o r the governm ent. 
A ttem pts by these institu tions to  reduce levels o f m edia vio lence w ill have to  take th is  
fragm entation o f lo ya lty  in to  consideration.
H ow ever, the fac t tha t environm ental organizations also get a ‘trust ra tin g ’ o f 80 
per cent has a s ig n ifica n t e ffect on p u b lic  perception o f m edia v io lence. The problem  
w ith  th is  grow th  o f tru s t tow ar ds environm ental organizations is tha t envir onm entalism  
has become a m asterfram e in  its  ow n rig h t. K laus Eder (1996, p .207) has pointed out 
tha t ‘eco log ica l discourse (is ) a m ajor elem ent in  the leg itim a ting  ideo logy o f  advanced 
m odem  societies.’ Eder (1996, pp. 206-7) explains th is  as fo llo w s :
E nv ir onm entalism  has become m ore than a mere sym bolic package constitu tive  
o f  a protest actor. I t  has become a new  m asterfiam e in  p u b lic  discourses w h ich  
is  addressed by non-protest actors as w e ll. A s a m asterfiam e i t  concerns not 
o n ly  environm ental issues..., bu t also other p o lic y  areas in  w h ich  ‘ecologica l 
reasons’ can be evolved to  m ob ilise  leg itim acy fo r the actions o f  non-protesters 
and decisions taken.
In  th is  sense, environm entalism  has become ‘ a constitu tive  elem ent o f m odern p o litic a l 
discourse’ (Eder, 1996, p.207), and has in  m any ways come to  replace the sense o f a 
tra d itio n a l re lig ious com m unity w ith  an ‘associational com m unity ’ (Eder, 1996, p.213), 
one tha t uses environm entalism  as a structu ring  p rinc ip le . T h is is a fa r cry  fro m  the 
p u b lic  perception o f environm entalism  as an ti-in s titu tion a l, as the discourse o f the 
‘protest actor’ . A cco rd ing  to  researchers such as Eder, and Jam ison (1996), ecologica l 
discourse legitim ates the dom inant ideo logy o f m odem  institu tions. Thus, w hat is 
perceived b y  the p u b lic  as an exam ple o f  counterdiscour se is  in  actual fact an exam ple 
o f the dom inant discourse.
T h is ‘p o litic a l ecology package’ (Eder, 1996, p.207) is a s ig n ifica n t reason w hy 
the ris k  argum ent is so im portan t to  an ti-v io lence organizations; w ith o u t it  the dom inant 
h ie ra rchy w o u ld  be unable to  gain the trust o f the pub lic . A n d  w ith o u t the trust o f the 
p u b lic , there w o u ld  be no oppo rtun ity  to  re in fo rce  the ideals o f the dom inant h ierarchy
153
through d ie  con tro l and regu la tion  o f m edia vio lence. W hat th is  means is tha t m edia 
v io lence has been defined and constructed as a social ris k  p os ition  tha t is unacceptable 
to  d ie  central com m unity. I t  is  unacceptable because it  threatens d ie  au tho rity  o f  the 
dom inant h ierarchy by  exp lo ring  a lternative risk-tak ing  ac tiv ities  tha t are no t sanctioned 
b y  d ie  com m unity. Exam ples o f m edia vio lence, such as Crash, o r The X-Files, contain 
socia l c ritic ism  and c o n flic t tha t are unresolvable b y  the central com m unity. In  Crash 
the central characters are distanced fio m  the rest o f the com m unity because they have 
express sexual desires tha t are perceived as unacceptable by  society; in  The X-Files 
emphasis is placed on the in d iv id u a l w ho can trust no one. The fac t tha t these examples 
o f m edia vio lence are popu la r because o f d ie  emphasis on the in d iv id u a l and the lack o f 
tru s t in  social in s titu tions  causes a problem  fo r the dom inant hierarchy. To counteract 
th is , organizations lik e  the m edia, the governm ent and re lig ious groups adopt the 
rhe to ric  o f ris k  in  re la tion  to  m edia vio lence because, w ith  a ris k  approach, such 
organizations are no longer perceived to  be part o f the dom inant h ierarchy, but are 
instead perceived by  the p u b lic  as environm ental organizations w ho target ins titu tions 
tha t cannot be re lied  upon, w ho pro tect the in d iv id u a l fio m  the risks o f  m odernization: 
i t  is th is  type o f  organization tha t the p u b lic  trust.
T h is ensures tha t despite the fac t tha t a large p ropo rtion  o f the general pu b lic  
choose to  consume m edia vio lence, m edia vio lence its e lf is constructed as a 
m odern ization ris k  tha t endangers the in d iv id u a l and the com m unity. The fact tha t 
m edia vio lence actua lly  poses a threat to  the values o f the dom inant h ierarchy is 
som ething tha t becomes subsumed under the rheto ric o f risk , w ith  its  protest against 
in s titu tions  and its  focus on the in d iv id u a l.
B u t w hat o f the ind iv idua l?  I t  is the in d iv id u a l w ho chooses to  become a risk - 
taker w hen they consume m edia vio lence. A nd, contrary to  w hat the dom inant
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h ierarchy says, these ind iv idua ls  are no t part o f a m arginalized sub-culture, bu t are part 
o f the central com m unity. In  the next chapter I  w ant to  exam ine the in d iv id u a l and d ie  
concept o f  the risk-taker. I f ,  as O 'R iordan's research suggests, people place then* trust in  
friends and fa m ily  w hen i t  comes to  ris k  and d ie  environm ent, then i t  stands to  reason 
d ia t they w o u ld  also place trus t in  th e ir ow n judgem ent w ith  regard to  risk . The next 
chapter aims to  exam ine the s e lf as risk-take r in  re la tion  to  v io lence and the mass 
m edia.
N o te s
1 By ‘hierarchical power’ I  am referring to Mary Douglas’ concept o f central communities, and social 
fields o f symbolic and economic capital, see Douglas, 1992, p. 107.
2 This advert for British Nuclear Fuel was shown regularly on ITV and Channel 4 January-March 1997.
3 For discussion o f this in relation to risk, see The Times Higher Educational Supplement, March 14 1997,
pp. 18-21.
4 Henderson examined British Government decisions regarding Concorde and Advanced Gas Cooled 
Reactor projects. He found that their massive economic miscalculations did not have an adverse affect on 
those responsible for these mistakes, he identified four characteristics o f British administration process: 
decorum; unbalanced incentives; anonymity; security.
5 See also Jamison et al, 1990, for further discussion o f new phases in post-war environmentalism.
6 This table is taken fiom  Jamison, 1996, p.227.
7 Eder talks o f figures such as Rachel Carson and Fairfield Osborn as some o f the first people to put this 
perspective in print. Interestingly, Jamison sees the development o f television and popular culture as a 
significant means o f bringing nature into the home environment, and therefore highlighting the need to save 
nature (see Jamison, 1996, p.228).
8 Reference to Medved cited in Kidd-Hewitt and Osbome, 1996, p.6.
9 This is an extremely brief reference to Giddens' theoiy o f structuration, and how structuration links in with 
human agents and social practices w ill be o f interest to later chapters on audience response to media violence. 
Giddens' interest in modernity and reflexive modernization (see Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, Giddens and 
Lash, 1995) also suggests further links with risk and the mass media.
10 See Buckingham (1996, p.33) for further reference to the ‘nanny state’ and anxieties about the
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relationship between the personal and the private in relation to media violence.
11 These comments by Barker and Brooks are taken from an unpublished article on ‘Investing in Film ’ 
which is based on recent ESRC funded research on teenagers’ responses to action movies.
12 In ‘Investment in Film ’, Barker and Brooks (1997) discuss the concept o f investment in relation to 
agency and structure, and investment is a means for possibilities o f action which theorists are unaware of. 
Thus, the investment o f engaging in risk-taking activity would be as important as identifying what activity 
this is.
13 O f course there are many other ways o f reading these texts. For example, Child’s Play 3 could be 
read and understood as a successor to slasher films such as A Nightmare on Elm Street, with a strange and 
novel twist, that o f the talking doll.
14 See Buckingham (1996, pp.34-39) and Barker (1997a, pp.l 8-21) for a detailed discussion o f the content 
and context o f Child's Play 3.
15 See adverts for Reservoir Dogs in various magazines and national newspapers, December 1992-January 
1993. The film  was released on January 8th, 1993. See Hutchinson (1993, p.39).
16 Natural Born Killers was due for cinema release in the UK on 18th November 1994, but was withheld by 
the BBFC and eventually released on 24th February 1995.
17 See advertisement for the film  and soundtrack available at West End cinemas February 24th, 1995, and 
advert in Time Out, March 1st, 1995, featuring a quotation from the critic Clark Collis o f Empire magazine.
18 Brass Eye is a comedy series by Chris Morris that lampoons the media, particularly questioning whether 
what we read and see in the media is actually truthful. The programme attracted a lot o f criticism in the press, 
particularly by spoof-victims, such as Noel Edmonds, who was tricked into condemning a mythical Czech 
drug, ‘cake’. In March, a sketch about Peter Sutcliffe, the Yorkshire Ripper, and a musical o f his life  was 
pulled from the series in response to media outrage (see Mulholland, 1997, the Guardian, Monday March 
10th, 1997).
19 Exact figure £10,446,512. Figures supplied by Screen International, 1996.
20 Figures supplied by BARB (British Audience Research Board).
21 The X-Files has been shown in the UK on BBC1 for over nearly two years now -  it began life on Sky 
One and then went to BBC2 -  and with its increase in popularity over the last year, along with the rise in 
Hollywood alien films such as Independence Day (Roland Emmerich, 1996) or Men in Black (Barry 
Sonnenfield, 1997) the X-Files has been routinely censored by the BBC and Sky for violence. A  good 
example is the episode ‘Home’ in season four, which contains scenes o f a mutilated baby which were cut 
from the BBC transmission, 17th September 1997, 9.30-10.10 pm.
6R is k - T a k e r s
A  technocratic v ie w  o f ris k  has dom inated d ie  w ay in  w h ich  ris k  assessment and 
com m unication have developed in  our society. R isk th e o iy  h igh ligh ts  the divergence 
between the expert and lay  perspective o f environm ental risk . H o w  people understand 
and respond to  m odernization risks has, u n til recently, been o f litt le  consequence to  
tiiose  organizations invo lved  in  ris k  assessment. A s G rove-W hite  (1997, p.283) points 
out: ‘embedded in  d ie  re levant in s titu tions  is  a know ledge cu ltu re  w h ich  embodies a 
truncated and inadequate conception o f d ie  hum an subject - tha t is, o f w hat real people 
are lik e .’
H ow ever, recent research (S lov ic , 1992, 1995; D urant, 1997; M arris  et a l.,
1997) has suggested tha t there are ‘ system atic "m ism atches" between expert and lay 
ris k  assessments’ (D urant, 1997, p.20). T liese ‘m ism atches’ ind icate tha t the pub lic  
assess ris k  in  re la tion  to  degrees o f personal con tro l, and degrees o f trust. Thus, m any 
people perceive tha t tra ve llin g  in  an airplane is m ore risky  than d riv in g  a car, despite the 
fact tha t experts c la im  the exact opposite is the case; d riv in g  a car feels less risky  d ian 
being in  an airplane because there is a greater degree o f  personal con tro l, and we can 
trus t our ow n response to  th is  risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity . S c ien tific  experts m ay say tha t d iis  is 
an exam ple o f  p u b lic  ignorance, bu t fio m  a socio log ica l perspective the lay  person 
reveals some s ign ifican t issues in  re la tion  to  risk .
In  th is  chapter, I  w ant to  focus on the risk-taker and exam ine John Adam s' 
theory o f the ‘ris k  therm ostat’ . The ris k  therm ostat hypothesis reveals tha t eve iy person 
has a propensity to  take risks, and eve iy  person balances the ir perception o f ris k  in  
re la tion  to  the benefits and drawbacks o f  certa in risk-tak ing  activ ities . Thus, the 
com plex and subjective nature o f the la y  person's ris k  assessment is as, i f  no t m ore, 
im portan t than the technocratic v iew . T h is new  theory o f ris k  w ill be o f  d irect relevance 
to  understanding v iew er response to  m edia vio lence, and the dangers and rewards 
associated w ith  th is  risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity .
T h e  R i s k  T h e r m o s ta t  H y p o th e s i s
Adam s (1995, p . l)  believes tha t eveiyone is ‘a true ris k  "expe rt"’ . W e a ll make 
decisions in  our eveiyday lives  tha t are to  do w ith  risk . H ow ever, ‘the v ie w  that there is 
a d is tin c tio n  to  be made between, real, actual, ob jective, measurable risk...and 
subjective ris k  inaccurate ly perceived by non-experts’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 10) is a v ie w  
tha t poses problem s fo r th is  theory. I f  the m ainstream  pos ition  in  ris k  assessment is tha t 
non experts are inaccurate in  then  perception o f risk , d iis  raises the question o f w ho is 
‘ accurate’ in  the d e fin itio n  and construction o f risk?
In  Chapter fou r, w e considered Adam s' c ritic ism  o f the ob jective , ‘accurate’ 
measurement o f  road safety and the im plem entation o f  safety b e lt leg is la tion . B rie fly , 
Adam s (1995, p p .l 13-157) found tha t the o rig in a l research on seat be lt usage and death • 
by  road tra ffic  accidents conducted in  A ustra lia  fa iled  to  take in to  account the concept 
o f ‘ ris k  com pensation’ . In  th is  case, ris k  com pensation m anifested its e lf in  people's
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propensity to  d rive  at greater speed and to  take m ore risks on the road because w earing 
a seat be lt made them  fee l safer. Thus, although the num ber o f deaths by road tra ffic  
accidents were reduced fo llo w in g  the im plem entation o f seat belts, the numbers o f 
accidents, and deaths o f pedestrians and cyclists increased. This is because people 
compensate fo r one risk  by in troducing  another; they m o d ify  th e ir behaviour according 
to  th e ir assessment o f risk . R isk com pensation means that there is no ‘accurate’ 
assessment o f risk , because as soon as ins titu tions attem pt to  manage risk , people alter 
th e ir behaviour accordingly.
Adam s has developed a m odel o f ris k  com pensation.1 F igure 2 illustra tes the 
‘ ris k  therm ostat hypothesis’ .
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F ig u re  2: the  r is k  th e rm o s ta t
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Adam s (1995, pp. 14-15) explains the risk  therm ostat as fo llow s:
•  everyone has a propensity to  take risks
•  th is  propensity varies fro m  one in d iv id u a l to another; th is  propensity is influenced 
by the poten tia l rewards o f risk -tak ing
•  perceptions o f  ris k  are influenced by experience o f accident losses - one's ow n and 
others'
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•  in d iv id u a l risk -ta k in g  decisions represent a balancing act in  w h ich  perceptions o f 
ris k  are w eighed against p ropensity to  take ris k
•  accident losses are, by d e fin itio n , a consequence o f tak ing  risks; the m ore risks an 
in d iv id u a l takes, the greater, on average, w ill be both the rewards and losses he or 
she incurs.
Adam s states tha t ‘eveiyone has a propensity to  take risks ’ . T h is means tha t contrary to  
U lric h  Beck's concept o f a ris k  society (1992, p .49), where eveiyone is  concerned w ith  
preventing the w orst, Adam s m aintains tha t risks are part o f our eve iyday lives, and that 
we take risks because there are ‘po ten tia l rew ards’ to  risk-tak ing  activ ities . Thus, un like  
‘ze ro -risk m an’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 16), the ra tiona l and responsible person tha t m ost 
safety lite ra tu re  invokes, Adam s asserts tha t people lik e  to  take risks: ‘H om o prudens is 
bu t one aspect o f the hum an character. H om o aleatorius - d ice man, gam bling man, 
risk -ta k in g  m an - also lu rks w ith in  everyone o f us’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 16).
H ie  risk-taker, according to  the ris k  therm ostat, m ust leam  to  balance th e ir 
behaviour. There are rewards, bu t there are also dangers in  risk -ta k in g  activ ities. W hat 
is s ign ifican t is  the perception o f ris k  and how  the in d iv id u a l chooses to  manage th is  
risk . Adam s (1995, p. 19) asks us to  im agine a d rive r negotia ting the bend in  a road. The 
rewards o f  d riv in g  fast m ig h t be to  im press friends, o r get to  the church on tim e. 
H ow ever, the dangers m igh t include damage to  the car, personal in ju ry  o r death. The 
speed o f the car w ill be to  do w ith  the balance between the driver's judgem ent o f road 
conditions, tim e  o f  day, the capab ility  o f the car*, and h is/her perception o f the rewards 
and dangers o f  d riv in g  fast.
R isk  is also an in te ractive  phenomenon. A  person's propensity to  take risks m ust 
be balanced w ith  others w ho are also contem plating the rewards and dangers o f risk - 
tak ing  activ ities. A nd  some risk-takers are capable o f causing m ore harm  than others. 
There are contro lle rs o f large risks. Adam s explains: ‘ ris ky  in te raction  frequently  takes
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place in  term s o f gross inequa lity. The damage tha t a heavy lo rry  can in flic t on a cyclis t, 
o r pedestrian is great; the physica l damage tha t they can in flic t on the lo rry  is sm a ll’ 
(Adam s, 1995, p .20). These contro lle rs o f large risks are in  a p os ition  o f pow er, and 
everyday m anagem ent o f  ris k  m ust negotiate ris k  inequa lity  and co n flic t.
Cultural Filters
A nother aspect o f  the ris k  therm ostat w h ich  is o f sign ificance here is  the 
inc lus ion  o f cu ltu ra l filte rs . Adam s asserts tha t perceptions o f  ris k  are cu ltu ra lly  
constructed and are made up o f  anticipations o f the fu ture  based on past experience. 
Adam s (1995, p .9 ) w rites:
...the adverse nature o f pa rticu la r events and their* p ro b a b ility  are inheren tly 
subjective. S lipp ing  and fa llin g  on ice, fo r exam ple, is  a game fo r young 
ch ild ren, bu t a p o te n tia lly  fa ta l accident fo r an o ld  person. A n d  the p ro b a b ility  
o f  such an event is  in fluenced both  by  the per son's perception o f the p robab ility , 
and b y  w hether they see i t  as fu n  o r dangerous. F o r exam ple, because o ld  people 
see the ris k  o f  s lipp ing  on an ic y  road to  be h igh, they take avo id ing  action, 
thereby reducing the p ro b a b ility . Y oung people s lipp ing  and s lid in g  on ice, and 
the o ld  people s triv in g  to  avo id  do ing d ie  same, belong to  tw o  separate and 
d is tin c t cultures. They construct re a lity  out o f then* experience o f it. They see 
d ie  w o rld  d iffe re n tly  and behave d iffe re n tly ; they tend to  associate w ith  k in d le d  
sp irits , w ho re in fo rce  then* d is tin c tive  perspectives on re a lity  in  general and ris k  
in  particular*.
F o r Adam s, the w ay to  exam ine the cu ltu ra l construction o f ris k  is to  exam ine d iffe ren t 
ra tiona lities . He uses a fo u rfo ld  typo logy, as ou tlined  by cu ltu ra l theorists lik e  D ouglas 
and W ildavsky (1983), and Thom pson et al. (1990); d iis  typo logy com bines the fo u r 
m yths o f nature w ith  the fo u r m yths o f hum an nature to  a rrive  at fo u r ra tiona lities: 
in d iv idua lis ts ; h ierarchists; egalitarians; fa ta lists.2 Adam s sees these four* ra tiona lities  as 
a means to  negotiate uncerta in ty h i re la tion  to  ris k  perception and management. For
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exam ple, id e n tify in g  tha t o ld  people avo id  ic y  roads and young people de libera te ly s lip  
and slide on the ice is a means o f a lign ing  certa in risk-tak ing  and risk-averse activ ities 
in  re la tion  to  specific  sub cultures. H ow ever, th is  does no t take in to  account tha t 
in d iv id u a l people operate in  d iffe re n t ways w hen negotia ting a s lippe ry  road. Adam s 
postulates that by using the fo u r types o f  ra tiona lities  we can com e to  an understanding 
about types o f  people w ith in  these sub cultures and the ra tio n a lity  they use fo r 
negotia ting  a s lippery road.
Adam s (1995, pp.40-41) outlines the fo u r ra tiona lities in  re la tio n  to  risk :
Ind iv id u a lis ts  tend to  v ie w  nature as stable, robust and benign...They are 
believers in  m arket forces and in d iv id u a l responsib ility , and are hostile  to  the 
regulators o f the ‘nanny State’ ... Egalitarians c lin g  to  the v ie w  o f nature as 
fra g ile  and precarious. They w o u ld  have eveiyone head lig h tly  on the E arth and 
in  cases o f sc ie n tific  doubt invoke the precautionary p rin c ip le ... H ierarchists 
believe that nature w ill be good to  them , i f  p rope rly  managed. They are 
members o f  b ig  business, b ig  governm ent, b ig  bureaucracy...They believe in  
research to  establish ‘the facts ’ about both hum an and physica l nature, and in  
regu la tion  fo r the co llec tive  good... Fatalists...believe nature to  be capricious 
and unpredictable. They hope fo r the best and fear the w orst...
These fo u r ra tiona lities  can be applied to  disputes about risk . Adam s (1995, p.37) 
considers tha t w hen people argue about risks such as g lobal w arm ing, they are arguing 
fro m  d iffe re n t view s about nature: ‘These d iffe re n t ra tiona lities  tend to  entrench 
them selves. B o th  the paradigm s o f  science and the m yths o f cu ltu ra l th e o iy  are 
pow e rfu l filte rs  through w h ich  the w o rld  is perceived...’ Thus, w hen we define and 
construct risk , w e anticipate a fu tu re  event tha t is perceived th rough the filte r  o f a 
ra tiona l discourse w h ich  is subjective rather than objective. W hat is  m ore, w hen we 
balance our propensity to  take risks w ith  our perception o f danger w e do so through 
these cu ltu ra l filte rs .
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The ris k  therm ostat is a sim ple, ye t rem arkable theory o f  ris k  management. I t
challenges the basic assum ption o f  a ll safety research and lite ra tu re  w h ich  is concerned
w ith  ris k  reduction: according to  d ie  ris k  therm ostat there is  no ‘ze ro -risk m an’ . U n til
recently, the purpose o f  a ll ris k  research was the rem oval o f risk . Once one ris k  has
been rem oved, fo r exam ple leg is la tion  to  w ear safety belts, other risks are id e n tifie d  and
new  campaigns are launched to  con tro l and regulate these new  risks. Adam s (1995,
pp.30-31) po in ts out tha t ris k  reduction  is an enormous industry. For exam ple, in
B rita in , the num ber o f people proceeded against in  court fo r m otor veh ic le  offenses per
year is over 2.5 m illio n ; th is  accounts fo r 75 per cent o f court proceedings. Such court
proceedings m ay include other types o f  ‘ ris ks ’ , fo r exam ple no M O T , no insurance, or
unpaid park ing  fines, bu t such a figu re  s till indicates tha t ris k  reduction is b ig  business.
A nd  yet ris k  reduction  fa ils  to  take in to  account the concept o f  ris k  com pensation; it
fa ils  to  understand d ia t people have a propensity to  take risks. The type o f risks m ay
a lte r over tim e , bu t levels o f  risk -ta k in g  activ itie s  w ill rem ain the same.
The ris k  therm ostat has dram atic consequences on the e fficacy  o f im posed
safety measures. I f  people compensate fo r the reduction o f one ris k  by incorpora ting
another, th is  means tha t safety measures do no t w o rk  in  iso la tion . Adam s (1995, p.215)
explains th is  as fo llo w s :
Safety in terventions tha t do no t a lte r people's propensity to  take risks w ill be 
frustra ted by responses that re-establish the leve l o f ris k  w ith  w h ich  people were 
o rig in a lly  content. In  the absence o f  reductions in  people's propensity to  take 
risks, safety in terventions w ill red istribu te  the burden o f risk , no t reduce it.
Balancing Calculations
Adam s’ research on safety be lt leg is la tion , discussed in  d ie  previous chapter, suggests 
tha t th is  is exactly the case. Further research adds v a lid ity  to  th is  hypothesis. For 
exam ple, research in to  the rates o f  death by accident and vio lence ind icate that despite 
the in tens ifica tio n  o f safety precautions and causality treatm ent around the w orld , the 
figures o f  death by  accident and vio lence have rem ained the same. Benjam in and 
O verton (1981) conducted a dem ographic study o f E ng lish  and W elsh m o rta lity  rates 
in to  the 21st century and they found ‘the ris k  o f accidental death rem ains the same, as 
some im provem ents in  the environm ent are balanced b y  the appear ance o f new  hazards’ 
(c ited  in  Adam s, 1995, p.61). Adam s (1995, pp.60, 61) also found tha t over a 75 year 
period  th is  century, the num bers o f death by accident and v io lence in  31 countries 
rem ained ‘rem arkably fla t’ despite the p ro fusion  o f safety regulations in  th is  period.3
S im ila rly , R obbins, Bales and D 'A ndrea (1996) analyzed p u b lic  perception o f 
security issues over the last 20 years. R obbins et a l. (1996, p. 10) found tha t ‘new  risks 
o r threats to  security replace o ld  ones, and there is no t a corresponding reduction in  the 
to ta l leve l o f concern o r insecurity, o n ly  the focus a lters.’ For exam ple, the num bers o f 
people in  B rita in  w ho fe lt tha t defence was a top  security issue fe ll fio m  35 per cent in  
1983, to  1 per cent between 1990 and 1995, and yet other security concerns such as 
nationa lism , and A ID S  began to  become s ign ifican t fio m  the late 1980s onwards, ju s t 
as defence declined (R obbins et a l., 1996, pp.9-10). Thus, security concerns such as 
defence, unem ploym ent, and la w  and order m ay peak at d iffe re n t periods over the last 
20 years, bu t the levels o f  concern regarding ris k  and security rem ain the same: security 
concerns have no t been reduced, instead they have been red istributed.
Such research supports Adam s' theory regarding ris k  com pensation. A lthough  
Adam s is sceptical o f any c la im  fo r ‘conclusive p ro o f o f th is  hypothesis, be liev ing  that 
ris k  com pensation ‘ is an explanation o f in d iv id u a l, no t co llective , behaviour’ (1995,
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p.62), the find ings o f researchers such as R obbins et al. (1996), o r B enjam in and 
O verton (1981) w ou ld  suggest tha t the ris k  com pensation hypothesis does have some 
grounding in  research. A s R obbins et a l. (1996, p .3) p o in t out, contrary to  Adam s 
assertion tha t perceptions o f  danger cannot be measured ob jective ly, ‘perceptions, lik e  
attitudes o r other form s o f the in te rna l measurements people m ake o f  the w o rld  around 
them  are measured w ith  re g u la rity  b y  large scale pub lic  op in ion  p o lls .’ Adam s m ay be 
rig h t to  d istrust the use o f ob jective  measurements as evidence o f ‘undeniable p ro o f in  
re la tion  to  risk , bu t th is  does no t mean to  say tha t quantita tive statistics do no t have a 
place in  our understanding o f  ris k  assessment. Indeed, here, they are an ind ica tion  that 
fu rthe r research in to  people's perception o f risk-tak ing  behaviour w ill y ie ld  interesting 
results. Research b y  M arris , Langfo rd  and O 'R iordan (1997) also suggests tha t th is  is 
the case. M a rris  et al. (1997, p . l)  argue fo r qua lita tive  and quantita tive  research in  ris k  
perception, using a psychom etric paradigm  and cu ltu ra l th e o iy  approaches.4 This is an 
issue I  w ill re turn  to  la ter.
The fact tha t Adam s has h im s e lf no ticed a change in  the dom inant discourse on 
ris k  over the last few  years is also an ind ica tion  that the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis is 
beginn ing to  be taken seriously by  exactly  the kinds o f h ierarch ica l ins titu tions w ho 
rejected th is  type o f hypothesis. F o r exam ple, the R oyal Society, B rita in 's  leading 
sc ie n tific  in s titu tio n , saw no reason to  support Adam s' ris k  therm ostat hypothesis in  its  
1992 report. Indeed, the R oya l Society's 1992 report has become know n fo r precise ly 
th is  d iv is io n  between socia l scientists and statisticians: ‘the report consists o f tw o  
sections w ritte n  fro m  d iffe re n t v iew po in ts w h ich  in  parts fla tly  contrad ict each other’ 
(H inde, 1997, p .18).5 H ow ever, fiv e  years on, Adam s was chosen to  start the 1997 
debate on ris k  at the R oya l Society. Lew is  W olpert, the chairm an o f the R oyal Society's 
com m ittee fo r the understanding o f science, has p u b lic ly  adm itted to  the v a lid ity  o f ris k
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com pensation (H inde, 1997, p . 19). T h is means tha t Adam s' ris k  therm ostat hypothesis 
has gained c re d ib ility  w ith  the R oyal S ociety w h ich , a fe w  years earlier, was in  
deadlock w ith  social scientists and theories o f the social construction o f  risk .
In  the next section I  w ant to  consider the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis in  re la tion  
to  m edia vio lence. I f  people have a propensity to  take risks, and ris k  management is 
undertaken b y  the in d iv id u a l as w e ll as the state, then it  is  im portan t to  exam ine how  the 
ris k  therm ostat m ay help us to  understand w hy people w atch v io le n t m ovies such as 
Reservoir Dogs (Q uentin  Tarantino, 1992) o r Natural Born Killers (O live r Stone, 1994) 
despite the fac t tha t the m edia, p o litic ia n s  and pub lic  cam paign groups apparently 
believe these m ovies to  be hazardous to  the environm ent.
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T h e  R i s k  T h e r m o s ta t  a n d  M e d ia  V io le n c e
Adam s (1995, p.66) suggests tha t there are ‘ degrees o f v o litio n  in  the tak ing  o f 
r is k ’ . Some risks are im posed upon an in d iv id u a l, and others are taken by an 
in d iv id u a l.6 A  consum er o f  m edia v io lence ac tive ly  chooses to  engage w ith  th is  risk - 
tak ing  a c tiv ity . W atch ing a film  o r te lev is ion  program m e w h ich  contains vio lence is a 
vo lun ta ry  a c tiv ity . I t  is  vo lun ta ry  in  the sense tha t people pay to  take part in  th is  leisure 
a c tiv ity  in  the same w ay people pay to  p la y  squash, or b ingo. M ed ia  vio lence is not 
im posed upon members o f the p u b lic ; consumers have the choice to  w atch, o r no t w atch 
representations o f vio lence, and there are other leisure activ ities they can take part in  i f  
m edia vio lence is no t to  then  lik in g .
H ie  ris k  therm ostat hypothesis is s ign ifican t to  our understanding o f consumer 
behaviour. H ie  previous chapters have explored how  m edia vio lence has been defined 
and constructed as a m odernization risk . Th is means that consumers o f  popular culture 
are v e iy  m uch aware tha t i f  they w atch a film  o r te lev is ion  program m e tha t contains 
representations o f vio lence, they are engaging w ith  ris k  on a personal leve l. Th is does 
n o t mean to  say tha t consumers o f m edia vio lence perceive a ll f ilm  and te lev is ion  
vio lence as an environm ental risk , s im ila r to  g loba l w ann ing , o r car p o llu tio n , bu t rather 
tha t they are aware o f the dom inant discourse on m edia v io lence, and its  d e fin itio n  o f 
certa in  texts as environm ental hazards w h ich  can harm  vulnerable view ers, especially 
ch ild ren. A  consum er o f m edia v io lence, therefore, is active ly  engaging in  a risk-tak ing  
a c tiv ity  w h ich  they understand to  be an in teractive  phenomenon.
A cco rd ing  to  anti-v io lence cam paign groups, and researchers operating w ith in  
the cause-effect paradigm , popu la r entertainm ent should seek to  reduce risk . Th is 
fo llo w s  the pattern o f  safety research and lite ra tu re  w h ich  strives to  a tta in  ‘ze ro -risk ’ ; 
an ti-v io lence  cam paign groups w ant ris k -fie e  entertainm ent. A s the N V A L A  (N ationa l 
V iew ers ' and Listeners' A ssocia tion) com m ents in  its  advertising pam phlet: ‘ "N o t m ore 
v io lence?" "W hat a w fu l language!" "W h y  should we ju s t sw itch  o ff? "’ . These 
com m ents are made b y  father, m other and ch ild , respectively; in  the cartoon dep icting  
th is  exchange in  fro n t o f the te lev is ion , even the dog is  m oved to  cover its  ears. The 
type o f entertainm ent anti-v io lence  cam paign groups such as the N V A L A  wants to  
m ake available to  the p u b lic  is safe entertainm ent fo r the w hole  fa m ily . A s the N V A L A  
states, the association cam paigns fo r: ‘wholesom e fa m ily  v ie w in g  he lp ing  to  strengthen 
m arriage and fa m ily  life .’ A  fu rth e r cartoon shows the same fa m ily  se ttling  dow n to  
en joy ‘wholesom e fa m ily  v ie w in g ’ ; the te lev is ion  depicts a fa m ily  d riv in g  through the 
country, and fa ther says: ‘ " I  w ish  w e could have m ore program m es lik e  th is ." ’ The
167
im age o f  the car is an h on ic  one, g iven  the perceived ris k  to  the environm ent by cars 
and the construction o f  roads; how ever, perhaps tin s  is shown in  order to  h ig h lig h t a 
‘ successful’ exercise in  ris k  m anagement.7 The im age o f the car shows the fa m ily  in  
another ‘bo x ’ , th is  tim e  under d ie  con tro l o f the father: he is d ie  fa m ily ’ s ris k  manager 
in  a ll aspects o f  life , w hether at hom e, o r in  the socia l environm ent.
Previous chapters discussed the ideo log ica l reasons w hy the dom inant h ierarchy 
w ishes to  con tro l and regulate popula r entertainm ent. Here, ‘ze ro -risk  m an’ applauds 
the program m e about d riv in g  in  the country because it  is perceived to  be a safe a c tiv ity  
tha t d ie  w ho le  fa m ily  can enjoy; i t  strengthens fa m ily  values: w hat could  be m ore 
norm al than tak ing  your fa m ily  fo r a Sunday afternoon drive? A n d  ye t there is no ‘zero- 
ris k  m an’ . D riv in g  a car is  a ris k y  a c tiv ity , ju s t as p lay ing  b ingo, w ater-skiing , and 
liv in g  alone are ris k y  activ itie s . Indeed, these ac tiv ities  are ‘ actual risks ’ (Adam s, 1997, 
p. 19), where the person invo lved  can d ire c tly  perceive d ie  risks and balance these w ith  
the rewards to  be gained fro m  these type o f  le isure activ ities. W atch ing te lev is ion  is a 
ris k  tha t cannot be d ire c tly  perceived: i t  is  a ris k  that scientists have no t ye t ob jective ly  
measured, and th is  means tha t e ffo rts  to  reduce ris k  in  re la tion  to  popula r cu lture are 
based on in su ffic ie n t know ledge o f  how  and w hy people tiiem selves define and 
understand th is  risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity . A s there is  no ‘zero -risk m an’ , people them selves 
do no t consume zero-risk entertainm ent. T h is is a basic fact tha t anti-v io lence  cam paign 
groups do no t understand.
A ll consumers o f entertainm ent w ill make decisions about the d iffe re n t types o f 
entertainm ent tiie y  w ish  to  experience. M ed ia  vio lence is  ju s t one exam ple, and d ie  risk  
therm ostat hypothesis is a means to  understand w hy people choose th is  type o f 
experience over another. The kinds o f view ers w ho consume m edia v io lence w ill have 
set th e ir ris k  therm ostats to  a h igher leve l than those w ho do no t w ish  to  experience th is
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type o f entertainm ent. To make entertainm ent risk-free  w ou ld  no t stop people fro m  
choosing to  engage in  risk -tak ing  ac tiv ities . R isk com pensation ensures that those 
people w ho lik e  to  w atch film  and te lev is ion  program m es w h ich  conta in vio lence w ill 
fin d  other ac tiv ities  w h ich  are also challeng ing to  the im agination.
The ris k  therm ostat hypothesis indicates tha t consumers o f  m edia vio lence 
perceive rewards to  be gained fro m  th is  type o f behaviour. H ow ever, audience research 
in  th is  area has repeatedly denied the p o s s ib ility  tha t w atch ing v io le n t m ovies can be an 
enterta in ing experience (see fo r exam ple, G erbner et al., 1980,1986; N T V S , 1996). The 
next chapter w ill exam ine audience research and m edia v io lence in  some deta il, 
how ever, the p o in t here is tha t the three types o f  effects m ost com m only associated w ith  
m edia vio lence - copycat effects; the desensitization hypothesis; cu ltiva tio n  effects (fo r 
m ore details see G auntlett, 1995, pp. 17-43) - are on ly  concerned w ith  dangers and 
accidents; there is no awareness o f view ers' propensity to  take risks, and th e ir 
understanding o f  the rewards o f th is  experience.
H ow ever, consumers have established a positive  perception o f  m edia vio lence 
because they have had no experience o f ‘ accident losses’ (Adam s, 1995, p. 15). 
W atch ing v io le n t film  and te lev is ion  program m es has always been a ‘ safe’ a c tiv ity , 
where any perception o f  danger has been part o f  a response to  the tex t, and concerned 
w ith  the im ag ina tion  o f the view er, no t w ith  real life  vio lence. Thus, contrary to  m ost 
effects research, and the be lie fs o f  an ti-v io lence  cam paign groups, active consumers o f 
m edia vio lence do no t associate w atch ing v io le n t m ovies w ith  ‘accidents’ . I f  they d id , 
v e iy  fe w  people w ou ld  actua lly  choose to  go to  the cinem a o r ren t a m ovie  w h ich  they 
know  to  conta in scenes o f  v io lence: to  do so w ou ld  be to  a c tive ly  place onese lf in  
harm ’s w ay. W hat th is  means is tha t the construction o f  ris k  in  association w ith  m edia 
v io lence is  v e iy  m uch concerned w ith  consumers' perception o f danger. T h is perception
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o f danger takes on tw o  form s: firs t i t  is concerned w ith  textua l references to  danger and 
the consumer's em otional responses to  th is  fic tio n a lize d  risk ; secondly, it  is  concerned 
w ith  the socia l construction o f  risk , and the la y  perspective tha t ‘accidents’ can happen 
to  other people. In  the next chapter, research in  consumers' be lie fs  tha t i t  is  other people, 
no t them selves, w ho are vulnerable to  the effects o f m edia vio lence w ill expand on th is  
po in t.
Cultural Filters
This emphasis on d iffe re n t attitudes to  ris k  is w hy the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis 
has been m o d ifie d  so tha t ris k  can be considered as an ‘ in te ractive  phenom enon’ 
(Adam s, 1995, p.20) w h ich  w e perceive through cu ltu ra l filte rs . Consumers construct a 
version  o f  re a lity  tha t is based on th e n  ow n experience. H ow ever, th is  experience is also 
filte re d  through various d iffe re n t cu ltu ra l perspectives. Th is is  w h y  consumers o f m edia 
vio lence do no t perceive any real danger to  th is  risk-tak ing  a c tiv ity , bu t they are 
concerned that ‘other people ’ m ay have a d iffe re n t experience fio m  then  ow n. The 
d e fin itio n  and cu ltu ra l construction o f  m edia vio lence as a m odern ization ris k  tha t is 
ha rm fu l to  vu lnerable view ers has ensured tha t th is  cu ltu ra l filte r  has some in fluence on 
in d iv id u a l perspectives o f risk , even i f  personal experience proves tha t th is  is  no t the 
case.
The u tiliz a tio n  o f  cu ltu ra l groups to  understand types o f  perception and patterns 
o f socia l re lationships is s im ila r to  P ierre Bourdieu 's th e o iy  o f habitus and fie ld . H abitus 
are m ental o r cogn itive  structures w h ich  are in terna lized w ith in  oui* everyday social 
structures. W e m ay no t be conscious o f habitus bu t it  is  part o f our eve iyday activ ities. 
W e acquire i t  through occupying a pos ition  in  society, and eveiyone has th e ir ow n
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habitus, although those people w ho occupy s im ila r social positions share s im ila r 
habitus. W hat is s ign ifican t about habitus is tha t it  both produces and is  produced by  the 
socia l w o rld . B ourd ieu  (1977, p .72) explains i t  as fo llo w s: habitus is the ‘d ia lectic  o f d ie 
in te rna liza tion  o f ex te rna lity  and the extem aliza tion o f in te m a lity .’ H abitus exists in  d ie 
m inds o f  actors, and fie lds, w h ich  are cu ltu r al and social ar enas o f struggle, ex is t apart 
fro m  habitus bu t there is a d ia lectica l re la tionsh ip  between the tw o .
Adam 's u tiliz a tio n  o f  four* types o f ra tiona lities  in  re la tion  to  the ris k  therm ostat 
hypothesis is  far* less p lastic than Bourdieu 's concept o f habitus. U n lik e  the fo u rfo ld  
typ o lo g y  o f cu ltu r a l bias, habitus is  m u ltitud inous, no t un ifo rm . A nd  although habitus 
provides some fo rm  o f structur ing  p rin c ip le  to  a person's life -cho ices, i t  suggests rather 
tiia n  dictates a course o f  action. H ie  d iffic u lty  w ith  the fo u rfo ld  typ o lo g y  o f cu ltu ra l 
bias is  tha t i t  can restric t rather than illu m in a te  perceptions o f risk . To use anti-vio lence 
cam paign groups as one exam ple, th is  sub-group can also be perceived as hierarchists 
and egalitar ians, and consumers o f  m edia vio lence m ay use a ll four* types o f ra tiona lities 
at d iffe re n t tim es and under d iffe re n t circum stances. Adam s accepts tha t cu ltu ra l types 
can be context-dependent (1995, p. 134), and tha t people are capable o f  assuming a ll 
fo u r types o f ra tiona lities . H ow ever, he does no t consider the consequences o f 
attem pting to  d iffe ren tia te  between cu ltu ra l types, and w hat th is  actua lly  te lls  us about 
in d iv id u a l perceptions o f risk . Id e n tify in g  d iffe re n t cu ltu ra l types m ay help to  c la rify  
d is tin c tive  form s o f  rhe to ric , bu t it  does no t te ll us w hy and how  people manage risk - 
tak ing  behaviour* in  d iffe re n t ways and in  d iffe re n t contexts.
Research b y  M a rris , Lang fo rd  and O 'R iordan (1997) suggests tha t em pirica l 
research in  perceptions o f ris k  does little  to  benefit from  using four* cu ltu ra l types to  
understand patterns o f perception in  re la tion  to  ris k  and the environm ent. In  their* recent 
study, M a rris  et al. (1997, p .47) com m ent tha t ‘cu ltu ra l biases cou ld  o n ly  exp la in  12%,
171
at m ost, o f the va ria tion  o f  ris k  perception ’ in  then  sample. In  fact, they found that 
respondents were m ore lik e ly  to  d isp lay m ixed  cu ltu ra l biases than a single cu ltu ra l 
bias.8 A lthough  M arris  et a l. (1997, p.48) are qu ick to  p o in t ou t tha t ‘ ris k  perceptions 
are no t ju s t about abstract ratings o f " r is k " ’ and tha t cu ltu ra l bias ‘ does suggest an 
explanation o f ris k  perceptions b y  show ing how  they f i t  coherently in to  w orldv iew s 
he ld  b y  respondents’ , the fact tha t cu ltu ra l bias scored lo w  as a p red ic to r o f perceptions 
o f ris k  does suggest tha t researchers should be aware tha t there is  little  em pirica l 
evidence to  support such a th e o iy  o f  ris k  perception.
In  fact, coherent w orldv iew s are d iffic u lt to  discover. Even w hen applying 
Bourdieu 's concept o f  habitus, i t  is  possible to  see tha t th is  is also restric tive  in  its  
app lica tion . L ik e  the fo u rfo ld  typ o lo g y  o f cu ltu ra l bias, B ourdieu 's theory o f fie ld  and 
habitus also suffers fro m  a lack  o f  em p irica l evidence, and an over reliance on 
structu ring  p rinc ip les. In  Distinction, one o f the th ings that B ourd ieu  is attem pting to  do 
is  to  show tha t culture can be a leg itim ate  ob ject o f sc ie n tific  study. W h ils t Bourdieu's 
theories are ce rta in ly  usefu l in  analyzing cu ltu re  and the uses o f  cu ltu re  in  eveiyday life , 
the fact o f w hether such theories can be va lida ted b y  em pirica l evidence rem ains to  be 
seen. Recent research by  B arker and B rooks (1997) suggests tha t ‘people do no t 
"be long" w ith in  a habitus in  some m echanical, even m anner’ and tha t w anting  or 
desiring to  achieve a goal is ju s t as im portan t as actua lly achieving tha t goal - indeed, 
th is  generates ‘poss ib ilities  o f action no t otherw ise availab le ’ .9
Thus, w hether one uses B ourdieu 's theory o f  habitus and fie ld , o r Adam 's th e o iy  
o f fo u r cu ltu ra l biases in  re la tion  to  the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis, e ither the o iy  can 
d is to rt and res tric t people's perceptions o f ris k  and the environm ent, and should be 
treated as hypotheses rather than exclusive explanations. A nd  w hat is m ore, cu ltu ra l 
bias cannot take in to  account ‘poss ib ilities  o f action no t otherw ise ava ilab le ’ . In  the
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m odel ou tlined  above, the three cu ltu ra l biases used in  re la tion  to  the m edia vio lence 
debate fa ile d  to  take in to  account p o litic a l ra tiona lities, w h ich  are no t dependent on any 
be lie fs concerning nature, but are rather concerned w ith  p u b lic  op in ion  and w inn ing  
votes. T h is means tha t a lthough the governm ent can f i t  in to  the cu ltu ra l bias o f 
h ierarchists, th e ir perspective o f m edia v io lence is dependent on the ideo logy o f  other 
dom inant ins titu tions, such as anti-v io lence  cam paign groups, and the m edia, w h ich  are 
in  tu rn  dependent on p u b lic  op in ion .
K laus Eder (1997, p.209) ta lks about the ins titu tiona lism  o f  environm entalism . 
He contends tha t ‘e th ica l com m itm ents and e th ica l theories have a become a central 
concern in  leg itim a ting  the re la tionsh ip  between m odem  p o litic a l ins titu tions and 
environm ental issues.5 H ow ever, such e th ica l concerns have becom e subsumed in  the 
m asterfram e o f eco log ica l discourse. Eder explains:
W ith o u t packaging in fo rm a tion  on the environm ent, no th ing  w ill be achieved: 
no t leg itim acy fo r the p o litic a l in s titu tio n , m ob ilisa tion  fo r d ie  environm ent, o r 
ra tiona l attitudes (o r even behaviour patterns) in  d ie  p u b lic  as a w hole. This 
c la im  is  based on the assum ption tha t i t  is the m ethods o f com m unicating 
environm ental conditions and ideas, and no t d ie  state o f environm ental 
de terioration its e lf, w h ich  explains the emergence o f a p u b lic  discourse on the 
environm ent, ‘ eco log ica l discourse’ .
U sing  a fo u rfo ld  typo logy  o f cu ltu ra l bias in  re la tion  to  perceptions o f ris k  and the 
environm ent w o u ld  fa il to  take in to  account the d is tin c tly  re fle x ive  nature o f ecologica l 
discourse, w h ich , rather than re ly in g  on one type o f e th ica l iden tity , uses a m asterfram e 
o f d iffe re n t types o f discourse to  achieve end results.
Consequently, w h ils t i t  w ou ld  be fo o lish  to  deny d ia t cu ltu ra l theo iy , and its  
concern w ith  ris k  perceptions and socia l patterns and relationships is s ign ifican t to  an 
understanding o f ris k  and the environm ent, i t  is w ise to  recognize tha t cu ltu ra l filte rs
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vary according to  in d iv id u a l perspectives, and the am ount and type o f cu ltu ra l filte rs  
used in  re la tion  to  the mass m edia should be determ ined by the in d iv id u a l, no t by the 
researcher.
O p e r a t io n a l  P r o b le m s
The ris k  therm ostat hypothesis is  a usefu l means o f  understanding w h y  m edia vio lence 
is a popula r le isure a c tiv ity , but, as Adam s (1995, p.15) states, i t  is  a ‘conceptual m odel, 
no t an operational one.’ Th is hypothesis distinguishes between pos itive  and negative 
responses to  m edia vio lence, i t  places emphasis on the in d iv id u a l and, s ign ifican tly , 
h igh ligh ts  the fact tha t people manage risk -ta k in g  activ ities, and tha t each person's 
propensity to  take risks varies fio m  one in d iv id u a l to  another. H ow ever, researchers 
should be a le rt to  operational problem s w ith  th is  hypothesis, and m o d ify  i t  accordingly.
For exam ple, there are tw o  problem s in  app ly ing th is  hypothesis to  the 
processes o f v ie w in g  m edia v io lence. F irs tly , the ris k  therm ostat is  concerned w ith  risk - 
tak ing  behaviour; i f  i t  is  applied to  m edia vio lence then th is  is also defined as a risk - 
tak ing  a c tiv ity . I t  is  ce rta in ly  the case tha t anti-vio lence cam paign groups, the m edia 
and p o litic ia n s  perceive m edia vio lence as a m odernization risk , bu t th is  im plies tha t 
m edia vio lence is  a product tha t can measured fo r side-effects, ju s t lik e  m easuring the 
side-effects o f car* p o llu tio n , w hen th is  is c lea rly  no t the case. W hat is m ore, the term  
‘r is k ’ im p lies vu ln e ra b ility  and the p o ss ib ility  o f harm . Once again, th is  certa in ly  
defines the alleged effects o f m edia vio lence, as anti-vio lence cam paign groups and 
effects researchers w o u ld  have us believe, bu t i t  has little  to  do w ith  the actual responses 
to  m edia vio lence by consumers them selves. A s the next chapters w ill reveal,
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ind iv id u a ls  respond to  m edia vio lence in  com plex and dynam ic w ays; they are fa r from  
vulnerable (fo r examples o f research tha t supports th is  see Schlesinger et a l., 1992; 
Buckingham , 1996; H ill,  1997).
I t  is  im portan t to  make the d is tin c tio n  tha t w ith  m edia v io lence, vu ln e ra b ility , 
harm , danger, aggression are a ll em otions w h ich  are fic tio n a lize d , w h ich  are, as N oe l 
C a iio ll (1990, p .79) w ou ld  argue, concerned w ith  ‘the thought theory o f  the em otional 
responses to  fic tio n s ’ . T h is means tha t view ers o f a v io le n t m ovie, fo r exam ple, are 
entertained by the though t o f  vu ln e ra b ility , danger, o r harm , no t b y  the actual 
experience itse lf. C a rro ll (1990, p .80) explains:
Standing on a precip ice, though in  no w ay precariously, one m igh t fle e tin g ly  
entertain the thought o f  fa llin g  over the edge. C om m only, th is  can be 
accom panied b y  a sudden c h ill o r a trem or w h ich  is brought about, I  subm it, not 
b y  our b e lie f tha t w e are about to  fa ll over the edge o f the precip ice, bu t by our* 
thought o f  fa llin g ... W e are n o t frigh tened by the event o f  our th in k in g  o f 
fa llin g , bu t b y  the content o f  our* thought o f  fa llin g  - perhaps the m ental image 
o f  p lum m eting through space.
In  a sim ilar' w ay, w atch ing  a v io le n t m ovie  invo lves the though t o f  v io lence, no t the 
re a lity  o f  v io lence; w e are frightened, o r th rille d , by the content o f  our thoughts, no t the 
event o f rea l v io lence in  the v ie w in g  envir onm ent.
T h is poses some prob lem  in  the app lica tion o f ris k  theory to  the mass m edia. 
Adam s (1997, p. 19) has attem pted to  d iffe ren tia te  between ‘d ire c tly  perceived risks, 
risks perceived through science, and v irtu a l risks ’ . W atch ing te le v is io n  is a ‘v irtu a l 
r is k ’ . Scientists cannot agree about the effects o f w atch ing te lev is ion , because any 
attem pt to  measur e responses to  representations o f  vio lence fa il to  take in to  account tha t 
m edia vio lence is im aginary. Adam s (1997, p. 19) w rites: ‘V irtu a l risks are products o f 
the im ag ina tion  tha t w o rk  upon the im ag ina tion ’ . Th is means tha t the v irtu a l ris k  o f
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w atch ing film  and te lev is ion  program m es w h ich  contain vio lence is o ffse t by the v irtu a l 
rew ard o f  stim u la ting  the im agination . One w ay people choose to  excite th e ir 
im ag ina tion  is b y  w atch ing film s  lik e  Natural Born Killers (O live r Stone, 1994).
Thus, the d e fin itio n  o f m edia vio lence as a ‘v irtu a l r is k ’ is  one means o f 
incorpora ting  the d is tin c tly  fic tio n a l nature o f responses to  th is  perceived risk-tak ing  
a c tiv ity . V irtu a l ris k  can sym bolize the rea l, fo r exam ple m any film s  and te lev is ion  
program m es depict vio lence in  a rea lis tic  m anner and view ers' responses re fle c t th is , but 
i t  can also sym bolize the illu so ry . Consumers o f m edia v io lence manage ris k  because 
they understand tha t it  is  no t rea l; they balance th e ir behaviour in  favour o f a propensity 
to  take risks because these are risks to  the im agination , no t to  the rea l w o rld . The kinds 
o f rewards to  be gained fio m  consum ing m edia vio lence, such as feelings o f 
excitem ent, challenges to  the im agination , opportun ities fo r socia l c ritic ism , are 
w eighed against the ‘ dangers’ , fo r exam ple, an increase in  fee lings o f  fear or unease, or 
the p o ss ib ility  o f  nightm ares. A n y  decision to  consume m edia v io lence is based on an 
ind iv id u a l's  perception o f  the pos itive  and negative. Those ind iv idua ls  w ho decide to  
consume m edia vio lence are those w ho fee l they can manage th is  risk . Indeed, part o f 
the pleasure to  be gained fio m  consum ing m edia vio lence is in  m anaging responses to  
fic tio n a l vio lence.
The second prob lem  in  app ly ing the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis to  the process o f 
consum ing m edia vio lence  is tha t in d iv id u a l perceptions o f ris k  are d iffic u lt to  quantify. 
Adam s (1995, p.25) argues: ‘S c ie n tific  uncerta in ty about the physica l w o rld , the 
phenom enon o f ris k  com pensation, and the in teractive  nature o f  ris k  a ll render 
in d iv id u a l events inheren tly  uncerta in .’ U n like  Beck (1992) o r W ildavsky (1991), 
Adam s does no t consider tha t long  runn ing  debates about ris k  can be resolved by 
science. In  the fin a l chapter o f Risk, Adam s (1995, pp.197-215) discusses the pressure
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on a ris k  theoris t to  suggest better ways o f  m anaging risk , to  have the answer. Adam s is 
quite rig h t to  resist th is  pressure because, as he points out, in d iv id u a l responses to  risk  
are inheren tly  uncertain, and i f  ‘people do no t w ish  to  be safer, i f  they do no t reduce the 
settings o f th e ir ris k  therm ostats, they w ill frustrate the e ffo rts  o f  ris k  managers w ho 
seek to  make them  safer than they w ish  to  be’ (Adam s, 1995, p .211). Th is seems to  be 
good advice w hen considering the unresolvable nature o f  the m edia vio lence debate, as 
defined by the ris k  argum ent
H ow ever, the results o f research by R obbins et a l. (1996) and M arris  et al. 
(1997), discussed earlie r in  th is  chapter, suggest tha t despite the d iffic u ltie s  o f 
m easuring attitudes to  risk , there are ways o f understanding perceptions o f risk , and the 
in te rna l assessments people m ake w hen they consume m edia vio lence. A n y  research in  
m edia v io lence should emphasize in d iv id u a l responses to  v irtu a l risk . A s recent 
research (S lov ic , 1992; S lov ic  et al. 1995; D urant, 1997; O 'R iordan, 1997) has 
suggested, there are ‘ system atic "m ism atches" between expert and la y  ris k  assessments’ 
and u n til we understand w hat the la y  perspective is, these ‘m ism atches’ w ill continue to  
take place. W hat is needed is a s h ift fio m  sc ien tific  analysis o f  ris k  to  a m ore 
socio log ica l understanding o f risk , in  a ll its  varied  form s. T ra d itio n a lly , w hen social 
scientists have sought to  understand in d iv id u a l feelings and perceptions they have 
turned to  qua lita tive  research m ethods. Q ua lita tive  research o ffe rs a means to  a id  an 
understanding o f  in d iv id u a l ris k  management. Q ua lita tive  research does no t preclude an 
acknow ledgem ent o f  the sc ie n tific  elusiveness o f risk , bu t i t  does a llo w  fo r fu rthe r 
know ledge o f ris k  perception.
T w o years a fter pub lish ing  Risk, Adam s offers a m ore o p tim is tic  approach to  
researching risk . He w rites (1997, p. 19):
I l l
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Debates about BSE, g loba l w arm ing  and asteroid defences are debates about the 
fu tu re , w h ich  does no t exist except in  our im aginations. They are debates to  
w h ich  scientists have m uch to  contribute, bu t no t ones tha t can be le ft to  
scientists alone. A n  understanding o f the d iffe re n t ways in  w h ich  people tend to  
respond to  uncerta in ty cannot settle arguments. I t  does o ffe r the prospect o f 
m ore coherent debate am ong those w ith  a stake in  such issues.
I t  is  exactly th is  need to  acknow ledge Hie sign ificance o f in d iv id u a l responses to  m edia 
v io lence tha t is the key to  engendering a m ore coherent debate about th is  em otive 
subject. Q ua lita tive  research is  one means o f  attem pting to  do th is , and the next chapter 
w ill focus on recent research w h ich  o ffe rs some illu m in a tin g  find ings w ith  regal'd to  
how  and w h y  ch ild ren  and adults choose to  engage w ith  the v irtu a l risks o f m edia 
vio lence.
N o te s
1 The model was originally devised by Gerald Wilde in 1976. It has been modified by Adams (1995, p.14).
2 The four myths o f nature are: nature capricious; nature perverse; nature benign; nature ephemeral. The four 
myths o f human nature are: the fatalists; the hierarchist; the individualist; the egalitarian (cited in Adams, 
1995, pp.34-5).
3 Adams charts the death by accident and violence in over 31 countries between 1900-1975, and his statistics 
are based on standardized mortality ratios. War's and natural disasters were taken into consideration (Adams, 
1995, p.60).
4 The ‘psychometric paradigm’ concerns ‘cognitive maps’ o f risks and hazards and was developed by Slovic 
et al. (1980. 1985). This paradigm identified expert and lay people's perspectives o f risk, but failed to allow 
for the fact that not everyone w ill respond to risk in the same way. Mariis et al. (1997, pp. 1-4) argue that
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cultural theory can aid an understanding o f social issues and relationships. Then* research attempts to utilize 
both frameworks.
5 For further discussion o f this see Adams (1995, pp.7-9).
6 Research by Fischoff et al. (1981) attempted to distinguish between voluntary and involuntary risk, and 
found that people were far more prepared to accept levels o f risk from activities that are voluntary.
7 A ll quotes taken from an advertising leaflet for the NVALA, 1996.
8 See Table 6.4 in Mairis et al (1997) (no page number given). In two samples, respondents with single 
cultural bias were 22 and 42 respectively, whilst respondents with mixed cultural bias were 60 and 80 
respectively.
9 See the unpublished article ‘Investing in Film ’ (Barker and Brooks, 1997) which is a brief introduction to 
recent empirical research in audiences o f action movies.
7Audience Research and Risk
T h is chapter aim s to  lin k  the ris k  therm ostat hypothesis w ith  new  audience 
research. W atch ing film s  o r te lev is ion  program m es w h ich  conta in scenes o f vio lence is 
a risk -ta k in g  a c tiv ity . The risks invo lved  are no t real risks, but ‘v irtu a l risks ’ (Adam s, 
1997, p. 19) w h ich  are part o f our im agination . I t  is  p recise ly because the v irtu a l risks o f 
m edia vio lence are located in  our im ag ina tion  tha t trad itiona l audience research w h ich  
focuses on m easuring audience behaviour is unable to  explore the var ie ty  o f responses 
to  m edia vio lence. I t  is  through ta lk in g  to  ch ild ren  and adults tha t we can begin to  
understand risk -tak ing  behaviour in  re la tion  to  m edia violence.
There has been a great deal o f current research in  the ethnography o f  m edia 
consum ption (M oores, 1993). Indeed, in  Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies 
D avid  M o rle y  com plains about the po p u la rity  o f ethnographic research and cautions 
researchers to  be aware tha t ‘the account w h ich  the ethnographer can g ive m ust be 
conscious o f  its  ow n p a rtia lity , incom pleteness and structured gaps’ (M o rley , 1992, 
p. 186). H ow ever, despite these m isg iv ings M o rle y  feels tha t ta lk in g  to  people about 
m edia consum ption is  s till the m ost e ffective  m ethod o f  understanding v iew er response. 
He w rites (1992, p.181):
...should you w ish  to  understand w hat I  am doing, it  w o u ld  probab ly be as w e ll 
to  ask me. I  m ay w e ll, o f course, lie  to  you or otherw ise m isrepresent m y 
thoughts o r fee lings, fo r any num ber o f purposes, bu t at least, th rough m y verbal 
responses, you w ill begin to  get some access to  the k in d  o f language, the crite ria  
o f d is tin c tio n  and the types o f categorisations through w h ich  I  construct m y
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(conscious) world. Without these clues m y  television viewing (or other 
behaviour) will necessarily remain the m o r e  opaque.
Therefore, bearing in m i n d  that n o research, whether qualitative or quantitative, can 
offer the ‘truth’ with regard to viewing practices, this chapter will examine new, 
ethnographic audience research because, as Moores (1993, p.l) claims: ‘critical 
ethnographic practice best equips us to m a p  out the media's varied uses and meanings 
for particular social subjects in particular cultural contexts’.
T h e  types of n e w  research I want to explore are qualitative and quantitative 
studies that concentrate o n  understanding children's and adults' responses to media 
violence. There is not time, here, to offer an exhaustive overview of such current 
research, and for the purposes of e c o n o m y  I will focus o n studies b y  Bu c ki n gh a m 
(1996), Schlesinger et al. (1992), Kieran et al. (1997), and Hargrave (1996) because 
these studies best exemplify the parallels between n e w  audience research and theories 
of risk.1 W h a t  these studies will reveal is that n e w  audience research has begun to 
address the processes of watching media violence from the point of view of risk. This is 
an important point because risk theorists and media analysts have been working in two 
distinct fields and are unaware of the existence of such parallels. For the purposes of 
this chapter, the similarities between Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis and this 
grounded research in media consumption suggests that perceptions of risk can be 
related to viewers' propensity to cons u me  media violence. W h a t  w e  shall find is that the 
factors associated with the risk thermostat hypothesis, such as variation in risk-taking 
behaviour from one individual to another, an awareness of the rewards and the 
perceived dangers of certain types of risks, and the significance of personal experience
of accident losses in relation to perceptions of risk, are apparent in n e w  ethnographic 
audience research.
Such findings will clarify and modify Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis, which, 
as A d a m s  (1995, p. 15) states in Risk, is an ‘impressionistic, conceptual model, not an 
operational one’. In association with the theory of risk compensation, the theory of the 
social amplification and attenuation of risk (Kasperson, Renn, et al., 1988; Kasperson, 
1992) will prove of particular interest in broadening our understanding of the social 
context in which people m a n a g e  risk. B y  re-reading current audience research w e  can 
reveal n e w  w a y s  of understanding the complexity of response to media violence, 
situating such micro-processes of analysis in relation to the macro-processes of 
environmentalism and the politicization of risk.
C h ild r e n ’s  R e s p o n s e s  to  M e d ia  V io le n c e
A  great deal of research has been conducted into the alleged side effects of 
media violence and its potential h a r m  to children. T h e N e w s o n  Report, ‘Video Violence 
and the Protection of Children’ (1994), the H o m e  Affairs Committee report on ‘Video 
Violence and Y o u n g  Offenders’ (1994), and the Parliamentary All Party Family and 
Child Protection Group ( P A P F C P G )  report on ‘Violence, Pornography and the M e d i a ’ 
all concern themselves with what are perceived to be the most vulnerable victims of the 
risks of media violence.
T h e  majority of research associated with these parliamentary reports considers 
young television viewers to be passive and in need of protection and supervision fiom
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adults (see Ballow and Hill, 1985; Cantor and Hoffher, 1990 amongst others).2 
However, the w o r k  of ethnographic researchers such as Palmer (1986), H o d g e  and 
Tripp (1986) and B u c k i n g h a m  (1993a, 1993b, 1996) helped change the nature of 
research in children's viewing practices. M o o r e s  (1993, p.56) comments:
In keeping with the aims and intentions of audience ethnography, they have 
concentrated on  children's active engagements with T V  and hied to dispel the 
m y t h  of the ‘square-eyed’ juvenile - endeavouring to comprehend programmes 
and viewing practices fiom the child's o w n  perspective.
I want to look at two studies, one conducted b y the Broadcasting Standards Council 
( n o w  Commission) (BSC, 1996) and the other conducted b y  David B u ck i ng h am  
(1996), in association with the B S C ,  in s o m e  detail. Both of these studies, to different 
degrees, reveal that children have then o w n  individual risk thermostats, and, contrary to 
research which suggests that children must be protected fiom media violence, have a 
high propensity to m a n a g e  then o w n  risk-taking behaviour- in relation to media 
violence.
(Young Peop le and  the M ed iay
H i e  Broadcasting Standards C om mission (BSC) is a statutory body which 
monitors die portr ayal of violence, sex, and taste and decency in television, radio, and 
satellite and cable services.3 ‘H i e  commission works as an advisory body, monitoring 
die content of broadcasting, considering audience complaints and reporting o n public 
opinion, which it tests b y m e a n s  of independent research.’4 Research Wor ki n g Paper
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13, Young People and the Media uses quantitative and qualitative research to examine 
they w a y  adolescents perceive the role of the media within society.
T h e  introduction to Young People and the Media cites an article b y  the D aily 
M ail about ‘T V  Tearaways’.5 T h e  article reports the findings of a research study which 
claims that ‘television viewing is closely associated with corrosive and self-defeating 
behaviour b y  youngsters’ (Hargrave, 1996, p.3). Considering the title of the report, The 
Socio-psychological Profile o f the Teenage Television Addict, it is not surprising that 
such results were found: to call a teenager w h o  likes to watch television an ‘addict’ 
automatically implies that watching television is negative and socially unacceptable.6 
T h e  media coverage of this report highlights the context for the B S C s  research in 
you n g people's perceptions of die media, which, as Hargrave (1996, p.3) herself points 
out, arises fiom the public's concern about television's negative influences on young 
people.
This popular perception of teenagers as ‘T V  Tearaways’ has an effect o n  the 
w a y  youn g  people themselves perceive television consumption, particularly the 
consumption of media violence. T h e  results of the BSC's research s h o w  that adolescents 
perceive media violence to be potentially harmful. For example, w h e n  asked if they felt 
violence o n  T V  encourages violence, 5 8 %  of the sample group agreed (Hargrave, 1996, 
p.56). T h e  teenagers in tins study also shared the popular anxiety diat it is young 
children that ar e most vulnerable to the perceived negative effects of media violence: as 
m a n y  as 8 8 %  of respondents feared young children might try and imitate dangerous 
behaviour tiiey s a w  on  T V  (Hargrave, 1996, pp.54, 55). And, echoing the type of ‘T V  
Tearaway’ press coverage of media consumption and rising crime rates that Hargrave 
(1996, p.83) cited at the start of this study, 6 0 %  of the respondents felt that there w a s
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m o r e  violence o n the streets because of high levels of violence o n  T V  and videos 
(Hargrave, 1996, p.55).
W h a t  these figures tell us is that children are very aware of the dominant 
discourses on media violence, and that watching media violence is perceived to be a 
negative risk-taking activity. This is further validated by  the fact that the teenagers in 
this study wished to regulate and control the potential side-effects of media violence; 
6 3 %  of the respondents thought that no sex or violence should be s h o w n  before the 
9 . 0 0p m  Watershed (Hargrave, 1996, p.52), and 8 7 %  thought that censorship w a s  
necessary to protect children younger than themselves (Hargrave, 1996, p.51).
However, the key factor to highlight here is that these teenagers are fearful of 
the perceived negative effects of media violence o n  other people, not themselves. Thus, 
although 8 7 %  of the respondents believed in censorship, this regulation w a s  acceptable 
precisely because it protects children younger than themselves. Similarly, although 
respondents accepted the principle of the 9.00pm watershed, Hargrave (1996, p.52) 
notes that ‘the majority of these respondents went to bed after 9 . 0 0 p m ’. A n d  w h e n  
asked if the ‘18’ rating for movies should be disallowed, 7 5 %  agreed with this 
statement (Hargrave, 1996, p.53). Such results directly contradict the perception of 
media violence discussed in the previous paragraph.
W h e n  one turns to the amount of media violence which the respondents actually 
watch, the figures reveal that these teenagers are regular* consumers of this type of 
programme. For example, 6 6 %  of the sample regularly watch violent material, and 4 4 %  
regularly watch such material with fiiends, which suggests that the virtual risks of 
media violence can be part of a social event (Hargrave, 1996, p.42). W h a t  is more, 
watching violence can be entertaining. W h e n  asked if violence in films can be too gory 
to enjoy, 5 6 %  disagreed with this statement (Hargrave, 1996, p.43). Teenagers regularly
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choose the genres of horror, action movies and thrillers w h e n  they go to the cinema or 
hire a video, although c o m e d y  is also a popular choice (Halloran and Gray, 1996, 
p.133).7 W h e n  it com e s to a popular and notoriously violent film such as Pulp Fiction 
(Quentin Tarantino, 1994) 5 3 %  of the respondents had already seen the film, and 1 7 %  
wou ld  like to see it in the future (Hargrave, 1996, p.83).8
T h e  point I wish to m a k e  is that teenagers do engage in this risk-taking activity 
because they see the rewards to be gained fiom these types of virtual risks. O n e  of the 
central aspects of Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis is that everyone is a risk-taker and 
that everyone's propensity to take risks varies ‘fiom one individual to another, fiom one 
group to another, fiom one culture to another’ (Adams, 1995, p. 15). W e  can see fiom 
this research that not all teenagers like to watch violence. E a c h  of the respondents has 
then* o w n  risk thermostat, and s o m e  teenagers have their thermostat set higher than 
others. This helps to explain w h y  the figures for the consumption of media violence 
varied in this study, not just fiom individual to individual, but in relation to age, gender, 
and genre.
For example, 5 8 %  of 15 and 16 year olds in the sample had already seen Pulp 
Fiction, whereas only 2 3 %  of 10 to 12 year olds claimed to have seen the film, and 5 2 %  
of 10 to 12 year olds claimed they weren't interested in seeing the film at all (Hargrave, 
1996, p.84). This tells us that Pulp Fiction is not popular with younger children, and if 
w e  look at examples of other ‘18’ rated movies, w e  can see that young children have 
then* risk thermostats set m u c h  lower than 15 and 16 year old adolescents. For example, 
3 8 %  of 15 and 16 year* olds had already seen Reservoir Dogs (Quentin Tarantino,
1992), 3 7 %  wanted to see it, and only 2 5 %  showed no interest in seeing the movie at 
all. hi contrast, 1 8 %  of 10 to 12 year olds claimed to have seen die film, 2 5 %  wanted to 
see it, and as m a n y  as 5 6 %  s h o w e d  n o interest in watching Reservoir Dogs (Hargrave,
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1996, p. 84) at all. Thus, although a good proportion of the sample s h o w e d  an interest in 
‘18’ rated films like Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction, and Natural Born K illers (Oliver 
Stone, 1994), there w a s  still a substantial amount of the respondents w h o  s h ow e d no 
interest at all, and this w a s  m o r e  apparent in younger children.
It could be argued, as Hargrave (1996, p.84) does, that this is because younger 
children cannot easily access ‘18’ rated films, and also that these films in particular are 
marketed at an older age bracket, thus making t he m  less appealing to 10 and 12 year* 
olds.9 However, whilst both these factors are significant, it is also the case that these 
films represent a type of virtual risk that younger children are simply not as interested in 
as adolescents. A Nightmare on Elm  Street ( W e s  Craven, 1984) is also an ‘18’ rated 
film, but the percentage of childr en w h o  have either seen the film, or express a desire to 
see this film could be expected to be higher than those figures cited for Pulp Fiction. 
Tire fact that A Nightmare on Elm  Street spawned so m a n y  different types of children's 
merchandise aimed at a younger age bracket, for example, a Freddy Krueger pillow 
case, or face mask, woul d  suggest that a cross reference with other research would be 
fruitful.10 David B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, pp.95-138) has s h o w n  that w h e n  researchers talk 
to children about watching media violence they focus on tire genre of honor, and it is 
particularly you n g children w h o  s h o w  a keen interest in such films and the special 
effects they produce. B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, pp.98-99) explains this as follows:
Particularly a m o n g  younger children, honor films clearly possessed 
considerable ‘adult’ status, and there w a s  a great deal to be gained fiom 
claiming to have seen th e m  - even if one had only heard about t h e m  fiom older 
children, or merely seen a trailer. This m u c h  w a s  apparent fiom the excited 
whispering and exchange of looks that often accompanied the initial mention of 
such films. Yet fiom their retellings of honor narratives, it w a s  clear that a 
n u m b e r  of six-year-olds had in fact seen and in s o m e  cases actively enjoyed 
such films. M o s t  children w h o  had developed a taste for the genre at least 
claimed to have begun their viewing at ar o und the age of eight or nine.
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T h e  reason w h y  younger childr en do express m o r e  of an interest in hono r  films such as 
A Nightmare on Elm  Stt'eet than violent movies such as Pulp Fiction m a y  suggest w h y  
different age groups set their* risk thermostats at different levels. A Nightmare on Elm  
Street contains the kinds of virtual risks that are reliant o n  special effects and are 
consequently m o r e  simple and visual in nature; Pulp Fiction contains virtual risks that 
are reliant on characterisation, dialogue and direction and are thus m o r e  complex, and 
m o r e  psychological in nature. W h a t  is more, these types of virtual risks are part of 
particular* genres and emphasise different levels of modality: a representation of a 
violent act in A Nightmare on Elm  Street wou ld  be far* less real, and far* m o r e  playful 
than a representation of violence in Pulp Fiction. This is an issue I will return to later.
Percep tions o f R isk
This re-reading of the results of the findings in Young People and the Media 
indicates that levels of risk are significant to h o w  and w h y  youn g  people choose to 
watch certain types of media violence. However, levels of risk-taking behaviour are 
also dependent o n  perceptions of risk. For example, Hargrave notes that those childr en 
w h o  perceived watching television violence to be harmful were less likely to express a 
desire to see c 18’ rated films in the first place, whatever their gender, or age bracket. 
She writes (1996, p.85):
Those w h o  agreed ‘Violence o n  television and videos encourages violence’ 
were less likely to say that they wanted to see any of the (‘18’ rated) films 
Indeed those respondents w h o  felt that televisual violence w a s  in any w a y  
negative were far less likely to choose violent films even if they had achieved
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cult status - a further argument that the adolescent regulated his or her o w n  
viewing.
This c o m m e n t  helps to validate Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis and his claim that 
perceptions of risk influence h o w  an individual chooses to m a n a g e  risk (Adams, 1995, 
p. 19). Here, those teenagers w h o  chose to watch/not watch a violent film such as Pulp 
Fiction, based their decision o n  then individual perception of this movie.
T o  ban teenagers fiom seeing ‘18’ rated films would not m e a n  that they would 
stop engaging in risk-taking activities. Hargrave (1996, p.85) touches on this point 
w h e n  she says: ‘Those respondents w h o  had agreed with the statement "There's not 
m u c h  on T V  or radio for people like m e ” were m or e  likely to express an interest in the 
list of ‘18’rated films they were s h o w n ’. Hargrave hypothesises that films with violence 
and excitement provide exactly the type of interest these teenagers do not feel is 
available on  mainstream television. If this is the case, Adams' theoiy of risk 
compensation is significant. Risk compensation me an s  that as soon as a risky activity is 
m a d e  safer, people alter their behaviour accordingly (Adams, 1995, pp. 113-157). These 
teenagers feel that mainstream television and radio has been modified to fit in with the 
concept of ‘family entertainment’, i.e. entertainment that is zero-risk (see Chapter six). 
However, ‘18’ rated films give these teenagers the opportunity to engage in the virtual, 
risks of media violence. Thus, even though the ‘18’ rating is there precisely to stop 
young people fiom engaging in this perceived risk-taking activity, a good percentage of 
these respondents compensated for this restriction by watching what is, in theoiy, 
forbidden material. Given the fact that in this sample 7 5 %  of teenagers thought there 
shouldn't even be an ‘18’ rating (Hargrave, 1996, p.53), Adams' theoiy of risk
compensation can be seen to be highly prevalent amongst teenagers and their choice of 
media.
W h a t  w e  can see already from this brief discussion of Young People and the 
Media is that Adams' theoiy of the risk thermostat and risk compensation is validated 
b y  an independent study in media consumption. Th e  evidence here suggests that the risk 
thermostat is dependent o n  age and peer pressure as well as individual taste, and that 
media coverage of ‘T V  Tearaways’ and the alleged side effects of watching media 
violence do influence teenagers' o w n  understanding of this activity. However, this does 
not stop teenagers from actually consuming media violence. T h e  next study that I want 
to examine will help further illuminate w h y  this is the case.
*M o vin g  Im ages9
This study is quite different from Young People and the Media (Hargrave, 
1996). F r o m  the outset David B u c k i n g h a m  acknowledges in Moving Images: 
Understanding Children’s Em otional Responses to Television that children like taking 
risks, and that children understand and engage in risk m a n a g e m e n t  w h e n  they watch 
media violence. B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, p.l) begins b y  describing his o w n  son's negotiation 
of risk:
B e tween the ages of two  and four*, m y  older son Nathan w a s  terrified b y  the 
character of Big Bird in Sesame Street. W h e n  Big Bird appeared, he would 
leave the r o o m  or turn off the set; and once he had mastered the remote control, 
he wo u ld  rapidly skip past Sesame Street adamant in his refusal to watch it...
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E v e n  at the age of two, Buckingham's son is managing his perception of risk; b y  the age 
of six, Nathan watches the hospital drama Casualty, and n o w  his risk thermostat can be 
seen to be set a little higher - characters dying in Casualty pose no  problem to Nathan 
because he recognises that it isn't real, it's ‘only tomato ketchup’ (Buckingham, 1996, 
p.2). B u c k i n g h a m  uses this anecdote as an example of the w a y s  in which children have 
complex emotional responses to television which cannot be simply labelled positive or 
negative. H e  explains:
M a n y  people - including children - actively choose to watch or read things that 
they k n o w  will upset or frighten them: and the sadness or fear* is often 
inseparable from the pleasure. Texts that generate such ‘negative’ emotions m a y  
also enable us to understand and deal with real-life anxieties and concerns. 
Because children are relatively powerless in our1 society, childhood is a period 
that is permeated with insecurity. Children are bound to be drawn to texts that 
speak to their fear* of loss and abandonment, of disgrace and humiliation, and 
offer t h e m  w ay s  of coming to terms with them...To dramatise such insecurities 
in a fictional form m a y  provide comparatively ‘safe’ opportunities for children 
to learn to cope with them.
Thus, B u c k i n g h a m  is aware that people, including young children, take part in risk- 
taking activities because they perceive benefits to this experience. T h e y  m a y  feel 
sadness or fear, but they also feel pleasure, and this pleasure is part of a learning 
process. B uc k i n g h a m  sees such risks as ‘"safe" opportunities’ to explore what w e  fear* 
the most. These risks are safe because they are not real; they are dramatised in a 
fictional form.
Although B u c k i n g h a m  does not use the term risk, he is in fact talking about 
exactly the s ame type of negotiation and m an a ge m en t  of experience that John A d a m s  
concerns himself with in relation to the risk thermostat hypothesis. A d a m s  (1995, p. 14) 
claims everyone has a propensity to take risks, but ‘this propensity varies fiom one
individual to another’, and, most importantly, people balance then behaviour: 
‘individual risk-taking decisions represent a balancing act in which perceptions of risk 
are weighed against propensity to take risks’ (Adams, 1995, p.15). T h e  children in 
Buckingham's study discuss h o w  individual risk-taking behaviour* is part of a balancing 
act, where a desire to watch horror films is weighed against a fear of the consequences 
of this risk-taking activity. B u c k i n g h a m  talks of children calculating the risks and 
rewards of viewing horror. H e  explains: ‘W a s  it worth running the risk of being scared - 
or, m o r e  accurately, of experiencing something that went beyond your ability to cope - 
in the hope of gaining s o m e  m o r e  intense pleasure?’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.l 14). For 
s o m e  children, this w a s  a risk they did not wish to take: ‘M a n y  children reported h o w  
they w ou l d leave the r o o m  or turn off the T V  w h e n  things got too hard to handle’ 
(Buckingham, 1996, p.l 14). However, for others, specifically horror fans, Bu c ki n gh a m 
(1996, pp.l 14-5) notes ‘this risk w a s  ultimately worth it’. Here w e  can see children 
managing risk, and for those w h o  see the benefits of watching honor, their perception 
of this risk as positive outweighs then* knowledge of the negative side to watching 
honor, i.e. the process of fear.
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L o c a l Com m unities
In relation to Kasperson, R e n n  et al. (1988) and the theory of the social 
amplification of risk, it is possible to see direct connections between the children w h o  
are familial* with and enjoy the genre of honor, and the concept of a local community. 
In contrast to the social amplification of risk at national levels which I discussed in
Chapter three, communities can experience risk attenuation at a local level because they 
can perceive the benefits to a local risk - a nuclear plant, for example, is a veiy real risk 
to the local community, but at the s a m e  time it offers employment and economic 
incentives to its workforce and their families (Kasperson, 1992, p. 174). This attenuation 
of risk takes place because, as Kasperson (1992, p. 174) explains: ‘the economic benefits 
associated with the risky activity (act) as a significant impediment to the emergence of 
negative responses and activism at the local level.’11
Children and adults w h o  enjoy watching horror movies are part of a sub culture, 
linked b y  taste and consumer choice. E v e n  though they m a y  live around the world, they 
share a taste for a specific type of entertainment, and this taste in horror leads to the 
forming of a sub culture, built o n shared knowledge, and perpetuated b y  magazines, 
fanzines, w e b  sites, festivals, and of course b y  social interaction, at home, at school and 
at work, hi this sense, the w a y  in which Kasperson, R e n n  et al. (1988) conceive of local 
and national or global communities can help us to understand the w a y  in which people 
w h o  are part of a sub culture take on aspects of a ‘local co mm u ni t y’; in other words, 
such consumers wish to attenuate the ‘risks’ of media violence. Thus, horror fans are 
prepared to take the risk of being scaled, or ‘not being able to cope’ (Buckingham, 
1996a, p.l 14) because they recognise the intense pleasure to be gained fiom responding 
to honor: in fact, they attenuate the negative aspects of hon o r and amplify the 
pleasurable rewards to be gained from this risk-taking activity. T h e y  do not see the risks 
of hon o r as a ‘burden to society’ (Kasperson, 1992, p. 161), but rather as a benefit to a 
sub culture w h o  shares this specific experience of risk.
Other children (and adults) w h o  do not like horror to the s a me  degree can be 
seen to reject this sub culture, or localised community; they do not perceive the benefits 
to such a risk-taking activity and they therefore amplify the perceived danger of
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watching horror. Such non-consumers, or partial consumers of horror can be seen to be 
part of a larger culture, or social community. Kasperson (1992, p. 161) explains this 
w h e n  he mak es  the point: ‘the social amplification of risk refers to the cultural, social, 
and individual structures and processes that shape the societal experience with risk.’ 
This shaping of the societal experience of risk serves to enlarge the ‘risk burden to 
society’ (Kasperson, 1992, p. 161). Non-consumers of honor share a social fear of the 
perceived danger of this product, and this fear helps to activate the secondary processes 
that are part of the social amplification of risk. Such secondary processes include: 
enduring mental perceptions of h o n or  fans as ‘sick’, and ‘juvenile’, and ‘stigmatised’ 
b y  their taste for violence. There can be political and social pressure to change this 
climate of violence and social disorder, in the form of protest groups and media 
generated moral panics about ‘video nasties’. This can lead to changes in risk 
monitoring and regulation, in the form of n e w  and am e n d e d  proposals for censoring and 
controlling media violence (see the Video Recordings Act, 1984, and the Criminal 
Justice Act, 1994); and repercussions on other technologies and social institutions, in 
the form of the public and political concern about computer ga m es  and the internet, and 
in a lack of trust in such regulatory bodies as the B B F C .  A s  Kasperson (1992, p.160) 
points out: ‘T h e  concept of the social amplification of risk is...dynamic, taking into 
account the continuing learning and social interactions resulting fiom social experience 
with risk’, and as such there is a ‘ripple’ effect which spreads the social amplification of 
risk to other locations and future generations. This can be seen most clearly in the w a v e  
of moral panics that have accompanied the ‘video nasties’ scare, and the Child's Play 3 
controversy in Britain, an issue that w a s  discussed in Chapter three.
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A n d  what are die benefits of watching h o n  or movies? hi his study B u ck i ng h am  
shows that children like ho no r  films because they clearly aren't real. In an illuminating 
discussion of Child's Play 3 (Jack Bender, 1993), B u c k i n gh a m talks about modality and 
the significance of our perception and judgement of realism in relation to horror. Earlier 
in this section I discussed the difference between levels of risk and levels of realism. If 
younger children, in Young People and the Media (Hargrave, 1996) did not seem 
interested in the types of virtual risks in Pulp Fiction, a film that is part of the genre of 
crime, I suggested that hon o r is a genre which would appeal to their imagination 
because the types of virtual risks in hono r  are often deliberately unrealistic and playful 
in nature. In Moving Images, children talk of the implausibility of the killer doll in 
Child's Play 3. I want to consider s o m e  of the children's responses to questions of 
modality in hon o r films because this helps to highlight h o w  children m a n a g e  risk, and 
w h y  risk m a n a g e m e n t  is part of the pleasures of watching media violence.
O n e  boy, Steven, aged 15, finds Chucky, the ‘evil’ doll in Child’s Play 3 
s om e wh a t comical: ‘It's like a little, like a cartoon thing / it m a k es  m e  laugh’, and other 
children c o m m e n t  o n  the special effects used in the film and its deliberate use of 
humour. This is one me t ho d  of managing risk: Steven questions the modality of the 
film, emphasising the fact that it isn't real, and focusing o n  the specific features of the 
film, the special effects, or the humour, that help to substantiate this. However, two 
younger children, Carol and Alison, aged 12, utilise different methods of managing 
then perception of risk. Carol comments:
M a n a g i n g  Risks
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I used to play with dolls and stuff, and it w a s  about a doll coming to life and he 
w a s  really evil, so I used to have, it did scare m e  a bit I suppose 'cause I used to 
have bad dreams, that m y  dolls c a m e  to life and they were really evil and they 
were trying to kill me. But I suppose any young girl that watched it and they 
played with dolls, they'd probably have the same nightmares. But it didn't scare 
me. It wouldn't scare m e  now. I've seen the other two, they don't scare me.
B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, p.44) explains: ‘Carol attempts to disclaim her fears, both locating 
t h e m well in die past, and by  generalising t h e m ’. This can be seen in die w a y  that she 
emphasises diat she ‘used to play with dolls’, and that ‘any you ng  girl’ woul d  be 
frightened b y  Chucky. Despite that fact that she explains in s o m e  detail w h y  the film 
scared her, Carol then stresses that ‘it didn't really scare m e ’, even taking die trouble to 
watch the other tw o films in the sa m e series (Buckingham, 1996, p.44). However, 
another girl, Alison, displays a different reaction. She ‘reflects a desire to see and not 
look’ revealing ‘a dynamic but ambiguous relationship between distress and delight' 
(Buckingham, 1996, p.44). Alison explains: ‘I sit there with m y  hands over m y  eyes just 
peeking out, which is really, I k n o w  it's really stupid because you can still see, but I just 
feel safe...I have to hide m y  eyes, but I still watch it all with m y  eyes covered’ 
(Buckingham, 1996, p.44).
W h a t  these examples reveal is that in this study younger children s h o w  a greater 
fear of the virtual risks in Child’s Play 3 than older teenagers. W h a t  is significant is that 
both young girls respond to this fear b y  managing their perception of risk. H ie y  are 
clearly aware that the film is not real, and they are clearly frightened b y  it; this is part of 
the pleasure of watching Child's Play 3, and this is the reason w h y  both girls returned to 
watch more: the fact that they can m a n a g e  their perception of risk m e a n s  that they are 
capable of adjusting the setting on then* risk thermostats, and diis is part of the reward to 
be gained fiom this type of risk-taking activity.
There are two points to be m a d e  here. T h e  first is that perceptions of risk-taking 
activities in relation to media violence are influenced b y  perceptions of modality. For 
m a n y  children in Buckingham's study, Child's Play 3 is comical; ‘the film appeals to 
discourage the viewer from "taking it too seriously"’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.37), and 
this is in part dependent o n  the type of genre that the film belongs to. Children w h o  are 
familiar with the genre of horror will k n o w  what to expect and k n o w  w h e n  a film is 
self-consciously parodying elements of the genre. However, for m a n y  adults, including 
the Honourable Mi* Justice Moreland, the film appears shockingly real. This is w h y  
Justice Moreland linked the film with the murder of James Bulger: elements of the film, 
in his view, appeared very similar to the real-life killing of a young child (see 
Buckingham, 1996, p.22; Barker, 1997a, pp. 17-19). Thus, the virtual risk of Child's 
Play 3 is perceived to be a real risk b y  other m e m b e r s  of the dominant culture. T o  
children, it is a humorous film; to adults a dangerous risk to the safety of the 
community. This m e an s  that w h e n  w e  apply Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis, or 
ICasperson's theory of the social amplification and attenuation of risk to media violence, 
w e  must take into account the fact that genre and perceptions of modality are also 
significant to people's understanding of risk. For consumers of hon o r films, what is 
perceived to be entertaining and unrealistic can be perceived by  others, outside this sub 
culture, or local community, to be hazardous and far too realistic for the safety for the 
com mu n it y  as a whole.
T h e  second point is that children (and adults) take pleasure fiom adjusting the 
setting of their risk thermostat w h e n  they watch media violence. Alison talked about 
feeling ‘safe’ (Buckingham, 1996, p. 115) and the m o re  she felt safe peeking through 
her fingers, the m o r e  she wanted to continue taking risks. For Buckingham, just as for 
A d a m s  (1997, p.19) and Noel Carroll (1990, p.80) these risks are not real. A n d  it is
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because these risks are not real that children like to watch a genre that deals with 
‘social, sexual and physical taboos’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.l 16). T h e y  can test tiieir 
response to these taboos, and adjust the setting of their risk thermostat safe in the 
knowledge that these are virtual risks to the imagination.
B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, p.Ill) refers to Carroll and his theoiy of meta-response, 
which is that viewers ‘indulge in a self-satisfied belief that they are capable of 
withstanding such heavy doses of shock and disgust’, and this creates a ‘self-conscious 
pleasure in one's ability to cope with such experiences’ (Buckingham, 1996, p.lll).12 
Here is one of Buckingham's participants talking about such a self-conscious awareness 
of levels of risk: ‘Y o u  have to be a person that, like, doesn't care and just wants to watch 
anything, doesn't care what happens, they want to see the end of it’ (Buckingham, 1996, 
p.l 11). This process of testing responses to media violence is part of managing risk, and 
in this case, the m o r e  one can raise the temperature of the risk thermostat, the m o r e  one 
can ‘see the end of it’, both in terms of the film, and in relation to individual thresholds 
for risk.
S o c ia l Contexts
Buckingham's study m a ke s  the distinction that ‘the social context of viewing is 
clearly a key factor in the pleasure of horror’ (Buckingham, 1996, p. 109). Children 
often talk of group viewing and describe their o w n  responses in relation to others, often 
amplifying then response, i.e. screaming, or attenuating then response, i.e. laughing, 
depending o n w h o  is in the r o o m  with t h e m  at the time. This m e a n s  that risk-taking 
behaviour is part of a social activity, and these children set their risk thermostats lower 
or higher depending on  w h o  they watch a film with at a given time. For children, being
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able to watch a honor film is part of growing up. This type of risk-taking behaviour 
serves to indicate h o w  ‘adult’ children can be. In this study, peers or older siblings 
offered ‘instruction in coping strategies’ (Buckingham, 1996, p. 109); s o m e  m o c k e d  
those w h o  were unable to cope with their fear, whilst others reminded those younger 
than themselves that the risks were not real. A s  with the BSC's study (Hargrave, 1996), 
these children were fearful of the negative effects of violence on  younger children, on 
‘other people’, and this in turn enabled these risk-takers to appear knowledgeable and 
capable of coping with high levels of violence.
T h e  point is that the benefits of this type of risk-taking behaviour are bound up 
with perceptions of individual and social environments. O n  the one hand, these risk- 
takers define their behaviour in relation to others, and gauge then response accordingly. 
However, these sa m e risk-takers see other people as m o r e  vulnerable, and less capable 
of managing risk in a safe manner. Here, it is the factor of age that signifies this 
distinction; but in terms of adult viewers of media violence, age, gender and social class 
operate as factors in people's perception of ‘other’ people w h o  cannot m a n a g e  risk (see 
Gauntlett, 1995, Barker and Petley, 1997).
This contradiction highlights the public/private divide of the acceptability of 
risk-taking behaviour. For children w h o  like to watch honor films, there is little risk in 
engaging in this activity. T h e y  themselves k n o w  this because they have not experienced 
the type of ‘accident losses’ feared by  the community as a whole. However, o n  the 
other hand, these children believe that there is a perceived danger to watching media 
violence for other children, younger than themselves. Thus, every time a child adjusts 
then risk thermostat to a higher level, they are consciously taking a step a w a y  fiom 
childhood and towards a perception of adult behaviour. T h e y  attenuate then o w n  
perception of risk, but amplify then perception of risk in relation to other children w h o
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are younger and m o r e  vulnerable than themselves. This attenuation and amplification 
can in turn be seen to affect their role in the public/private domain. Being a honor fan 
celebrates individual risk-taking behaviour and the rewards to be gained fiom this 
experience: these rewards can be shared with other m e m b e r s  of the s a me  sub culture; 
being fearful of the perceived danger of honor films o n  younger, m o r e  vulnerable 
viewers re-affirms one's position within the community as a whole: the perceived 
danger can be shared with eveiyone.
This is a good example of Kasperson's concept of the layering of risk processes 
(Kasperson, 1992, p. 173). Kasperson m a y  talk about this in relation to the media and 
geographical communities, but the w a y  that these children discuss their o w n  and other 
people's perceptions of risk is most certainly part of a complex layering of individual 
and social experience of risk. B u c k i n g h a m  (1996, p.312) attempts to consider this w h e n  
he claims: ‘w e  need to regard (emotional responses) as forms of social action, which are 
used to achieve particular social purposes.’ However, the political and social 
construction of risk and environmentalism should direct us to a m o r e  concrete 
understanding of what types of social action, and what kinds of social purposes people 
have in m i n d  w h e n  they balance individual risk-taking activities in relation to social 
perceptions of safety in the community. In the next section, I want to look at h o w  adults 
m a n a g e  risk in relation to media violence, and h o w  they adopt both individual and 
social positions that are part of a complex layering of perceptions and experience of 
risk.
2 0 0
A d u lt  R e s p o n s e s  to  M e d ia  V io le n c e
2 0 1
Earlier in this chapter I discussed h o w  anti-violence campaign groups and media 
coverage have focused o n  what are perceived to be the most vulnerable victims of the 
hazardous effects of media violence: children. This has meant that the majority of 
audience research in the ‘effects’ of media violence has concentrated on children (see 
B u c k i n g h a m  and Allerton, 1996; Gauntlett, 1995). Research into adult responses to 
media violence has not been as prominent, or as eagerly received b y  the press. W h a t  is 
more, research which attempts to examine audience response to media violence from a 
‘critical ethnographic perspective’ (Moores, 1993, p. 140) has not been forthcoming.
Traditionally, audience research has assumed that ‘"watching television" is a 
one-dimensional activity which has equivalent meaning for all w h o  perform it’ (Morley, 
1992, p. 176). This assumption of television audiences ensured that two types of 
research dominated the field for s o m e  time. T h e  first, audience measurement, relied 
solely on head-counting. A s  A n g  (1991) has argued, ‘television watching is a complex 
and variable m o d e  of behaviour, characteristically interwoven with other, simultaneous 
activities’ (cited in Morley, 1992, p.177). This mea n s that attempting to measure 
audience response from a binary opposition of watching/not watching simply does not 
take into account that television audiences are engaged in multi-dimensional activities. 
T h e  second, ‘effects’ studies, has been well documented in Chapter two, but here w e  
can see that the mistaken assumption that television audiences can be measured has also 
ensured that attempts to understand responses to media violence have tr aditionally been 
dominated b y  resear ch into aggression, using the ‘hypothesis that the viewing of acts of
aggression or violence on  the television screen causes people...to act in similar w a y s ’ 
(Gauntlett, 1995, p.2).
M o r e  sensitive research methods into audience research have begun to pave the 
w a y  for a greater understanding of the complexity of response to media violence. 
Notably, research b y  Gunter (1987) Gunter and W o b e r  (1988), Morrison and 
M a c G r e g o r  (1993), Hill (1997), Schlesinger, Dobash, Do b a s h  and W e a v e r  (1992), and 
Kieran, Morrison and Svennevig (1997) have used qualitative and quantitative methods 
to understand people's attitudes and responses to media violence: such research goes 
beyond the ‘effects’ tradition in search of h o w  and w h y  people respond in a variety of 
different and often contradictory w a y s  to representations of violence, hi this chapter, I 
wish to focus on  two studies in particular. T h e  first, Women Viewing Violence is a study 
in gender and the media, and Schlesinger et al. (1992) consider h o w  experience of real 
violence m a y  effect responses to fictional violence. T h e  second, Regulating for 
Changing Values assesses public attitudes to media regulation in a rapidly changing 
social environment. Both studies use quantitative and qualitative research, and both 
were funded by the B S C . 13
W om en V iew ing  V io len ce9
Women Viewing Violence is an interesting study in h o w  w o m e n  respond to 
fictional and factual representations of violence. Schlesinger et al. divided then sample 
group into half and monitored h o w  w o m e n  with experience of violence compared, or 
differed fiom w o m e n  without experience of violence in relation to watching media 
violence.14 For the purposes of this study, Women Viewing Violence is a good example 
of A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis. T h e  w o m e n  used in this study are not identified
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as active consumers of media violence, and based o n their responses to the selected 
programmes used in this study, it is possible to suggest that these w o m e n  are not regular* 
consumers of media violence at all. T h e  par ticipants have set their risk thermostats at a 
l o w  level, and do not perceive media violence as entertaining in any way. For example, 
w h e n  discussing the film The Accused (Jonathan Kaplan, 1988) Schlesinger et al. 
(1992, pp.138-139) note: ‘almost universal were sentiments of repulsion, distress and 
shock...it w a s  simply not acceptable to define the experience of seeing The Accused as 
pleasurable’. Thus, I w o u l d  suggest that the title to this book is misleading: the w o m e n  
w h o  view violence in this study are almost wholly w o m e n  w h o  w o ul d  not normally 
perceive any benefits to watching media violence: they are therefore w o m e n  w h o  view 
violence as disturbing, perceive it as dangerous, and ar e not active consumers of media 
violence.
This is, of cour se, c o m p o u n d e d  b y  the fact that the centr al purpose of this study 
is to examine whether w o m e n  with experience of violence perceive media violence in 
different w a y s  to w o m e n  without experience of violence. If w e  refer to Adams' risk 
thermostat hypothesis, it is possible to see that ‘perceptions of risk are influenced by  
experience of accident losses’ (Adams, 1995, p. 15). T h e  w o m e n  in this study have 
experience of real violence, one of the ‘accident losses’ associated with certain types of 
risk-taking activities, and to be a victim of the risk of real violence ensur es, as A d a m s  
suggests, tliat an individual's perception of risk will alter, and this negative experience 
will affect an individual’s risk-taking behaviour.
T h e  results of this study do suggest that experience of violence is a key factor in 
an individual's understanding of media violence (see also Docherty, 1990; Hargrave,
1993). Schlesinger et al. (1992, pp. 168-169) explain this as follows:
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In particular, w o m e n  w h o  have experienced violence expect the depiction of 
violence against w o m e n  to be realistic, in order that it m a y  best serve as an 
educational purpose for the general public and for violent m e n  w h o  thereby 
might better understand the experiences of w o m e n  w h o  are abused...It is not 
surprising, therefore, that, for the most part, the violence o n  television portrayed 
in this study w a s  not defined as ‘exciting’ or ‘entertaining’, but rather as 
‘educational’ or ‘relevant’, while at the same time as ‘disturbing’ and 
sometimes ‘offensive’. Thus the importance attributed to what w a s  viewed w a s  
not in terms of pleasure, escape or fantasy but in terms of relevance and social 
importance.
There are a n u m b e r  of points to be m a d e  here. T h e  first is that the risk thermostat can be 
seen to be in operation; for the w o m e n  in this study, personal experience of the negative 
effects of risk has meant that media violence is not exciting or entertaining for these 
viewers. However, these w o m e n  do see s o m e  benefit to screening media violence, but it 
is h o w  they define ‘benefit’ that is significant: benefit is perceived in an educational 
sense. It is the benefits of social instruction, not entertainment or excitement, that 
concerns these w o m e n  because it is only through education that programmes which 
contain violence can justify their existence as a fonn of social communication. Thus, as 
Schlesinger et al. (1992, p. 169) point out, it is the social importance of media violence 
that becomes the most significant factor in the acceptability of media violence; and 
individual viewers see their response as part of wider social concerns about levels of 
real violence: they do not perceive any personal benefits to this form of entertainment.
T h e  issue of social concern and perceived danger is something I will deal with 
in a moment. W h a t  I want to consider at this point is the type of programmes which 
were used in this study, as this has s o m e  impact on women's perceptions of the risks 
and hazards associated with media violence. There were four* programmes used: 
Crimewatch UK, EastEnders, Closing Ranks and the film The Accused}5 All of the 
programmes s h o w n  are concerned with violence against w o m e n ,  and s h o w  w o m e n  as
victims at risk to physical violence.16 T h e  research team considered other types of 
media violence, for example Friday the 13th (Sean S. Cunningham, 1980), or Blue 
Velvet (David Lynch, 1987), but these programmes were either thought to be too 
unrealistic (Friday the 13th has a female protagonist w h o  commits multiple murder), or 
too disturbing (Blue Velvet w a s  thought to be offensive) (Schlesinger et al., 1992, 
pp. 19-20). W h a t  can be seen is that all of the chosen programmes are concerned with 
realistic depictions of violence against w o m e n ;  all of these programmes aim to treat 
violence in a serious mann e r and provide s o m e  form of educational relevance to the 
depiction of violence. For the w o m e n  in this study, watching these programmes and 
discussing their responses to depictions of violence would only serve to emphasise 
perceptions of w o m e n  as victims at risk to physical violence, and perceptions of 
violence, both real and fictional, as serious and disturbing, with dramatic consequences 
for the victim of a violent act.
This is a very specific type of media violence that is being viewed and discussed 
in this study. Whilst such research is both important and revealing about gender and 
violence and the mass media, it wo u ld  have been interesting to have seen h o w  w o m e n  
w o u l d  respond to a film such Terminator 2: Judgment Day (James Cameron, 1991) in 
which a female protagonist protects herself against violent male characters. This film 
aims to depict violence as unrealistic and entertaining; and, significantly, it aims to 
s h o w  that w o m e n  are not always victims in the face of risks: w o m e n  take risks too. 
W h a t  this m e a n s  is that, in relation to Adams' risk thermostat hypothesis, Women 
Viewing Violence only considers half of the balancing act performed by  everyone w h o  
manages risk. Here, these w o m e n  are encouraged b y  the researchers to focus on 
‘accidents’ and ‘perceived danger’. It is significant that despite this negative perception 
of risk, the w o m e n  in this study, including those w h o  had experienced violence, did not
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wish to ban such risk-taking activity. However, they did wish to control and regulate the 
screening of media violence so that any ‘benefits’, or ‘rewards’ to watching screen 
violence w o u l d have social, rather than individual importance.
S o c ia l Contexts
W i t h  only half the risk thermostat in operation, the w o m e n  in this study do not 
present a balanced picture of viewing media violence. W h a t  they do represent is a social 
group that amplifies risk, and clearly differentiates between risk-takers, and victims of 
risk along gender lines. Given the evidence to support the case m a d e  by  Schlesinger et 
al. (1992, p.9) that w o m e n  are subject to rape, sexual assault and domestic abuse far 
m o r e  than men, and that the media presents a distorted view of w o m e n ,  sexuality and 
violence, it is not surprising to find that w o m e n  fear violence b y  men, and perceive m e n  
as the risk-takers and w o m e n  and children as victims at risk. However, in terms of 
crime rates overall, w o m e n  are less likely to b e c o m e  victims of physical violence than 
men. Schlesinger et al. (1992, p. 169) point out that this disparity between real crime and 
fear of crime can be linked to people's perceptions of the severity of a crime: being a 
victim of r a n d o m  sheet violence does not have the same repercussions as being a victim 
of rape b y a stranger. This attitude towards gender and acts of violence can seen in the 
media and press coverage of rape, child abuse and sexual assault. Soothill and W a l b y  
(1991, p.156) comment: ‘the regular presence of a sex fiend o n  the front page is a 
p h e n o m e n o n ’ of our media reportage of violence, and this only selves to strengthen fear 
of violence towards w o m e n  b y  m e n  in the community as a whole.
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H i e  w o m e n  in this study were asked to watch programmes that emphasised this 
particular fear of crime and, not surprisingly, the results s ho w ed  that w o m e n  distrust 
male responses to media violence. A s  with the two earlier studies discussed so far, 
these participants did not see themselves as subject to the negative effects of media 
violence; their fear w a s  directed towards male viewers w h o  m a y  be encouraged to copy 
the violent behaviour they see on television. This is most clearly seen w h e n  the w o m e n  
discussed the acceptability of the rape scene in The Accused. For these w o m e n ,  the 
scene w a s  acceptable only if it w a s  s h o w n  in an educational context; they did not trust 
male viewers to respond to this scene in the cinema or h o m e  environment precisely 
because they believed male viewers m a y  find it entertaining and m a y  be encouraged to 
rape w o m e n  (Schlesinger et al., 1992, p. 154). Thus, a distrust in male viewers of media 
violence and an amplification of fear of real violence mea n s that for these w o m e n ,  the 
risk of violence is everywhere, it is part of their social environment. This explains w h y  
these w o m e n ,  both with and without experience of violence, do not see reactions to 
media violence o n an individual scale; they do not see themselves as part of a sub 
culture which enjoys this type of entertainment. Instead, they see themselves as part of a 
larger c o m mu n it y  and they share the fears of the ‘central co m m u n i t y ’ (Douglas, 1992, 
p. 107) with regard to media violence and real violence.
Schlesinger et al. (1992, p. 170) propose three findings in relation to their study:
W o m e n ' s  concern that televised violence against w o m e n  be portrayed 
realistically and sensitively and used to effect s o m e  positive outcome, such as 
public education or crime prevention; women's fear that such portrayals m a y  
have negative effects u p o n  w o m e n  and children; and indications by  w o m e n  that 
there are s o m e  limits beyond which the portrayal of violence against w o m e n  
should not go.
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If w e  interpret those findings in relation to the risk thermostat hypothesis and the theory 
of the social amplification of risk, it is possible to see that for n o n  risk-takers w h o s e risk 
thermostats are set at a low level in relation to media violence, the risks of media 
violence are amplified, and the desire to control and regulate both the product and the 
consumer of such a product is directly linked to a strong distrust of risk managers, in 
this instance m e n  and the entertainment industry. Th e  w o m e n  in this study perceive 
themselves as better managers of risk, despite the fact that they are not risk-takers and 
can see n o reason w h y  s o m e  people m a y  choose to watch media violence for the 
purposes of entertainment. T h e y  trust then o w n  responses to media violence, and 
emphasise the shared c o m m u n a l  experience of w o m a n h o o d  and fear of violence; they 
distrust ‘other’ male responses to media violence, and the entertainment industry.
Thus, in this study, the w o m e n  form perceptions about private risk-taking 
activities which ar e not based on experience of viewing violence but o n  the cultural and 
political construction of risk, i.e. all m e n  are violent and cannot be trusted. Despite the 
fact that these w o m e n  do not regularly watch media violence, they ar e prepared to m a k e  
value judgements and policy recommendations precisely because they share a 
perception of media violence as an environmental hazard. W h a t  w e  can see fiom this is 
that the public and the private ar e closely linked to levels of individual risk-taking. For 
these participants then* private response is very m u c h  linked to public attitudes to media 
violence, and h o w  viewers respond to media violence can n o w  be seen to be a political, 
social and moral environmental issue. H i e  last study to be examined in this chapter is a 
research project that considers what the public have to say about the role of the media in 
society, and in particular* the significance of regulation to consumer choice and 
television viewing.
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‘R e g u la tin g fo r C hang ing  V alu es’
Kieran, Morrison and Svennevig (1997, p.7), in Research Work i ng  Paper 1, 
Regulating fo r Changing Values, set out to examine h o w  people perceive ‘the cultural 
and moral issues that broadcasting presents’. Using a large, representative sample of 
British respondents (aged 16 or over), this study employs a mixture of qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques. T h e  two national surveys involved 1,062 and 535 
adults respectively, and the focus groups involved fourteen in-depth discussions, with 
respondents fiom the B C 1 / C 2  social grade. T h e  researchers focus o n  social and media 
concerns; concerns about crime; concerns about morality; a decline in individual, moral 
and social values; and a concern about invasion of privacy b y  the media.
R isk  M anagers
O n e  of the interesting issues the study raises in relation to the public and private 
divide is that p r o g r a m m e  makers are certainly not seen as moral or ethical media 
practitioners. Kieran et al. (1997, p.6) write: ‘Programme-makers were believed to be 
willing to flaunt accepted rules of conduct in relation to privacy in order to m a k e  
p r o g r am m es ’. T h e  respondents s a w  themselves as mo r e  likely to m a k e  moral and 
ethical decisions which take into account what is best for society as a whole. Thus, 
Kieran et al. (1997, p. 101) find that: ‘Respondents aspired to tolerance but supported 
m a n a g e m e n t  of the cultur e through regulation. Three out of every four responses b y  the 
majority in the national surveys were concerned with the c o m m o n  rather than individual 
good.’17
It is possible to see that respondents desire regulation and legislation in order to 
keep media practitioners in check. Kieran et al. (1997, p. 119) write: ‘Unregulated 
broadcasting w a s  believed to pose risks to society as a whole...and to the individual.’ 
This is w h y  risk ‘experts’ are trusted b y  the public to help control and regulate the 
entertainment industry: ‘62 per cent said a p r o g r a m m e  should not be s h o w n  if experts 
thought a p r o g r a m m e  with disturbing scenes "might trigger violent behaviour* in a f ew 
unbalanced people’” (Kieran, et al., 1997, p.119).18 Kieran et al. (1997) fail to clarify 
exactly what type of ‘expert’ the public has in m i n d  here. However, it is probable that 
the public have in m i n d  the idea of an ‘expert’ w h o  is professional and objective and 
can be trusted b y  the c om m unity as a whole. H i e  fact that such an expert does not exist 
is not important, what is significant is that the public believe such an expert to be a 
better* ‘risk manager’ than themselves or pr o gr a m m e  makers, even though television 
audiences are probably the best equipped to deal with such an issue precisely because 
they actually watch the progr a m m e s  in question. This is an issue I will return to later.
Despite misgivings about the alleged negative effects of media violence, the 
viewers in this study do not support the banning of such risk-taking behaviour outright, 
but, instead concentrate o n  regulating and controlling such behaviour*. Adams' theory of 
risk compensation, as discussed in the previous chapter, has demonstrated that people 
like to feel safe in order to engage in risk-taking activities. Kieran et al. (1997, pp.80- 
82) note in one of then* key findings that m a n y  people in then* study believed that media 
violence w o u l d  be acceptable if s h o w n  on a pay per view, or satellite channel. If 
viewers were willing to pay for a service, respondents felt that such risk-taking 
behaviour* w o u l d be safer for the c om m unity as a whole. For example, in one discussion 
of the representation of homosexuality o n television, s o m e  participants objected to the 
‘contamination’ of a p r o g r a m m e  (EastEnders) that w a s  widely available to the general
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public (Kieran et al., 1997, p. 5 5). Such a depiction of homosexuality could be s h o w n  on 
a minority channel, but w a s  not acceptable on terrestrial television. O n e  participant 
comments: T f  it's something that's not incorporated into everyday situations then it's 
something that stands apart because it is something that should stand apart’ (Kieran et 
al., 1997, p.55).
T h e  researchers are clearly puzzled b y  this. Th e y  write (1997, p.82):
T h e  entry of direct payment is therefore seen to change not only the public's 
relationship to regulators but also its attitude towards each other as viewers. It is 
almost as if what one did in o ne’s o w n  h o m e  w a s  no body else’s business. W h a t  
people are overlooking here is that, whilst one might pay directly for a service, 
so do other people, thus other h o m e s  are still culturally connected as theirs. It is 
as if the act of payment creates private space which the state or s o m e  other 
agency cannot enter.. .Perhaps ill equipped to m a k e  moral judgements in a 
systematic way, then money, and what that means for access to goods and 
privileges in a consumption society, becomes the judge of what is right.
Quite apart from the lack of specificity -  what does ‘other h o m e s  are still culturally 
connected as theirs’ actually m e a n ?  - Kieran et al., fail to consider the implications of 
pay per view and the issue of media violence. T o  pay for different types of 
entertainment is to open up the notion of what is acceptable risk to incorporate the 
concept of a free market. However, this does not necessarily m e a n  that viewers believe 
that what one does in the private space of one’s o w n  h o m e  is ‘no b od y  else’s business’, 
but rather that these viewers do not want to see certain types of representations available 
to the general public without certain regulation in place. This does not s eem to be 
evidence of an ‘unsystematic’ approach to moral judgements. Table 20 in Regulating 
fo r Changing Values shows that the researchers asked respondents if ‘unedited versions 
of...films should be available for adults to watch if they want to’ (Kieran, et al., 1997, 
p.l 16). 5 1 %  said yes, and w h e n  they were asked: ‘which of these places, in your* view,
could have such films available’ the respondents turned to a list of outlets: the most 
populai* outlets they chose were private film clubs, video rental shops and mail order 
catalogues. Thus, the public perceive other forms of private consumption of media 
violence acceptable, if part of a controlled environment. T h e  point is that, as with the 
children in Young People and the Media, people like to have s o m e  degree of regulation 
and control of ‘risky’ film and television programmes. Pay  per view m e a ns  that certain 
types of media violence are contained and controlled whilst still m a d e  available to the 
public as a whole.
Kieran et al.,(1997, p.32) call this option regarding pay per view an example of 
‘democratisation’, hut it is not clear* what they actually m e a n  b y this term. I have s h o w n  
thr oughout this chapter that there is a complex layering of perceptions of risk by  
viewers of media violence. O n  the one hand people, children and adults, want to 
regulate ‘risk’; they want the social co mm unity to be a safe place. O n  the other hand, 
people like to take risks, and they want to have the option to do so o n an individual and 
localised level. H o w  do viewers w o r k  with these two contradictory beliefs? T h e y  use 
the risk thermostat to balance then* behaviour* and perceptions of risk. People trust then- 
o w n  individual taste with regard to ‘risky’ types of entertainment, but they do not trust 
other people and other institutions to respond to such ‘risky’ entertainment in a safe and 
ethical way.
M a n a g e m e n t  of risk is the key to our* understanding of this; and to contr ol and 
regulate the social context of media violence, whilst allowing for individual freedom of 
choice seems a logical balance to take. This is an example of democratisation at work. 
Without distrust w e  could not have trust. In the final section of this chapter I wou l d like 
to examine the concept of democratisation and pay per view in m o r e  detail.
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D e m o c ra t is a tio n  o f  R is k
Theodore L o w i  (1990, p.30) has s h o w n  in ‘Risks and Rights in the History of 
American Governments’ that risk m an a g e m e n t  has transformed fiom individual 
responsibility of risk, as characterised in the Industrial Revolution, to a social and 
democratic responsibility towards risk. E v e n  though L o w i  is writing about die U S A ,  
where insurance has quite a different meaning and context given die lack of government 
welfare provision, his points about the socialisation of risk and insurance illuminate the 
significance of ‘social costs’ in relation to the ‘social problem’ of media violence in 
America and in Britain. L o w i  (1990, p.30) explains the transformation fiom individual 
responsibility to a socialisation of risk as follows:
T o  summarise, the direction of development (in governmental statutes) was 
fiom individual responsibility to interdependence, fiom individual blame to 
distributional balance, fiom liability to risk, and fiom negligence defined as ‘no 
liability without fault’ to the dropping of negligence altogether in favour of 
ability to pay, spread dirough insurance and tiuough customer mark-up, toward 
the concept of ‘social costs’. All this can be understood as the socialisation of 
risk and the democratisation of the costs of risk taking.
Hius, die development of governmental statutes ensured that, rather than an individual 
being liable for all injuries resulting fiom risk creating activities, responsibility for any 
injuries woul d  lie with whichever ‘party’s carelessness had brought the injury about’ 
(Lowi, 1992, p.27). This meant that risk be c am e  a social issue and as governmental 
statutes m a d e  risk m o r e  of a democratic procedure, the cost of injuries fiom risk
creating activities w a s  spread across the com m un i ty  as a whole. This is what L o w i  calls 
the ‘socialisation of risk’.
T h e  concept of insurance is significant to an understanding of the 
democratisation of risk. L o w i  lists three reasons w h y  this is so. Liability insurance ‘is a 
me ch a n i s m  of risk m a n a g e m e n t ’ and it signifies that ‘risk control and risk taking are 
directly rather than inversely related’ (Lowi, 1990, p.31). Liability insurance helps to 
‘translate moral questions of responsibility into instrumental questions of cost’ (Lowi, 
1990, p.31). A n d  thirdly, liability insurance places emphasis on the larger universe; it 
focuses on past and future injuries so that everyone can help pay for the social cost of 
risk. This is the opposite to risk regulation, which focuses on individual responsibility 
and narrows the universe so that ‘a particular person and set of causes are located’ 
(Lowi, 1990, p.31).
T h e  issue of liability insur ance and the socialisation of risk ar e of significance to 
the debate about media violence and the w a y  in which people respond to this risk-taking 
activity. A s  w e  have seen from the research examined in this chapter, viewers of media 
violence are simultaneously engaged in risk control and risk-taking behaviour*. Viewers 
like to take risks and balance then* behaviour* with regard to what types of violence they 
are prepared to watch, or not watch in film and television programmes, but they will 
only do so if they feel in control of the situation. Thus, w h e n  one teenage girl in Moving 
Images (Buckingham, 1996) says that she likes to watch honor films though her fingers 
she is simultaneously engaged in risk control and risk-taking behaviour*. All of the 
research examined in this chapter supports the case that risk control and risk-taking 
behaviour ar e interlinked, and this is of particular* interest w h e n  w e  consider the role of 
responsibility in relation to risk and media violence. This w ou l d suggest that people are 
responsible for their* o w n  actions w h e n  it comes to the consumption of media violence.
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T h e  question of cost and the socialisation of risk is a m o r e  complicated issue. 
T h e  results of Regulating fo r Changing Values shows that pay per view is one w a y  of 
interpreting the moral responsibility of media violence into a question of cost. This 
takes the emphasis a w a y  from individual blame, and m o r e  toward a question of 
‘distributional balance’ (Lowi, 1990, p.30). O n  the one hand viewers realise that 
individuals have the right to take risks, but o n  the other hand they do not wish such risks 
to jeopardise the safety of the social community. This is w h y  m a n y  viewers of media 
violence hold contradictory views; they are attempting to m a k e  a transition from 
individual responsibility to a m o r e  balanced view of the ‘socialisation of risk’. 
However, there is an ambivalent relationship between individual and social 
responsibility; individual responsibility and the costs, i.e. economic, of watching media 
violence represent one aspect of people's perceptions of media violence; and a desire for 
a larger, m o r e  social control of the costs, i.e. negative effects, of media violence 
represents another.
If viewers choose to support pay per view as an option that will reduce the risks 
of media violence on the comm u ni t y as a whole, then they are choosing to support die 
concept of a free market. Th e  problem is that as the research discussed in this chapter 
has shown, f e w  people will take risks unless certain pre-conditions are m e t  beforehand. 
This m e a n s  that teenagers like to take risks and watch ‘18’ rated movies precisely 
because they feel assured that certain pre-conditions have been met. Teenagers like to 
watch ‘18’ rated movies, but they do not like to k n o w  that ‘other’ children, younger 
than themselves can also watch ‘18’ rated movies. This is w h y  regulation and the 
concept of the socialisation of risk are bodi present in people's understanding of the 
risks of media violence. People want to have the opportunity of watching ‘risky’ 
entertainment, and yet they wish to control w h o  watches and when.
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In fact, the ‘social costs’ of media violence would not be so democratic if pay 
per view were to b e c o m e  a viable option in die future. P a y  per view channels are at die 
m o m e n t  only available to tiiose m e m b e r s  of the public w h o  have a satellite dish or cable 
receiver, and if the example of S k y  Sports is anything to go b y  then w e  can expect pay 
per view channels showing the latest Oliver Stone movie to be rather expensive. T he 
cost of watching the latest heavyweight boxing match on S ky Sports is over ten pounds 
per event, and this is o n  top of the regular monthly payment (currently £34.99 at Cable 
London) for other satellite and cable channels. In a sense, Rupert Murdoch, the media 
m o g u l  behind S k y  Sports, is anticipating that people w h o  like to watch sport do so 
because it is a social activity. This m e a n s  that for people w h o  like to watch horror 
movies, for example, the cost of watching such programmes at h o m e  m a y  have to be 
m e t  b y  a n u m b e r  of hon o r fans. This w ou l d m a k e  pay per view an example of a free 
market where risk-takers cluster together, as part of a sub culture, in order to meet the 
costs of diis type of risk-taking behaviour. This is of course already taking place w h e n  
people rent videos, but to extend this to television viewing w o u l d  place a different 
dynamic on the role of broadcasting and h o m e  entertainment.
T h e  suggestion of pay per view is not an example of liability insurance, but the 
w a y  in which viewers discuss media violence and the links between risk control and 
risk-taking behaviour shares s o m e  similarities with L o w i ’s outline of the basic points of 
interest regarding liability insurance and the development of risk. Certainly, I w ould 
suggest that the w a y  in which anti-violence campaign groups such as C A R E ,  or the 
M C D  lobby for die control and regulation of media violence is m o r e  similar to the 
concept of liability insurance than anything the general public have to say about this 
issue. C A R E  and the M C D  campaign to regulate and reduce existing levels of media 
violence in our society on  the basis tiiat media violence m a y  h a r m  people in the future.
216
Therefore the debate about media violence is a debate about the probability of future 
outcomes. C A R E  and the M C D  would like to see the government take responsibility for 
reducing the probability of the unwanted outcome of media violence. This m a y  not, as 
yet, be an example of liability insurance in action, but it is certainly a step in the 
evolution of risk. L o w i  (1990, p.31) writes that ‘once injury becomes a matter of 
indemnification and insurance and once it is recognised that the larger universe is to be 
preferred for the purpose, the step to govemmentalization of part or all of die 
responsibility - or, underwriting part or all of the risk - is not a very big one at all.’ W e  
can see from the w a y  in which C A R E ,  the M C D ,  or John Grisham (1996) focus o n the 
significance of causal proof as a factor in the debate about the alleged negative ‘effects’ 
of media violence that the m o v e  from proving the negative ‘effects’ of media violence, 
to insuring oneself against s o m e  or all of the negative ‘effects’ of media violence is a 
small step to take. Certainly Oliver Stone (1996) would be wise to take out an insurance 
policy against the likelihood of further litigation. Risk indemnification m a y  m a r k  the 
futur e of media violence.
Perhaps what is m o r e  to the point is the link between risk regulation and the role 
of the government in controlling and managing media violence. T o  allow the 
government to take responsibility for the alleged effects of media violence would m e a n  
that media regulation w o u ld  b e c o m e  far* removed from the individual risk-taker, and 
part of a political and social agenda that has little to do with trust and safety, and m o r e  
to do with p o w e r and control. Previous chapters have s h o w n  that this is exactly where 
the media violence debate is heading. Th e  debate is less and less about people's 
individual practices in relation to risk, and m o r e  to do with the probability of risk and 
the protection of the social c om m unity from the costs of such risks. T h e  V-chip is a 
good example of this. T h e  V-chip is a ‘social cost’ which w e  all must pay for* and yet
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w e  are paying for a risk that does not exist, because risk ‘is a n a m e  w e  give to unwanted 
outcomes’ (Lowi, 1990, p.38).
It is the unwanted outcome of increased violence in our society that fuels the 
campaign for the control and regulation of media violence, and yet of course media 
violence has very little to do with real violence in om society. T h e  real reasons for 
violence are not part of the future, but already present in unemployment, alcohol, poor 
housing and living conditions. T h e  ‘masterframe of environmental discourse’ (Eder, 
1996, p.207) mea ns  that media violence is perceived to be an environmental hazard that 
w e  must take steps to reduce; and yet media violence is not concerned with real risks, 
but virtual risks. It is this regulation of a virtual risk that does not yet exist that is having 
a dramatic effect on our understanding of public and private space. T h e  socialisation of 
risk, and the masterframe of environmental discourse are t w o  factors which have 
initiated a restmctuiing of public space (see Eder, 1996, p.216). hi relation to the virtual 
risks of media violence, it is the private space of our imagination that is being opened 
up to incorporate a public concern for real risks to the environment.
Thus, it can be seen that the democratisation of risk is a hollow concept w h e n  it 
com es  to the issue of media violence. However, risk analysts such as Kasperson et al. 
(1992) and Slovic et al. (1992) have pointed out that the issue of trust and distrust is 
very significant to democratisation and the w a y  in which people choose to m a n a g e  risk. 
A s  w e  have seen fiom the w a y  in which viewers talk about media violence, people trust 
then o w n  responses to media violence, mo r e than they trust politicians or p r o gr a mm e 
makers. In the next chapters I want to consider h o w  individual risk-takers interpret and 
understand media violence, with particular- emphasis on  self-regulation. If w e  cannot 
trust governmental agencies and insurance companies to regulate risk, then let us turn to
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individual response to risk in order to understand h o w  people m a n a g e  risk and media 
violence.
N o te s
1 Other studies which prove interesting to examine are Hagell and Newbum (1994) and Gauntlett (1997).
2 For a very good overview of research into the negative emotional responses to television see Buckingham 
and Allerton (1996b).
3 The Broadcasting Standards Council and the Broadcasting Complaints Commission merged on 1 April 
1997 to become the Broadcasting Standards Commission.
4 This quotation is taken from the front cover of the BSC's complaints bulletin.
5 See the D aily  M ail, September 2nd 1996, cited in Hargrave (1996, p.3).
6 This report by the Revd. Professor L, J, Francis and Professor D, J, James is published by Trinity College, 
Carmarthen, Wales, 1996. Hargrave says that the D aily  M a ils  coverage of this research over emphasized the 
results of the research, see p.3.
7 The BSC report Young People and the Media is compiled as two compatible reports; the first by Hargrave 
(1996), and the second by Halloran and Gray (1996).
8 Pulp Fiction  had its cinematic release in Britain in 1994, and it followed hot on the success of Tarantino's 
first movie Reservoir Dogs which became notorious for its violence (see amongst others Usher, 1992; Sigal, 
1993; Andrew, 1994 for discussion of the extreme violence in these films).
9 T8' rated films used in the study were: Silence o f  the Lambs; Pulp Fiction; Reservoir Dogs; Seven; Natural 
Born K illers; Trainspotting (Hargrave, 1996, p.84).
10 For analysis of the phenomenon of Freddy Krueger and his popularity with younger children see Conrich 
(1997, pp.l 18-131) who suggests that Krueger is a substitute father figure.
11 Kasperson (1992, p.l 14) is talking specifically of field studies into the effects of accidents such as the 
Ginna Nuclear Plant accident (1982); the Gorbleben radioactive accident (1987); the WIPP brine leak (1987- 
88), see Kasperson, 1992, pp.170-174 for more details.
12 For original reference, see Carroll, 1990, p.193 and p.243.
13 Women Viewing Violence was actually funded by the then Broadcasting Standards Council (1992).
14 Just over half of the sample group (52) were identified as having had previous experience of violence. 
There were fourteen viewing groups, and the study took into account national background, ethnicity and class, 
see Schlesinger et al (1992, p.23).
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15 Crimewatch U K  uses drama-documentary techniques, and it reconstructs crimes that have taken place in 
order to appeal to the public to come forward with information pertaining to a case shown on the programme. 
It is followed by Crimewatch U K Update which reports on the public reaction to police appeals for help. 
Programme transmitted on BBC1, November 10th 1987. EastEnders is a British soap opera, popular for its 
realistic treatment of social issues, episode transmitted on BBC!, 18th July 1989. Closing Ranks is a single 
play made for television, transmitted on ITV January 1988. The Accused is a Hollywood film by Jonathan 
Kaplan, 1988, transmitted on BBC1 in January 1992. See Schlesinger et al., 1992, for more details.
16 Crimewatch U K  featured a rape of a women by a stranger; EastEnders involved an ongoing dramatic 
portrayal of domestic violence; Closing Ranks involved issues of domestic violence and police brutality; The 
Accused featured a gang rape of a woman by strangers, and her fight for legal justice. See Schlesinger et al., 
1992, for further details.
17 This quotation is taken from the press release for Regulating fo r  Changing Values, see p.2.
18 See Mairis et al. (1997) for further research in the public trust of environmental experts, and see Chapters 
four and five for further discussion of this issue in relation to the mass media.
8Audience Research: a Case Study
T h e  object of researching responses to viewing violence is to understand w h y  
people choose to watch violent movies and w h y  they respond to violence in particular 
ways. This is a simple objective but nonetheless significant to any study which attempts 
to explore the process of viewing violence. Unless researchers actually talk to 
consumers of violent movies they will not be able to explain the appeal of such movies. 
Consequently, this case study tests certain hypotheses about the process of viewing 
violence b y  conducting qualitative research in this area.1 These hypotheses incorporate 
elements of John A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis, discussed in Chapters six and 
seven, and are concerned with the reactive mechanisms of self-regulation and 
m a n a g e m e n t  of risk in relation to media violence. It is m y  hypothesis that consumers of 
violent movies self-regulate then responses to media violence and this is part of a 
learning process. A s  is c o m m o n  in qualitative research, I soon discovered that the 
nature of participants' insights generated hypotheses as m u c h  as tested them, and in this 
respect the results of the qualitative research proved more rich and diverse than I could 
have hoped for.
David Gauntlett (1995, p. 103) has pointed out in his b o ok  Moving Experiences: 
Understanding Television’s Influences and Effects that listening to the audience goes 
beyond simple surveys and provides valuable research into the uses and interpretations 
of media consumption:
T h e  m o r e  sophisticated, qualitative...research which engages respondents 
with the focus of study, such as television depictions of violence, (is) m o r e  
likely to reveal then* actual feelings, concerns, interpretations and preferences 
about television output, than simple surveys which seek to keep television 
separate from the other questions in respondent's minds.
Thus the models for this research are dra w n from media studies and social psychology, 
not from film theoiy, or psychological ‘effects’ research. Following in the footsteps of 
similar qualitative research studies into viewer response, such as Video Playtim e: The 
Gendering o f a Leisure Technology, A n n  Gray (1992), Video C ritical: Children, the 
Environment and Media Power, David Gauntlett (1997), and Moving Images: 
Understanding Children’s Em otional Responses to Television, and David B u ck i ng h am  
(1996), this study attempts to understand the complex and sophisticated response to 
viewing violence. T h e  focus of this research is the discourses employed b y  active 
consumers of media violence. It is not the aim of this study to find the ‘truth’ about 
media practices, nor is it the aim of this study to focus solely o n  cognitive processes; 
rather, this case study is concerned with h o w  emotional and interpretative strategies are 
used b y  viewers of media violence. It is these strategies that will help us to understand 
risk perception and m a n a g e m e n t  o n  a localised level and it is these strategies that will 
s h o w  h o w  people trust their o w n  responses to media violence rather than the responses 
of politicians and social commentators precisely because they perceive benefits to this 
type of risk-taking behaviour.
T h e  methodology which I have used to analyse the data is that of qualitative 
data analysis. Micro-sociology allows the researcher to focus on individual practices of 
viewing violence and is concerned with micro-levels of analysis and critical 
ethnographic practice (see Morgan, 1988; Moores, 1993): this can be seen most clearly 
in the use of self-contained focus groups as a m e a n s of understanding media usage both
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o n  an individual and contextual level. Qualitative data analysis allows the researcher 
to focus on  language use, and looks for repetition, contradiction and emergent themes in 
the raw data. M y  analysis of the focus group transcripts shows qualitative data analysis 
techniques in action.
D e s ig n in g  th e  F o c u s  G ro u p s
M y  research into viewing violence began as a series of pilot studies, using a 
combination of qualitative and quantitative research methods. Individual interviews 
and questionnaires were completed during a period of six months (January-June, 1995) 
and a total of 70 consumers of violent movies were either interviewed (20) or asked to 
fill in a questionnaire (50). Participants were recruited either b y  poster, direct address 
outside cinemas, or through the snowball technique. Whilst the results fiom these pilot 
studies were relevant to the question of w h y  people choose to watch violent movies, 
both methods of questionnaire response and individual interviews were found lacking. 
For the purposes of this study, questionnaire response woul d  only be useful if 
conducted on a large scale, and as this w a s  not possible, it w a s  thought better to turn to 
other m o r e  self-contained and manageable methods of collecting data. W h a t  is more, 
the purpose of this study is to explore the complex and sophisticated response to 
viewing violence, not attempt to survey a cross section of the general public on their 
viewing tastes. Individual interviews proved a m o r e  successful method; however they 
lacked an interaction of ideas, and over time I c a m e  to recognise this interaction is 
necessary to understanding the process of viewing violence, an activity which is m o r e  
social than individual.2
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Consequently, I chose to conduct self-contained focus groups, as the 
advantage of focus groups is that they provide an opportunity to collect data from group 
interaction (See Morgan, 1988; Krueger, 1988; Greenbaum, 1987).3 This group 
interaction takes the basis of lively and informal conversation which explores specific 
topics and reveals emotional responses and cognitive processes at work. It is this ability 
to register discourses, identify emotional and cognitive positions and generate 
hypotheses which m a k e s focus groups the most productive method of collecting data 
for this research. A s  David L. M o r g a n  states in Focus Groups as Qualitative Research 
(1988, p.25): ‘Focus groups are useful w h e n  it comes to investigating what participants 
think, but they excel at uncovering why participants think as they do.’ T h e  term ‘self- 
contained’ signifies that the results of these focus groups can stand o n  their* own; 
however, this qualitative data can also be incorporated into a lar ger b o d y  of resear ch if 
and w h e n  this should be undertaken.
Therefore, the a im of this study is not to reach statistical conclusions about w h o  
watches violent movies but to test and to develop m y  o w n  hypotheses regarding the 
process of viewing violence. A  triangulation of methods have been used to design this 
study; this is a system of using a n u m b e r  of sources, encour aged within the sociological 
field, particularly in areas of micro-sociology (Denzin, 1978).4 These triangulation 
methods can be seen in the w a y  in which data w a s  generated using three different 
methods: individual interviews; questionnaires; and focused group discussions. Careful 
reference to the pilot questionnaires, interviews and focus groups revealed that self- 
contained focus groups proved to be the most effective methods of generating data for 
the purposes of this research. Further* tr iangulation w a s  used w h e n  collecting data: here, 
taped recordings of the focus group discussions, notes m a d e  b y  the moderator during 
the discussion, and additional notes m a d e  by the assistant moderator* concerning facial
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and body movements, proved helpful in building up a clear and comprehensive 
pictur e of the focus group discussions.
‘N ew  B ru ta lism 9 and  F ilm s  Used in  the Study
This case study focuses on active consumers of violent movies and explores the 
reactive mechanisms of thresholds and self-censorship and tire issue of gender in 
relation to the viewing process. Tlie movies considered in the focus groups are films 
which have been given a theatrical 18 Certificate release, and (in all but one case)5 are 
available o n  video. Three of the target movies (Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction, and 
Natural Born K illers) have been screened on terrestrial television.6
Eight movies were chosen as exemplifying societal/cultural consensus of 
extremely violent films, an important consideration w h e n  considering risk-taking 
behaviour* in relation to media violence, particularly perceptions of risk and the decision 
making processes involved in consuming media violence. These films are:
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Table3: Films used in the study
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F ilm D irector/Year
Reservoir Dogs Quentin Tarantino, 1992
Pulp F iction Quentin Tarantino, 1994
True Romance Tony Scott, 1993
N atura l Born K ille rs Oliver Stone, 1994
Man Bites Dog Belvaux, Bonzel, Poelvoorde, 1992
Henry, P orti'a it o f  a Serial K ille r John McNaughton, 1990 (Prod. 1986)
Bad Lieutenant Abel Ferrara, 1992
K illin g  Zoe Roger Avary, 1994
These films were released in Britain during 1990 to 1995, however, it w a s  the release of 
Reservoir Dogs (Tarantino, 1992) which attracted media interest in what began to be 
described as a ‘n e w  w a v e ’ of violent movies. This prompted the media to discuss the 
target films as extreme, and uncompromising in their depictions of violence on screen. 
W h e n  Reservoir Dogs w a s  released in the U K  in January 1993, journalists and film 
critics highlighted Tarantino's ‘cinema of viscera.’7 Alexander Walker, in the Evening 
Standard, ran an interview with Tarantino, titled: ‘Shooting the D o g s  of G or e ’;8 whilst 
Shaun Usher, in the D aily M ail, wrote a review of Reservoir Dogs titled: ‘Deadly D o g s  
Unleash a Whirlwind of Violence.’9
Consequently, it is the release of Tarantino's first film and the popularity of 
Tarantino's ‘cinema of viscera’ (Dargis, 1994) which fuelled debate regarding 
contemporary violent movies. Quentin Tarantino is involved as director, writer or 
producer in five out of the eight target films: he wrote and directed Reservoir Dogs and
Pulp Fiction; he wrote the screenplay for True Romance; he wrote the original 
script, and subsequent story for Natural Born Killers',; and he w a s  executive producer 
for K illing  Zoe. N o t  surprisingly, it is his reputation as ‘T h e  G u n  G u y ’ which has 
affected societal/cultural consensus of these films. Ephraim Katz describes Tarantino as 
a film maker of ‘blistering, uncompromising dramatic fare’ (1992, p. 1329); the 
Guardian Weekend magazine describes Tarantino as ‘a connoisseur* of cruelty’ (Sigal, 
1993, p.24), whilst Quentin Tarantino himself tells Geoff A n d r e w  (1994, p.26) in Time 
Out. ‘I don't think y o u  can go too far* with violence if what y o u  are doing is right for the 
movie. What's too far*?’
With regard to the three target films Tarantino is not involved with, each of 
these movies have been marketed as extreme and disturbing. Derek M a l c o l m  (1993a) 
describes Man Bites Dog as follows: ‘it m a k e s  Reservoir Dogs look like muzzled 
mongrels’, a quote displayed on the video cover* of this film. Similarly the video cover 
for Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r, which w a s  released not long after Reservoir Dogs 
in 1993, carries the warning: ‘This film contains scenes which m a y  be disturbing to 
s o m e  viewers’ (Electric Pictures, 1993). Bad Lieutenant is described b y  Jonathan 
R o m n e y  (1993, p.34) as a ‘O n e  w a y  ticket to hell’, with even the Sun referring to the 
movie and its star* (Harvey Keitel), w h o  also appears in Reservoir Dogs, as ‘Gore 
Blimey Keitel's Back. ’10
Quite w h y  the Sun could refer to Keitel in such a w a y  must be attributed to the 
cluster of violent movies released at the start of 1993. A  w e e k  after the U K  release date 
of Reservoir Dogs (January 8th 1993), Man Bites Dog w a s  released, and only a few 
w eeks after* that Bad Lieutenant gained its theatrical release (19th February 1993).11 
This prompted journalists to speak of a ‘n e w  w a v e ’ of visceral films which fuelled the 
debate about screen violence. Hence, the D aily Telegraph ran an article, ‘Are These
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Films T o o  Violent?’,12 where it interviewed James F e rm a n  of the British Board of 
Film Classification and asked whether he could be held responsible for releasing such a 
w a v e  of violence. Similarly, an article b y  B. R u b y  Rich in Sight and Sound comments 
on the intense and individualised violence which is a hallmark of these films: she 
describes these movies as a ‘w a v e  of neo-violence’ (Rich, 1992, p.5) specific to the 
1990s. Another journalist, Jim Shelley (1993a, p.7, 1993b, p. 12), refers collectively to 
these films as ‘heralding the arrival of "tire n e w  brutalism"’ twice in two separate 
articles early in 1993.
It is because of the notoriety of these films as uncompromising violent movies 
that I have chosen to use the term ‘n e w  brutalism’ to differentiate these films fiom other 
movies of similar- content.13 “N e w  brutalism” is a term that usefully encapsulates social 
perceptions of media violence as a risk-taking activity; it is new, and therefore part of 
a specifically m o d e m  technological development within the entertainment industry that 
is seen b y  s o m e  as immoral and unethical; and it is brutal, implying that such n e w  
forms of entertainment brutalise innocent viewers. This term, and other related terms, 
therefore ensures that consumers of such movies will be well awar e of the negative and 
‘risky’ connotations that a cc o mpany such films as Reservoir Dogs, or Man Bites Dog. 
W h a t  these movies shar e, in terms of content, is a preoccupation with violence towar ds 
the individual, as opposed to the state, and, in terms of style, the use of realism w h e n  
representing violence. These eight films were chosen to represent a current cultural 
fiend in violent movies. There were m a n y  films that could have been added to the list, 
but it w a s  these eight that served the purpose of prompting par ticipants to discuss w h y  
they choose to watch violent movies that are marketed and discussed as a risk to 
individuals and the social environment as a whole.
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‘V io len tM o vies’ and  ‘D esen sitisatio n ’
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A  note on  the terms ‘violence’ and ‘desensitisation’ is applicable here. T h e  term 
‘violent movies’ is used to refer to societal/cultural consensus of the target films. Care 
w a s  taken in the focus groups not to introduce the terms ‘violent movies’ or 
‘desensitisation’ until participants had done so of their* o w n  accord, lest an air* of 
condemnation derived fiom the term ‘violence’ coupled with ‘desensitisation’ descend 
onto the focus group discussions before they had even begun. A s  societal/cultural 
consensus of the target films and consumers of these films is so overwhelmingly 
negative (see the above section, and Chapter 3 for examples of this), it w a s  only 
practical to allow participants to introduce the terms of reference themselves, as it 
w o ul d  not do for the moderator to appeal* anything other than neutr al in this regar d.
T h e  term ‘violent movies’ with reference to the target films did not prove 
problematic within the discussion groups. Participants appeared comfortable using this 
term, and if they wished to differentiate between different types of fictional violence 
they did so of their o w n  accord. T h e  term ‘desensitisation’ w a s  used o n occasion by 
participants, yet those fe w  participants w h o  chose to use this term were careful to 
qualify what they felt it signified to t h e m  and their* personal experience of viewing 
violence. T h e  reactive mechanisms c o m m o n  to participants' viewing experience deal in 
s o m e  detail with the concept of boundary testing, which is not aligned with the notion 
of ‘desensitisation’, as used b y  the media, but is defined as a term of reference in its 
o w n  right. Here, it is clear* ‘desensitisation’ is being re-defined b y  participants, and it is 
their examination of this phrase which indicates that a separate term of reference should 
be used in order to differentiate between ‘desensitisation’, as used b y  the media, and 
boundary testing, as a m e a n s  of interpreting and responding to violence.14
Consequently, the term 'violent movies’, and other related teims, such as ‘viewing 
violence’, have been adopted in this study in order to accurately reflect the content of 
the discussion groups and participants' response to the target films, hi contrast, the term 
‘desensitisation’ has not been adopted in this study, and the term ‘boundary testing’ has 
been employed in order to accurately reflect participants' response to the viewing 
experience.
C rite ria  and  Recru itm en t
T h e  criteria for selecting participants for the focus group discussions were kept veiy 
simple. T h e  criteria were:
• Participants must be over 18 years old;
• Participants must have seen three or mo r e films on the target list;
• Participants must not be engaged in any research in this field.
These straightforward criteria enabled m e  to recruit current consumers of violent 
movies w h o  did not have a clear agenda, but w h o  did have an active interest in the 
research subject.
M a l e  and female participants were recruited equally in order to ensure that all 
male, all-female and m i xe d  gender focus groups contained a balanced m i x  of 
participants. Tire decision to ensure this balance of focus groups reflects the nature of 
this study which is to examine w h y  people watch violent movies: ‘people’ includes 
male and female consumers, a fact often overlooked w h e n  considering the role of the
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consumer and violent movies. It is one concern of this study to examine whether
# Kthere is any noticeable difference between the w a y  m e n  and w o m e n  view violence.
Recruitment w a s  conducted using the snowball technique, with follow up phone 
calls and letters explaining the nature of the focused discussions. This proved to be 
time-consuming and difficult to achieve, but it did produce a collection of participants 
w h o  were not specifically self-selective, and who, although interested in the research 
subject, w o u ld  not go out of then* w a y  to openly discuss their opinions. Telephone calls 
helped to select participants w h o  fitted these criteria. There were particular* problems 
recruiting female consumers of violent movies, who, although available in theory, were 
difficult to persuade to join the discussions. M a n y  w o m e n  w o u l d  only c o m e  to single 
sex discussions, and if they could not m a k e  the suggested dates, were lost as potential 
participants. Similar* difficulties did not occur w h e n  recruiting male participants, w h o  
exhibited a confidence in choosing to b e c o m e  part of the focus groups that m a n y  female 
participants lacked. T h e  end result reveals a slight gender difference in recruitment, 
with 20 male participants and 16 female participants contributing to the discussions.
Backg rou n d  C h aracte ristics o f Pa rtic ip an ts
T h e  sample used in this research does not constitute a representative survey, and 
consequently macro-sociological patterns, such as class, or ethnicity (with the exception 
of gender, see this chapter, ‘Criteria and Recruitment’), do not feature as part of this 
research. This is because this is a small-scale independent study that is primarily 
interested in a specific type of viewer. Studies such as Women Viewing Violence 
(Schlesinger et al., 1992) m a y  offer a large-scale representative sample of British 
w o m e n ,  but significantly they do not offer* a representative sample of active consumers
231
of media violence. M y  study focuses on  active consumers of media violence rather 
than a representative sample of the British population precisely because its central 
research question concerns h o w  active consumers of media violence respond to this 
leisure activity: to consider h o w  people respond to media violence is not the same thing 
at all. However, certain basic demographic data were collected during the focus group 
discussions and are documented here as a source of information to be used in future 
research in this area.
T h e  C i n e m a  Advertising Association undertakes film profiles that are 
representative samples of the British population and serve to highlight such macro- 
sociological patterns as age, gender and the social background of moviegoers. Tables 
la, lb, and lc in Chapter four- reveal that participants w h o  took part in the focus groups 
share similar* macro-sociological patterns to those outlined in the C A A ' s  representative 
sample. For example, in the C A A  Film Profile the average age of moviegoers w h o  went 
to see Pulp Fiction is between 20 and 34, which corresponds with the average age of 
those participants in the focus groups w h o  went to see Pulp Fiction (See Table lc). 
Similarly, the C A A  Film Profile reveals that although there is s o m e  difference in 
figures between the numbers of male and female participants w h o  went to see this film 
( 6 5 %  and 3 5 %  respectively) the n u m b e r  of female moviegoers still represents a 
substantial amount (see Table la). Although the n um b e r  of female participants in the 
focus groups w h o  s a w  this film is higher that the C A A  survey, this cross reference still 
indicates that female consumers of violent movies are a force to be reckoned with. 
W h e r e  relevant, cross-references will be m a d e  between the C i n e m a  Advertising 
Association's representative sample, and m y  o w n  breakdown of the background 
char acteristics of participants in this study.
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Participants were asked to fill in a short registration form (see Appendix 3). 
Information given in these registration forms provides a useful indicator of participants' 
age, ethnic background, education, cinemas frequented, and magazines/newspapers 
most often read. Other information regarding the target films has been used in the main 
b od y  of this study and will not be repeated here.
Participants were aged between 18 and 50. Th e  most c o m m o n  age bracket w a s  
between 18-30, with 10 participants aged between 18-20, and 16 participants aged 
between 20-30, making a total of 26 participants aged 30 or under taking part in the 
discussions. Only 10 participants were over 30, and only one out of that figure w a s  over 
40. This corresponds with those figures supplied by tire C A A  Film Profile, which 
indicates that the average age of moviegoers for the target films is 18-34 (see Table lc 
for cross-reference). T h e  majority of participants were British (33), with only 3 
participants being of a different ethnic origin (1 Indian, 1 Australian, 1 Chinese).16 All 
participants were educated to G C S E  level/A level standard, with 21 participants having 
finished a technical or vocational course or part of a university course and three 
participants w h o  had completed a post graduate course. Although there is n o  breakdown 
of figur es for the education of moviegoers in the C A A  Profile of the target films, Table 
lb reveals that the target films are m o r e  popular* with the A B C 1  bracket, which includes 
middle class workers, than the C 2 D E  bracket, which includes the working class. Whilst 
this is not offered as substitute information, the class breakdown does offer s o m e  
indication that the target films are m o r e  popular* with middle class (educated) 
moviegoers, although s o m e  films, such as Reservoir Dogs, attract similar* figures from 
both social brackets.
Response to the ‘cinemas most frequented’ question on  the registration form 
w a s  varied, and indicates participants use their* local cinemas as frequently, if not mo r e
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than W e s t  E n d  cinemas. There w a s  no c o m m o n  cinema mentioned, but reference to 
various local and independent cinemas in the L o n d o n  area. Response to which 
newspapers/magazines participants read reveals participants read a variety of 
broadsheet newspapers and magazines, the most c o m m o n  being the Guardian, Empire, 
The Face and Time Out. For a breakdown of these reading figures see Table 6: Reading 
Figures for Popular Newspapers/Magazines.
C onducting the Fo cu s G roups
A  pilot focus group w a s  conducted in order to test the suitability of questions 
and viewing material during the discussion period and to give an indication of time 
requirements and group interaction. Participants in the pilot study were fiom 
R o e h a m p t o n  Institute London. A  series of six focus groups were conducted at The 
Green Door Cafe in London, between N o v e m b e r  to D e c e m b e r  1995. N u m b e r s  of the 
focus groups were kept relatively small, between 4-6, although one focus group did 
include seven participants. T h e  reason w h y  the focus groups contained small numbers 
w a s  to encourage group interaction and in-depth discussion of the process of viewing 
violence. Small groups fostered an intimate atmosphere, and enabled a ll participants to 
reflect and consider then complex and sophisticated response to violent movies. T h e  
success of this study is not dependent on  sample size, but rather on the variety and 
depth of discourse employed. A s  Potter and Wetherell (1988, p.161) point out: ‘If one 
is interested in discursive forms, ten interviews might provide as m u c h  valid 
information as several hundred responses to a structured opinion poll.’ T he  research 
question is h o w  active consumers respond to media violence, and in order to answer
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this question I have concentrated on small scale, informal discussions; these 
discussions generate a variety of linguistic patterns, and it is this variety of patterns that 
provide the rich sour ce of data here, not the amount of participants involved.
T h e  discussions took place on Saturday afternoons in a restaurant hired solely 
for the purposes of this study, and this location w a s  a deliberate choice because I felt it 
w a s  important to provide a neutral, safe environment for participants w h o  were being 
asked to consider a sensitive issue, an issue where the concept of safety is very 
important. Wine, soft drinks and light refreshments were m a d e  available, and once 
again, the decision to provide alcohol w a s  designed in order to relax participants and 
foster a m o r e  social environment. Offering wine in a restaurant seemed a logical step to 
take.
T h e  format for tire focus group discussions w a s  standardised, although, where 
appropriate, allowance w a s  m a d e  for specific issues raised b y  participants in a given 
group. Pilot interviews and focus groups allowed m e  to consider and modify questions 
and to m a k e  sure that the overall organisation of the focused discussion w as 
operational. Discussion w a s  opened with a request for brief biographical information, 
and participants were invited to offer their opinions concerning the target films. Initial 
reactions were followed b y  a m o r e  focused discussion guided b y  a series of questions 
posed b y  myself, acting as moderator (see Appendix I). I used probe and follow-up 
questions to generate variation and diversity in accounting practices, and this led to 
m o r e  informal conversation which m a k e s the interviewer an active participant in the 
focused discussion.
Three cues were used: a list of target films (see Appendix 33), a scene fiom the 
film Reservoir Dogs, and a scene fiom the film Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K iller. Both 
film clips were s h o w n  during the discussion, and timed to coincide with specific
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questions related to these t wo scenes. T h e  two  scenes chosen were: the eye- 
stabbing scene from Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r directed by John McNaughton, 
1990 (produced 1986) (see Hill, 1997, pp.39-50 for mo r e  details) and the ear- 
amputation scene from the film Reservoir Dogs directed b y  Quentin Tarantino, 1992. 
T h e  ear-amputation scene w a s  chosen because it exemplifies an infamous scene of 
extreme violence which challenges notions of acceptability and therefore proves a 
useful visual prompt w h e n  discussing issues of risk and reactive mechanisms of self­
regulation and m a n a g e m e n t  of risk.
T h e  discussions lasted t w o  and a quarter hours. A  short break occurred after the 
screening of the eye-stabbing scene from Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r, 
approximately half w a y  through the discussion, and once again this w a s  designed to 
encourage participants to relax and interact with one another. T h e  question of 
interaction is of particular significance to this study. It w a s  noted b y  myself and the 
assistant moderator that male participants were less likely to express then* thoughts and 
explore the process of viewing violence than female participants. In male-only focus 
groups, stiff b o d y  movements, and an unwillingness to expand o n  responses to 
questions posed by the moderator meant that a great deal of prompting and follow up 
questions were needed to ensure group discussion ran smoothly. In contrast, female- 
only focus groups positively thrived o n group interaction, and very little follow up 
questions were needed to ensure group discussion wa s  relaxed and lively.17
Male-only focus groups proved m o r e  difficult to run. A  mark e d difference could 
be seen w h e n  mix e d gender groups took place and this w a s  because the presence of 
female participants visibly relaxed those male participants present. However, as the 
focus groups progressed it be c a m e  easier to break d o w n  initial barriers, and, through 
experience and observation, provide as open an atmosphere as possible in all focus
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groups. T h e  presence of a male assistant moderator w a s  a significant mea n s of 
relaxing male participants and encouraging infonnal discussion.18 During the breaks, in 
particular, it w a s  noticed that male participants were naturally draw n  to the assistant 
moderator to m a k e  casual conversation, and this proved important in breaking d o w n  
barriers w h e n  discussing self-regulation, which occulted directly after the break.
D ata  C o llection  Instrum ents and  A n a lysis
A s  moderator, I adopted a neutral role and posed the s a m e  questions in each 
group to ensure a systematic protocol. Every necessary step w a s  taken to ensure 
reliability and validity; the s a m e  questions were asked in the s a me  order, the same cues 
were used at the s a m e  time in the discussion, and the s am e  location w a s  used each 
week. Three data collection points were used in an attempt to triangulate the data. These 
data collection points were:
• T h e  moderator;
• T h e  assistant moderator;
• Audio recording equipment.
T h e  data collection points aided an important validity check; b y  the fourth focus group, 
material w a s  found to be substantially repeated b y  participants, and focus groups 5 and 
6 served to document the reliability of participants' observations over a period of time.
E a c h  focus group w a s  fully transcribed. Preliminary readings of transcripts 
assessed emergent themes and useful categories for analysis. Report writing proved a 
useful preliminary stage for analysis of the data, and a short report w a s  m a d e  after each
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focus group w a s  conducted. Similarly, discussions with m y  research supervisors 
and the assistant moderator aided the development of interpretation and analysis of the 
transcripts. A  systematic approach to the presentation of themes has been adopted and 
quotes have been chosen as those best served to represent the range of discourses 
arising in the focus groups.
Participants have not been identified as male or female unless the data analysis 
is directly concerned with gender issues. Quotations are attributed to individual 
participants but the code of reference is anonymous, detailing the n u m b e r  of the group 
m e m b e r  in each focus group, and the n u m b e r  of which focus group this participant 
attended, for example (Participant 1 - FG1). T h e  reason for this anonymity is to best 
represent group c o m m e n t s  as a whole and not to single out individual participants 
unless a specific point is m a d e  regarding an individual's response. T h e  issue of gender is 
only significant at certain stages in the data analysis; to indicate the gender of every 
illustrative quote w o u l d be to highlight this issue unnecessarily, and in certain instances 
bias the study towards the issue of gender w h e n  the first object of this study is to 
examine the processes of viewing violence.
A n  O v e rv ie w  o f  th e  S tu d y
T h e  qualitative research conducted in this study demonstrates that active consumers 
of violent movies possess ‘portfolios of response’. This m ea n s that viewers utilize a 
n u m b e r  of reactive mechanisms and ‘interpretive repertoires’ (Potter and Wetherell, 
1988, p. 156) in order to interpret and emotionally engage with fictional violence. These 
methods include:
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• Situating media violence in a social context;
• Anticipating violent images/scenes;
• Self-regulating fictional violence;
• Testing of established boundaries.
Central to the processes of viewing violence is the context of the viewing event as a 
social activity. This m e a n s  that active consumers of media violence possess a social 
awareness of the risks associated with this type of leisure activity; there is a shared 
social knowledge of types of people w h o  like to watch media violence, and viewers 
gauge their responses according to their perception of other risk-takers as well as their 
o w n  personal experience of risk behaviour'. T h e  social activity of viewing violence and 
the significance of public and private perceptions of risk-taking behaviour will be 
outlined in Chapter nine. Another significant aspect of the processes of viewing 
violence is that viewers test boundaries safe in the knowledge that this is a fictional 
context, separate from then* awareness of real violence in contemporary society. 
Boundary testing is a good example of the risk thermostat hypothesis at work; viewers 
of media violence balance and self-regulate their' risk-taking behaviour* b y managing 
levels of risk. This risk m a n a g e m e n t  is essential to the enjoyment of viewing media 
violence and will be discussed in detail in Chapter ten.
B y  developing ‘portfolios of response’, consumers of violent movies 
demonstr ate h o w  complex and dynamic the processes of viewing violence can be. It is 
possible to constr uct a model of the viewing process, based on the notion of ‘portfolios 
of response’ and risk management. T h e  model of the viewing process and the notion of 
‘portfolios of response’ are discussed in depth in Chapter twelve. T h e  model indicates
that contextual and individual factors form the viewing experience. It is this theory 
of ‘portfolios of response’, and the subsequent model of the viewing process, which 
breaks the circular nature of the ‘effects’ debate so far. Rather than endlessly debating 
whether watching violent movies m a k e s  y o u  violent, let us try to understand the 
complexity of response to the processes of the viewing media violence. Let us explore 
w h y  violent movies are shocking and entertaining.
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N o te s
1 For discussion of qualitative research see Kirk and Miller (1986), Krueger (1988), Morgan (1988).
2 Other research in media studies confirms this. Recent ethnographic work by Gray (1992), Gillespie
(1995), Palmer (1986), and Gauntlett (1997) explores media texts and social relations as a primary 
focus of research.
3 For discussion of qualitative research and focus groups see, Denzin (1970), Giddens (1976), 
Goldman and McDonald (1987), Hughes (1990), Greenbaum (1987), May 1993) amongst others.
4 See Fielding and Fielding (1986) and Denzin (1970).
5 N atura l Born K ille rs  (Oliver Stone, 1994) is still awaiting a video release, despite the fact the 
BBFC has passed this film for its video certificate. After the Dunblane massacre in March 1996, 
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banned.
6 Channel 5 screened N atural Born K illers on November 8d' 1997 (the BBC hold the rights to show 
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earlier BBC2 screened Pulp Fiction  uncut on Sunday, November 2nd, 1997. See Culf, 1996, the Guardian, 
Wednesday March 27 1996, p.7. Channel Four hold the rights to show Reservoir Dogs, and after waiting 
some time before screening this film, finally transmitted it on Saturday 31st May 1997, 22.40pm. See
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K illin g  Zoe have all been broadcast on satellite channels from 1995 onwards.
7 Manohla Dargis, ‘Pulp Instincts’ in Sight and Sound, Vol.4, Issue 5, May 1994, p.6.
8 Walker, 1992. ‘Shooting the Dogs of Gore’ in the Evening Standard, 5 November 1992, pp.43-44.
9 Usher, S, 1992. ‘Deadly Dogs Unleash a Whirlwind of Violence’ in the D aily  M ail. 22 December 1992,
p.26.
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Bad Lieutenant was released in the UK, Mean Stt'eets (Martin Scorsese, 1993) was re-released at the 
cinema. As Harvey Keitel stars in both films, and was also in Reservoir Dogs, only released a month 
before, this no doubt prompted the Sun to comment on his appearance, though why "gore" is 
mentioned can only be attributed to the 'New Violence' ciuxent in the press at the start of 1993.
11 Soon to follow in 1993 was the re-release of Mean Streets (Martin Scorsese, 1973), and the UK 
release of H ard  Boiled  (John Woo), the Australian film Romper Stomper, and the video release of 
Hemy, P ortra it o f  a Serial K ille r. All referred to in Guttridge (1993, p. 18).
12 Guttridge, Peter, 1993. 'Are These Films Too Violent?' in the D aily Telegraph. 22 January 1993, p.18.
13 As far as I can tell, the term originates from Jim Shelley who is the only journalist I have found 
who refers to these films as "the new bmtalism" in two articles at the start of 1993. See Shelley 
(1993a, p.7, 1993b, p,12). David Gauntlett (1995, p.5) also uses this term when discussing Reservoir 
Dogs, and Hemy, P ortra it o f  a Serial K iller.
14 There have been a number of studies into 'the desensitization hypothesis', and David Gauntlett
(1995) discusses these in Moving Experiences (pp.39-40). As Gauntlett points out, although some 
studies claim to find examples of 'desensitized' viewers (see Van Evra, 1990, pp.96-97), this does not 
necessarily suggest viewers are numb to real violence, only more used to fictional representations of 
violence. In any case, research by Belson (1978) and Hagell and Newbum (1994) find no evidence to 
support ‘die desensitization hypothesis’.
15 For discussion of gendered response to violent movies in sociological research see, Buckingham
(1996), Schlesinger et al. (1992), Gunter and Wober (1988), Docheity (1990).
16 The terms 'Indian', 'Australian', and 'Chinese' were used by participants themselves when filling 
in the ethnic origin section in the registration form for focus group participants.
17 The fact that I was a female moderator undoubtedly influenced participants' interaction in the 
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Padfield and Procter (1996), Bell, Caplan and Karim (1993), Finch (1993), McKee and O'Brien 
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18 See Padfield and Procter (1996), Bell, Caplan and Karim (1993), Finch (1993), McKee and 
O'Brien (1983) for discussion of the effect of researchers' gender on the interview process.
9T h e  S o c i a l  A c t i v i t y  o f  M e d ia  V io le n c e
Watching media violence is a social activity. There are a n u m b e r  of factors 
which participants take into account w h e n  they choose to watch a violent movie and 
these factors are based on an individual and social awareness of media violence as a 
form entertainment that is ‘problematic’, that is perceived to be negative b y  certain 
sections of society. Thus, the discourses used by participants highlight these negative 
perceptions of media violence. In relation to social theories of risk, w e  can see that this 
awareness of media violence as a social ‘problem’ allows participants to categorise 
themselves in relation to what w e  can call ‘risk-takers’ and ‘risk products’; there are 
specific types of products, for example, Hollywood action movies, and specific types of 
risk-takers, for example young males, which participants are aware of. Indeed, 
participants gauge then* responses to media violence by  then* awareness of types of 
movies and types of viewers. W h e n  watching a film such as Reservoir Dogs (Quentin 
Tarantino, 1992) viewers have actively chosen to associate themselves with a particular* 
category of product and consumer, in this instance a film that is part of a n e w  breed of 
violent, realistic and intelligent movies that attracts intelligent and sophisticated 
audiences.
In this chapter, I want to consider h o w  participants are aware of the marketing 
of certain violent movies as ‘risks’. This is not to say that participants themselves used 
the term ‘risk’ in the focus group discussions to signify their* understanding of the 
process of watching media violence. ‘Risk’ and other related terms such as ‘risk-taking
activity’ are theoretical terms that I have used in order to understand participants’ 
responses in relation to social theories o f risk, in particular the risk thermostat 
hypothesis and the social amplification o f risk (Adams, 1995; Kasperson et al., 1988). 
This in this chapter, I want to consider how participants use categories such as 
‘Hollywood action movies’ to differentiate between different types o f representations 
o f violence , or what we can term ‘virtual risks’. This decision making process leads to 
a distinctive social awareness o f other viewers, and o f a shared social knowledge o f 
the types o f responses appropriate to the viewing experience. I want to consider in 
some detail the way participants regulate then* responses according to perceptions o f 
other people and their reactions to media violence. And I also want to consider the 
significance o f physical and emotional responses to media violence and how these are 
part o f the perceived benefits to this ‘risk-taking activity’. This combination o f a social 
awareness o f perceptions and categories o f media violence and die importance of 
physical and emotional responses to media violence bears light on the significance o f 
the public and private discussed in the previous chapter. Here, we have an awareness o f 
viewing media violence as a social activity, and yet at the same time an interest in 
individual responses: the private experience is part o f a public understanding o f the 
alleged ‘risks’ o f media violence.
T y p e s  o f  M o v i e s ,  T y p e s  o f  V i e w e r s
There are a number o f reasons why participants in this study choose to see die 
target films: media hype; peer pressure; personal experience: these are all factors which
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influence participants to watch, or not watch violent movies. The number o f target films 
participants have seen is indicated in Table 4. Figures reveal Pulp Fiction, Reservoir 
Dogs, True Romance and Natural Born Killers (in that order) ar e the most popular films 
to have been seen by participants, and Bad Lieutenant, Man Bites Dog, Henry, Portrait 
o f  a Serial Killer, and Killing Zoe (in that order) are the least popular* films to have been 
seen by participants. These figures correlate with the official UK box office grosses for 
1996 (see Table 5). The most popular* target films with participants are also the most 
popular* target films at the cinema, with a film such as Pulp Fiction grossing over 
£10,000,000 at the box office, while a film such as Man Bites Dog grossed just over 
£73,000 (Screen International, 1996). There is a slight difference in figures, with True 
Romance scoring higher with participants than at the box office, and Killing Zoe scoring 
lower with participants than at the box office, but over* all it can be seen that 
participants' viewing figures for the target films correspond with the official UK box 
office figures for the target films. For a more detailed breakdown o f participants' 
cinema and video viewing figures, see Chapter ten, Tables 7and 8 and 9.
Table 4: Viewing Figures for T arget Films
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Film M ale Female Total
Reservoir Dogs 20 16 36
Pulp Fiction 20 16 36
True Romance 15 14 29
Natural Born Killers 10 9 19
Man Bites Dog 9 6 15
Henry, Portrait of.. 8 6 14
Bad Lieutenant 11 5 16
Killing Zoe 6 3 9
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Table 5: UK Box Office Grosses, 1996
Film Box Office Figures
Reservoir Dogs £5,900,719
Pulp Fiction £10,446,312
True Romance £2,179,160
Natural Born Killers £4,849,685
Man Bites Dog £73,697
Henry, Portrait of... £72,598
Bad Lieutenant £373,634
Killing Zoe £465,997
Figures supplied by Screen International
Group members commented on media hype and peer pressure as determining 
factors in their choice o f movie. The most popular magazines and newspapers cited by 
participants are the Guardian; Empire; The Face; Time Out; the Independent; The 
Times; New Musical Express (see Table 6). This indicates participants read the 
broadsheet papers and popular cultural magazines, in particular, the Guardian and 
Empire, and in doing so are kept in touch with current movie news and movie hype.
Table 6: Reading figures for popular newspapers/magazines
Title M ale Female Total
Empire 6 1 3 9
The Face 2 4 6
The Guardian 8 8 16
The Independent 2 3 5
New Musical Express 3 2 5
Time Out 4 2 6
The Times 3 2 5
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It is because the target films attract a specific kind o f publicity that participants 
are drawn to view a film in order to test then own response to that o f the media. 
Therefore, in the case o f a movie such as Reservoir Dogs (1992) its cinematic release 
attracted controversial publicity, and consequently the film was subject to rumours and 
scandal, not just in the media but as a cultural phenomenon in itself. Many participants 
claimed they were drawn to see this film precisely because they wished to enter the 
cultural debate, and judge whether the controversy was justified. Participants explain 
then reaction:
These films have a particular reputation and I think I've got to see them and 
form my own opinions. I f  there is a controversy then Til make a special effort to 
watch the film and see what it's all about.
(Participant 3 - FG4)
Finding out about these films isn't too hard because any violent film gets a lot of 
publicity. If  a film is getting a lot o f publicity then I'll try and make an effort to 
see it; if  it's making that much o f a difference to other people it must be worth 
seeing.
(Participant 4 - FG6)
You hear all these rumours and scandals about these films and you think, what's 
the fuss all about? You go and see the films just to find out whether it's worth all 
the hype and bullshit.
(Participant 3 - FG6)
Many participants linked media hype with peer pressure. Two group members 
comment on this:
I'm swayed by media hype. Films like Reservoir Dogs, everyone's talking about 
it, and if  you haven't seen it you're not in the gang.
(Participant 2 - FG4)
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One reason I didn't see Reservoir Dogs was because people had said they’d seen 
it and even though they said it was a good film, for some reason I didn't want to 
go and see it because I knew it was violent. I think probably this was because it 
was one o f the first films o f that genre that was veiy publicly known, veiy much 
talked about and for that reason I didn't want to see it. When I did, I thought it 
was a great film.
(Participant 5 - FG3)
Both participants cite media hype as a significant factor in relation to peer pressure. In 
the first example, this participant claims he feels left out, not part o f the gang who have 
seen the movie, and his desire to be part o f this gang is such that he chooses to see the 
film. The second participant cites an opposite reaction. It is because the film has 
attracted so much interest that she resists becoming part o f the phenomena o f Reservoir 
Dogs. She perceives this film as the start o f the ‘new brutalism’ movies to appeal* at the 
cinema in 1992, and avoids the film because it has attracted controversy for its violent 
representations.
What has become apparent in all focus groups is that Reservoir Dogs and Pulp 
Fiction are two films participants consider necessary to see: in Table 4 viewing figures 
for these target films reveal each movie has been seen by all participants, and Table 5 
reveals how popular both these films were (and still are) at the box office. The films are 
signs o f social and cultural success, and there is a cachet in being part o f such cultural 
events, part o f a Zeitgeist. None o f the other target films can compete in teims of 
popularity and cultural significance. As one participant says: ‘How can you go to a 
dinner* party if  you haven't seen Pulp FictionT  (Participant 7 - FG2).
Evidence from the focus groups r eveals participants ar e veiy aware o f the hype 
and cultural significance of the target films in their immediate society. The target films 
are discussed, praised, and vilified by the media and peers alike, and although 
participants did not claim they chose to see the target films because they were violent,
evidence indicates die heightened awareness of participants to the controversy 
surrounding die target films and then representations of violence is a contributing factor 
in then decision to see the films. These participants can be seen to be a type of 
consumer who chooses to see the target films out of cultural curiosity. Their comments 
indicate that it because o f the hype surrounding these movies, and because these ‘new 
brutalism’ movies are discussed in the press as something ‘new’, something different to 
Hollywood action movies that these participants are curious to see for themselves what 
tiiey think o f this new cultural phenomenon.
There is another type o f consumer o f ‘new brutalism’ movies. Chapter three 
considered how films such as Natural Born Killers, Reservoir Dogs, or Crash are 
marketed as ‘dangerous’, and this promotion o f these films in adverts, trailers, reviews, 
interviews and front page news items does ensure that those people who choose to see 
such films are aware o f the hype and controversy surrounding diem. This hype and 
contr oversy, however, is more concerned with extreme representations o f violence, with 
‘risky entertainment that sets out to shock the viewer. These type o f consumers may 
also be curious about the cultural phenomenon o f a movie such as Natural Bom Killers, 
but, as the following comments suggest, they are also curious to see just how violent 
and disturbing such movies really are.
Here are two participants who discuss how they deliberately test then response 
to infamous representations o f violence:
I'm interested in my reactions to violent films because I think I don't like them. 
So, I put myself thr ough it to see if  I can tolerate die violence. It's a purposeful 
position. I adopt this kind o f bunker mentality, like I'm steeling myself to not be 
shocked.
(Participant 1 - FG4)
Yeah, I think I would agr ee with you there as well and quite often with violent 
films or movies like this I sort o f put myself through seeing the film, to see can I
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brave this you know. Everyone else has gone to it, you're a wimp if  you don't 
sit through it. ‘Reservoir Dogs oh yeah, veiy very violent you know’, like you 
have to get...
(Participant 2 -  FG4)
Yeah, it definitely feels like a bit gruelling... I feel like I’ve got to see if  I can 
tolerate i t . ..
(Participant 1 - FG4)
This illustration selves to highlight the preparation and conscious desire o f certain male 
participants to not be shocked by die violent content in die target films. This is of 
interest when male attitudes to thresholds and self-censorship are analysed in the next 
chapter. Here, it indicates that the concept o f monitoring response is one factor that 
influences male participants to choose to view the target films. And it is a veiy specific 
kind o f response that these two participants consider here. They use such words as 
‘tolerate’, ‘steel’, ‘brave’, to establish die position o f the risk-taker as a tough 
personality, and they augment such words with phrases like ‘steeling myself to not be 
shocked’ and ‘you’re a wimp if  you can’t  sit dirough it’ in order to accentuate the 
masculine aspect o f the risk-taker. The second participant follows up the comment 
made by the first participant, echoing his point about a ‘bunker mentality', and inviting 
him to feel that he is not alone in his desire to monitor his own response. The second 
participant re-enforces the position o f a masculine risk-taker, but as we can see fiom the 
first participant’s rejoinder, he is not necessarily agreeing with this point. The fact that 
he begins his sentence with ‘it definitely feels like a bit gruelling’ should tell us that he 
is actually introducing a slightly different approach to the position o f the risk-taker. On 
the one hand, the risk-taker steels himself to tolerate the violence, but on the other hand, 
the violence can be gruelling, and indeed this participant goes on to say: ‘I think I ’m not 
going to be shocked, whereas it does still get to m e’ (Participant 1 -  FG4). Thus, whilst
this participant does choose to see violent movies in order to monitor his own 
(masculine) response, at the same time he is aware that he is sensitive to media 
violence.
What this example reveals is that there is a complex series o f negotiations 
taking place when someone chooses to watch a violent movie. Participants engage in a 
balancing act, where they weigh their perception o f the risks o f media violence with the 
reality o f their experience o f media violence. Indeed, I would argue that for these types 
o f consumers o f media violence, then* decision to watch a ‘dangerous’ film is base din 
part on their wish to engage in a risk-taking activity. I want to talk about this in more 
detail in a moment. However, in the next section I want to briefly consider the way in 
which participants construct categories, or types of risk products and risk-takers in order 
to position themselves in relation to these definitions o f media violence.
H o lly w o o d  V e rsu s  ‘N e w  B r u ta l is m 9
Participants clearly differentiate between Hollywood action movies, such as the 
Die Hard  series, or Terminator 2, and the target films. All participants agree dialogue is 
significant to the tar get films and then* appreciation of them. Evidence o f sharp, incisive 
and intelligent dialogue in such films as Pulp Fiction is one o f the most significant 
differences between the target films and Hollywood action movies. In particular*, 
Tarantino is praised for witty, intelligent dialogue and characterisation in his films. One 
participant explains:
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Hollywood action movies are too cartoony at the moment. Something like the 
Terminator, it's just straightforward kind o f kids' comic adventure. There is no 
sophistication in the text, in the dialogue. There's no irony.
(Participant 1 - FG4)
Hollywood action films are considered good fun, but the target films possess more 
thought provoking representations o f violence. The target films are more disturbing and 
challenging because they are more realistic in then depiction of violence. A number of 
examples will serve to highlight this:
I went to see Die Hard with a Vengeance at the cinema. It was veiy, very 
violent but it was so funny, so stupid that it made me laugh. It didn't trigger die 
same as either Reservoir Dogs or True Romance. They scared me far* more.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
In a lot o f Hollywood action films thirty people fall over and that's it, it means 
nothing: it's violence without consequences.
(Participant 1 - FG3)
Die Hard with a Vengeance or Terminator 2 are very mainstream Hollywood 
films, whereas diese films are more offbeat, more on the fringe, so they can get 
away with saying more. There's nothing that really, really makes you scream 
inside about drose films, whereas Reservoir Dogs and Man Bites Dog definitely 
do.
(Participant 3 - FG6)
Participants discuss then heightened levels o f fear and adrenalin when viewing 
the target films as opposed to viewing Hollywood action movies. To be scared, or 
‘scream inside’ is a desired response by Participant 3, and other group members imply 
they know what to expect fiom Hollywood action movies whereas the target films can 
take diem by surprise. What is more, the target films represent the consequences of 
violence; these representations o f violence are more real and this difference is praised. 
Two participants discuss this:
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I think Hollywood movies are far more offensive personally because o f the way 
they portray violence. There's a total lack o f reality. I mean - in Pulp Fiction 
compare John Travolta, when he accidentally blows a guy's head off in the car. 
In Die Hard  Bruce Willis never gets covered in bits o f bone and brain; his 
clothes fall off so we get to see a bit more o f his body, he gets beaten to a pulp 
and then gets up and scales an elevator shaft or something.
(Participant 4 - FG3)
People like Schwarzenegger or Stallone don't even look real. They look 
fantastical. Whereas in Henry, Portrait o f  a Serial Killer, Henry is someone you 
could see walking down the str eet. You don't know.
(Participant 1 -FG1)
Thus, realistic representations o f violence are subject to praise because they cannot be 
anticipated, because they are not formulaic, but based on participants' perceptions o f 
real life experiences: it is because o f these factors that participants take these films more 
seriously than then Hollywood counterparts.
However, although participants consider the target films as different to other 
Hollywood action movies o f similar* content, this does not mean they do not like to 
watch Hollywood action movies. As one participant says: ‘The Terminator films are 
mainstr eam, but they're still interesting and a lot of fun to play around with’ (Participant 
4 - FG6). The phrase ‘play around’ serves to highlight the differentiation made by 
participants between fun films and serious movies. This categorisation o f Hollywood 
action movies as firn, playful and unrealistic works as a way o f distinguishing other 
violent movies as the direct opposite: serious, intelligent and realistic. It is certainly the 
case that Hollywood actions movies are quite different fiom fihns such as Reservoir 
Dogs, or* Man Bites Dog but this does not mean to say that viewers do not ‘play around’ 
with the textual representations o f violence. Indeed, judging fiom participants’ repeated 
praise o f characterisation, dialogue, dir ection and acting in the tar get films it is possible 
to see that it is then* aesthetic appreciation o f such films that is one o f the reasons for*
tiieir enjoyment o f this type of risk-taking activity. Aesthetic appreciation is another 
way to ‘play around’ with responses to violent movies.
The point is that die categorisation o f ‘new brutalism’ movies as different from 
Hollywood action movies ensures that those consumers who choose to see ‘new 
brutalism’ movies are positioning themselves as a specific type o f viewer. By saying 
that these films are intelligent, sophisticated and realistic in their representation of 
violence, these participants are associating themselves with types o f consumers who can 
appreciate such films, i.e. intelligent and sophisticated audiences. The pleasure that 
these participants gain from this type of risk product is a pleasure that they share and 
agree with in general principle; this pleasure does not involve ‘playing around’ with 
media violence, but rather involves aesthetic appreciation. This is a particular* type of 
risk-taker; one that is not uncritical o f media violence and one that is not uncritical of 
the benefits o f this type o f risk-taking behaviour*. This deliberate categorisation and 
definition o f types o f  risk-takers is a means o f ensuring that these risk-takers are part o f 
a localised community. Members o f this community like violent movies which are not 
mainstream, which are perceived to be independent and challenging, which do not cater 
for the masses. Modes o f response are based on this social and cultural construction of 
the target films as different from more mainstream products. We shall see in the next 
section how viewers o f media violence are very aware that there are acceptable and 
unacceptable responses to viewing violence and that specific types o f risk-takers must 
be conscious o f socially acceptable modes o f response.
253
A u d i e n c e  A w a r e n e s s
The process o f viewing violence is a conscious activity. Evidence fiom this 
study indicates that participants are aware not only o f why they choose to see a movie, 
but also of the specific environment associated with viewing violence. Environment 
signifies an awareness o f context, both in relation to cinema or home viewing and in 
relation to the context o f violent representations themselves. Participants gauge then 
own response to violence by monitoring audience reaction to violent scenes/images, and 
they do so whilst at the same time acknowledging the specific context o f violence on 
screen: both activities are comparable. This reveals that viewers o f media violence 
utilize categories, and ar e sensitive to the social and textual contexts o f media violence, 
situating then own responses in relation to pre-existing types o f responses.
Audience awareness is closely linked with physical and emotional responses to 
violent movies. Participants experience a range o f physical and emotional responses, 
such as anger, fear, excitement, disgust: there is no one response to viewing violence. A 
key factor in the range o f response available is the role o f anticipation when viewing 
violence. Anticipation heightens response, increases excitement and emphasizes the 
significance o f preparation: participants anticipate the worst that can happen and 
prepare themselves for just such an imaginary event. The significance o f real experience 
emerges as central to understanding fictional violence; in this section the activity of 
viewing violence can be seen to be influenced by personal experience, and the types of 
discourses employed by participants would suggest that constructions o f the self as 
sensitive and socially responsible are significant to our understanding o f the viewing 
experience.
Thus, in relation to risk it is possible to see that consumers o f media violence 
self-regulate then responses according to how other people react to virtual risks; here, 
perceptions o f risk influence how viewers perceive themselves and other people in the
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viewing environment and a delicate balancing act takes place, similar to the balancing 
act o f John Adams’ risk thermostat hypothesis (see chapters 6 and 7). The risk 
thermostat hypothesis shows how people balance their behaviour according to then 
perception and understanding o f risk. Thus, an understanding o f the significance of 
personal experience o f risk, and an exploration o f the perceived benefits to risk-taking 
behaviour combine to influence the outcome o f viewing violence. What is more, 
Adams’ risk thermostat hypothesis postulates that ‘risk is an interactive phenomenon’ 
(Adams, 1995, p.20). Consequently, the way in which people balance risk-taking 
behaviour has consequences for others. In relation to media violence, this balancing act 
reveals a number o f significant issues, such as public and private responses to violence, 
trust o f self and distrust o f others, that help to illuminate why people like to take risks, 
and why people find violent movies shocking and entertaining.
C o llec tive  R e s p o n s e s
The majority o f participants are aware o f audience reaction to violent scenes 
when at the cinema. Participants mime audience response: placing hands over then 
eyes, turning away fiom die screen, squirming in then seats. One participant recalls: ‘In 
Pulp Fiction when they do the insulin shot the whole cinema just erupted’ (Participant 2 
- FG6). Two participants discuss a collective response to Reservoir Dogs and the 
infamous ear-amputation scene:
We spent the first horn* waiting for the ear-slicing scene, then during this scene 
the entire cinema was saying oh, oh, this is it, and then after that eveiyone is oh 
no, wow....
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(Participant 3 - FG4)
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The cinema was packed, there was definitely an atmosphere, like going to a gig 
or a play. There was a tangible tension and then people definitely relaxed a lot 
after the ear scene.
(Participant 1 - FG4)
For one participant, one o f the reasons he chose to watch Natural Born Killers was to 
monitor his own reaction:
I think with these films, you go in the cinema and are very aware o f other 
people's reactions, you're expecting it. Especially with Natural Born Killers. It 
was banned, and so you're watching the film partly for yourself and partly to see 
how others react because it has been hyped up. You want to see how your 
friends react to all the killings. (Participant 1 - FG1)
Participants were aware that viewing violent movies can be a self-conscious 
activity and that the nature o f a film, and in many cases the media hype surrounding its 
release, contributes to audience awareness. Most participants recall audience response 
to infamous scenes from movies such as Reservoir Dogs, Natural Born Killers, or Pulp 
Fiction precisely because participants are alert to the shared anticipation and excitement 
specific to viewing such films. What is more, participants consider how types of people 
may respond to infamous scenes o f violence both within the viewing experience and 
before and after the viewing experience. For example, one participant discusses his 
perception o f types o f risk-takers who choose to watch Reservoir Dogs as follows:
I don't think I've actually ever heard or seen anybody scream or stand up in the 
cinema and go, ah no look they've just cut his ear* off and run out the cinema. 
So, I think everybody's sort o f socially prepared for these type of films but 
obviously when you come out o f the cinema you all have to shout all at once 
until you get to the pub as quickly as possible. I think everybody always starts 
talking about it and then they all get to the pub and they all start going, ‘oh yeah 
what about that bit’, you know, like - when he was going to shoot him in the 
head or something like tha t... I think people tend to analyze films too much.
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They can't be real, but I think people's reactions - I think people do react 
differently. I think some people sort o f say ‘oh yeah I didn't really like that and 
I wouldn't go and see it again or recommend it to anybody’; and then other 
people take it quite light heaitedly - aren’t too bothered about violence, right.
(Participant 2 -  FG4)
What about the person sitting next to you - what about (Participant 3) sitting 
next to you in the cinema?
(Interviewer -  FG4)
Yeah, she has to cover her eyes occasionally because, perhaps, I don’t know, in 
China it's a different culture so perhaps they don't have violent films like this. 
Although having said that I was going to bring in at this point that I’ve seen a lot 
o f martial ait films years ago and they were pretty violent.
(Participant 2 -  FG4)
For this participant, there is a particular type of consumer o f media violence that he 
associates himself with; someone who is light hearted, socially prepared, and the kind 
o f person who doesn’t scream, or react excessively to scenes, or images o f violence. 
The fact that this participant claims that he is unaware o f other people’s responses to 
notorious scenes o f violence within the cinematic environment is in many ways an 
indication o f the types o f risk-takers he does not wish to associate himself with. When 
he is asked to consider his female partner’s responses to media violence, her, in his 
view, different response to his own is explained by the fact that she is not socially 
prepared for this type o f excessive violence. However, this participant then goes on to 
discuss the goiy violence in martial aits films, and his partner confirms this; she thinks 
that martial aits films are ‘more gory’ (Participant 3 -  FG4) than the target films. 
There is clearly a contradiction here, and what this selves to highlight is this participant 
wishes to align himself with the socially prepar ed, with the types o f viewers who do not 
cover then eyes, or scream, or take representations of violence too seriously. These are 
the types o f viewers who can go to the pub, who this participant would wish to socialize 
with. He explains his own partner’s different response in relation to her lack o f social
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awareness or preparation for the violence in the target films, and yet this leads him to 
consider the ‘gory’ violence of martial arts films, exactly the type o f risk product which 
his partner is familiar with. Tlie point is that this denial and contradiction serves to 
highlight how this participant does not wish to acknowledge that his partner belongs to 
a different type o f consumer; she is someone who is ‘bothered about violence’, 
someone who isn’t Tight’ in this context.
T h e  S ig n i f ic a n c e  o f  C o n te x t
Context is a key issue when considering the activity o f viewing violence. 
Context is closely linked to environment. Certain films and certain friends do not go 
together. One participant cites an example o f seeing the film Braveheart (Mel Gibson, 
1995) with a fiiend who called out and laughed at the violence. Whilst this may have 
been appropriate to a film such as Pulp Fiction, this participant felt embarrassed at his 
friend's inappropriate response to this movie. He explains:
I went to see Braveheart not long ago with a couple o f mates and thoroughly 
enjoyed it. But, what really annoyed me was that one o f my friends sat through 
all the battle scenes saying: ‘oh yes, see his head come off, oh brilliant, oh look 
at all that blood’, and I was thinking ‘shut up’. This is not the sort o f film where 
you want to be doing this. You should be saying: ‘oh those poor people laying 
down thefi lives’, not ‘oh cool, did you see his arm fly o ff .
(Participant 3 - FG4) 
Another participant comments on the ear-amputation scene in Reservoir Dogs:
The TV we watch is so aggressive and Tarantino's films are like that too. The 
films are TV in the way they move at a fighting pace. People my age don't really
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dwell on the ear-slicing scene, but when older people see that they think it was a 
graphic scene, and then they walk out and ask the reaction o f kids and they say: 
‘Great, I loved it’.
(Participant 3 - FG1)
For this participant, an older generation is not equipped to respond to the movie in the 
same way his peers are: they have not been taught what to expect, or told how to 
anticipate the ‘fighting pace’ o f this film: an older generation does not understand the 
cultural context o f the movie. Whilst this comment is not validated by other group 
members, it highlights a notion o f individuality and distinctiveness concerning this 
participant's own ‘generation’ and a desire to retain the cult (i.e. youth) status of 
Tarantino's movies. Terms such as ‘aggressive’ and ‘move at a fighting pace’ help to 
situate these films with a particular* type o f risk-taker, someone who is alert to this new 
type o f entertainment, who, to refer to the earlier participant in the previous section, 
‘aren't too bothered about violence, right’.
As the first example illustrates, laughter is a common response participants 
notice and question. Certain movies generate acceptable laughter, such as Pulp Fiction, 
whilst others, such as Henry, Portrait o f  a Serial Killer or Braveheart do not, and to 
laugh at inappropriate places risks censure from other members o f the audience. Two 
participants discuss how sensitive they become to unwanted noise and inappropriate 
laughter:
I get hyper-sensitive when I'm watching a film and I can hear* the slightest noise 
anywhere - it drives me absolutely mad. The worst film I ever saw was The 
Texas Chain Saw Massacre (Tobe Hooper, 1974). Everybody in the audience 
just seemed to be laughing constantly, as loud as possible, just to impress their 
mates; to say: ‘I'm not affected by this, it doesn't upset me at all’. I wished 
they'd just shut up and watch the film. It is a social activity but, you know, keep 
your* (social side) out.
(Participant 4 - FG6)
2 6 0
There’s also something, for example in Braveheart. A guy falls to his death and 
eveiybody laughed at that and I felt as if  maybe I should laugh with them, and I 
did. I can't understand why I did that. I suppose you try to fit in with eveiybody 
else so you're not left out.
(Participant 3 - FG6)
It is the social context o f the viewing experience that sets up this understanding of 
appropriate/inappropriate responses to media violence. The first speaker wants to 
disassociate himself fiom normative responses to horror films; he is aware that certain 
risk-takers perceive such films as an opportunity to show how ‘lighthearted’ types of 
media violence can be, and, significantly, how ‘socially prepared' (Participant 2 -  FG4) 
they are for the accepted response to such a horror film. Once again, it is this sense of 
testing responses, o f identifying categories o f audiences and situating oneself in a 
specific categoiy by responding in certain ways, in this instance laughter, that is most 
apparent here. For the first speaker, it is his identification o f this type o f young male 
horror fan who wishes to impress his mates with his lighthearted responses to media 
violence which allows him to situate his own response as opposite to this, i.e. mature 
and sensitive, even ‘hypersensitive’ to the social activity o f viewing violence. It is 
interesting that the second speaker follows up this comment with a personal example o f 
die significance o f context. He too wishes to show that he is a sensitive and mature risk- 
taker, only this time this participant does not offer an example o f his observation of 
others, but rather shows that in his ability to recognize his own weakness he is 
demonstrating that he has leamt the correct mode of response. This participant clearly 
does not want to associate himself with this type o f immature and insensitive risk-taker; 
he confesses to a moment o f weakness where he wished to ‘fit in with eveiybody else’, 
but now sees that there are other types o f risk-takers, as exemplified by the first 
participant.
Participants place specific emphasis on the correct way to respond to certain 
violent films; sensitivity to the context o f violence is significant, and an awareness of 
those moviegoers who do understand this significance places all the more emphasis on 
the moviegoer who knows how to respond appropriately to specific scenes. In the case 
o f laughter and the context o f violence, participants cite their annoyance and disgust at 
inappropriate laughter because it signifies the fine line between legitimate and 
unacceptable response to fictional violence. Aware of societal/cultural consensus of 
consumers o f violent films, and conscious o f their own perceptions o f risk-takers 
participants become hypersensitive to how they should respond, and show an ability to 
monitor other responses and censure that which is inappropriate to a specific category 
of risk-taker, or to the context o f representations o f violence. In all the examples cited, 
no participant compared an awareness o f laughter and screen violence with laughter and 
other movie genres. This laughter is accompanied by a visually violent scene, and is 
recognized as different. Indeed, as the above example illustrate, even within the context 
o f media violence, there are further distinctions to be made. As one participant says: 
‘That kind o f response is alright in Pulp Fiction, hut if  everybody starts going "ah, 
please" in the middle o f Man Bites Dog you'd go mental’ (Participant 4 - FG6).
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G e n d e r  A w a r e n e s s
It is possible to see in the previous section that some male participants associate 
types o f responses with types o f risk-takers, in this instance young males. Other 
participants also use certain types o f categories to distinguish between the way men and
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women react to representations o f violence. Men are perceived as having little reaction 
to violence, whereas women are more voluble and physical in their response to 
violence. Two participants explain:
I pay a lot o f attention to the way other people react in the cinema. I think there 
is a difference between the way men and women react to violence and I think a 
lot o f it is a conditioned response. It's okay for women to scream but a lot of 
men don't feel comfortable doing that kind of thing.
(Participant 4 - FG3)
I really loved Braveheart; it was very violent, very gory, but I really enjoyed it - 
we were hiding under our* coats - it was very gory. I noticed other people, 
especially men sit there and have to watch it. We were like this -  ‘Oh my god 
that's disgusting’ - they were like (mimics serious expression, pur sed lips). I was 
looking around at people and they were half-watching me.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
This conscious awareness o f other moviegoers and the issue o f gender becomes a 
subject groups debate at length. For example, in one all-male group, one participant said 
he knew o f a female friend whose response was noticeable because it was extreme, and 
other gr oup members laugh at this comment, also citing examples o f other women they 
know who have similar* responses when viewing violence. One participant claims if  he 
goes to the cinema with male friends he is aware that their reaction is a positive 
reaction, i.e. ‘that's cool’, whereas if  he goes to the cinema with his girlfriend, or in 
mixed gender company, he is aware that female reactions are different: ‘Girls don't like 
it when someone gets shot’ (Participant 3 - FG1).
Some male participants claim they do not notice audience response to violent 
scenes, however on closer inspection these admissions reveal how aware male 
participants really are o f the shared activity o f viewing violence. For example, one male 
participant comments:
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I f  I'm watching a film, I don't notice what other people are doing. The only time 
I do notice is when I feel something like a jump, you know, you feel eveiyone 
else doing the same thing. But other than that I don't actually look at what other 
people are doing. I get the impression they're not doing anything except 
watching the film. (Participant 3 - FG3)
This participant concentrates on his own non-responsive state when viewing violence. 
He speaks as an individual member o f the audience, and for the audience as a whole. He 
claims to not notice audience response, yet shows just such an awareness; as soon as he 
claims not to notice other moviegoers, he mentions audience fear and shock; if 
‘eveiyone is doing the same’ then surely eveiyone, despite his claims to the contrary, 
must be aware o f the social activity o f viewing violence.
A further example will illustrate this point. One couple debate the issue of 
audience awareness and the process o f viewing violence. The male partner claims:
I don't find myself shocked veiy often by violence in films. I think if  you're 
shocked you might look around for a reinforcement o f your feelings. But, I'm 
not aware o f why I should be looking to see other people's reactions if  I'm not 
reacting myself. (Participant 1 - FG3)
Because he is not shocked by violence, this participant does not feel the need to monitor 
his response in relation to other moviegoers. In contrast, his partner verbally and 
physically responds to violence on screen. She replies to his comment as follows:
If  I see something which is shocking then I'll yell out or laugh. It's the shock that 
makes me laugh. I'll bring my knees up or I'll hide under a coat and then Til look 
around to see if  anyone is looking at me or other people are doing the same.
(Participant 5 - FG3)
His partner's comment o f her reaction to violent scenes suggests this male participant is 
aware o f the person sitting next to him when watching the target films, if  only fiom the 
perspective that his reaction is the opposite to his partner's response. This participant 
claims he focuses on the movie alone - yet when engaged in conversation with his 
partner about this subject, he reveals an acute awareness o f her reaction to violent 
scenes and his own non-responsive viewing process. Indeed this may suggest that this 
participant models his own behaviour on what he perceives as opposite to his partner's 
reaction to violence in the target films: by reacting in an opposite way to his female 
partner this participant highlights his own male behaviour.
Thus, it can be seen that participants construct types o f risk-takers based on their 
perceptions o f audience reactions to media violence. These types o f  risk-takers are 
subdivided into levels o f response, for example those who laugh at inappropriate 
moments, or those who take representations o f violence too seriously, and into male and 
female response, for example, those male risk-takers who show no response to media 
violence, and those female risk-takers who squirm and squeal at representations of 
media violence. It is possible to see fiom the types o f discourses used by participants 
that this categorization o f risk-takers confirms gender stereotypes and helps to situate 
participants’ own responses to media violence within a desired categoiy o f risk-taker. 
Male participants wish to be perceived as sensitive, mature, unresponsive, and socially 
prepared in their reactions to media violence; female participants wish to be perceived 
as sensitive, mature, responsive and socially prepared in their reactions to media 
violence. There is only one difference between both sets o f risk-takers. This should 
alert us to the possibility that the issue o f gender may appear* clearly defined, but on 
further inspection proves complex and variable and that participants construct a 
definition o f types o f risk-takers in order to mask other responses to media violence.
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Such is the case when physical and emotional responses are examined in the next 
section. Here, participants reveal veiy different responses to those charted above.
P h y s i c a l  a n d  E m o t i o n a l  R e s p o n s e s
In this section I want to examine the perceived benefits o f risk-taking behaviour. 
Such benefits include the significance of physical and emotional responses to viewing 
violence, and the importance o f anticipation, a preparatory mechanism that aids 
participants’ enjoyment o f media violence. Here, we can see that despite the fact that in 
previous sections participants discussed types o f viewers along gender lines, when it 
comes to actual responses to viewing violence there is little noticeable difference. The 
perceived benefits o f this type o f virtual risk-taking behaviour blur categoiy 
distinctions.
Participants commented on a range of physical and emotional responses to 
viewing fictional violence. For example, participants note their heart beats faster; they 
feel hot and cold; tense; nauseous; angry; satisfied; fearful; excited. Group members 
may flinch; curl up in then- seats; close then* eyes; half cover their eyes with their* hands; 
cover their mouths with their hands or bury then* head in a coat. Such comments were 
substantiated when participants viewed specific scenes in the discussion. For example, 
when participants saw a scene from Henry, Portrait o f  a Serial Killer they exhibited 
distinctive bodily reactions: participants touched their eyes, ears, covered their* mouths, 
steeled themselves and showed tense facial muscles. Not only did participants exhibit 
such responses during screenings, the memory o f certain violent images was so strong
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many participants re-enacted then physical response duiing the discussion. One group 
member even claimed she felt a specific sense o f smell, a smell that made her put her 
hand to her mouth as she described it in the discussion.
A number o f examples will help to illustrate the variety o f response when 
viewing violence, h i the following extract, participants consider how increased 
adrenalin levels lead to feelings o f excitement, dizziness, nausea, and alertness. 
Participants discuss these responses as if  they are natural reactions to risk-taking 
behaviour:
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What physical emotions do you feel when you see a violent scene in a film -  do 
you sweat, does your heart beat faster, that kind o f thing?
(Interviewer -  FG3)
I guess my heart beats faster. I have never really tried to describe it really - if  I 
had the feeling now I'd know it immediately but I guess it is based around my 
heart beat - don't sweat though.
(Participant 1 -  FG3)
One woman last week said she smelt things.
(Interviewer -  FG3)
That's a natural reaction, yeah, yeah. Senses are heightened =
(Participant 4 -  FG3)
= If  I see something really violent I start to feel ill, my stomach feels like its 
going to be sick. If  it is really gory and horrible then I'll feel quite dizzy. When 
you get that horrible dread-like feeling and your- stomach just sinks, that's what I 
feel.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
Sometimes I cringe slightly if  I can - say a particular* body part is being violated, 
then I cringe at that time, especially.... it’s a sort o f physical shrinking o f some 
kind. (Participant 3 -  FG3)
More especially that particular* body part.
(Participant 1 -  FG3)
Testicles mainly.
(Participant 4 -  FG3)
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I get palpitations; it's quite awful to admit but I often feel a sense o f excitement 
when I watch violence. If  I'm totally truthful it's suppressed anger working its 
way out. When I go to see a violent film I often feel quite high after I've seen 
it...The films can breed excitement.
(Participant 4 - FG3)
It makes me quite alert as well. I sit up and sort o f take notice as well.
(Participant 3 -  FG3)
Yeah, you do feel that kind o f heightened awareness, I think, after you've seen 
violence.
(Participant 4 -  FG3)
These participants discuss then physical and emotional reactions to media violence in a 
relaxed fashion. As one person speaks, another joins in to confirm or add to the 
discussion. Neither male or female participants attempt to differentiate then* responses 
along gender lines; instead, feeling nauseous, alert or excited are considered to be 
natural reactions to this type o f risk-taking behaviour. Categories are no longer- 
important in this instance; heightened senses are the key to understanding die shared 
awareness o f the perceived benefits to risk-taking behaviour*. The significance o f the 
personal pronoun, the attention to the body and the use o f descriptive details to 
communicate the feelings o f  excitement and tension these participants feel within the 
viewing experience all point towards a shared understanding o f the physical experience 
o f viewing violence. This experience may be uncomfortable at times, but this is 
acknowledged as part o f the enjoyment o f risky entertainment. As one participant 
explains when watching Henry, Portrait o f  a Serial Killer:
I can just feel a prickly sensation on my neck, feel the colour just dr aining out of 
you. I mean it's just awful. There is a slow, really obvious build-up to the film - 
you know what's going to happen, you just know you can't stop it. It's kind of 
fascinating.
(Participant 4 - FG6)
What participants describe here, are a range o f physical and emotional 
responses which are veiy powerful and memorable. Certain scenes fiom specific films 
produce intense responses, and part o f the process of viewing violence is to anticipate 
and explore such feelings. From the range o f examples cited here it is possible to see 
participants gain different levels o f enjoyment fiom experiencing intense physical 
and/or emotional responses. Evidence suggests participants may expect, even desire, to 
be shocked or excited, to feel a rush o f emotions when viewing fictional violence.
Although both male and female participants discussed response to viewing 
violence equally, there were one or two noticeable differences in methods o f response. 
For example, many female participants use their hands to cover then eyes, mouth, or 
ears when watching a violent scene. Whilst some men discussed and exhibited similar* 
signs during the focus groups, there were far* fewer male participants who responded in 
a similar* fashion: protecting the face with hands appealed to be more specific to female 
participants. Another difference to emerge fiom the focus groups was the way in which 
female participants often responded in a more emotive way to images o f violence than 
male participants. A t first this appeared to be a stark difference in response, but as the 
groups progressed, more male participants revealed emotive responses to fictional 
violence and appeared to share what had at first appeared to be a specifically female 
trait in the discussions. What this may suggest is that whilst other areas o f discussion 
highlight gender difference, the immediacy o f discussing physical and/or emotional 
response to viewing violence proves to be an area which male and female participants 
feel confident and uninhibited in discussing. Indeed, participants can be seen to trust 
their responses to media violence because these responses are based on personal 
experience. The next chapter will reveal how personal experience is a key factor in 
management o f risk, and viewers balance their behaviour placing weight on then*
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perceptions o f risk, both on a social and individual level. Here, the balance can be seen 
in favour o f individual experience o f the benefits o f risk; whereas earlier, the balance 
was in favour o f social perceptions o f risk-takers and acceptable responses to viewing 
violence.
T h e  R o le  o f  A n tic ip a tio n
In the last section o f this chapter I want to consider how the preparatory 
mechanism o f anticipation is significant to our understanding o f the benefits to risk- 
taking behaviour. Evidence fiom the focus groups reveals that anticipation has a key 
role to play in physical and/or emotional responses to fictional violence. Group 
members emphasize the importance o f anticipation when experiencing physical 
emotions, and they claim this can be part of the enjoyment o f viewing the target films. 
When at the cinema, participants recall placing their hands over then eyes, turning away 
fiom the screen, and gripping their* companion's arm to both alleviate and heighten their* 
sense o f excitement and fear*. When at home, participants recall running out o f a room 
when they anticipate certain violent scenes in a film and such an experience is both 
exciting and frightening, and is specific to home viewing.
When anticipating violence, participants imagine possible outcomes o f events, 
attempting to guess how fat* the director will go in utilizing the visual effects o f 
violence. One participant explains: ‘I anticipate something violent is going to happen all 
the time. H ie worst, you know, like they're going to decapitate someone and eat their 
brains’ (Participant 2 - FG4). Many participants imagine the worst possible outcome for
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a violent scene, playing a game with individual expectation and the director's 
imagination.
Media hype and friends' response can influence anticipation, and many 
participants claim they had heard about the violence in certain target films before seeing 
them - Reservoir Dogs and the ear-amputation scene being one example. However, this 
does not necessarily lead to an attenuation o f response. Certainly, comments detailed in 
this chapter would indicate knowing the outcome o f an infamous scene can add to the 
excitement and range o f emotions participants experience when viewing violence. 
Although this is not the case for all participants, many spoke o f the build-up o f tension 
and anticipation in the audience when viewing Reservoir Dogs or Pulp Fiction and this 
was seen as part o f the excitement o f viewing such movies. Prior knowledge o f a 
violent film can engender shared anticipation which in turn heightens physical and 
emotional response.
Discussion o f specific scenes reveals the way in which participants fuse 
anticipation and emotional response with close attention to the aesthetic constructs in a 
film. H ie male homosexual rape scene in Pulp Fiction produced a number o f responses. 
Here is one extr act provided as an example o f the ways in which anticipation o f a rape 
scene can affect male responses to this type o f risk:
In Pulp Fiction there's the bit where Marcellus and Bruce Willis are taken by 
these people and put into a pawn shop, and you feel ‘oh shit, they're going to be 
tortured to death’ and you're tensing up and you're feeling what's happening in 
this room is going to be tenible. And then Marcellus is taken away and you hear* 
this squealing voice and you feel he's being killed. This is like hell, I can't stand 
to look, and when you realize what's really happening you laugh to release the 
tension because what you were expecting hasn't actually happened.
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(Participant 3 - FG6)
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Basically we're boys togetber and the two characters are unwilling participants 
and that scene gets you to sit back and think, fuck this. It's a relief that they 
actually get out o f it and you think ah ha, your comeuppance.
(Participant 1 - FG6)
But you do get a sense when watching, that whole anticipation bit - it's not like a 
sudden shock like - I mean much more than these films - a film that I found 
really scary was Silence o f  the Lambs. I mean, just the way like towards the 
ending.. .you think ‘oh my God’. I was shaking a bit.
(Participant 4 -  FG6)
And that's because you don't anticipate it coming?
(Interviewer -  FG6)
Well that's basically a honor film I think, whereas these, I mean the 
unpleasantness you feel is because you kind o f know what's going to happen 
and you see it and you're going to go ‘oh my God, oh’, you know, and then you 
get a sense that somebody is going to get their comeuppance, as you say, and 
you say ‘hey it's going to happen, come on, get a bit o f this’ and that's a real 
different kind o f experience altogether.
(Participant 4 -  FG6)
I think it's just a case o f what's implied is worse than what happens. The scene 
gets your mind going and then pulls back and you think, god, thank goodness 
for that.
(Participant 2 - FG6)
In this scene two heterosexual men are captured and one is raped by two 
sadomasochists in a pawn shop. Here, the rape scene is discussed as unpleasant and 
hell-like; participants note their increasing sense of anticipation and dread as the scene 
reveals the extent o f what both heterosexual characters can expect: rape and torture. 
When Butch (Brace Willis) escapes during the rape o f Marcellus (Ving Rhames) it is a 
matter o f honour' that he kill his potential torturers and save Marcellus any further 
degradation. Anticipation and expectation are heightened when it is none other than 
Brace Willis, well known for his action roles, who retaliates with force and such action 
creates a sense o f satisfaction and excitement for these participants. The fact that these 
participants have prepared themselves for an act o f violence far* worse than is shown 
only increases their sense o f anticipation and adrenalin. Other films may operate in
different ways, but here these male participants consider their anticipation o f the 
retaliation and revenge by the two central characters. Thus, these participants feel a 
sense o f dread and honor to begin with and this is heightened by the fact that they can 
anticipate the successful outcome, indeed anticipate their own sense o f  relief when 
Bruce Willis stabs one rapist, and Ving Rhames shoots another in the groin. This build 
up o f anticipation and heightened physical and emotional responses to this scene serves 
to emphasize the benefits o f viewing violence; it is a rollercoaster ride, with fear* and 
dr ead at one end o f the scale, and relief and elation at the other.
When these male participants discuss their* anticipation and responses to this 
scene, they do so by compar ing their sense o f relief with what they expected to happen.
It is clear* that they expect something worse that male rape. What this something worse 
is is not discussed here; it is left unsaid. For other* participants, that sense o f ‘something 
worse' is more easy to articulate in relation to personal experience. One participant 
explains her reaction to the use o f knives in individual scenes and this reaction is based 
on her personal experience o f violence which involved knives:
If  it is a knife scene, it really makes me feel very confused and upset. If  it is a 
gun, then I feel very different. It is the context of the violence - (with a knife 
scene) I kind o f freeze and it gives me an all over feeling o f great distr ess.
(Participant 5 - FG3)
Other group members agree; then* physical emotions are heightened when knives, or 
familiar’, household weapons are used to torture someone and this is because 
participants can relate to a knife as a weapon, and can also relate to the pain such a 
weapon inflicts, whereas participants consider guns to be unfamiliar and
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depersonalizing when used in the target films, and this is because guns are so rarely 
seen in the United Kingdom. Two participants explain:
I don't like one-on-one violence when it looks like it really hurts, and they use 
knives. Shooting's not the problem - it's torture or instant pain.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
Guns ar e something that no one here has any experience of, I certainly don't, but 
knives - everybody's cut themselves. The idea o f being attacked by a knife is 
something everyone can visualize.
(Participant 1 - FG3)
What such comments reveal is that participants will consider individual scenes, 
sequences within scenes and choice o f weapons in relation to real life experience. This 
has implications for mediods o f response to violent movies, for participants' physical 
and emotional reactions to viewing violence are dependent on context and reference to 
individual experience. Response to fictional violence is collateral with a personal 
understanding o f violence in real life, and although participants may not directly relate 
to acts o f fictional violence, they bring personal knowledge, such as cutting oneself with 
a knife, to their interpretation o f violent acts. In the next chapter it is possible to see that 
participants regulate and manage risk based on personal experience and understanding 
o f violence. We shall see that participants have thresholds in relation to violence, and 
that once this threshold is reached, self-regulation becomes a key reactive mechanism to 
balancing risk-taking behaviour*.
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C o n c lu s io n
Viewing violence is a social activity. Societal/cultural agreement about the 
target films as extreme and brutalising ensures that most participants are drawn to see 
these films precisely because o f this factor: participants chose to see a film such as 
Natural Born Killers because it is perceived as ‘risky’ entertainment. There is a cultural 
cachet attached to movies such as Pulp Fiction, and peer pressure is prominent. 
However, other factors such as characterisation, dialogue, and direction indicates 
participants are active consumers, and not wholly influenced by media hype and peer 
pressure. No participant claimed they chose to see the target films because they were 
violent; many other social and cultural factors influenced then decision-making 
processes. One o f the most significant considerations for consumers o f  media violence 
is that the target films are perceived as different to the usual Hollywood fare, and 
participants specifically praise the intelligence, humour, dialogue, acting and direction 
o f ‘new brutalism’ movies. They may enjoy Hollywood action movies, but the target 
films are more intellectually satisfying, and more demanding o f the viewer.
This categorisation o f risk products also leads to a categorisation o f risk-takers, 
and participants align themselves with a specific type o f risk-taker, one that is 
intelligent, sensitive and mature. This is an example of ‘social competence’ (Potter and 
Wetherell, 1987, p.57). Participants understand that there are correct acts one can 
perform in social situations, and the competence o f a risk-taker depends on their 
understanding o f methods o f response to media violence. Participants make choices 
and there are rules and conventions to talking about and actually watching types o f 
media violence; these rules and conventions must be followed if  participants are to 
justify their risk-taking behaviour*.
Participants are aware o f other moviegoers' responses to fictional violence and 
monitor then own response according to perceptions o f risk-takers and risk products.
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Participants appear* to distrust other* risk-takers, particularly types o f risk-takers who do 
not fit in with participants’ own perception o f acceptable responses to media violence. 
However, participants do trust individual responses, and this leads to a greater degree o f 
trust in other* people’s physical and emotional responses to media violence. Perceptions 
o f risk-takers may be dependent on a social awareness o f correct and incorrect 
responses to risk, but, conversely, an understanding o f individual responses to risk 
serves to highlight the shared experience o f physical and emotional responses to 
fictional violence. This is an example o f balancing behaviour* in relation to risk and 
media violence (Buckingham, 1996; Adams, 1995). It is also an example o f the way in 
which consumers o f media violence situate then* own private responses in relation to the 
public arena o f risk. In a sense, participants are social actors, and they shift between 
social perceptions o f risk and personal understanding o f risk. These two factors, rather 
than working against each other, compliment risk perception and management, and 
illustrate that risk is an interactive phenomenon.
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T e s t i n g  B o u n d a r i e s
The management o f risk is a complex and sensitive process. Risk-takers are 
engaged in a delicate balancing act, one which involves personal and social perceptions 
o f risk. Viewers o f media violence are also engaged in this balancing act; diey balance 
personal experience o f media violence with an understanding o f the social 
consequences o f watching a form o f entertainment that is perceived to be ‘risky’. This 
balancing act enables consumers o f media violence to test their responses and to 
recognize boundaries to what they perceive to be acceptable representations o f violence. 
The process o f recognizing such thresholds is part o f the management o f risk, and this 
selves to highlight the significance o f self-regulation, or self-censorship of 
representations o f violence.
In this study, die reactive mechanisms o f thresholds and self-censorship prove 
to be central to the process o f viewing violence. ‘Thresholds’ signify different types and 
contexts o f violence which participants find personally disturbing. ‘Self-censorship’ 
signifies methods o f choice in relation to watching/not watching violent movies. Both 
areas are fluid and dependent on context, and both areas denote complexities of 
response to fictional violence. Examples o f types and contexts o f violence participants 
find disturbing reveal there are social and personal thresholds to viewing violence. 
Social thresholds indicate participants identify a type of violence they find personally 
disturbing, but tiiis violence is a common fear shared by a number o f other participants; 
the process o f identifying this threshold is collective rather than subjective. Personal
thresholds indicate participants identify a type of violence they find personally 
disturbing, but unlike social thresholds, reasons for this can be traced to a subjective 
experience unique to that individual.
Participants use a number o f different methods with which to self-censor, 
ranging fiom self-censoring types o f movies, for example horror, to types o f images, for 
example knives. Self-censorship involves physical barriers, where participants use then 
body to withdraw fiom viewing violence, and mental barriers, where participants 
choose to concentrate on anything other than violent depictions on screen. There are 
also methods o f not self-censoring, where participants prepare for violent 
representations they wish to watch uninterrupted. The two factors most significant to 
self-censorship ar e preparation and anticipation, and these factors enable participants to 
take an active role in the process o f viewing violence.
Thresholds and self-censorship demonstrate boundary testing. It is through 
testing boundaries that thresholds are identified and self-censorship utilized. 
Anticipation and preparation are part o f boundary testing, enabling participants to 
activate consumer choice. It is through boundary testing that participants experience a 
sense o f achievement and/or liberation and this experience is significant to why 
participants choose to view violent movies. This chapter will outline these reactive 
mechanisms to media violence and consider the range o f discourses used by participants 
to differentiate between types o f consumers, or ‘risk-takers’. John Adams’ risk 
thermostat hypothesis (Adams, 1995, p. 15) will prove to be o f particular* relevance here. 
The risk thermostat ‘is analogous to the behaviour* o f a thermostatically controlled 
system5 (Adams, 1995, p. 15). Individuals adjust the setting of then* risk thermostat 
according to their individual and social perception o f risk; a propensity to take risks is 
balanced against the perceived danger o f the risk act: each individual var ies their* risk-
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taking behaviour according to this set o f principles. Evidence fiom the discussion 
groups will indicate participants utilize the reactive mechanisms o f thr esholds and self­
censorship in order to test the setting o f their risk thermostat. Indeed, the function of 
these reactive mechanisms is to highlight risk and reward and to place emphasis on the 
pleasure to be gained fiom risk management. This chapter will explore why boundary 
testing is inherent to the process o f viewing violence.
S o c i a l / P e r s o n a l  T h r e s h o l d s
M ale and Female Response to Rape: A  Social Threshold
Social thresholds are part o f the management o f risk. When an individual 
shares a fear' o f a violent act with another individual, and when many individuals 
express a dislike o f such violent acts being depicted on film or television programmes 
then this is an example o f a social threshold. Social thresholds are usually concerned 
with social taboos, for example rape, child abuse, or incest. What these collective 
thresholds share is the way in which participants identify a level or type of violence 
they find personally disturbing, yet these thresholds cannot be traced to subjective 
experiences; they are social taboos, reinforced by the veiy existence o f the social 
threshold itself. Thus, social thresholds enable participants to share a collective fear 
which is recognized and validated by other group members.
For example, one group member comments: T m  really not convinced it's safe 
to portray violence against children and animals on film’ (Participant 2 - FG5). For 
many participants it is the thought o f a film which exhibits cruelty to children or
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animals, rather than specific instances themselves, which defines this threshold. As one 
participant explains: ‘I f  I knew that there was going to be a kid tortured in a film I 
wouldn't go and see it in the first place’ (Participant 3 - FG1). The implicit question is: 
would anyone choose to see such a film if  it did exist? For all participants, the answer is 
negative, and by identifying such an emotive threshold, participants can share in a 
feeling o f social responsibility and gr oup acceptance.
The most common type o f violence participants identify as personally 
disturbing is violence towards women, in particular* rape. For heterosexual male 
participants, rape is a complex issue, and manifests itself as a desire to protect fictional 
female characters who are attacked/sexually attacked, a desire which can be traced to 
social/cultur al typecasts o f the male as protector and the female as the protected. Rape 
is also a complex issue for female participants, generating both fear* and anger at 
fictional and real incidents o f rape. As with male participants, social/cultural typecasts 
o f women as victims influence female participants' response to the issue o f rape.
Many male participants refer* to the scene in True Romance (Tony Scott, 1993) 
where Alabama (Patricia Arquette) is beaten, and in turn beats and kills a gangster*. As 
men, these participants wish to save Alabama. Seeing a woman brutally beaten brings 
out strong feelings o f anger and a practical desire to protect the character. However, this 
scene also brings out feelings o f guilt; Alabama is a beautiful woman, and many male 
participants are attracted to Alabama, yet at the same time angry that she is treated in 
such a brutal way in this scene. Such ambivalent feelings provoke complex responses to 
this scene. Two participants comment:
In True Romance, when Patricia Arquette is getting beaten up, you get to see a 
bit too much violence. It's really hard to watch because you really like her at that 
point in the film. You want to help her* but you can't. You're helpless.
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You fall in love with Alabama. Or at least I did. She's so sweet and nice and 
caring. You don't want to watch her getting beaten up, and when you're 
watching the violence you expect another character to beat up the bad guy - not 
just punch him, but cut him in half. The violence provokes a reaction.
(Participant 3 - FG1)
Here, these two male participants comment on their* attraction to the character of 
Alabama, whilst at the same time referring to a strong desire to protect her fiom other 
male characters in this fictional setting. The scene itself provokes such a reaction 
because Alabama is depicted as both sexual and aggr essive in this scene; her clothes are 
tom to reveal her body in a provocative way, yet the violence towards Alabama is 
extr eme and unsettling, and as she herself becomes violent, she is transformed fiom a 
stereotypical female victim to an atypical female aggressor. This provokes a complex 
reaction fiom both participants. They feel ‘helpless’; they will another male character to 
‘beat up the bad guy’ so that Alabama can be saved, and yet she is the one who saves 
herself. It is possible to see fiom the way that they describe her* as ‘sweet and nice’ and 
the way they express their* attachment to this character, ‘you fall in love with Alabama’, 
that both male participants are situating their* own responses in relation to distinctive 
gender stereotypes, in this instance the beautiful victim and the protective male.
The same desire to protect the female victim fiom sexual violence can be 
mapped throughout the discussion -  ‘the violence provokes a reaction’ (Participant 3 - 
FG1). Two male participants discuss then* response to fictional representations o f rape:
In Man Bites Dog tire rape scene was very simple, in black and white, and for 
some reason I just kept trying to look away. I almost felt like I wanted to jump 
in the film and get the woman out.
(Participant 1 - FG1)
(Participant 3 - FG6)
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Rape scenes affect me two ways. I either don't like it because they diminish the 
effect o f a rape by titillating it, but at the same time if  it is done horrifically, like 
I believe it should be, it fucking horrifies me.
(Participant 1 - FG6)
Do you feel that you want to protect the victims involved in the scenes?
(Interviewer -  FG6)
Well yeah, that was the point with Hemy (in Henry Portrait o f  a Serial Killer), 
that was why I said I couldn't identify with him but I could identify with his 
actions, because basically it is a masculine trait you should protect women, you 
know ... I'm not saying it's right, you know, that masculine construction, but to 
me that was die only decent tiling that he did do in the film ... that was to me the 
only time that he behaved in a way that I would accept as normal, he went in 
and he did protect her and at the same time I thought it was good that they 
showed that he lost the fight technically when he got hit with a bottle and she 
was actually the one that sort o f saved the day as it were.
(Participant 1 -  FG6)
What we can see fiom this discussion is that male participants have a complex reaction 
to representations o f female rape. The first participant is struck by the realistic 
representation o f rape in the film Man Bites Dog and feels so strongly about this that he 
describes wanting to ‘jump in the film’ and save the female victim. It is his disturbed 
reaction to this scene that provokes this strung reaction. The second participant 
discusses the validity o f showing female rape scenes at all; rape is not titillating, rape is 
horrific; and he emphasizes his position by saying ‘it fucking horrifies m e’. Once again 
this is a strong reaction to this type of violence. However, although this participant 
wishes to act out the role o f the male protector, he is aware that he is being positioned in 
this role; the ‘masculine construction’ he refers to shows an awareness o f manipulation 
and o f categorization o f males as protectors and females as the protected. The reference 
to the character o f Hemy shows this participant’s ambivalent response; he identifies 
with the serial killer at one point in the film, the point where he attempts to protect the 
female victim, and yet he celebrates the female victim’s ability to rescue herself fiom
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this situation; she is not so helpless after all. Thus, there is a sense o f  acceptance and 
rejection o f this ‘masculine construction’ in this discussion.
Female participants discuss the issue of rape from an emotional and critical 
perspective, both exhibiting fear and anger, and questioning die validity o f filmic 
representations o f rape. One female participant actively chooses not to watch films 
which contain rape and feels diis is not a subject for film makers to portray. Watching 
rape scenes in films such as The Accused (Jonathan Kaplan, 1988) or Man Bites Dog 
(Belvaux et al., 1992) has had a lasting effect on diis participant. She says: ‘I hate the 
personalization o f violence: I watch a film like Man Bites Dog  and think it's me, and it 
makes me scared for weeks’ (Participant 5 - FG2). She echoes many female group 
members when she criticizes the common occurrence o f rape in movies: ‘Let's slot in a 
rape scene’ (Participant 5 - FG2) and fears women and men will become desensitized to 
violence towards women.
The Accused attracted a number o f comments by female participants, comments 
which highlight female participants' fear o f rape in real life and then- criticisms of die 
way in which rape is represented on screen. A number o f illustrations will serve to 
highlight this:
I watched The Accused and I was upset for about two weeks afterwards. It was 
terrible. I don't like the feeling I get from it. I don't like my personal reaction: 
‘oh God if  I watch the rape it could happen’. I don't want to picture what 
happens. It puts me in a bad mood and makes me feel annoyed and upset.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
The Accused  is die only film I can think o f that I've not seen on purpose because 
I knew it was all about rape. I don't want to see Jodie Foster get raped because 
she's someone I admire. I think she's a strong person.
(Participant 4 - FG3)
I don't particularly enjoy watching women being raped, but for me it depends so 
much on context. I found The Accused veiy, very, veiy upsetting but one o f the
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reasons I found it upsetting is that we only get to see the rape through the eyes 
o f a man. It's only when the guy stands up in court and says: T m  the hero, I'm 
the saviour’ that the rape happens. Something like Straw Dogs is veiy 
distressing; it's about ownership and territory and that extends to women in the 
film. I think any threshold I have is based on context. I mean, I'm far more 
offended by Pretty Woman than I am Straw Dogs.
(Participant 1 - FG5)
The first female participant identifies the social threshold o f rape as an act o f violence 
she fear s will occur in real life; watching The Accused has dramatic repercussions. The 
second female participant cites this film as the only film she deliberately chose not to 
see because it contained the threshold o f rape; building a relationship with the centr al 
character in this film would prove problematic and seive to highlight women as victims, 
not a role this participant associates with Jodie Foster, who is someone she admires -  ‘a 
strong person’. The third female participant contextualizes the issue o f rape and 
criticizes specific films - Straw Dogs (Sam Peckinpah, 1971), Pretty Woman (Gary 
Mar shall, 1990) - for their misogynistic portrayal o f women; representations of fictional 
rape are distressing, but certain contexts are more offensive than others. All three 
examples indicate how participants identify the social threshold o f rape, and choose to 
self-censor, a reactive measure which will be discussed in more detail later in this 
chapter. What these three participants also share is an understanding of the 
categorization o f women as victims and a rejection o f such a categorization. They all 
uses terms which emphasize their impatience with this type o f victim. For example all 
ar e annoyed or angry with having to consider representations o f rape; and for two o f the 
participants it is the strength o f women, rather than their weakness that they wish to 
emphasize: Jodie Foster is a ‘strong person’, she does not need a man as her ‘saviour’.
Thus, it is possible to see that as with male participants’ discussion o f female 
rape, female participants also question the validity of this masculine and feminine
construction; not all women are victims and not all women need to be saved by a male 
in movies which depict female rape. However, this questioning o f gender constructs did 
not lend itself to a consideration o f representations o f male rape in movies. Neither male 
or female participants discussed fictional representations o f male rape as a social 
thr eshold. One male participant, when referring to Marcellus (Vick Rhames) in the male 
rape scene fiom Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994) considers the impact o f this 
rape far* less disturbing than representations o f female rape. He explains: ‘I suppose 
technically I didn't bleed for* him as much as I would for a woman, I think women ar e 
more vulnerable’ (Participant 1 - FG6). Another* female participant comments: T 
thought, thank God it's not a women being raped. Isn't that terrible?’ (Participant 2 - 
FG3).
Such comments serve to highlight how participants anticipate representations o f 
female rape, and anticipate they will be disturbed by such scenes. This anticipation does 
not occur* with regard to representations o f male rape and it is the lack o f representations 
o f male rape which participants highlight as a reason why they do not experience such 
anticipation. Two female participants comment:
Two guys getting raped - we never see that. It's very, very rare you see it. And 
young men in the audience are going to be embarrassed and uncomfortable and 
laugh at what is a distressing rape scene.
(Participant 1 - FG5)
It's strange because in The Accused I obviously empathized with Jodie Foster, 
but with the two men in Pulp Fiction I didn't empathize with them at all because 
they were men. I mean it was disturbing and horrible to watch but I didn't have 
the same feelings as I did when Jodie Foster got raped. It was a different kind o f 
rape, a rape for a reason.
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(Participant 3 - FG5)
Here, two participants comment on a lack o f empathy or engagement with the male 
characters in Pulp Fiction and they trace this lack to the unfamiliarity o f male 
representations o f rape. It is because female representations o f rape are more common 
in movies that these participants can engage with events, understand the ‘reason’ for the 
rape. The first participant's perception o f male members o f die audience and their 
embarrassed response to this scene corresponds with an absence o f response by male 
participants in the discussion groups to this scene, despite the fact that Pulp Fiction is 
considered to be the most popular movie by participants.
Male rape is not a shared fear because male participants do not express a fear of 
such a violent attack, and female participants do not express a desire to protect male 
victims o f rape. Indeed it appeals as if  there is not a discourse participants can share 
when discussing male rape; fear o f such a rape and a desire to protect male victims o f 
rape is not a common topic for discussion. It is female rape which attracts a collective 
interest and participants’ response to female rape confirms societal/cultural fears o f this 
act o f violence. Thus, most male participants wish to act as the protector when viewing 
female rape scenes and most female participants wish to eschew die subject o f rape 
altogether. However, a resistance to this social construction o f female rape can be seen 
in the way participants’ discuss their uneasiness with this masculine construction. Thus, 
the social threshold o f rape selves to confirm and question social taboos.
P e r s o n a l T h re sh o ld s
Personal thresholds re-affirm the effects o f personal experience. They also have 
a significant effect on the way that participants continue to manage risk; personal 
diresholds influence perceptions o f risk because personal experience o f violence,
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whether involving oneself or other people, is a key factor in how people balance risk- 
taking behaviour. As John Adams’ points out in Risk: ‘individual risk-taking decisions 
represent a balancing act in which perceptions o f risk are weighed against a propensity 
to take risk’ and ‘perceptions o f risk are influenced by experience o f accident losses -  
one’s own and others”  (Adams, 1995, p. 15). In this section, participants discuss 
personal experience o f violence and how this has shaped tire way in which they watch 
media violence.
The tr ansition fiom social to personal thresholds reveals that many participants' 
personal thresholds involve the same types o f violence identified as social thr esholds in 
the previous section. An example will illustrate this. One participant reveals:
I really don't like rape scenes now. I have a fiiend who described her experience 
o f rape; I had no idea it was so traumatic. I used to love A Clockwork Orange 
but now I'd find it difficult to watch it knowing the realities o f rape for women.
(Participant 3 - FG1)
The threshold o f female rape has been identified as a collective fear* by other group 
members; however, what makes this example different to participants' comments in the 
previous section is the way in which this participant uses a friend's personal experience 
to shape his own viewing habits, i.e. he finds it difficult to watch A Clockwork Orange 
(Stanley Kubrick, 1971) because it contains gr aphic depictions o f rape. The impact of a 
specific instance o f violence has a vivid and lasting effect on this participant, and this 
personal experience is a main factor in the identification o f this threshold. It is this 
which makes the threshold individual rather than collective.
Many participants have childhood memories which affect personal thresholds. 
One participant recalls an incident as a child whereby he saw an image o f a thr oat being
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cut on TV; the memory is vague, but the impact o f seeing this image is such that he will 
not watch any scene involving this type o f violence. He says:
I don't like to see people having their throats cut. You can always tell when 
that's coming because someone fiom behind puts a hand over the victim's 
mouth. I always look away - that is the one thing I don't like to see. I saw 
something as a child on TV. I remember being quite young and seeing it after 
school. I'm sure I saw someone get then throat cut. It's the only thing I know I 
can't really watch.
(Participant 1 - FG3)
Another participant finds the visual effect o f blood disturbing. She recalls:
My mum was a nur se in a Chinese hospital, and I saw a lot o f blood. I'm always 
scared o f blood, you know, seeing my mother come home and she had been in 
an operation and sometimes blood would be on her clothes. It makes me scared 
to see tilings like that - seeing blood affects me more than anything else.
(Participant 4 - FG4)
This participant does not say what she feared as a child - perhaps that her mother was 
hurt in some way - however the effect o f this memory is such that she identifies the 
visual effect o f blood as a personal thr eshold.
Real life experience affects thresholds and the viewing process. A number o f 
group members experienced real life violence and this influenced participants in 
different ways. For example, one participant witnessed a knife attack not long before 
the discussion and she made a decision not to watch any violent movies after this attack. 
She explains: T have got to the point where I do align violence with die real act and it 
bothers m e’ (Participant 1 - FG2). Another woman was attacked and threatened with a 
knife, and she identifies any violence involving knives as her threshold. Here, personal
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experience leads to self-censorship, yet unlike the fust participant she does not class all 
violence as personally disturbing, only specific types. She explains:
I was attacked, and any violence involving knives physically repulses me. It 
really brings up all sorts o f veiy strange emotions that I never feel at any other 
time. If  there is a knife involved I get quite angry, and it has definitely affected 
me as a person. I have a lot o f violence in me. I kind o f will my attack to happen 
again so that I can act it out. I keep thinking T wish I could have fought back’, 
and so if  I see a rape scene I think, ‘wouldn't it be great if  she could just do 
something violent - do this and lucking do that’.
(Participant 5 - FG3)
Although tills participant experiences anger and fear when viewing fictional violence 
involving knives, and this is directly related to personal experience o f violence, as a 
consumer she re-lives her attack through watching violent movies where the female 
victim fights back. Anger is deliberately channeled into a fictional scene o f violence 
where women are seen as aggressors -  ‘do this and fucking do that’. This participant 
identifies a personal threshold related to real experience o f violence, but it is through 
this personal thr eshold that she continues to watch other types o f violence, making the 
process of viewing violence traumatic in certain instances and cathartic in others.
Another participant witnessed real violence but this experience did not effect 
her viewing habits to any substantial degree. She explains:
I was on the bus one time when a guy was stabbed. I tried to tell the driver to do 
something about it but you're on a bus and there's very little you can do. I was 
shaking and in a state o f shock after the attack because I knew I had a 
responsibility and I couldn't fulfil that responsibility. I mean, I've seen violence 
against friends in the past. I think you learn to avoid violence. I avoid it at any 
costs. But I go and see these movies because I know it's fiction.
(Participant 3 - FG5)
For this participant, the experience o f seeing real violence is tr aumatic and ensures she 
avoids potentially violent situations at all costs. However, this experience does not lead 
to an identification o f any specific personal threshold when viewing fictional violence. 
Violent movies are not real and do not equate with real experience o f violence. For a 
more detailed discussion o f participants' response to real violence and their* perception 
o f fictional violence see Chapter eleven.
There are two points to be made regarding personal thresholds. First, whilst 
participants may share similar thresholds to others, i.e. rape, or blood, which could be 
considered social taboos, personal experience means such thresholds have added 
significance and re-affirm relationships between personal experience and choices and 
values made in real life. Second, participants who have experienced/witnessed real 
violence do not necessarily react in similar* ways: some may eschew all violent movies, 
others self-censor specific types o f violence, whilst some participants notice no marked 
difference in then* viewing habits. Clearly, examining personal thresholds produces 
varied results, and the experience o f real violence does not necessarily lead to anti­
violence attitudes, although in some instances this is the case. What participants’ 
discussion o f personal and social thresholds reveals is that a delicate balancing act takes 
place, a balancing act that involves participants re-adjustment o f then* responses to 
media violence based on perceptions o f risk at a social and personal level.
S e l f - c e n s o r i n g  V i o l e n c e
Self-censorship o f representations o f violence is also part o f the management o f 
risk. The way that participants self-censor reveals two types o f reactive mechanisms, 
one physical, the other* cognitive. Both o f these reactive mechanisms rely on
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anticipation and preparation; without such gr oundwork participants would be unable to 
identify thresholds and choose to self-censor, or not self-censor. The activity o f self- 
censoring violence is one that participants perceive as distinctive to particular types of 
risk-takers. Male participants perceive female viewers o f media violence as types of 
risk-takers who do not wish to test boundaries; female participants perceive male 
viewers o f media violence as types o f risk-takers who enjoy testing boundaries: there is 
a definite sense that participants construct particular* types o f discourses in order to 
categorize risk-takers. However, thr ough an examination o f the variability of these 
discourses used we can see that risk-takers, whether male or* female, share the same 
goals when it comes to watching media violence: all wish to test responses and 
successfully manage individual risk-taking behaviour*.
M e th o d s  o f  S e lf-C e n so r sh ip
Participants choose to self-censor violent movies in four* ways:
1 Self-censor* all violent movies;
2 Self-censor violent movies which contain thresholds;
3 Self-censor violent scenes which contain thresholds;
4 Self-censor violent images which contain thresholds.
There are a number o f methods to self-censorship. For* example, some participants half 
watch the screen, covering their face with then* hands, or mentally switch off and stare 
at a comer* o f the screen, movie theatre, or home environment when choosing to self­
censor. Other participants may choose different measures and place their head in then*
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hands, hide under their coat, hide behind sofas, or offer to make the tea when a key 
scene occurs. An extract from a discussion o f hon or movies will help to illustrate this:
I can't watch horror films. I can watch realistic violence but people with white 
faces coming in and chewing lumps out of one another, they frighten me so I 
don't watch them. I'm outside the door, watching through the crack: ‘Is it over 
yet? Fuck me, I'll make the tea’.
(Participant 1 - FG6)
I watched Twin Peaks the other night on video, and they found this body and 
they were lifting her veil and I couldn't watch. It was a dead body, she couldn't 
feel anything, it was obviously special effects, but I just couldn't watch it.
(Participant 4 - FG6)
Some people can't stand to see like a needle going in ...
(Participant 2 -  FG6)
It very much depends on the individuals themselves. For example, I see nothing 
wrong - I'm not afraid o f cadavers or anything like that, or if  somebody is 
getting up from graves or stuff but I do get affected by really deep rumbling 
voices, like in Candyman or Evil Dead. I'm more afraid o f possession and stuff 
like that. The Exorcist would be my nightmare, it’s something I couldn't really 
watch. But it really does depend. It depends on your* lack o f experience in what 
you're used to and not used to and what kind of beliefs you have and what 
happened to you when you were a kid - it really depends on the individual.
(Participant 3 - FG6)
What can be seen from these extracts is that each participant has their own tale to tell 
about what they don’t like to watch. There are different gradations for each participant 
and their consideration o f thresholds and self-censorship. One participant won’t watch 
zombies, another doesn’t like dead bodies, another is afraid o f demonic possession. 
Each gives an example o f the type o f violence they do not wish to watch, and from the 
comment made by Participant 2 -  ‘Some people can't stand to see like a needle going 
in’ -  it can be seen that this is a common experience, something eveiyone can talk about 
and provide examples of. The way in which the last participant moves from a first 
person account o f his own experience o f self-censorship to a generalized account of
how ‘you’ and ‘your’ experience and beliefs shape responses to media violence 
suggests that self-censorship is shared experience that is part o f the management of risk.
And as this participant points out ‘it really depends on the individual’. If  a type 
o f violence is identified as a threshold by a participant, then self-censorship is a means 
to personally control the viewing experience, however, how a participant chooses to 
self-censor depends on the individual. Based on the way that participants discuss this 
reactive mechanism it is possible to divide the process o f self-censorship into physical 
and cognitive responses, although both responses can be activated whilst viewing 
violence.
Cognitive responses signify the methods by which participants choose to 
concentrate on something other than the events taking place on screen. Two participants 
explain:
When something's too violent for me I switch off- Til step back and say: ‘this is 
a film, I can step out o f i f . (Participant 7 - FG2)
I was telling myself ‘it's not real, it's a film, I'm with my friends and we're 
having a good time’. (Participant 2 - FG5)
This form o f self-censorship focuses on the division between fiction and reality when 
viewing violence: the violence is not real and therefore through highlighting its fictional 
status these participants are able to dis-engage with events taking place. In relation to 
risk, these participants are able to re-assure themselves that they are in control of this 
risk-taking activity, and, as the second example illustrates, viewers are able to 
emphasize what is safe and entertaining about watching violent movies -  ‘it’s a film, 
I ’m  with my friends and w e’re having a good time’ -  although the fact that this 
participant has to say this to herself is an illustration of just how delicate the balancing
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act o f risk management can be. This participant is clearly emphasizing the benefits of 
this type o f risk-taking behaviour, but at the same tune she is also working through a 
perceived danger to this risk. In fact, what this participant does is to emphasize that this 
is a virtual risk; such a cognitive response to a media violence acts as a successful filter, 
allowing this participant to adjust her response to this film.
Physical responses signify the methods by which participants use their own 
body, or immediate environment to filter the impact o f a violent image or scene, and to 
allow participants time to manage their response to this virtual risk. Two examples will 
illustrate this:
I always watch a film to the end, but I have covered my eyes in a film. One film 
I can't watch is Outbreak because to me it is a real threat which affects 
everybody. I find that disturbing and difficult to watch.
(Participant 3 - FG4)
The first time I watched Resetyoir Dogs I hid my face and stood up and said, 
‘no, I don't want to watch that’. I was imagining the cop's face, while I was 
listening to the music and when I came back into the room he had no ear* and his 
face was slashed. I was relieved he didn't do anything more horrible. The ear 
scene put me off watching the whole film.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
What these examples illustrate is the active decision-making which takes place when 
viewing thr esholds o f  violence. In each instance a physical barrier is created in order to 
self-censor a threshold to violence. H ie first participant uses his hands, the second 
participant uses a variety o f physical responses - standing up, hiding her face, running 
out o f the room - in order to self-censor. What the second example also illustrates is the 
way mental and physical barriers can be combined. This participant mentally and 
physically dis-engages with the scene; she walks out of the room and also concentrates
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on events that are not taking place in the film itself, using her imagination to distance 
herself from the actual violence depicted.
When participants choose to self-censor a violent image or scene they can 
physically using then bodies as a barrier, and as a filter to events taking place. A 
common response by participants is to hold their hands over their eyes, but peek 
through their fingers in order to see the rest o f the film. For example, one participant 
considers her response to the threshold o f violence involving eyes; she would half­
watch such scenes if  they appeared in a film. She explains: T would definitely want to 
see the scene, I wouldn't want to not see it at all; but I would be protecting myself, I 
guess, by watching it through my fingers’ (Participant 1 - FG5), Here, curiosity is 
fuelled by the knowledge that this participant can self-censor, but also remain partially 
engaged with the film; covering her own eyes is an act o f self-preservation as it is eyes 
which are subject to violence on screen, yet eyes also register what is talcing place and 
they are the means to satisfy the curiosity o f die viewer.
Self-censorship is a reactive mechanism which relies on anticipation and 
preparation in order for a viewer o f media violence to choose a specific type o f 
response. In this sense self-censorship, or self-regulation o f media violence helps to 
highlight consumer choice. If  a consumer o f media violence has identified a personal 
and/or social threshold to violence and diey wish to monitor their response to this type 
o f violence by self-regulation, then what type o f film or television programmes are 
chosen depends upon an individual’s propensity to take risks. If, as many o f the above 
examples indicate, an individual chooses to watch a film or television programme 
knowing that it contains scenes o f violence they will find disturbing, then their 
behaviour reveals a desire to take risks. In the next section I want to consider what
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exactly these risks are, and I want to examine the perceived benefits to watching types 
o f media violence that viewers know in advance they will find disturbing.
B o u n d a r y  T e s t i n g
John Adams’ risk thermostat hypothesis is concerned with people’s responses to 
risk. Risk compensation is when someone modifies ‘both then levels o f vigilance and 
their- exposure to danger in response to then subjective perceptions o f risk’ (Adams, 
1995, pp. 14-15). In Chapter six it was shown that researchers have discovered that risk- 
takers modify then behaviour* depending on their perception o f risk and on their control 
o f the risk activity. Therefore the perception o f a risk product or risk activity and the 
degree o f personal control over this product or* activity is significant to the way people 
manage risk.
In relation to media violence, we can see that viewers’ perceptions o f the 
virtual risks o f media violence are in many ways balanced by an understanding o f the 
high degree o f control viewers has over this material. Thus, a viewer o f media violence 
may perceive violence involving knives as personally disturbing, but they may choose 
to watch such scenes o f violence because they can control how much or how little they 
see on screen. In this section I want to consider how participants test their* responses to 
media violence, and how this boundary testing is part o f the perceived benefits to 
watching media violence. What we shall see is that it is an individual’s perception of 
risk and then* personal control o f risk that shapes their responses to media violence.
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In this study, the reactive mechanisms o f thresholds and self-censorship 
highlight the way in which participants test boundaries whilst viewing violence. 
Boundary testing involves participants identifying a thr eshold o f violence and choosing 
whether to self-censor or not. The way in which participants utilize this consumer 
choice is through anticipating and preparing for violent scenes to occur*; participants 
anticipate a threshold whilst viewing violence and prepare for then* choice o f self- 
censorship. Although male and female participants perceive a difference between the 
way active consumers o f violent movies test boundaries, anticipation and preparation 
are intrinsic to all participants, and boundary testing applies whatever levels of self- 
censorship are chosen.
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A n tic ip a tio n  a n d  P re p a ra tio n
Evidence fiom the focus groups suggests participants are aware of the role 
anticipation and preparation have to play in the process o f viewing violence. One 
participant describes die effect o f anticipation on the viewing process. He says: ‘I have 
a har der time watching the build-up to violence than the actual incident. I get so tense. I 
don't mind the actual violence itself, it's the build-up to it; you can feel the fear in your 
seat’ (Participant 3 - FG1). Another group member describes her response to the ear- 
amputation scene in Reservoir Dogs:
This is one of the most disturbing scenes I've ever seen. The guy's completely 
defenceless, there's a knife, the atmosphere is completely electric. I looked up 
twice, once when he wiped the blood on his shirt, and once when the music
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came on because I felt relaxed. Then I felt the atmosphere again and I just didn't 
want to watch it. It has a horrible effect on me.
(Participant 5 -  FG3)
What was going through your mind when you were looking down?
(Interviewer -  FG3)
I was thinking that I need to lose weight [she laughs]. I was thinking what are 
the others thinking about me? Am I over-reacting? Should I watch it? I felt my 
heart pounding. I could almost cry actually, that's how I felt.
(Participant 5 - FG3)
The way this participant describes her response to this scene highlights the close 
attention she pays to her own sense o f anticipation. Because the cop is defenceless and 
there is a knife, this participant anticipates torture and therefore chooses to self-censor 
those moments in the scene she believes to contain representations o f tortur e. She notes 
the atmosphere, and looks up to view the scene only when she anticipates the 
atmosphere has altered, i.e. the torture has ended.
This example o f self-censorship took place during a discussion gr oup and this 
participant's body language was such that she showed her anticipation for the violence 
by covering her ear s with her hands as the scene was screened, an appropriate response 
considering the type o f violence portrayed in the scene itself. This participant is very 
conscious o f her own response to this scene and how other group members perceive 
her. She thinks o f her physical appearance; she questions the intensity o f her reaction; 
she focuses on her heightened emotions: her response reveals the vulnerability she feels 
whilst self-censoring, and her conscious awareness that other people will be watching 
her reaction to viewing violence.
Thus, anticipation and preparation are conscious activities which serve to 
highlight participants' awareness o f other moviegoers. This awareness is most apparent 
when participants consider specifically male and female methods o f self-censoring. In
the next section, the way in which the issue o f gender and the two factors o f anticipation 
and preparation come together can be linked with perceived notions o f male and female 
consumers o f violent movies.
T h e  I s s u e  o f  G e n d e r
The types o f discourses used by participants when discussing methods o f 
response to media violence would suggest that perceptions o f risk-takers are constructed 
along gender lines. As in the previous chapter, when we discussed the social activity of 
media violence, it is possible to see that viewers o f media violence utilize categories in 
order to associate themselves with specific types o f risk-takers and risk products. In diis 
instance, the way that participants discuss perceptions of male and female responses to 
violence indicates that participants associate themselves widi either a responsive or non- 
responsive mediod o f response. Male participants perceive female consumers o f violent 
movies to physically and vocally respond to representations o f violence, and liberally 
self-censor, actions which male participants consider the opposite to then own non- 
responsive state when viewing violence. Female participants perceive male consumers 
o f violent movies to brace diemselves when representations o f violence occur’, and 
rarely, if  ever, self-censor whilst viewing violence. As one participant explains: ‘I don't 
want to be sexist but I know a couple o f women who wouldn't like to watch these films. 
All the geezers I know feel "I'm too hard not to watch it", but women tend to react a bit 
more’ (Participant 5 - FG1).
This construction o f types o f male and female risk-takers shapes the way in 
which participants discuss self-censorship. For example, the majority o f male
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participants claim they do not self-censor violent representations, even if  they find the 
violence disturbing and it is identified as a threshold. Methods for not self-censoring 
centr e ar ound the two areas o f anticipation and preparation. Most male group members 
prepare to sit thr ough a violent scene in its entirety and one o f the ways to prepare for 
viewing violence is to anticipate the worst and most violent scenario that could occur: 
thus when watching a scene, participants can imagine an act o f violence far* worse than 
is in actual fact depicted. One participant comments:
I sort o f put myself through seeing a film to see if  I can brave it. You know, 
everyone else has gone to see it and you're a wimp if  you can't sit through it. 
Perhaps there ar e some things that make me nauseous, but I would try to watch 
it, I wouldn't cover my eyes, I would say: ‘oh I've got to see this’. It's a bit like 
going to the dentist. (Participant 2 - FG4)
The description o f going to the dentist is apt; most male participants view violence as if  
they have the drill in their* mouth: to interrupt events may be fatal. Many male 
participants possess a serious attitude to viewing violence, they feel a responsibility to 
watch events, no matter* if  they find these events disturbing.
Other participants consider* a non-responsive state desirable when viewing 
violence and this non-responsive state is part o f testing boundaries. Two examples will 
illustrate this:
You pay your money and you want to see the whole film. You may find certain 
things distressing but you still watch the film.
(Participant 4 - FG1)
I don't think I've ever looked away fiom anything. I just want to watch the film. I 
don't really take the violent aspect into consideration when I want to watch a 
film, it's not something I think about. (Participant 3 -  FG3)
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These participants emphasize then* non-responsive state when viewing violence; 
looking away, not watching a film, thinking about the violent content in a movie are all 
activities which these participants do not take part in. They perceive themselves as 
distanced from violent representations, and even though, as the first example reveals, 
these participants may find certain scenes disturbing, they choose to watch the ‘whole’ 
film rather than self-censor.
When asked why they did not wish to self-censor, comments indicated many 
male participants feel a duty to watch the ‘whole’ movie if  they wish to take film, a 
form of ait, seriously. Two participants explain:
I know people who react in different ways to violent scenes and I think it would 
be very wrong to get so far into a film and then go, ‘no’, and turn the film off. If  
someone wants to close their eyes during a scene fair enough but to just turn it 
off and say: ‘oh no, that's too bad, I can't watch any more o f it’ is detrimental to 
an overall opinion o f the film. You can't comment on something unless you've 
seen it all the way through.
(Participant 3 - FG4)
You know a film's going to be bad, you think it's going to be bad but you watch 
out o f respect for the ait, I hope. You're preventing the film maker from 
presenting his message. The proper approach to ait is one o f humility and 
openness. Acting as a censor is a proud action not a humble action.
(Participant 4 - FG1)
Both participants are adamant films need to be watched in then entirety, and violent 
movies are no exception. For the first participant, certain forms o f self-censorship he 
has obseived in others, not himself, are acceptable forms o f behaviour when viewing 
violence, however to choose to switch off a film is a method o f self-censorship which is 
perceived as unacceptable to this participant. Why this form o f self-censorship is 
perceived as unacceptable can be related to the concept o f watching the ‘whole’ film, 
This concept implies that there is a contract entered into by the film maker and the
filmgoer. Here, this filmgoer will not breach the contract; he will be a professional and 
watch eveiy part o f the film. For the second participant, to not watch a violent film, 
even though the film may be ‘bad’, i.e. extreme, is an act o f disrespect for the film 
maker, a proud action not a humble action. For this participant self-censoring is a form 
o f sacrilege.
What is common to both participants is an awareness that it is other viewers, not 
they, who self-censor. This is exemplified when the second participant replies to a 
comment that female consumers o f violent movies over-react to scenes o f violence. He 
says: ‘I took a woman fiiend to see one o f these films and I couldn't tell her reaction. 
Well, her reaction was no reaction. She didn't move, I didn't hear her say anything, and 
she wasn't in a state afterwards. She was super cool’(Paiticipant 4 - FG1). Her reactions 
mirror this participant's own response to violence, i.e. no response, and this method of 
viewing violence is associated with male rather than female consumers o f violent 
movies - it is ‘super cool’.
For many male participants not self-censoring a violent scene or image is part of 
then interest in choosing to see violent movies in the first place. It is an enjoyable 
ordeal. Two participants comment:
The worst thing I can remember doing is if  a film gets really gross then maybe 
I'll look away, but there is that thing that you're still kind o f curious.
(Participant 1 - FG4)
If  I’m  watching a film, I don't want to miss any o f it. I'm aware that it's not 
necessarily the right thing to watch in terms o f how it has an effect on me but I 
don't seem to turn away easily.
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(Participant 1 - FG3)
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As these participants highlight, it is the challenge o f viewing the ‘whole’ film which 
draws certain participants to not self-censor; they may desire to look away, but by 
anticipating violence they can prepare to test their own boundaries o f response, to test 
endurance levels. This aspect o f male participants' response to self-censorship serves to 
indicate that for some participants, to be desensitized to violent representations is not a 
negative reaction, indeed in many ways it is a desired reaction.
Sensitivity is a term applied to perceptions o f female consumers o f violent 
movies. Female participants provide examples o f self-censorship where they have used 
anticipation and preparation to deliberately eschew specific types o f fictional violence, 
and this is something male consumers o f violent movies are perceived as unlikely to 
undertake. Two examples will illustrate this. One participant actively chooses not to 
watch horror films. She explains:
I do self-censor. I don't go and see films like Nightmare on Elm Street. I find 
them quite scary and there tends to be a predominance o f violence against 
women and I don't like that. I know a lot of people don't find them scary but I 
find them absolutely terrifying. I self-censor because I don't want to see women 
get it as victims. I went to see The Shining when I was quite young and this film 
scared me so much I just decided never to go and see another horror film. The 
thrill while you're in the cinema isn't worth the risk when you get home, when 
you can't sleep. And if  you live on your* own then you certainly don't need that 
kind o f thing, you really don't need to feel that scar ed when you're at home.
(Participant 3 - FG5)
This female participant identifies thresholds and uses self-censorship in a way which 
highlights her sensitivity to violence towards women. She is afiaid o f violence in real 
life and acknowledges that watching horror films where, as she puts it, ‘women get it as 
victims’, only serves to highlight the danger o f violence for this participant: the ‘thrill’ 
o f fictional violence isn't worth the ‘risk’ o f real fear* o f real violence. Personal
experience, reference to her fear o f horror films, reference to her awareness o f other 
moviegoers who are not disturbed by this type o f violence are factors which indicate 
this participant has a low threshold for this type of violence and liberally self-censors in 
order to control her viewing experience. She does not test her response because she is 
aware o f how fearful she will be i f  she watches horror films.
Another participant does not like to see violence towards women. She will not 
watch films which contain such representations because she fears the same violence 
may happen to her. She recalls watching True Romance and choosing to self-censor a 
specific scene because it contained violence towards women:
h i True Romance, when Alabama is fighting with that guy and she gets the 
corkscrew, I thought it was going to be a surprise and she was going to plunge it 
into his heart, but she stabbed him in the foot instead. I thought, oh no, he's 
going to rape her and she was in the bathroom with glass everywhere and I 
couldn't watch it after that. I didn't watch the rest o f the film.
(Participant 2 - FG3)
This participant anticipates Alabama (Patricia Arquette) will be raped and killed. She 
prepares herself for this event and self-censors, yet by self-censoring she is unaware that 
Alabama violently and successfully defends herself against her attacker. Therefore, this 
participant highlights her sensitivity to violence towards women in film by choosing to 
self-censor, but through doing so is not able to watch the ‘whole’ film and consequently 
does not realize Alabama is not raped and killed. For many male participants, this form 
o f self-censorship would be a sacrilege, revealing a low threshold for violence and an 
inability to comment on the entire film. Once again, this participant does not wish to 
test her response because she is aware how disturbed she will be if  a female character is 
raped and killed in a fiction film.
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Participants' response to self-censorship and boundary testing so far reveals 
there is a perceived gender division in the way participants view violence. However, 
subtle variations and contradictions in participants' response to self-censorship indicates 
that the way participants perceive response is veiy different to the actuality o f response 
to thresholds o f violence. What can be seen is that participants borrow methods of 
response from what are perceived as traditionally male or female domains. Thus, 
participants undermine the gender division they themselves perceive, by reacting 
differently to the perceived notion o f male and female viewing methods. What is more, 
all participants utilize context, characterization and the role o f anticipation when 
choosing whether to self-censor or not, and these shared methods may be used to 
achieve different goals, but they also seive to highlight how similar male and female 
participants' response to violence can be.
For example, many male participants at first indicated they did not self-censor 
and wished to ‘endure’ fictional representations of violence. However, once this 
distinction had been made contradictions occurred within male attitudes to self­
censorship. Once having stated: ‘I do not self-censor’ rare examples o f self-censorship 
ensue: ‘I do not self-censor, but there was this one occasion...’ Two participants 
comment on rare instances o f self-censorship:
I went to see Misery and when James Caan's legs are broken it made me want to 
put my hands over my eyes. I watched it the first time, and when I knew she 
was going to hit him I put my hands over my eyes. What made me watch it 
again was to try and keep my eyes open the second time.
(Participant 2 - FG1)
The only time I would consciously glance away is if  the violence is to do with 
the phallic - it just hits a spot, my crutch - but normally I try not to self-censor. I 
actually do prefer to watch and try to take on boar d the message o f a film.
(Participant 1 - FG6)
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Here, these t w o  participants identify thresholds and choose to self-censor. Both 
participants point out this is not a c o m m o n  occurrence; the fir st example emphasizes he 
watched the sa m e scene again in order to test his o w n  boundaries; the second example 
states that most of the time, apart fiom this exception, he will always watch a film in its 
entirety and ‘try not to self-censor’. However, despite these considerations it is still 
possible to see h o w  these male participants utilize elements of what is perceived to be 
female response to viewing violence. It is the exception to the rule that is of significance 
here. These male participants construct then responses based o n  perceptions of a 
specific type of risk-taker they wish to associate themselves with, i.e. a non-responsive 
male viewer of media violence. However, they also discuss rare occasions w h e n  they 
have acted against type, w h e n  they have s h o w n  a sensitivity to an act of violence. T h e  
fact that both male participants emphasize the exception to the rule -  ‘try to keep m y  
eyes open the second time’, ‘I do prefer to watch’- is an indication that they wish to 
remain associated with male types of risk-takers, and yet, there must be a purpose to 
recalling such exceptions to the rule: the purpose of such recollections is to s h o w  that 
male risk-takers can be sensitive, and that a non-responsive state is something that is 
cultivated, that is constructed b y  the risk-taker.
This utilization of different methods of response can be found in female 
participants' discussion of self-censorship. A  nu m b e r  of female participants adopt what 
is perceived as specifically male attitudes to viewing violence. A s  one participant 
explains:
I do try to m a k e  myself watch things. It's interesting to m e  w h y  people don't 
watch violence. W h y  is it that m e n  m a k e  themselves watch? I find I've got an 
element of that in m y  personality and I will force myself to watch things; it's
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kind of like a test. I'm a person w h o  has a great need to k n o w  a lot of things. I 
try to watch because I need to know.
(Participant 4 - F G 3 )  
Another female participant c o m me n ts  on her desire to not self-censor violence:
I can't think of anything that w o ul d  m a k e  m e  say: ‘No, I'm not going to see that’ 
because it has something I don't like in it. I don't like eyes and injections, but I 
wouldn't turn a w a y  completely and I wouldn't not go and see a film just because 
I hear s o m e b o d y  gets their eye gouged out. S o m e  films are really awful and I 
think I don't really want to watch any mo r e  of this, but I do try to stick with 
tilings, just so as I can talk about them. (Participant 1 - F G 5 )
A s  with male participants w h o  recall instances of self-censorship, certain female 
participants utilize what are perceived as specifically male responses to viewing 
violence. These t wo female participants actively try to not self-censor because they 
wish to watch the ‘whole’ film, and even if they find certain representations of violence 
disturbing they will still try to test then* o w n  boundaries and steel themselves to watch 
fictional violence. T h e  w a y  that these t w o  female participants adopt the s a me  type of 
rhetoric used b y  male participants w h e n  discussing their responses to media violence 
suggests that having a desire to k n o w  the outcome, and wanting to ‘stick with things’ is 
perceived to be part of the repertoire of male risk-takers.
There is a conscious crossing over taking place here that reveals that consumers 
of media violence can adopt methods of response which best suit their purposes in a 
given situation. Therefore, although participants construct specific types of risk-takers 
in order to associate themselves with types of responses to media violence, they also 
transfer methods of response from both categories of risk-takers into then* individual 
repertoire of responses to media violence. Thus, whilst a male consumer of media
violence associates himself with a type of risk-taker that is strong, capable and able to 
endure representations of violence, he will also draw upon other types of responses, 
such as sensitivity, in order to present an alternative portrait of a male risk-taker. This is 
because, although consumers of media violence associate themselves with types of risk- 
takers, individual practices vary from person to person. In the final section of this 
chapter male and female participants highlight the significance of boundary testing to 
the process of viewing violence, and w e  shall see that testing boundaries and going 
against type can be an exhilarating experience, an experience that participants 
deliberately seek out as one of die benefits of risk-taking behaviour*.
T e s tin g  R e a c tio n s
Evidence fiom the focus groups suggests there are diree factors which are of 
significance to diresholds and self-censorship and the process of viewing violence. 
These factors are:
• C o n s u m e r  Choice;
• Expectation;
• Boundary testing.
T h e  function of thresholds and self-censorship is to utilize these three factors and test 
response to viewing violence. Whilst watching violent movies, participants identify 
individual thresholds, anticipate and prepare for these thresholds to occur, and choose
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whether to self-censor or not. It is through consumer choice that participants test 
boundaries. It is tire w a y  in which participants utilize boundary testing that indicates 
there are strong similarities between the w a y  male and female participants respond to 
violent movies. Whether self-censoring or not self-censoring, participants employ 
consumer choice, expectation and a desire to test individual response. Co n s u m e r  choice 
signifies the methods b y which participants choose to watch/not watch specific films or 
scenes containing violence; expectation signifies the w a y  in which participants identify 
thresholds and choose to self-censor; boundary testing signifies a strong desire to 
monitor individual response w h e n  engaged in die social activity of viewing violence.
A  n u m b e r  of examples will serve to illustrate this. O n e  participant actively self­
censors, using all methods available. W h e n  watching the ear-amputation scene from 
Reservoir Dogs during the discussion, this participant forced herself to watch the scene 
a second time. She explains:
W h e n  the scene started I thought ‘oh  God, no I can't watch any of this’ but 
because it wasn't the exact bit where the cop gets his ear' cut off and I k n e w  this 
wasn't for a while I watched the scene right up until Mr. Blonde got the knife 
out and the music c a m e  on. Then, I thought, ‘oh, this is the bit where I wouldn't 
watch last time’. This time, I w a s  sitting there thinking ‘oh  n o ’ but I carried on 
watching. I s a w  Mr. Blonde stand in fiont of the cop and chop his ear* off and I 
felt physically sick while he w a s  doing it. I watched the bit afterwards w h e n  he 
talks into the ear-. That w a s  disgusting. But I think I w a s  m o r e  disturbed the first 
time w h e n  I didn't see h i m  doing it.
(Participant 2 - F G 3 )
This participant tests herself to see h o w  long she can watch this scene without self- 
censoring. She anticipates and prepares for the violence to occur', using her past 
knowledge of the scene to influence present viewing. H er reasons for doing this can be 
attributed fust to the environment she is in; as part of a discussion group there is s o m e
pressure on her to watch the scene so that she can talk about it later. However, it is also 
clear fiom her bo d y language and excited retelling of key stages in the scene that she 
gets a certain amount of satisfaction fiom testing her o w n  thresholds with regard to 
violence. She recalls each stage in s o m e  detail. First, she thinks ‘o h God, no I can't 
watch any of this’, then she thinks ‘oh, this is the bit where I wouldn't watch last time’. 
Already, her response has altered; no  longer is it the whole scene, but only a small 
portion of it that she remembers as disturbing. Thus, the violence becomes m or e 
manageable, and she tests her reaction to the scene a second time round. This time, the 
violence is not so disturbing. E a ch  stage in die scene is accompanied by a testing of 
boundaries, and it is methods of self-censorship which aid this complex response.
A s  this example reveals, there is an excitement to be gained fiom boundary 
testing. A s  one participant describes it: ‘I love the dirill of daring yourself to watch a 
violent scene - that's a real kick. No, I'm not going to watch and dien yeah, just do it, 
m a k e  yourself watch it’ (Participant 7 - FG2). Part of the pleasure to be gained fiom 
watching media violence is to daring oneself to watch scenes, or films, to go against 
type and take risks in the viewing environment. For s o m e  participants, this risk is part 
of a conscious decision to alter then perception of risk-taking behaviour. A n  extract 
fiom a discussion of reasons for boundary testing and choosing different types of 
entertainment will help substantiate this point.
O n e  participant describes the satisfaction to be had fiom changing consumer 
tastes, and being ‘open’ to seeing films this participant has never before wished to see.
A  fiiend and I both ended five year* relationships at the s am e  time and were 
extremely miserable. I've always said I hate violent movies but I just thought, 
well, what the hell - Til go and do something really horr ible n o w  because I want 
to counteract the relationship. So, for a four or* five m o n t h  stmt w e  only sa w 
violent films to prove w e  could do it.
309
310
H o w  did that m a k e  y o u  feel? (Interviewer -  F G 5 )
I felt achievement that I’d  got myself out and I’m  doing things because I did 
feel that I w a s  better able to define boundaries between myself and the cinema. I 
felt exhilaration because of the action o n the screen, and also because I wa s  
doing something which w a s n ’t anything that I had done before. N e w  areas, you 
know. Also, w e  were kind of laughing at the whole thing which w a s  extremely 
-  m e  and m y  mate -  w e  were feeling really awful but w e  were going out and 
seeing these horrible films. I wanted to see these films for m y  o w n  benefit, you 
know, kind of use the system. It w a s  veiy therapeutic. So  with a long, 
particularly drawn out scene like the ear scene in Reservoir Dogs I say to 
myself: ‘I will see this and I will get something out of it and I will test myself.
(Participant 2 - F G 5 )
I’m  really interested in this. I k n o w  y o u ’ve got veiy personal reasons for 
wanting to monitor these films but h o w  far is it to do with your gender, or your 
personality. For example, are y o u  the kind of person w h o  isn’t particularly into 
violence or is it because y o u ’re female? I’ve never had a conflict with -  you 
know, I’m  a w o m a n ,  I shouldn’t be watching these films.
(Participant 1 -  F G 5 )
No, I d o n ’t think it’s a gender thing, I think it’s just me. I thought I w a s  a 
sensitive person w h o  didn't like violent films. I shied a w a y  fiom them. I thought 
they were morally wrong. A n d  then you go through a stage where all your 
boundaries just dissolve and y ou don't k n o w  where the hell yo u  are, and you 
feel liberated at the s a me  time. I think film is a good m e d i u m  for doing that 
because it is so realistic, it enables y ou to use your brain and feel immediate 
catharsis. It's very therapeutic.
(Participant 2 - F G 5 )
(Participant 2 - FG5)
T h e  first participant uses the process of viewing violence for her o w n  benefit. She 
identifies the three areas the reactive mechanisms of thresholds and self-censorship are 
primarily concerned with: consumer choice; expectation; boundary testing, and relates 
these factors to her reasons for choosing to see violent movies: ‘I will see this and I will 
get something out of it and I will test myself.
W e  can see fiom this extract that this participant takes s o m e  time to explain the 
change in her perception of risk-takers and risk products. Prompted b y  another female
participant, she claims that it is not because of her gender but because of herself that she 
chose to not watch violent movies before. However, the w a y  that she describes herself 
as a ‘sensitive person w h o  didn’t like violent films’ is very similar* to the construction of 
female viewers of media violence, as discussed b y participants earlier in this chapter. 
N o t  only that, but this participant describes herself in the past as a non-risk-taker, 
s omeone w h o  used to perceive the dangers of media violence, w h o  used to consider it to 
be ‘morally w r o n g ’. It is significant to A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis that it is her 
personal experience that alters her perception of this type of risk product. T h e  metaphor 
of boundaries dissolving is significant because it is as these conceptual boundaries 
dissolve that the real experience of viewing media violence takes over. Testing 
boundaries and monitoring responses is a satisfying experience. This participant 
describes it as exhilarating; she feels a sense of achievement, and she perceives very 
real benefits to this type of risk-taking behaviour. For her, the benefits are therapeutic; 
she feels ‘liberated’. W h a t  is clear is that in her explanation of her risk-taking 
behaviour, this participant perceives herself as taking risks in a safe environment; 
violent movies m a y  appear real, but part of her attraction to this type of entertainment is 
that they are virtual risks, and can therefore be controlled and used for personal benefit.
C onclusion
Boundary testing signifies consumer response to violent movies. There is no 
one method of self-censoring representations of violence, and participants utilize a 
range of methods from not self-censoring at all, to peeking through fingers, to 
eschewing specific types of violence altogether. Various methods of self-censorship are 
available because participants have complex and contradictory responses to viewing
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violence. Various methods of self-censorship are employed because participants' 
responses are fluid and dynamic.
In relation to risk, it is possible to see that consumers of media violence balance 
then behaviour according to perceptions of risk and real experience of risk. Thus, social 
and personal thr esholds to violence ar e an example of the w a y  in which perceptions of 
risk and real experience of risk shape the viewing process. Methods of self-censorship 
are a m e a n s to m a n a g e  risk and remain in control of the risk experience. This 
m a n a g e m e n t  of risk involves physical and cognitive responses to media violence and it 
also involves testing boundaries. Boundary testing is an example of the w a y  in which 
risk-takers adjust the setting of their risk thermostat. A s  the thermostat reaches a certain 
level, the risk-taker tests past and future settings; they dare themselves to watch a 
violent scene they k n o w  they will find disturbing because it is exciting and rewarding: 
testing boundar ies is one of the perceived benefits to this type of risk-taking behaviour*.
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Safety Precautions
John A d a m s  (1997, p. 19) points out that ‘people.. .persist in being their o w n  
judges of what is safe’. In this chapter of this study I want to consider h o w  
responses to media violence are shaped b y  perceptions of safety. In the previous t wo 
chapters, w e  looked at h o w  the social activity of media violence and the significance 
of testing boundaries are centr al to our understanding of h o w  and w h y  people choose 
to watch media violence. Viewers of media violence monitor their* o w n  responses in 
relation to others and this is because, according to A d a m s ’ risk thermostat 
hypothesis, perceptions of risk are influenced b y  one’s o w n  and other* people’s risk 
behaviour*. It is also the case that one of the perceived benefits to watching media 
violence is the opportunity to self-regulate risk and to test boundaries, both of which 
are methods of response that rely o n  a delicate balancing act between perceptions of 
the dangers and benefits of media violence. This is w h y  the concept of safety is so 
significant to the m a n a g e m e n t  of risk and media violence. If viewers of media 
violence feel safe and in control of their risk-taking behaviour then they are m o r e  
inclined to take risks and test boundaries. However, if viewers of media violence do 
not feel safe and in control of their* risk-taking behaviour then they will be mo r e 
likely to regulate their response and even withdraw from the perceived threat 
completely.
Safety precautions, therefore, are important to our understanding of the 
m a n a g e m e n t  of risk, and in this chapter evidence from the focus gr oup discussions 
will suggest that consumers of media violence are the best judges of what is ‘safe’
entertainment. It is once viewers feel ‘safe’ that they can enjoy certain types of 
violent movies. There is a balance to be found in relation to h o w  m u c h  ‘risk’ a 
viewer wishes to take, and h o w  m u c h  enjoyment they wish to have fiom watching a 
movie. T h e  greater a viewer’s sense of control of the viewing experience, the greater 
will be then sense of enjoyment at engaging in a ‘risk-taking activity’. Certain types 
of movies are perceived to be m o r e  entertaining than others, and there are certain 
types of violence that is considered to be not entertaining in any way, for example 
realistic representations of female rape, however for movies such as Pulp Fiction of 
Natural Born K illers it is important to point out that participants did enjoy seeing 
such movies. These films m a y  be distressing and shocking in certain scenes, but they 
are also perceived to be entertaining. This is something that should not be forgotten 
in discussion of the perceived benefits of engaging in a ‘risk-taking activity’.
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S a fe  E n v iro n m e n t
In the focus group discussions a great deal of attention w a s  given to the 
safety of the viewing environment. Participants discussed the w a y  in which the type 
of viewing environment had a substantial effect o n they w a y  in which they chose to 
respond to media violence. Different viewing environments have an effect on 
participants' attitudes to self-censorship. For example, most participants do not walk 
out of the cinema, but do switch off videos if they find a violent scene too disturbing. 
T w o  participants explain:
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It's m u c h  easier to switch off a video. W e  do that all the time. There's lots of 
videos I've not watched to the conclusion but there is only one film I’ve ever 
walked out of in m y  life. There is a difference.
(Participant 4 - F G 3 )
There w a s  something the other day I recorded and I w a s  watching it and it 
w a s  horrible and I turned it off. T h e n  I thought Til watch it again a bit later 
and I turned it on and stalled watching a bit m or e  of it but I couldn't watch it 
and turned it off completely.
(Participant 3 - F G 5 )
Participants self-censor m o r e  freely in the h o m e  environment than at the cinema. 
T h e y  feel m o r e  able to identify thresholds and choose to self-censor because the 
h o m e  environment is familial* and time is flexible. A s  both examples illustrate, 
participants can return to a film m a n y  times in the h o m e  environment and self-censor 
a film in stages, whereas at the cinema this would not be so easy to undertake. 
Participants consider the cinematic environment to offer less diversions, and less 
opportunities to self-censor; they invest time and m o n e y  into a social activity where 
the wide screen d emands attention and the darkness silence.
Certain films are deliberately chosen to be watched in the h o m e  environment 
because there are m o r e  opportunities to self-censor. Therefore, although participants 
acknowledge that concentration is attenuated in the h o m e  environment, certain 
participants still choose to view specific violent movies o n video. A s  one participant 
explains:
If you're watching something o n video you're mo r e likely to shout things out 
and scream and talk and m a k e  stupid comme nt s  which I w o u l d  never do in 
the cinema. And, of cour se, there is that sort of line w h e n  you're in your* o w n  
h o m e  and yo u  might not accept certain things.
(Participant 1 - FG5)
Certain participants utilize self-censorship w h e n  the line has been crossed and they 
do not wish to ‘accept’ certain levels, or types of fictional violence in then o w n  
home.
T w o  participants discuss w h y  they choose to watch certain violent movies at 
h o m e  rather than at the cinema:
I w a s  prepared to see Reservoir Dogs on video rather than at the cinema 
because I k n e w  that I could obviously walk out of the r o o m  or I could feel 
comfortable averting m y  eyes, or switching off, pick up a magazine if it did 
have a bad effect on me, if I w a s n ’t happy watching it.
(Participant 5 - F G 3 )
Pulp Fiction I s a w  at the cinema because I k n e w  what w a s  going to be in it, 
and it w a s  quite funny rather than being gory and violent and disgusting. But, 
Reservoir Dogs and True Romance I wanted to watch o n  video rather than at 
the cinema so that I could not watch it.
(Participant 2 - F G 3 )
Both participants cite specific films which they wish to watch at h o m e  because they 
can self-censor what is ‘gory and violent and disgusting’. Methods of self-censorship 
involve certain types of filters, such as reading a magazine whilst remaining in the 
viewing environment, and m o r e  physical barriers to media violence, such as walking 
out of the r o o m  or switching off the television. Indeed, for one participant the 
knowledge that she can not watch True Romance or Reservoir Dogs (i.e. she can 
self-censor) is a significant reason in her choosing to view these films in the h o m e  
environment. T h e  cinema wou ld  not allow such freedom of self-censorship.
Implicit in participants' c o m m e n t s  so far is the impression that the h o m e  is a 
safe environment for certain types of violent movies. However, other participants 
perceive the h o m e  as the opposite to a safe environment, and choose to watch 
specific violent movies at the cinema because they do not wish certain violent
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movies to enter into the h o m e  environment. For example, one participant berated her 
partner for renting Man Bites Dog. She explains:
It w a s  a Saturday night at ten to nine and I said, shall w e  watch a video 
tonight, and he c a m e  back with Man Bites Dog. I thought: ‘it's not a Saturday 
night film’. I got really angry with h i m  for putting it on, and I just said T'm 
not fucking watching this’ and I walked out of the room. It's the only time 
I've ever done that. It’s the only time I’ve ever reacted like that because I 
k n e w  what it w a s  like, and I w ond er  whether m a y b e  it w a s  because of a 
stubbornness in m e  because -  oh  —  once yo u  hired this film I k n e w  that w e  
couldn’t take it back and I just said ‘w h y  the fuck have y o u  got that for?’, 
and I walked out the r o o m  and spoilt the whole thing...
(Participant 5 - F G 3 )
Having heard about the violent content of the movie before hand, this participant 
be ca m e angry with her partner for assuming she would enjoy such a movie at h o m e  
o n Saturday night. T h e  time and day are significant; in her opinion this movie is not 
an entertaining film - something she anticipated for a Saturday night. W h a t  is more, 
she is sensitive to the fact that the movie is in her h o m e  in the first place: her h o m e  is 
not a safe place to watch the movie. T h e  w a y  that this participant repeats her angry 
response to her partner -  ‘w h y  the fuck have y o u  got that for?’ and T ' m  not fucking 
watching this’ -  serves to emphasize h o w  frustrated this participant is to not take part 
in the decision making process; and the fact that she cannot take the film back 
because it is too late in the evening only serves to frustrate her even m o r e  -  the film 
has to stay in her house until the next day and is a visible risk to the safety of her 
h o m e  environment.
Other participants c o m m e n t  o n  the w a y  in which they wish to highlight the 
virtual risks of media violence b y  viewing certain violent movies at the cinema. T w o  
examples will illustrate this:
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Watching a film in the cinema is a veiy safe place to be because y ou are 
surrounded b y  people all having the s am e  effect, they’re all scared: then you 
go out of the cinema and it's a completely different world. W h e n  I'm 
watching a film in m y  o w n  h o m e  it's a completely different experience - it 
doesn't feel very safe. If I'm the only one there I can't watch certain films 
because I will b e c o m e  too frightened to c an y  on  watching.
(Participant 6 - F G 2 )
I prefer to see something at the cinema; it mak e s it mo r e  fonnal. T o  see a 
film on video - I m a y  find that m o r e  disturbing. I like a fonnal separation 
between m y  life and what I choose to go and see.
(Participant 2 - F G 5 )
It is possible to see h o w  these participants, unlike the earlier examples, do not find 
then h o m e  environment safe, and do not wish to use methods of self-censorship to 
establish a safe environment. A  ‘formal separation’ between the fictional world of 
the film and the real world of the viewer is of primary importance here.
Audience viewing figures indicate participants choose to watch the target 
films at the cinema and at h o m e  in roughly equal amounts. Tables 7 and 8 reveal 
Reservoir Dogs and Pulp Fiction are the most popular* movies to have been seen at 
the cinema, with 25 and 32 participants having viewed each film respectively, and 
Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction and True Romance the most popular movies to have 
been viewed at home, with 22, 17 and 19 participants having seen each film 
respectively. Figures for cinema viewing are higher than those for h o m e  viewing in 
the case of Reservoir Dogs and Pulp Fiction, but True Romance scores higher on 
h o m e  viewing, whilst Natural Born K illers has roughly the s a me  figures (12, 13) in 
each table, despite the fact that it is not legally available on video in this country.
T h e  C i n e m a  Advertising Association's Film Profile of Pulp Fiction and 
Reservoir Dogs for* August 1996 (see Table la-c, Chapter four) estimates the total
n u m b e r  of people w h o  claimed to see these films at 4,330,000 and 1,344,000, in 
comparison with K illing  Zoe or Man Bites Dog which only attracted 250,000, and 
286,000 moviegoers. Table 8 reveals that the nu m b e r  of video retail units sold of the 
target films corresponds with the difference in figures noted for cinema viewing. 
Pulp Fiction, for example, sold 371,394 video retail units in 1995, whilst K illing  Zoe 
sold approximately 30,000 in 1996, and Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r only sold 
just under 7,000 in 1996. W h a t  such cross referencing reveals is that participants’ 
preference for Pulp Fiction and Reservoir Dogs at the cinema and o n  video is typical 
of other moviegoers in the Great Britain.
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Table 7: C i n e m a  Vi ewing Figures
Film M a l e F e m a l e Total
Reservoir Dogs 13 12 25
Pulp Fiction 19 13 32
True Romance 6 8 14
Natural Born K illers 6 6 12
Man Bites Dog 1 2 3
Henry, Portrait o f.. 1 2 3
Bad Lieutenant 4 3 7
K illing  Zoe 1 1
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Table 8: Video Viewing Figures
Film M a l e F e m a l e Total
Reservoir Dogs 16 6 22
Pulp Fiction 12 5 17
True Romance 14 5 19
Natural Born K illers 8 5 13
Man Bites Dog 8 5 13
Henry, Portrait of... 7 5 12
Bad Lieutenant 9 2 11
K illing  Zoe 7 1 8
Table 9: Video Retail Unit Figures
Film/Distributor No.of Units
Reservoir Dogs 250,000
Polygram Film Entertainment Aug. 1996
Pulp Fiction 371,394
B e u n o  Vista H o m e  Entertainment Sept. 1995
Henry, Portrait of... 6894
Electric Pictur es Aug. 1996
Bad Lieutenant 24,718
Guild Film Distribution Aug. 1996
K illing  Zoe 30,000 July
Polygram Film Entertainment 1996
No figures for Man Bites Dog or Tme Romance
Cross tabulation (Tables 7 and 8) reveals Man Bites Dog, Henry, Portrait o f 
a Serial K ille r, Bad Lieutenant and K illing  Zoe score m o r e  highly on  h o m e  viewing, 
and these are all films participants consider realistic and in m a n y  cases not 
entertaining. In contrast, Pulp Fiction is considered the most entertaining, and this is 
the film most participants have seen at the cinema. This m a y  reflect c o m m e n t s  m a d e  
earlier b y  participants that certain films are chosen to be watched at h o m e  because 
there is m o r e  opportunity for self-censorship. However, it m a y  also reflect the 
availability of certain films on video rather than at the cinema. Pulp Fiction and 
Reservoir Dogs received widespread cinematic release for a long period of time 
(Reservoir Dogs w a s  released in January 1993 and is still showing in selected 
cinemas), whereas other target films received short cinematic release, and quickly 
be ca m e m o r e  widely available o n  video.
C o m m e n t s  m a d e  regarding the h o m e  and cinematic environment and 
methods of self-censorship were m a d e  b y  female participants. N o  male participant 
claimed to choose one form of environment over another in relation to the violent 
content of a film. Table 7 indicates there is no substantial difference between the 
figures for male and female participants' cinema consumption of the tar get films. 13 
male participants and 12 female participants chose to watch Reservoir Dogs at the 
cinema; 6 male participants and 8 female participants chose to watch True Romance 
at the cinema; and, whilst Pulp Fiction reveals s o m e  difference in figures, 19 male 
participants and 13 female participants, all other target films attract similar- viewing 
figures regardless of gender. However, Table 8 indicates there is a substantial 
difference between the numbers of male and female participants w h o  choose to 
watch the target films in the h o m e  environment. 16 male participants as opposed to 6 
female participants chose to watch Reservoir Dogs on video; 14 male participants
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and 5 female participants chose to watch True Romance on video: each target film 
scores substantially less in the column for female video viewing figures.
Taking into account c o m m e nt s  m a d e  exclusively by  female participants 
regarding the h o m e  environment as unsafe, these figures would indicate m a n y  
female participants actively choose to watch the target films at the cinema because 
they perceive the cinematic environment as presenting a formal separation between 
fiction and reality. T h e  fact that h o m e  viewing provides m o r e  opportunities for self­
censorship does not influence the majority of female participants to choose to watch 
violent movies in the h o m e  environment. This is of significance to our* understanding 
of John A d a m ’s risk thermostat hypothesis in relation to media violence. A d a m s  
(1995, p. 15) claims that the ‘setting of die risk thermostat varies fiom one individual 
to another, one group to another, one culture to another’. Whilst this variability is 
apparent in the focus group discussions, it is also possible to see in this instance the 
type of environment is just as important to the w a y  people perceive the risks of 
media violence. A t  the cinema, viewers can emphasize the virtual risks of media 
violence; at home, viewers m a y  perceive these virtual risks as m o r e  real and they 
m a y  feel m o r e  threatened and perceive m o r e  danger in the h o m e  environment. The 
fact that participants used a variety of different discourses and chose to vary their* 
responses to media violence depending o n types of film and types of viewing 
environment wou ld  also suggest that in this instance the function of self-censorship 
is to highlight consumer choice. W h a t  participants s e e m  most concerned with, 
whatever then* choice of viewing environment, is whether they w o ul d  feel safe, and 
this is an issue that I want to consider m o r e  closely in the next section.
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S a fe  E n te rta in m e n t
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If there is a right environment for viewing media violence, then there is also 
a right type of entertainment to be viewed in this environment. N o t  all aspects of 
media violence are perceived to be the same, and, indeed, participants in tbis study 
m a d e  a clear* distinction between different types of ‘safe’ entertainment. Just as 
participants perceive a type of risk taker w h o  is sensitive and matur e and above all 
‘safe’ in then* responses to media violence, so too is tbere a type of risk product 
which is perceived to be intelligent, sensitive and ‘safe’. W h a t  ‘safe’ signifies in this 
instance is a risk-taker w h o  is aware of the difference between real violence and 
fictional violence, and a risk product which m a ke s  a clear* distinction between real 
violence and fictional violence.
In Chapter* nine participants considered the social activity of media violence, 
and discussed different types of risk-takers in s o m e  detail. W h a t  is significant here, is 
that the construction of different types of risk-takers and risk products allowed 
participants to associate themselves with the type of risk-taker* they felt most did 
justice to then* responses to media violence. This type of risk-taker is an intelligent, 
sensitive and safe consumer* of media violence. Th e  types of participants w h o  took 
part in the focus group discussions w o ul d  also classify tbemselves as intelligent, 
sensitive and safe moviegoers, moviegoers w h o  like different types of entertainment, 
s o m e  of which can be classified as media violence. Hi e  point is that participants in 
tbis study do not wish to be associated with popular perceptions of viewers of media 
violence w h o  are the type of risk-takers w h o  ar e neither intelligent, sensitive or safe,
w h o  do not k n o w  the difference between reality and fantasy, and w h o  do not k n o w  
that real violence is abhorrent and painful and in no  w a y  entertaining.
In other words, there is a learned social behaviour for moviegoers to respond 
to films or television programmes in an appropriate manner. For the purposes of this 
study, the type of moviegoer is an active consumer of media violence, and therefore 
the learned social behaviour for moviegoers of media violence is very specific. So 
far*, w e  have seen that within the categorization of media violence, there ar e m a n y  
different types of risk-takers and risk products, and there are m a n y  different 
responses to media violence. Participants in this study are primarily middle class and 
educated; this reflects the type of moviegoer of tire target films (see Chapter eight for 
further details), and w e  can see that this particular* consumer of the target films 
chooses to see this type of risk product because it is intelligent and sensitive and 
safe. H i e  risk product reflects the consumer tastes of the risk-taker. Thus, w h e n  
participants discuss the difference between Hollywood action movies and ‘n e w  
brutalism’ movies in Chapter nine, they differentiate between these types of media 
violence in order to differentiate between types of risk-takers. H i e  participants in this 
study enjoy Hollywood action movies but are not nearly so enthusiastic or so full of 
praise as they are towards the target films. H i e  target films are intelligent, they have 
g o o d scripts, they are well directed, they are well acted, they are subtle in their 
treatment of violence. Participants in this study appreciate such qualities and 
perceive themselves as best equipped to respond to such films in an acceptable 
manner. If this study were concerned with consumers of action movies, w e  would 
have a different set of criteria and a different perception of what are acceptable and 
desirable responses to this type of media violence (Barker and Brooks, 1997).
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W h a t  w e  shall see in the following sections is the w a y  in which participants 
construct particular* types of discourses that serve to highlight the intelligence, 
sensitivity and safety of types of risk-takers and risk products. T h e  participants in 
this study are the type of risk-takers w h o  perceive real violence to be abhorr ent and 
not entertaining in any way; it is because real violence is so horrific, that participants 
turn to fictional violence in order to explore the virtual risks of media violence: 
media violence is only truly entertaining w h e n  it is far* removed fiom the reality of 
violence in our* eveiyday lives.
R e a l V io lence is  N o t En te rta in in g
All participants clearly differentiate between real violence and fictional 
violence. Participants are deeply affected b y  real violence, whether they have been a 
witness to violence or experienced violence themselves. T w o  participants explain 
then* response to real violence and mediated images of violence:
If I see people fighting it upsets m e  m o r e  than anything I can tell you, mo r e 
than anything I could ever watch at the cinema. I can't believe anyone is 
m o r e  sensitive to violence than I a m  in a real life situation.
(Participant 1 - F G 3 )
Real violence has a m u c h  m o r e  lasting impact. These are real people, that 
could have been a fiiend of mine, this could have been someone fiom m y  
family, y ou know. I w a s  thinking of s o m e  ne w s  footage of a massacre in 
Rwanda. That w a s  m u c h  m o r e  shocking than these films. Real violence is 
really, really disturbing and really hard to take because it's so relentless. 
There are n o  clever one-liners, there are no little bits of humour* to let y ou off 
the h oo k  - the violence is raw.
(Participant 1 - FG4)
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In both instances, each participant uses fictional violence to differentiate between the 
impact of real violence and viewing fictional violence: real violence is intense and 
shocking because it is real - it has a lasting impact, an impact fictional violence does 
not possess.
Participants do not find real violence, or mediated images of real violence 
entertaining. M a n y  participants avoid watching news/documentary footage of 
violence and self-censor mediated images of real violence. O n e  group m e m b e r  
comments:
There are certain tilings o n  the n e w s  I've avoided. W h e n  there w as  the 
Hillsborough disaster, the last thing I wanted to see w a s  people getting 
crushed, it's not necessary. There are things like that I definitely avoid at all 
costs.
(Participant 1 - F G 3 )
Participants point out real life experience of violence influences then response to 
fictional violence. For a f ew participants this leads to active self-censorship of 
specific types of fictional violence, however for others it can highlight h o w  unreal 
fictional violence is in comparison to personal experience of violence. T h e  following 
extract is an example of h o w  participants consider the impact of real violence and 
the role fictional violence has to play in an understanding of violence in our society:
Unfortunately, the lower d o w n  y ou are on  the economic scale the m o re  
chance you have to witness violence whether you agree with it or not. Y o u  
actually do witness the extent of violence and the d a m a g e  it does, whereas 
the higher up the social ladder y o u  climb the m o r e  likely y o u  are to depend 
o n the telly to portray what y o u  accept as an image of violence... If someone 
gets glassed or slashed or whatever else - you have a gaping wound, there's 
an awful lot of blood and y o u  see parts of tissue and everything else and it is 
not pleasant. In a film, at best they s h o w  blood and all of a sudden it's 
covered - they don't actually s h o w  yo u  the extent of it. I m e a n  there’s a
327
p r o g r a m m e  I'm watching about the battles up in Scotland between different 
gangs, and they just s h ow e d one bloke w h o  had been taken into hospital w h o  
had been done with a machete, but I m e a n  you're talking about absolute 
gaping wounds, yo u  know. I m e a n  this w a s  real life. T h e y  don't s h o w  it in 
films and they don't s h o w  it on  the news. This w a s  one documentary over a 
hospital where it just actually sh o w e d  - only for a few seconds - but it 
s h o w e d  the extent of the w o u n d s  and they were horrific. I don't think people 
realise the d a m a g e  that weapons do and anything else - whether it's warfare 
or whether it's just gang warfare - people are anaesthetized to the effects of it.
(Participant 1 -  F G 6 )
W h a t  about those pictures on T V  w h e n  that lad w h o  got burnt, that w a s  
obviously quite traumatic - he w a s  obviously going to die and that w a s  
disturbing. I think y o u  have to sort of have a self-preservation thing don't 
you? If y o u  expose yourself to all m a nner of violence everyday you would 
just - it wou l d be intolerable for a normal person to carry on. I mean, in a lot 
of these films - Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction for instance - there is a lot of 
h u m o u r  in these films which is I think - 1 don't k n o w  if that is really to s h o w  
the h u m o u r  in it or s h o w  the violence - I mean, I don't really k n o w  what 
direction he's [Quentin Tarantino] coming fiom but what c a m e  through, 
especially in Pulp Fiction - it w a s  a really funny film, that w a s  m y  -
(Participant 2 -  F G 6 )
W h i c h  is even m o r e  - m o r e  dangerous in m a n y  ways.
(Participant 3 - F G 6 )
Here, mediated images of real violence are implicitly criticized for their inability to 
s h o w  the consequences of first hand experiences of real violence. For the fust 
speaker, experience of real violence is linked to his social upbringing, and he claims 
such an upbringing brought h i m  into contact with real violence, a contact which 
serves to highlight the unreality of fictional violence and mediated images of real 
violence. It is the ‘extent’ of violence and the consequences of violent acts which are 
significant to this participant; without knowledge of real violence, middle to upper 
class viewers ‘accept’ mediated images of real violence as real, w h e n  clearly, for this 
participant, this is not the case. H e  calls for m o r e  graphic images of real violence so 
that everyone will b e c o m e  less ‘anaesthetized to the effects of it’; and it is the details 
of real violence, the size of the wounds, the amount of blood, that ar e significant. If
m o r e  people s a w  what real life w a s  like, then the mo r e people w o ul d  understand the 
consequences of violence and h o w  horrific it really is.
T h e  first speaker constructs himself as the type of consumer of media 
violence that abhors real violence. Indeed, he draws upon his experience of violence, 
whether fust hand, or through what he has seen on factual programmes, in order to 
s h o w  diat his responses to fictional violence are shaped b y  this. T o  him, fictional 
violence, and mediated images of real violence are too safe; n o  one will k n o w  the 
consequences of violence if it is so sanitized in its fictional form. However, for the 
second speaker, it is the very h u m o u r  and the veiy fictional nature of certain types 
of media violence that is important. It is h u m o u r  that mak e s t h e m  safe. W o r d s  such 
as ‘expose’ and ‘self-preservation’ help to emphasize diat for diis participant, media 
violence is not diere to remind the viewer of the reality of real violence, but to help 
preserve the viewer from the impact of real violence. N o  ‘normal’ person would  
wish to be exposed to real violence; it would be ‘intolerable’.
W h a t  w e  can see from this discussion of the safety of fictional violence is 
that participants construct their responses around perceptions of the safety of media 
violence and the honor of real violence. There is no  doubt in participants’ minds tiiat 
real violence is not entertaining; but there is s o m e  r o o m  for discussion about h o w  
realistic fictional violence should be. Th e  first two speakers utilize t w o  different 
types of discourses; both of which seive the purpose of highlighting h o w  sensitive 
and aware these participants are to the debate about the function of media violence in 
society. W h e n  the third speaker intemipts die discussion with die c o m m e n t  that films 
which treat violence in a humorous w a y  are perhaps ‘m o r e  dangerous’, he is picking 
u p o n  die hesitancy of the second speaker to define what it is he actually likes about 
the h u m o u r  of Pulp Fiction. A s  he stumbles for words, the thud speaker steps in to
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remind h im of the function of media violence -  it must be safe, but it must also be 
responsible. A n d  yet, the second participant has a point. W h a t  is w r o n g  wilb 
shocking entertainment? In the final section w e  shall see that w h e n  participants 
discuss the question of entertainment, they do indeed single out the fictional nature 
of media violence as a key factor in then* enjoyment of such movies. Thus, although 
participants wish to point out that they are the type of risk-takers w h o  k n o w  the 
difference between real violence and fictional violence and do not perceive real 
violence to be entertaining in any way, m a n y  participants then go on to point out that 
safety of media violence lies in its fictional status,
Types o f En terta in m en t
T h e  w a y  that participants discuss perceptions of entertainment and 
perceptions of safety serves to highlight the function of media violence which is to 
be shocking and entertaining. H o w  successful the target films are in relation to this 
criteria is one that each participant gauges according to personal and social 
perceptions of risk, safety and entertainment. Participants openly debated the validity 
of the term ‘entertainment’. Participants note different films are m o r e  entertaining 
than otbers and h o w  tbey choose to define the term ‘entertainment’ depends on 
taste, individual preferences, critical appreciation, stylistic representations of 
violence, and, above all, the fictional status of a movie.
A  n u m b e r  of examples will serve to illustrate h o w  participants debate the 
issue of entertainment:
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It depends on what y o u  m e a n  b y  entertaining. Reservoir Dogs I found 
entertaining because it w a s  completely different to anything I'd seen before 
and quite exciting for all that, but at the same time quite disturbing and 
horrific. So, there w a s  an entertainment side and another side which isn't 
what I'd call entertaining. Pulp Fiction I found thoroughly entertaining in 
eveiy way.
(Participant 3 - F G 5 )
I think y o u  w ou l d have to define what y o u  meant b y  entertainment. I think in 
the old fashioned sense Pulp Fiction w a s  the only film that I thought 
entertaining. I engaged with the other films on certain levels but I don't think 
I w o u l d  use the w o r d  entertaining. There is entertainment that is disturbing 
and entertainment that is funny. (Participant 1 - F G 4 )
There are different aspects of entertainment. I m e a n  for m e  Pulp Fiction w as 
fun, but Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r - you haven't had a huge giggle 
watching it, but it's m a d e  y o u  think a bit more. (Participant 4 - F G 6 )
These three participants consider what the term ‘entertainment’ signifies for them. 
There are different aspects of entertainment; s o m e  movies are fun to watch, others 
are disturbing but can still be termed entertaining, and s o m e  films aren't entertaining 
at all, but can be considered thought provoking. Individual experience is significant 
and helps to define what participants consider to be, or not to be an entertaining 
violent movie.
This recour se to individual experience links with the reactive mechanisms of 
thresholds and self-censorship, discussed in the previous chapter. O n e  participant 
defines which target films are entertaining b y  considering her role as a consumer. 
She says: ‘I think Reservoir Dogs, Pulp Fiction and True Romance are entertaining 
because y ou can choose what sort of level you b ec o m e  involved in. I have a choice’ 
(Participant 4 - FG5). Another participant examines tire issue of thresholds and her 
role as a consumer:
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I find Tarantino and Natural Born K illers entertaining. M y  fiiend and I really 
liked Natural Born K illers, w e  even adopted the n a m e s  of M ic k e y  and 
Mallory for a while. Watching these films is something I did in defiance of 
what people thought I should be doing. Previously I'd seen cinema as an 
extension of reality and I didn't want to b e c o m e  involved in that, but n o w  T m  
prepared to see it because it's fiction and I want to test boundaries. It's good 
to see intelligent and constructive films which also include elements that I 
wouldn't normally have thought I wanted to see. I like the idea of 
questioning entertainment. W h a t  does it m e a n ?  Is it something that makes 
y o u  think or feel in comparison with w h a f  s real and not real? D o e s  it m a k e  
yo u  feel able to cope with m o r e  situations than you thought you'd be able to 
see?
(Participant 2 - F G 5 )
Here, the reactive mechanisms of thresholds and self-censorship combine in a 
complex w a y  to inform the question of entertainment. A t  first, this participant chose 
not to see violent movies because she thought this w a s  an area she w o ul d  not find 
entertaining: violent movies are ‘an extension of reality’ and she did not want to 
b e c o m e  involved in such an area of reality. However, through a desire to push 
boundaries and test perceived thresholds of violence, this participant alters her 
opinion and considers movies such as Pulp Fiction, or Natural Born K illers, 
entertaining because they ar e fictional representations of violence, not an ‘extension 
of reality’. This participant transforms a fear of real violence into an enjoyment of 
fictional violence, and her enjoyment is defined b y  the veiy fact that she is surprised 
at her o w n  response - viewing violence can be an entertaining and safe experience.
Certain violent movies are clearly m o r e  entertaining than others and w h y  this 
is so is closely linked to a conscious awareness of real violence. A s  one participant 
explains:
I think Reservoir Dogs is very entertaining. I think Pulp Fiction, True 
Romance, Natural Born K illers and to an extent Man Bites Dog, except for 
the rape scene, ar e entertaining. Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r and Bad
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Lieutenant I just think are so relentless I can't possibly find t h e m  entertaining 
in any way. I think they are good films, and have a lot to say about the nature 
of violence and our response to it but I wouldn't say I enjoyed th e m  and I 
wouldn't encourage people to see t h e m  - I wouldn't say: ‘oh  yeah, if you 
want a nice, unchallenging Saturday night movie just go to the pictures and 
see these films’.
(Participant 1 - F G 5 )
Pulp Fiction is entertaining because it is fictional and distanced fiom real violence 
b y  its stylistic presentation. Its veiy stylishness separates the film fiom other violent 
movies such as Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r, Man Bites Dog and Bad 
Lieutenant because even though a film like Man Bites Dog is fictional it utilizes 
realistic devices, such as documentary style footage, which m a k e s  it appeal* real. T he 
closer a fictional film com es  to real images of violence, the m o r e  difficult it is to 
watch, and the less entertaining it appeal’s to participants.
Here are three participants criticizing the realism of Man Bites Dog:
I don't think Man Bites Dog is entertaining. It's done in black and white; it's 
sub-titled; it's French. It's just too realistic. It's depressing visually, and it's 
not Hollywood.
(Participant 5 - F G 3 )
H i e  w a y  Man Bites Dog is shot, the whole kind of documentary nature of it 
m a k e s  it hard to sit d o w n  and think ‘oh, I'm really enjoying this fikn’, 
someone's telling a stoiy, and it's visually entertaining. It's not like that; it's 
not like y o u ’re being told a story. I actually switched off for a while. I wasn't 
bored - the violence just didn't have an effect on m e  anymore; it w a s  violence 
for its o w n  sake and it w a s  trying to be mo r e  and m o r e  graphic each time, 
just to upset me. (Participant 1 - F G 3 )
In Man Bites Dog there were s o m e  funny scenes, but there were bits that did 
get too much. Like the rape scene. I can see they're hying to have a joke and 
I just couldn't find it funny. It w a s  too horrifying. It w a s  a bit too m u c h  like a 
documentary, y o u  couldn't really laugh at it. (Participant 1 - F G 4 )
These participants criticize the movie for its lack of narrative drive, its lack of 
Hollywood style, and its realistic depiction of violence. These are aesthetic and 
personal criticisms which dr a w  upon an awareness of real violence to define what is 
not entertaining about this violent movie. T h e  fact that participants continually refer 
to the w a y  Man Bites Dog or Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r appear* too similar* to 
viewing mediated images of violence is a clear* indicator participants do not desire to 
be reminded of the horror of real violence. A s  one participant explains:
W h e n  I watched Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r, it wasn't so m u c h  the 
scenes themselves that I considered extremely violent, as the w a y  in which 
they c a m e  across. I felt I had actually witnessed violence. M o s t  other films 
the violence is glossed over, or done with a sense of h u m o u r  to take the edge 
off it so that it doesn't leave yo u  too shell-shocked. T h e  thing is, if you 
actually see violence for what it is, it is horr ific.
(Participant 1 - F G 6 )
T h e  safe, protective environment of a fiction film is only present w h e n  the film itself 
takes steps to distance the viewer from an awareness of real violence. Thus, aesthetic 
constr ucts such as characterization, dialogue, and the fictional style of a movie allow 
r o o m  for participants to feel safe. Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r or Man Bites 
Dog are not ‘Saturday night movies’; they leave viewers with the sense that they 
have actually witnessed violence, whereas the point of certain types of media 
violence is that it allows viewers to respond to violence in a safe environment, to 
actually feel distanced from real violence in society.
O n e  participant discusses w h y  they perceive media violence to be a safe 
form of entertainment which is separ ate from then* experience of real violence in 
society:
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If you're living in the suburbs, violence does happen regularly in the pubs. 
W h e r e  I w a s  brought up there w a s  always violence on a Saturday night. So, 
if y ou want to avoid violence y o u  c o m e  to L o n d o n  and y ou go to the cinema. 
Real violence is horrible but we'll go to the cinema to see it because it's a safe 
way. I avoid real violence at any costs, but I'll go and see violent movies 
because the violence isn't real. (Participant 3 - F G 5 )
This participant escaped small to w n  violence by coming to the city, yet she chooses 
to watch films about violence because it is ‘safe’, it ‘isn't real’. Therefore, although 
this participant wishes to avoid real life violence, and left her o w n  suburban t o w n  in 
order to do so, she does not eschew all interest in violence. H e r  awareness of real 
acts of violence is tr ansformed into a desire as a consumer to watch movies which 
depict fictional representations of violence.
This conscious awar eness of real violence w h e n  viewing fictional violence is 
of specific interest w h e n  considering the question of entertainment. Evidence 
suggests that although participants differentiate between real violence and fictional 
violence, and do so in a n u m b e r  of varied ways, a conscious awareness of real 
violence w h e n  viewing fictional violence is present in each case. W h a t  is more, 
evidence indicates that it is precisely because participants in this study abhor real 
violence that they choose to see violent movies. A s  one participant explains:
W h e n  you're watching violent films they're just a safe w a y  of experiencing 
the things y ou might be really, really frightened about in real life. I don't 
want to be beaten up, I'm scared of real violence, but I'm not as scaled w h e n  
I watch a violent film because I feel I can safely get out all m y  fears - it's a 
legitimate w a y  for m e  to deal with violence.
(Participant 1 - F G 5 )
Perhaps one of the most distinctive issues to emerge fiom the focus group 
discussions is the w a y  in which participants consider ‘legitimate ways.. .to deal with
violence’. T h e  function of violent movies is to shock and entertain viewers. A n d  yet 
for participants in this study, it is not acceptable for a consumer of media violence to 
dwell solely o n these two factors. Consumers of media violence must associate 
themselves with a type of risk product and a type of risk-taker. There are clearly 
defined responses to media violence. Thus, for participants in this study, to associate 
themselves with the type of consumer of media violence w h o  enjoys such films as 
Pulp Fiction or Reservoir Dogs is to choose legitimate w ay s  of dealing with 
violence. It is legitimate because the types of risk-takers participants associate 
themselves with ar e intelligent and sensitive and safe; and the type of risk product 
these risk-takers engage with are also perceived by t he m  to be intelligent and 
sensitive and safe. It m a y  be that other, n o n  risk-takers do not perceive these risk 
products in a similar' way, but what is important is not the social construction of risk 
but individual risk-taking behaviour’. For these risk-takers, watching media violence 
is a safe activity. T he  reason it is perceived to be safe is due to a n um b e r  of 
presuppositions on behalf of consumers of media violence. Participants in this study 
pre-suppose tbat other viewers, including themselves follow certain codes of 
behaviour; these risk-takers gauge then response according to others; these risk- 
takers k n o w  the difference between reality and fantasy; these risk-takers can self- 
regulate risk. These are perceived to be legitimate w a ys  of dealing with violence.
T h e  functional pre-requisites for the safety of media violence are numerous 
and diverse. These pre-requisites will differ fiom risk-taker to risk product. But what 
is clear is that participants in this study wish to be in control of the virtual risks of 
media violence. T h e y  can be in contr ol of these risks because they are not real; this is 
one of the pre-requisites of watching media violence, to k n o w  that it isn’t real. 
W h e n  participants discuss their responses to real violence, or movies which appear*
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too realistic in their depictions of violence, w e  can see that then* reactions are quite 
different. Thus, it is significant that viewers of media violence discuss its function as 
a responsible and safe form of entertainment. Th e y  define what is safe about media 
violence because as consumers of media violence they know, m o r e  than anyone else, 
w h y  they choose to watch this form of entertainment.
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Summary and Conclusion
Throughout the course of this thesis I have s h o w n  that a relationship exists 
between social theories of risk and theories of the mass media. I have used the media 
violence debate as an example of the w a y  in which risk and environmentalism intersects 
with effects research and the control and regulation of media violence. W e  have seen 
that media violence is heated as if it is an environmental hazard. This m e an s  that anti­
violence campaign groups attempt to measure die effects of watching media violence, 
using scientific research methods as a m e a n s  of testing negative effects, and attempting 
to prove that a causal link exists between media violence and aggressive acts. This 
construction of media violence as an environmental hazard leads to an overwhelmingly 
negative perception of media violence as dangerous and hazardous to individuals and to 
Hie community as a whole.
I have s h o w n  that the process of watching film and television programmes 
w hich contain violence does not lend itself to precise scientific measurement: the 
viewing process is not an example of stimulus-response but, rather, is a complex and 
sophisticated experience that cannot be measured or tested in the s a m e  w a y  that the 
effects of carbon monoxide can be measured. N e w  audience research suggests that 
viewers of media violence are engaged in a delicate balancing act, whereby the 
perceived ‘risks’ of media violence are offset by  the benefits of watching shocking 
entertainment.
I have spent s o m e  time outlining the construction of media violence as an 
environmental hazard and the reality of the w a y s  in which people themselves m a n a g e 
‘risk’ and understand and respond to media violence. It is n o w  time to see what 
relationships exist between the production of risk and individual risk-taking behaviour. 
W h a t  I want to s h o w  in this final chapter is that despite the success of anti-violence 
campaign groups and their treatment of media violence as an environmental risk, there 
are other methods of understanding this type of entertainment T h e  problem with anti­
violence campaign groups and effects researchers is that they conceptualise media 
violence as an environmental hazar d, and this mea ns  that they use the w r o n g  conceptual 
and methodological tools to study this phenomena. It is time for researchers to change 
tbe terms of reference. This thesis presents an appropriate response to the issue of media 
violence. It offers a conceptual breakthrough on tbe w a y  in which tbe ‘risks’ of media 
violence can be seen to be used b y  viewers as developmental opportunities, and b y  this 
I a m  referring to the w ay s  in which viewers of media violence develop a range of 
personal responses to media violence that can be seen to be part of a learning process.
M e d ia  V io le n c e : a  S o c ia l D ra m a
W e  began this study with an examination of Ufiich B e c k ’s Risk Society (1992) 
and the utilization of the risk argument b y anti-violence campaign groups, politicians 
and the media. According to Beck, w e  n o w  live in a risk society, where industrial 
modernization products threaten the health of our- friends and loved ones. Risks which 
were once invisible have n o w  b e c o m e  visible, the side effects speak up. Multi-national
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corporations m a y  deny the existence of such side effects, and scientists m a y  say that 
there are ‘acceptable levels’ of toxicity, but citizens k n o w  that it is multi-national 
corporations w h o  are to blame. In die face of such denial non-governmental 
organizations, such as Greenpeace, fight to prove that a causal link exists between, for 
example, environmental pollution and certain types of industrial waste. If their 
campaign is successful, then diey will place pressure on die government to produce n e w  
legislation to control and reduce risks. This is an example of the risk argument in 
action; campaign groups c o m e  together and utilize a set of practices that can lead to 
political and social change.
However, there are m a n y  factors which m a k e  up a ‘risk society’. A s  Ortwin 
R e n n  (1992, p. 179) points out: ‘knowledge of physical consequences, the handling of 
risk information by individuals and social groups, the social and cultural meaning of 
risk causes and effects, as well as structural and organizational factors, shape the social 
experience of risk.’ This m e a ns  that risk is not only a real issue, but a symbolic one as 
well. Individual and social groups w h o  intend to influence collective decisions or 
policies which are concerned with risk issues mobilize resources so diat what are 
considered to be media friendly risk issues b e c o m e  vehicles for odier causes for 
concern. This is what R e n n  (1992, p.191) calls die ‘symbolic nature of risk’. C a mp a ig n  
groups use a particular risk as a symbol for other issues. R e n n  refers to anti-nuclear 
p o we r  groups as an example of the symbolization of risk; these social groups ‘view die 
debate over nuclear pow e r as a surrogate for larger policy questions about desired 
lifestyles, political structure, and institutional p o w e r ’ (1992, p.191). However, in this 
diesis, I have used anti-violence campaign groups as an example of the symbolic nature 
of risk. Here R e n n  and Palmlund’s theory of the ‘social d r a ma ’ of risk (1992, p. 199) 
c o m e  togetiier. Anti-violence campaign groups such as C A R E ,  or the M C D  view die
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debate over media violence as a surrogate for larger policy questions about desired 
lifestyles that are modeled o n  the teachings of the Bible (see Barratt, 1997; Thompson, 
1992). These citizens groups c o m e  together in order to generate risk consciousness and 
conflict, but they are not concerned with the ‘risks’ of media violence per se, but rather 
in what media violence symbolizes, i.e. secular entertainment that is not concerned with 
family values. This is w h y  such groups also campaign against media which contain sex 
and bad language. These types of entertainment symbolize all that groups such as 
C A R E ,  or the M C D  despise about m o d e m ,  secular society.
Thus, the social drama of risk is such that campaign groups choose to fight 
against nuclear power, or media violence because these ‘hot’ risk issues provide the 
‘social resources they need to fight their “real” battle’ (Renn, 1992, p.191). A n  
examination of this ‘real’ battle reveals that individuals and social groups w h o  
campaign against media violence are in fact arguing for Christian values, middle class 
values and elitist po we r  structures. T i m e  and again, anti-violence campaign groups, 
politicians and the media argue for the control and regulation of media violence based 
o n the assumption that media violence is morally wrung, can corrupt innocent minds, 
and encourage working class, adolescent boys, fiom single parent families, to c omm i t 
crime.1 It is only elitist power structures such as the B B F C ,  or government approved 
regulatory bodies that can contr ol and reduce existing levels of media violence.2
It is the production and dissemination of knowledge in relation to the media 
violence debate that is significant to this study. Anti-violence campaign groups, 
politicians and the media construct a negative and inaccur ate picture of media violence 
as harmful and dangerous. Kasperson, R e n n  et al. (1988) and the theory of the social 
amplification of risk can help us to understand this. C a m p a ig n  m e m b e r s  such as David 
Alton, tire Liberal Democrat peer, or newspapers such as the D aily M ail, amplify the
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negative effects of media violence, creating enduring mental perceptions of media 
violence as evil and depraved, over-emphasising the harmful ‘effects’ of media 
violence, and demanding changes in risk monitoring and regulation. T h e  social 
amplification of risk does not only refer to the manufacture of news, but is also 
concerned with ‘the cultural, social and individual structures and processes that shape 
the societal experience with risk’ (Kasperson, 1992, p. 161). hi relation to media 
violence, w e  can see that the structures and processes that shape societal experience 
with risk serve to amplify the threat of dnect risks to the individual and to the 
environment, i.e. ‘negative effects’ such as copycat violence or desensitization, and the 
threat of symbolic risks, i.e. h a r m  to social institutions, or values. W h a t  is considered 
‘harmful’ is socially and culturally determined, and the characteristics of the social 
amplification process ensures that media violence is seen to pose a large threat to 
society, despite the fact that other issues such as unemployment or poor housing have 
been s h o w n  to be m o r e  important in relation to levels of real violence in our society. 
These real issues are attenuated b y  politicians, the media and anti-violence campaign 
groups in favour' of the social amplification of media violence. It is far easier to amplify 
tbe negative effects of media violence and suggest short term, cost-effective solutions, 
such as the V-chip, than to address the problem of unemployment or poor living 
conditions neither of which could be solved b y  short term, cost-effective solutions.
W e  can see fiom the w a y  in which groups such as C A R E ,  or the M C D ,  and 
newspapers such as the D aily M ail campaign against media violence that risk conflicts 
are political events. Tire recent controversy over Crash (David Cronenberg, 1996) is a 
good example of this. A n d  yet, there is very little evidence to support tbe social 
amplification of media violence as a modernization risk. Detailed examination of 
‘effects’ research which claims to s h o w  a direct causal link between watching media
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violence and negative ‘effects’, such as copycat violence, shows that such research is 
neither reliable or valid (see Cmnberbatch and Howitt, 1989; Gauntlett, 1995; 
B u c k i n g h a m  and Allerton, 1996). This type of research which dominates the media 
violence debate is based on  the inaccurate assumption that the effects of watching 
media violence can be measured in die same w a y  the effects of carbon monoxide can be 
measured. It is precisely because ‘effects’ research has pre-conceived ends and fixed 
assumptions that it is an inappropriate scientific response to the p h e n o m e n a  being 
studied. Watching television is a complex and sophisticated process and therefore if 
researchers wish to understand this process, they must use complex and sophisticated 
conceptual and methodological tools.
In the last section of this study, I have concentrated o n  individual risk-taking 
behaviour* and n e w  audience research because it is here that progress can be m a d e  in 
our* understanding of media violence and w h y  it is that despite the overwhelmingly 
negative portrayals of media violence as hazar dous and dangerous, people still choose 
to watch films and television programmes which contain scenes of violence. John 
A d a m s ’ theory of the risk thermostat hypothesis (1995) has proved useful as a mean s  of 
understanding the delicate balancing act that takes place w h e n  people choose to engage 
in a risk-taking activity. According to A d a m s  (1995, p.15) people balance their 
propensity to take risks with their* perception of the rewar ds and dangers of certain types 
of risk-taking behaviour. Everyone has the setting of then* risk thermostat set at different 
temperatures: s o m e  like it hot, others like it cool, but, according to A da m s ,  no one 
wants to be ‘zero-risk m a n ’: everyone has a propensity to take risks of one form or 
another. M e d i a  violence is one example of such a risk, although, as A d a m s  is quick to 
point out, not every risk is to do with real danger. Portrayals of violence in the media
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are examples of ‘virtual risks’ (Adams, 1997) which are part of our imagination, not 
part of our experience of eveiyday life.
W e  can see fiom a detailed examination of n e w  audience research into children 
and adults’ responses to media violence that A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis is a 
conceptual model that has s o m e  grounding in empirical research. O f  particular' interest 
is the w a y  in which viewers provide examples of ‘risk compensation’ (Adams, p. 114), 
which is w h e n  an individual takes m o r e  risks because they feel safer. For example, 
m a n y  of the viewers in recent audience research say that they believe there is too m u c h  
violence on television and they support the regulation of media violence, but at the 
sa me  time these same viewers s h o w  that they themselves watch a n u m b e r  of films and 
television programmes which contain violence (see Hargrave, 1996; Buckingham, 
1996). These viewers are prepared to watch media violence precisely because they feel 
safe in die knowledge that a regulatory bo d y has s o m e  control over the transmission of 
media violence.
N e w  audience research also suggests tiiat viewers’ experience of real violence is 
significant to dieir perceptions of media violence. Viewers w h o  perceive dangers to 
watching media violence are less likely to engage in this type of risk-taking behaviour 
(see Schlesinger et al., 1992). This m e a ns  that people with experience of real violence 
are m o r e  likely to set their risk thermostats at a l ow level. W h a t  such research also 
reveals is the fact that people do not trust other viewers to respond in the s ame w a y  as 
themselves. Thus, w o m e n  with experience of violence do not trust male viewers, and 
fear media violence m a y  negatively effect male viewers, for example, making t h e m  
‘desensitized’ to violence towards w o m e n ,  or, in extreme cases, encouraging them to be 
violent towards w o m e n  (see Schlesinger et al., 1992). M y  o w n  research would suggest 
that the exact opposite is the case, as male viewers in this study could be seen to be
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sensitized to representations of female rape, and in no w a y  encouraged to be violent 
towards w o m e n .  However, such research findings have done little to counteract public 
distrust of other viewers of media violence. In Regulating fo r Changing Values distrust 
of other people in relation to media violence led to s o m e  viewers suggesting that media 
violence should b e c o m e  a pay per view activity, which would ensur e that this type of 
risk-taking behaviour* is controlled and regulated, but is still available for those people 
w h o  wish to watch media violence and can afford to pay for this option (see Kieran et 
al., 1997).
Such individual reactions to media violence suggest that tire construction of 
media violence as ‘risky’ and dangerous to certain types of vulnerable viewers has had 
s o m e  effect on the w a y  in which people perceive this type of entertainment. Viewers 
m a y  feel that they themselves can m a n a g e  the ‘risks’ of watching media violence, and 
indeed w h e n  viewers talk about individual viewing practices they can be seen to 
attenuate such ‘risks’, but, w h e n  it comes to ‘other’ people, viewers amplify the ‘risks’ 
of media violence and exhibit fear* and anxiety about vulnerable viewers. Here w e  can 
see h o w  tbe theory of the social amplification of risk intersects with individual viewing 
practices. Before I m o v e  on to discuss the implications of tbis relationship with the 
social construction of media violence and individual perceptions of risk, I would like to 
summarize the findings of the quabtative research conducted for this thesis.
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A u d ie n c e  R e s e a rc h  a n d  P o rtfo lio s  o f  R e sp o n se
Qualitative research is a useful m e a n s  to generate insights into the w a y  in which 
people think and act in social situations. It has been used in this study as a research tool 
w hich can best aid an understanding of viewing practices and the issue of media 
violence. However, the results of qualitative research are difficult to summarize, and it 
w o ul d  be foolish to attempt to offer a series of grand claims: this is not the aim of this 
research. Therefore, I w o ul d  like to outline a n um b e r  of patterns and emergent themes 
that suggest w a y s  of understanding media violence and point to suggestions for n e w  
research in this area. T h e  results of this research are as follows:
1 Violent movies test viewers, and consumers are aware o f this.
M e d i a  hype and peer pressure ensure consumers of violent movies are veiy 
m u c h  aware that violent movies test viewers. Testing signifies the w a y  in which ‘n e w  
brutalism’ movies challenge audiences with unflinching and realistic portrayals of 
violence: violence with consequences. It also signifies the w a y  in which ‘n e w  
brutalism’ movies contain intelligent dialogue and direction. It is precisely these factors 
which d raw moviegoers to see these films and to m a k e  up then o w n  minds about 
movies which are perceived as dangerous and unhealthy by  moral watchdogs in the 
media and government. Viewers can be seen to categorize types of media violence and 
associate themselves with specific ‘risky’ movies. This m e a n s that viewers also align 
themselves with specific types of risk-takers, in this instance viewers w h o  are 
intelligent, sensitive and mature.
2 Viewing violence is a social activity
Awareness of media hype and peer pressure surrounding these movies ensures 
that the activity of viewing violence is social. M o s t  viewers I spoke to watched these
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films either at the cinema or at home, and did not do so alone. Part of the enjoyment of 
viewing violence is to monitor audience reaction, as the films themselves provoke 
reaction. Individual response is part of a m u c h  wider awareness of the variety of 
responses available to consumers of violent movies.
3 The issue o f trust and distrust is significant to media violence 
Participants were very m u c h  aware that there are ‘acceptable’ responses to types
of media violence, and here, viewers can be seen to monitor then o w n  physical and 
emotional responses in relation to others. Hiis is an example of die w a y  in which 
consumers of media violence situate then o w n  private responses in relation to the public 
arena of risk and media violence . In this study, participants are social actors, and they 
shift between social perceptions of the ‘risks’ of media violence and personally 
understanding media violence. This m e a ns  that participants tr ust then o w n  response to 
media violence but are distrustful of ‘otiier’ types of consumers of media violence.
4 Anticipation is a key factor in determining response to violence
It is through anticipation that consumers of violent movies are able to choose
which m ethod of response they wish to use in order to interpret a violent film or scene. 
A s  there ar e a variety of complex and sophisticated responses to violence, the choice is 
lar ge, and those viewers I spoke to deliberately anticipated scenes of violence in order 
to be prepared for individual reactions to violence. This cognitive response of 
anticipation and preparation is essential to the enjoyment of viewing violent movies.
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5 Thresholds re-affirm social taboos and individual experience
Thresholds are part of the w a y  violent movies test the viewer. Movies use 
thresholds to provoke reactions, and it is part of the process of viewing violence that 
participants identify thresholds to violence. S o m e  thresholds are social; they re-affinn 
social taboos (such as female rape) and signify collective fears. Others are personal and 
re-affirm individual experience, often based in childhood memories or personal 
experience of violence. Identifying social or personal thresholds does not necessarily 
lead to self-censorship. Moviegoers can anticipate and prepare for specific types of 
fictional violence but choose to not self-censor. Social and personal thresholds to 
violence ar e an example of the w a y  in which perceptions of risk and real experience of 
the ‘risks’ of media violence shape the viewing process.
6 Viewers use a variety o f methods to self-censor violence
There is no  one me thod of self-censoring violence, and viewers draw upon 
individual preferences, perceived notions of consumers of violent movies, and audience 
reactions to shape then* o w n  meth od  of self-censoring. Those viewers I spoke to 
activated any number* of methods of self-censorship at a given time, looking a w a y  fiom 
the screen, peeking through then* fingers, thinking of the ironing, running out of the 
r o o m  and switching off a video. T h e  w a y  in which viewers prepare to self-censor is tbe 
s a m e  whether they choose to watch a violent representation or not. Methods of self­
censorship are a m e an s  to m a n a g e  the perceived ‘risks’ of media violence and remain 
in control of the viewing experience.
7 Boundary testing is part o f the process o f viewing violence
Testing boundaries is a key factor in w h y  people choose to watch violent 
movies. Through thresholds and self-censorship, and the roles anticipation and
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preparation have to play in that process, viewers test their o w n  boundaries whilst 
viewing violence because it is a safe w a y  of interpreting violence in a fictional setting. 
Boundary testing is not comparable with ‘desensitization’. It arises from reactive 
mechanisms associated with specific viewing experiences. Boundary testing is an 
example of the w a y  in which viewers adjust the setting of their risk thermostat. A s  the 
thermostat reaches a certain level, the viewer tests past and future settings; they dare 
themselves to watch a violent scene they k n o w  they will find disturbing because it is 
exciting and rewarding: testing boundaries is one of the perceived benefits to watching 
media violence.
8 Real violence is raw and brutal and not entertaining
Active consumers of violent movies do not find real violence in any w a y  
entertaining, and they differentiate between real violence and fictional violence. In 
m a n y  ways, it is because they abhor real violence that those viewers I spoke to chose to 
watch fictional violence. O n c e  again, it is a safe w a y  of understanding response to 
violence, without having to experience violence in real life.
9 Fictional violence is entertaining
O n e  of the reasons people choose to see violent movies is because they are 
entertaining. This does not m e a n  consumers of violent movies find all violence 
entertaining, but the process of watching a film which is composed of acting, 
soundtrack, direction, dialogue, as well as representations of violence, is meant to be 
entertaining because violent movies are part of the entertainment industry and m a d e  
widely available to the consumer: violent movies aren't free, consumers have to pay for 
their entertainment as they w o u l d  with other comparable leisure activities. Those
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viewers I spoke to thought all die target films could be classed as entertaining, but there 
are different aspects of entertainment, and s o m e  movies are thought m o r e  entertaining 
than others depending o n  individual preferences, and the stylistic presentation of 
violence.
10 Violent movies are seen as safe
It is precisely because violent movies are fictional that viewers can feel safe to 
experience a range of complex and sophisticated responses to violence. T h e y  would not 
be able to do this in any comparable w a y  in real life. Hence, they go to the movies. 
Violence is something all viewers I spoke to feared and abhorred, but this did not m e a n  
they eschewed all aspects of violence: it is real violence which is to be avoided, not 
fictional violence. For these participants, watching media violence is a safe activity. The  
reason it is perceived to be safe is due to a n u mb e r of presuppositions o n  behalf of 
consumers of media violence. Participants in this study pre-suppose that other viewers, 
including themselves, follow certain codes of behaviour-; these viewers gauge their 
response according to others; these viewers k n o w  the difference between reality and 
fantasy; these viewers can self-regulate the ‘risks’ of media violence. These are 
perceived to be legitimate w a y s  of dealing with violence. Consequently, violent movies 
act as a safe w a y  of exploring the issue of violence and provide a forum for 
complexities of response.
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The Theory o f Po rtfo lio s o f Response
A  significant factor to emerge fiom the qualitative research is that participants 
possess what I have termed ‘portfolios of response’ w h e n  viewing violence. The 
expression ‘portfolios of response’ signifies the w a y  participants understand and 
interpret violent movies. It is a theory which best describes tbe accumulation of 
responses that ar e part of tbe viewing process.
Portfolios signify a b od y  of work, a record of experiences. T be theory 
‘portfolios of response’ best sums up the processes of viewing violence because 
moviegoers possess experiences which are multiform. T h ey  possess dynamic and fluid 
methods of response. S o m e  of these methods of response are shared b y  m a n y  others. 
For example, anticipation is a m ethod of response m a n y  participants utilize in order to 
prepare for watching or not watching violence. Other methods of response are shar ed by 
few. For example, personal thresholds are unique to each individual, and are utilized in 
order to re-affirm personal experiences within the context of viewing violence.
However, all of these methods of response are part of a portfolio of experiences 
tbat are identifiable as belonging to a particular type of entertainment activity. In this 
instance, watching films such as Reservoir Dogs, or Pulp Fiction involves an awareness 
of a series of ‘acceptable’ physical and emotional responses. Participants draw upon 
their portfolio of experiences in order to associate themselves with a particular type of 
viewer. These films are categorized b y  consumers of media violence as intelligent and 
sophisticated films which invite intelligent and sophisticated responses. It follows that 
viewers of such films will wish to respond in the appropriate manner. A s  w e  have seen 
fiom the results of tbe focus group interviews, such responses include anticipation of 
acts of violence in order to prepare for the ‘right’ response; self-censorship of 
representations of violence that are perceived to be distur bing b y the individual; and, an 
understanding that fictional violence can be entertaining and real violence and mediated
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images of real violence are abhorrent and not entertaining. This m e a ns  that ‘acceptable’ 
responses to films such as Pulp Fiction (Quentin Tarantino, 1994) m a y  be categorized 
as an anticipation that acts of violence in this film will be treated in a humourous way; 
an awareness that this film is deliberately testing certain thresholds, for example male 
rape, but in such a playful w a y  that it is not necessary to self-censor, although s o m e 
people m a y  feel die need to do so; and, an understanding that this film is self­
consciously stylized and unrealistic in its representations of violence. However, if w e  
take another film, Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K iller (John McNaughton, 1990), it is 
possible to see that participants respond to this film in quite different ways. This film is 
categorized b y  participants as being realistic and disturbing in its tr eatment of violence. 
Therefore, what is considered to be ‘acceptable’ responses to this film can be 
categorized as an anticipation that the violence in this film will be heated in a realistic 
way; an awareness that this film will deliberately test thresholds, for example female 
rape, and that it will do so in such a disturbing w a y  that m a n y  viewers will find it 
necessary to self-censor; and, an understanding that this film undertakes to examine and 
critique violence in a serious manner.
Thus, it can be seen that w h e n  a consumer of media violence comes to the 
viewing experience they bring with th e m an understanding of what are ‘acceptable’ 
responses to different types of media violence. T o  laugh at the rape scene in Pulp 
Fiction is an acceptable form of response, but to laugh in a similar* fashion to the rape 
scene in Henry, Portrait o f a Serial K ille r is not acceptable for the reasons outlined 
above. Consumers of media violence are very m u c h  awar e that everyone has then* o w n  
w a y  of interpreting and responding to media violence, but nevertheless there ar e certain 
pre-conditions and presuppositions about what are socially acceptable forms of 
response both before, during and after the viewing event. A s  the practice of watching
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media violence is a social activity, viewers place s o m e  importance on these pre­
conditions, and monitor then o w n  responses in relation to h o w  other people also 
respond to representations of violence.
Viewers posses portfolios of response so that they can m a n a g e  then risk-taking 
behaviour' in relation to others, and in relation to different types of media violence. 
However, it follows that if there ar e a variety of responses to media violence, and that 
viewers of media violence possess experiences which ar e multiform, then there will be 
types of consumers of media violence that exhibit what are perceived to be 
‘unacceptable’ responses. Participants in this study were quick to cite examples of 
‘unacceptable’ forms of response to types of media violence. These include laughing at 
inappropriate moments, and being unaware of the serious content of a film. A  few 
participants also expressed a concern that there m a y  be s o m e  types of viewers w h o  
could imitate acts of violence which they s a w  on film. This reflects a c o m m o n  concern 
b y  viewers and can be seen to be evident in other audience research discussed in this 
study. However, it is important to point out that I found no  evidence in the focus group 
discussions to support the concept that watching media violence can lead to an increase 
in violent behaviour. Participants m a y  express concern about such a viewer, but this 
concern reveals m o r e  about dominant discourses and media violence than about 
participants’ o w n  viewing practices.
These particular- types of ‘problem’ viewers of media violence ar e located at the 
far- end of the scale of what are perceived to be ‘unacceptable’ forms of response by 
participants in this study. T h e y  do not possess an awareness of cinema going as a social 
activity; they do not d ra w  up o n portfolios of response but instead draw upon a limited 
and distorted understanding of media violence and real violence. These types of viewers 
of media violence are also types of people that are perceived to be psychotic and
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socially inadequate; it is not that participants believe these people to be drawn to media 
violence, but rather that these types of people exist in every local community. These 
people transgress social rules and threaten the stability and safety of tbe community. It 
does not matter what type of activity these people are involved in, whether it be robbing 
banks or selling life insurance, such people will exhibit asocial behaviour*. This is an 
important point. T h e  theory of portfolios of response does not exclude the possibility of 
a ‘problem person’ w h o  never* self-censors and w h o  does not k n o w  the difference 
between reality and fantasy. However, this ‘problem person’ is not m a d e  this w a y  by 
watching media violence, but rather is a person w h o  brings with t h e m  the experience of 
psychosis, or* child abuse, or schizophrenia, w h o  brings with t h e m  a history of 
aggression, and unhappiness and mental illness that m a k e  then unable to balance then* 
behaviour* in relation to others.
T h e  s a m e  logic can be applied to theories of risk-takers. There are m a n y  
similarities between John A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis and the theory of 
portfolios of response. Before I go on to outline the ways in which the risk thermostat 
hypothesis can help us to understand the positive aspects of watching media violence it 
is as well to point out n o w  that, if, according to Ad a ms ,  everyone has a propensity to 
take risks, and everyone sets then* risk thermostat according to their perception of tbe 
dangers and rewards of types of risk-taking behaviour*, then this hypothesis must also 
include the concept of a ‘problem’ risk-taker. This type of risk-taker is someone w h o  
cannot balance their behaviour in relation to others, w h o  has n o understanding of 
socially acceptable responses to risk-taking activities, and w h o  does not care for safety 
precautions. S o m e o n e  w h o  is a member* of a gun club and enjoys shooting for sport is 
not the same as a m ass murderer w h o  kills innocent children, and yet both are risk- 
takers. Th e  difference is that the second example is a person w h o  brings with t he m  a
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distorted and unbalanced experience of h u m a n  life. These people exist in every 
community, and there are wa ys  of reducing the risks of such people committing real 
violence, but these safety measures should not be confused with safety measures for all 
other types of risk-taking activities.
A s  I have shown, media violence is a good example of the w a y  in which a risk- 
taking activity has b e c o m e  confused with real violence in our* society. There is a place 
for the regulation of media violence, and yet this regulation should not be confused with 
steps to reduce levels of real violence: this is an entirely separate issue. W h a t  the 
resear ch findings of the focus groups interviews reveal is that viewers of media violence 
are already engaged in a complex balancing act, whereby responses to media violence 
ar e balanced with perceptions of real violence. Participants are aware that they live in a 
violent world. A n d  they also suggest that they find it difficult to understand and 
comprehend this violent world. O n e  of the w a y s  in which to comprehend real violence 
is to choose to watch certain types of fictional violence. Participants suggest that in 
certain instances they wish to use media violence not to desensitize themselves to real 
violence but to achieve further understanding of the acceptability and unacceptability of 
violence in society. Here, the ‘risks’ of media violence are transformed into 
developmental opportunities. O n e  of the reasons participants choose to watch media 
violence is to achieve a balanced view, not just towar ds media violence, but towar ds the 
reality of violence in our society.
Figure 3 is an adaptation of A d a m s ’ risk thermostat hypothesis in relation to 
media violence and the theory of portfolios of response.
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Figure 3: Portfolios of response
W h a t  w e  can see fiom this model is that viewers of media violence balance their 
behaviour. Factors which influence individual behaviour and m a k e  up the portfolio of 
response include:
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• Perceptions of media violence as positive and negative
• Personal experience of violence, to oneself and to others
• Identification of social and personal thresholds to fictional and mediated 
representations of violence
• T h e  use of different methods of self-censorship as a m e an s  of managing and 
controlling responses to media violence
• Testing boundaries is a reactive mec ha n is m  to media violence and symbolizes the 
risks and rewards of this type of entertainment
• Trust and distrust are significant to the w a y  in which viewers respond to media 
violence; viewers trust their o w n  responses to media violence because they are in 
contr ol of this experience; viewers distrust other people, but place confidence in the 
portfolios of response which people bring to the viewing experience.
This model of the theory of portfolios of response is based u p o n  a simplified 
version of the empirical research conducted in this thesis. It is both a conceptual model, 
and an operational one. However, in this form the model of the theory of portfolios of 
response is specific to a type of consumer of media violence, a consumer that associates 
themselves with films such as Pulp Fiction, a consumer that wishes to categorize 
themselves as intelligent and sensitive viewers of these types of media violence texts. It 
is therefore a model that must be adapted to suit different types of consumers of media 
violence and different types of activities. M a n y  of the factors that I have related to the 
viewing experience will be shared by  other viewers of media violence, but there will 
most certainly be other factors, not included here, which need to be addressed. This is 
not a weakness in the theory of portfolios of response, but rather an acknowledgement 
that in every ‘portfolio’ there are m a n y  different w ay s  to respond to media violence. A  
consumer of Hollywood action movies, or a horror fan, will not respond in exactly the
s a m e w a y  as a consumer of crime movies. It is as well to bear this in m i n d  w h e n  
researchers attempt to understand viewing practices in relation to media violence. A s  
the research findings in this study indicate, viewers themselves are quick to categorize 
different types of films and different types of viewers within the framework of media 
violence; this subtlety of distinction between the range and variety of what can be 
classified as ‘violent’ is something researchers themselves woul d  be wise to pay 
attention to.
P a rtic ip a tio n  a n d  C o m m u n ica tio n
T h e  research findings of the qualitative research conducted for this thesis 
provide an example of the w a y  in which people themselves ar e far* m o r e  intelligent and 
media literate about the function of media violence than politicians or self-appointed 
moral watchdogs. If m o r e  attention can be paid to public response to tbe issue of media 
violence then it w o u ld  be possible to m o v e  a w a y  fiom the type of one-sided debate that 
currently dominates this emotive issue.
A t  present, the general public can be seen to be confused and distrustful of the 
competing claims about the role of scientific research in the media violence debate. 
T i m e  and again newspapers report that ‘experts’ have discovered a causal link between 
watching media violence and negative ‘effects’, such as aggressive behaviour*.3 This 
type of research is unreliable and invalid because it is based on the flawed assumption 
that the effects of watching television can be scientifically measured, and because it 
ignores powerful extraneous variables such as employment, age, or* existing mental
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health. Other types of research which a im to s h o w  that responses to media violence are 
complex and diverse and cannot simply be labeled as positive or negative are routinely 
ignored b y  politicians, campaign groups and the media. However, even without a 
balanced perspective of research into media violence, the general public are far m o re  
likely to possess a m o r e  rational and non-judgemental perspective of media violence 
than politicians, the media and anti-violence campaign groups. Recent research suggests 
that although the public are anxious about the alleged negative ‘effects’ of media 
violence, and believe that there is a great deal of violence on  television which should 
not be available to children, they still do not suggest that all media violence should be 
banned (see Kieran et al., 1997). Indeed, the general public can be seen to present far- 
m o r e  practical measures to dealing with the issue of media violence, for example pay 
per view, than politicians and policy makers.
S uch a suggestion is not m a d e  in ignorance of the cur-rent situation with regar d 
to media violence. I have spent a large proportion of this thesis considering the 
overwhelmingly negative and inaccurate portrayal of media violence b y  anti-violence 
campaign groups. T h e  problem with this construction of media violence as an 
environmental hazard is that it plays u p on  public confusion of this issue -  do ‘video 
nasties’ kill? -  and amplifies the potential ‘risks’ of media violence, so that people are 
encouraged to think that if ‘experts’ cannot agree o n the ‘risks’ of media violence, it is 
better to be safe than soriy. Anti-violence campaign groups moralize the issue of media 
violence. ‘Moralization is a mec h an i sm  that allows spectators to form attitudes or 
opinions about an issue even if the beliefs about the factual outcomes indicate 
uncertainty and ambiguity’ (Renn, 1992, p. 192). B y  moralizing the issue of media 
violence, campaign groups polarize positions on media violence policies. O n e  side of 
the argument proposes that all media violence is unjustified as long as it is capable of
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killing a single individual, and the other side argues that media violence is an inevitable 
reflection of societal/cultural anxieties. This moralization and polarization of the issue 
of media violence offers n o compromise. A n d  as the m or e  popular opinion is that it is 
better to be safe than sorry, politicians, the media and campaign groups seize upon this 
position and propose policies which will set out to reduce levels of media violence in 
the com mu n it y  as a whole.
However, it is as well to bear in m i n d  that unlike environmental hazards such as 
global warming, the general public do have immediate experience of watching media 
violence. T b e social amplification of media violence and the politicization of this issue 
have ensured that there is little open dialogue with tbe public and policy makers. 
Regulatory bodies such as the B B F C ,  the I T C  and the B S C  have undertaken regular* 
surveys, and public opinion polls over the last decade, and have also conducted regional 
discussion gr oups into public concern about the issue of media violence ( B B F C ,  1996). 
Whilst this is certainly to be applauded, opinion polls and surveys are an example of 
one w a y  communication programmes, whereby ‘experts’ learn about the ‘lay 
perspective’. E v e n  w h e n  such ‘experts’ engage in public discussion groups, this is still 
not an example of reciprocal risk communication, because the general public have little 
trust in such organisations (see Marris et al., 1997). Trust is an important factor in 
successful risk communication. European and American studies have s h o w n  that public 
distrust in authorities can affect perceptions of risk and lead to deadlock over suggested 
risk conflict resolutions (Kasperson et al., 1992; Slovic et al., 1991). It is important to 
advocate m o r e  reciprocal communication programmes, whereby ‘experts’ consider 
w a y s  of increasing trust levels through encouraging m o re  open dialogue. Given the one 
sided nature of the media violence debate at present, a proposal to encour age m o r e  open 
and objective lines of communication wo ul d  s e e m  a better alternative than leaving tbe
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media violence debate in the polarized state that it is in at the moment. Although such a 
strategy w o ul d  not avoid anti-violence campaign gr oups, politicians and the media fiom 
using media violence controversies for political gain, it should help to reduce the 
problems associated with the social amplification of the risks of media violence b y  
increasing public understanding of this issue, and encourage the public to take m o re  
control in decision making processes.4
Thus, I w o u l d argue that although risk communication studies (see Otway, 
1992; Winterfelt, 1992; McDaniels, 1997) suggest that it is no easy task to include 
public discussion within decision making processes, research into h o w  and w h y  
children and adults respond to media violence would suggest that it is film and 
television audiences w h o  have a gr eater understanding of this issue than self-appointed 
moral guardians, politicians or policy makers. Researchers in audience communication 
studies can leam fiom the experience of risk communication studies which have s h o w n  
that risk communication is not about simple surveys, or advertising, or providing 
credible information which die public will passively accept as ‘true’, but, rather, risk 
communication is about entering into a social relationship with the public, w h o  can 
expect to play a m o r e  significant role in conflict resolution and in the sharing of power 
and responsibility of risk issues (see Otway, 1992). O n e  w a y  to begin to promote 
reciprocal communication between the public and policy makers is to undertake mo r e 
sophisticated audience research, research which focuses on the contextual and 
individual factors which m a k e  up the viewing experience (see Buckingham, 1996; 
Gauntlett, 1997; Barker and Brooks, 1997). hi the final section of this chapter I would 
like to argue for a m o r e  integrative approach to understanding and dealing with the 
issue of media violence, both in terms of empirical research and in terms of social 
theories of risk and the mass media.
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Tliroughout the course of this thesis I have argued that a relationship exists 
between the construction of the media violence debate and the ‘masterfiame of 
environmental discourse’ (Eder, 1996). I have deliberately focused o n the areas of risk 
analysis and media violence because it is m y  intention to s h o w  that the media violence 
debate can be better understood in relation to environmentalism and the political, social 
and cultural construction of media violence as an environmental hazard. However, this 
does not m e a n  that I w o u ld  wish to exclude other approaches to the issue of media 
violence, or indeed other methods of research into the area of m a ss  communication 
studies. Different theoretical and empirical approaches to the mass media certainly have 
an important role to play in future studies of die mass media. For example, feminist 
analysis provides the researcher widi tools to investigate p o w e r relations widiin texts, 
and to challenge representations of w o m e n .  Postmodernism provides the researcher 
with the tools to investigate intertextuality and to foreground shifting identities. 
However, the function of feminist or postmodernist approaches to the mass media is to 
present a specific reading, and this is both a virtue and a shortcoming. W e  m a y  leam 
about patriarchal p o we r  relations or the use of irony, but o n their own, such 
mediodologies abstract the researcher from other cultural and contextual factors which 
are also significant to an understanding of the mass media.
This is w h y  a m o r e  integrative approach to the study of the mass media has 
proved fruitful to dris investigation of die issue of media violence. Figure 4 is a 
conceptual model of this integrative approach.
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F i g u r e  4: risk a n d  m e d i a  violence: a n  integrative a p p r o a c h
▼ ▼
Audience Media
Research content
analysis
1
Riskn-. _ . ,ua . athermostat
of risk
Communications
research
Here w e  can see that the issue of media violence can be understood fiom three 
different perspectives. T h e  first represents a micro-level of analysis, and is concerned 
with individual behaviour and social interaction. Audience research and media content 
analyses are two examples of this, and in tbis study I have argued for a m o r e  critical 
ethnographic approach to audience research, and a close attention to the w a y  in which 
the media construct controversies. T h e  second perspective represents a meso-level of 
analysis, and is concerned with the ‘segmentation of society into different.. .systems 
that interact with each other but still preserve their autonomy’ (Renn, 1992, p. 181). T he 
risk thermostat hypothesis and the social amplification of risk are t w o  methods of 
analysis which help to understand anti-violence campaign groups, and types of 
consumers of media violence, and in this study I have argued that both methods of 
approach ar e extremely useful in revealing the dynamic and social experience of risk in 
relation to media violence. T b e  thud perspective represents a macro-level of analysis 
and is concerned with societal behaviour- as a whole. Social theories of risk, 
communications resear ch and social theories of the mass media ar e all examples of this 
w a y  of understanding large-scale social systems, and in this study I have argued that the 
political, social and cultural construction of media violence as an environmental hazard 
has far reaching implications about the production and dissemination of knowledge and 
the role of popular* cultur e in everyday lives.
This integrative approach to the issue of media violence allows for cross­
fertilization and provides a framework for comparative analysis. T h e research 
conducted in this study has s h o w n  that social theories of risk and the mass media 
combined with communications research have proved a fruitful m e an s  to investigate 
this area. A n  integrative approach to the issue of media violence can help to identify the 
contextual and individual factors which m a k e  up the experience of watching media
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violence; it can help to explain social, political and public concern over this ‘risky’ 
subject; and, it can provide a framework with which to design n e w  w a y s  of evaluating 
and dealing with media violence, an issue that will be the subject of hot debate for s o m e  
time to come.
N o te s
1 See the Newson report (Newson, 1994) and the P A P F C P G  report (PAPFCPG, 1997), both of which 
are examples of the way in which anti-violence campaign groups use media violence as a symbol for 
other issues. See also Barker and Petley (1997) for recent criticism of the way in which such groups 
target ‘undesirable’ aspects of society, i.e. adolescent boys from single parent families.
2 Lord David Alton, the Liberal Democrat peer and Julian Brazier, a Toiy MP, are campaigning for 
the B B F C  to be made more accountable, and for members of the board of the B B F C  to be approved 
by the government (see Sylvester, 1997).
3 There have been many examples of this type of media campaign. Probably the most famous is the 
reportage of the Newson Report hi 1994, where experts were considered to have made a ‘U-turn’ 
about the effects of media violence (see Newson, 1994; Buckingham, 1996; Barker, 1997a). However, 
a recent example can be seen in The Sunday Times, see Hellen and Rufford (1997, p.l) and a new 
report by Dr Kevin Browne and Amanda Pennell, titled ‘The Effect of Video Violence on Young 
Offenders’ which claims to have proved a connection between young offenders and a taste for media 
violence.
4 I a m  grateful to Ragnar Lofstedt for his helpful comments about risk and public discussion, and 
many of the points in this section are adapted from an article titled ‘Risk Communication’, published 
in Energy Policy, Vol.24, No.8, pp.689-696, 1996.
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I I N T R O D U C T I O N
There are name cards around the table and I'd like to ask you to introduce yourself and tell us the most 
recent film you saw on the list in front of you.
n  O P E N I N G  Q U E S T I O N
1 H o w  do you choose to see these movies?
A) H o w  do they compare to other films like the Die Hard series, or Terminator 2? 
m  TRANSITION Q U E S T I O N
2 Going to the cinema is a social activity; do you notice how other people respond to violent 
scenes in a film?
3 What physical emotions do you feel when you see a violent scene in a film?
A) Can you anticipate the violence in a film?
IV K E Y  QUE S TI O NS  
Characterization
CUE: Hemy, Portrait of a Serial Killer -eye-stabbing scene
4 Do  you identify with any one character in this scene?
5 Is it necessaiy to know something about the characters before you are able to identify with one 
of them?
Thresholds and Self-censorship
6 What do you think to the visual effects of violence in these films?
CUE: Reservoir Dogs - ear-amputation scene
7 What is your personal response to this scene?
A) Would you, or anyone you know not watch this scene?
B) What would be the reason?
8 Would you not watch a scene in a film you found disturbing?
A) What would be the reason?
E N T E R T A I N M E N T
9 H o w  does these movies compare to watching real violence on the news, or in real life?
10 Are these films entertaining?
CUE: List of target films.
V  S U M M A R Y  A N D  C O N C L U S I O N
12 Summary of key questions.
13 Invite comments.
Appendix 1: Guiding Questions for Focus Groups
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Appendix 2: List o f Target Films Used in Focus Groups
LIST O F  T A R G E T  FILMS 
Reservoir Dogs 
Pulp Fiction 
True Romance 
Natural B o m  Killers 
M a n  Bites Dog
Henry, Portrait of a Serial Killer 
Bad Lieutenant 
Killing Zoe
A ppendix 3 : R eg istratio n  Fo rm  - Fo cu s G roups
N A M E ___________________________
A G E ______________________
M A L E / F E M A L E _____________
E T H N I C  ORIGIN_________________
E D U C A T I O N A L  QUALIFICATIONS
P L E A S E  TICK W H I C H  FILMS Y O U  H A V E  S EE N
Reservoir Dogs 
Pulp Fiction 
True Romance 
Natural Born Killers 
M a n  Bites Dog
Hemy, Portrait of a Serial Killer 
Bad Lieutenant 
Killing Zoe
P L E A S E  INDICATE W H I C H  FILMS Y O U  H A V E  S E E N  A T  T H E  CINEMA, O N  VIDEO, O R  BOTH. 
U S E  C  F O R  C I N E M A  O R  V  F O R  VIDEO, A N D  W R I T E  T H E  C O R R E S P O N D I N G  L E T T E R  N E X T  
T O  E A C H  FILM
W H I C H  C I N E M A S  D O  Y O U  R E G U L A R L Y  G O  TO?_____________
W H A T  P A P E R S / MA G AZ I NE S  D O  Y O U  R E G U L A R L Y  R E A D ?
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